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American Bureau of Shipping (ABS). A classification society. 
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Allision. An unintended, usually violent collision with a fixed object such as a 
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Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage 
by Sea (PAL). The IMO‟s PAL Convention “establishes a regime of liability for 
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They structurally support the hull sides of the vessel and, if watertight, can 
subdivide the vessel‟s hull into watertight compartments. 
 
Bulker. A ship designed to carry cargoes such as minerals, grain or 
woodchips in bulk utilising large watertight compartments. 
 
Bureau Veritas. A classification society. 
 
Carley float. A lifesaving device resembling a small, double-sided boat. 
Designed to support a number of survivors. 
 
Captain. The person in command or control of a vessel and responsible for its 
safe navigation. 
 
Casino ship/boat/vessel. Any vessel either berthed or underway, the primary 
purpose of which is to facilitate gambling. 
 
Catamaran. A vessel having two separate hulls joined by a rigid bridge-deck. 
The two separate hulls normally comprise several watertight compartments. 
Those factors make catamarans more stable and less likely to sink than single 
hulled craft. They, and trimarans, have the best safety record of all ferries. 
Having two fine hulls normally means that catamarans incur less water 
resistance than conventional vessels and, thus, require less power. 
 
Classification society. A mutual organisation charged with ensuring the safety 
and seaworthiness of vessels. 
 
Collision. An unintended, usually violent, connection with another vessel. 
 
Compartments, watertight. Are compartments in a vessel‟s hull separated 
from the adjoining compartment by a water-tight bulkhead. They enhance the 
buoyancy of the vessel especially in the event of an accident. 
 
Consequence. The outcome of an accident. 
 
Contact. Striking any fixed or floating object other than those involving a 
collision, allusion or grounding. 
 
Container ship. A ship designed and constructed to carry standard steel 
shipping containers of either 6x2.5x2.5 m or 12x2.5x2.5 m external 
dimensions.  
 
COSPAS- SARSAT. The joint American/Russian satellite radio distress 
monitoring system that forms the basis for the use of EPIRBs. 
 




Crew Supply Boat (Vessel).  A fast offshore service vessel used to carry 
personnel and light supplies to and from offshore oil and gas installations and 
vessels. 
 
Critical wash. Vessel wake that causes damage to other vessels or 
shorelines. 
 
Cronyism. Organisation of business among a group of friends or aquaintances 
who have undue influence over a government. 
 
Crony capitalism. An economic system based on cronyism (see above). 
 
Cruise ship/liner/vessel. A live-aboard passenger vessel that voyages on 
irregular routes. 
 
Developed country. Any country with a gross domestic product per capita 
measure that places it in the top quartile of nations. A euphemism for “rich” 
country. 
 
Developing country. Any other nation. A euphemism for “poor” country. 
 
DNV- GL. A Norwegian/German classification society. 
 
Domestic shipping. Any shipping activity undertaken within the maritime 
boundaries of the home country of the vessel concerned. 
 
Explosion. An accident or incident where an explosion is the initiating event.  
 
Fast ferry. Any ferry having a service or operating speed of 25 knots or more. 
 
Fast catamaran ferry. A twin-hulled ferry with a service speed exceeding 25 
knots. 
 
Fast hydrofoil ferry. A fast ferry, usually single-hulled, that uses the speed of 
the vessel acting on hydrofoils to lift its hull clear of the water‟s surface. 
 
Fast jetfoil ferry. Similar to a hydrofoil but with waterjet propulsion operating 
through the hydrofoils.  
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knots. 
 
Fatalism. A belief that whatever happens in one‟s life is pre-ordained so that it 
is pointless to try to change or improve it. 
 
Fatigue. Tiredness arising from lack of sleep or overwork or a combination of 
the two. 
 





Fire. Accidents where fire is the initiating event. 
 
Flags of convenience. Are flown by vessels registered in a particular flag state 
for reasons of reduced taxation, lower crewing costs or less stringent safety or 
seaworthiness standards. 
 
Flag state. The country where a vessel is officially registered. Its home 
country. 
 
Float. A buoyant device normally used in the sense of life saving. 
 
Flotsam. Rubbish floating on the sea. 
 
Frequency. Number of times an action occurs. 
 
Gangway. A plank or ramp used to provide access to a vessel in harbour. 
 
Grandfathered. An allowance in regulation or rule-making for pre-existing 
conditions prior to the rule or regulation being implemented. 
 
Grounding. When a vessel strikes the bottom of a waterway or an underwater 
object such as a rock or coral. 
 
Hazard. Any kind of object such as a reef or rock or man made structure that 
presents a danger to a vessel. Can also be a weather hazard such as a 
storm. 
 
High speed ferry. Any ferry having a service or operating speed exceeding 25 
knots. 
 
Hull. The main, outer shell of a vessel below its sheerline. 
 
Human error. Can be defined as wrongful decisions, mistakes, blunders, 
carelessness, miscalculations or negligence made by or on the part of human 
beings. 
 
Human factors. Any action, usually malign or dangerous, that can be 
attributed to human action or negligence. 
 
Hydrofoil. Any fast craft with a main hull that lifts clear of the water by means 
of its forward speed creating lift using hydrofoils. 
 
Hypothermia. A dangerous human condition caused by excessively low body 
temperature. 
 
Incat Tasmania/Australia. An Australian builder of large, fast, aluminium Ro-
Pax ships. One of the pioneers in the development of such vessels.  
 




INTERFERRY. International association of ferry owners, operators and their 
suppliers. {Disclosure: The author is a member of INTERFERRY}. 
 
International shipping. Shipping activity that involves voyages between two or 
more sovereign states. 
 
Jetfoil. See Fast Jetfoil Ferry, above. 
 
Jetty. A man-made structure extending from the shore into the sea to facilitate 
access to vessels. 
 
Life boat. A small boat used to provide a means of escape from and survival 
in the event of a larger vessel sinking. 
 
Life float. A simple buoyant raft-like device with the same purpose as a life 
boat. 
 
Life jacket. A personal, wearable floatation device. 
 
Life preserver. Similar to a life jacket. 
 
Life raft. A compact floatation device, usually inflatable, that provides refuge 
for survivors in the event of a ship or boat sinking. 
 
Lloyd‟s Register. Classification society. 
 
Long-tail boat. Small, about 12 metres LOA, engine powered, fast, narrow 
boats used as ferries and tourist boats in Thailand 
 
Look out. “A person or party employed or stationed to look out; or 
reconnoitring boat or vessel”. 2. “The action or an act of looking out”. Source: 
The New Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, 1993. 
 
Master. The person in command or control of a vessel who is aboard the 
vessel and directing its navigation and operations. 
 
Mayday. A distress signal broadcast by radio or telephone indicating that the 
sender is in serious and immediate danger. 
 
Motor bangca or banca. An engine powered bangca. Common in the 
Philippines. 
 
Nautical Institute (The). The Nautical Institute, a British based international 
organisation of master mariners which promotes safety at sea and greater 
professionalism among its members. {Disclosure: The author is a member of 
The Nautical Institute.} 
 





Negligence. Negligence is the failure to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances. It has been defined in the New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary, 1993, as: “Lack of attention to what ought to be done; failure to 
take proper or necessary care of a thing or person; lack of necessary or 
reasonable care in doing something; carelessness”. 
 
Officers. The trained, experienced and educated executives charged with the 
safe and economical operation of  a vessel. 
 
Open registry. A legal device designed to attract shipowners to register their 
ships on a normally more expensive or rigorous national ship registry. 
 
Outboard motor. An easily removable marine engine that is attached on a 
smaller vessel, usually at the stern. 
 
Over load/Overloaded/ Overloading. “Load with too great a burden or cargo, 
put an excessive load on”. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993. 
 
Pan Pan Pan. A distress message transmitted by radio when a situation is 
threatening but not yet catastrophic. Assistance is required but not necessarily 
immediately. 
 
Passenger. A person who has paid to undertake a voyage on a ship or boat. 
 
Passenger vessel. A vessel having the primary purpose of carrying 
passengers. 
 
Pilot. A highly qualified mariner with considerable local knowledge who 
advises vessel masters on their transits through navigationally complex areas, 
usually in to or out of ports. 
 
Pool noodle. A cheap, simple, pipe shaped device made from foam plastic 
that is used to provide buoyancy to recreational swimmers in pools and at 
beaches. 
 
Poor country. Any sovereign nation having a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita of less than USD 3,000 per annum at 2015 prices. 
 
Port side. To the left side of a vessel, looking forward. 
 
Port State Control. The regulation and control of ships by the government of 
the country in which they are currently located. 
 
Port State Inspections. The enforcement of the above. 
 
Quay. A man-made structure designed to preserve a shoreline and to provide 




Ratings. Junior ship‟s personnel whose activities are directed by the vessel‟s 
officers. 
 
Rich country. A nation with a Gross Domestic Product per capita exceeding 
USD 40,000 as at 2017. 
 
Risk. The possibility of an accident or disaster occurring. 
 
Roadworthiness. The ability of a road vehicle, truck, bus or car, to safely 
reach its destination. 
 
Ro-Pax ferry. A ferry designed, constructed and equipped to carry passengers 
and road vehicles. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries have proved to be 
especially vulnerable to accidents caused by human error.  
 
Ro-Pax/Train ferry. A ferry designed, constructed and equipped to carry 
passengers, road vehicles and railway trains. They have similar vulnerabilities 
to conventional Ro-Pax ferries. 
 
Ro-Ro vessel. A cargo vessel designed, constructed and equipped to carry 
road vehicles, usually trucks. 
 
Satcom. Satellite communications. Such as by INMARSAT, Irridium and 
Thuraya. 
 
Seafarers. Seagoing personnel generally. 
 
Seamanship. “…the art or practice of managing a ship or boat at sea; the skill 
of a good seaman”. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993. 
 
Seaman. A skilled seafarer. 
 
Seaworthiness. A ship is seaworthy if it is fit to put to sea and able to survive 
the prevailing or expected sea conditions when fully loaded. It should be fully 
and competently manned, properly navigated and carrying appropriate stores 
and fuel for the intended voyage. 
 
Sheer line. The curve of a vessel‟s deck between the top of the bow and the 
top of the stern. Can also be described as the curvature of the deck in a 
longitudinal direction. 
 
Ship. A vessel, usually fully enclosed or decked, used primarily for commerce 
or war. 
 
Ship management. The management of vessels with the objectives of 
profitability, safety, environmental soundness and longevity. 
 
Situational awareness. The self-knowledge of precisely where a person or, 
particularly the vessel he is operating, is located related to other vessels, the 




SKYbrary. Library and database of aviation safety data and statistics. A joint 
venture of ICAO and EUROCONTROL. 
 
Snag. A log, branch or other piece of wood floating or submerged in water. 
 
Special Drawing Rights. (SDR). SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable 
currencies. Their value is based on a basket of five major currencies. That 
value is calculated daily and posted on the IMF website. On 26 May 2017  
SDR 1 = USD 1.38. 
 
Starboard side. On or to the right hand side of a vessel, looking forward. 
 
Stockholm Rules. Stockholm Agreement into European Ferry Stability 
Regulation. 
 
Super critical wash. A vessel‟s wake or wash that can cause significant 
danger or damage to other vessels or the shoreline if the vessel is operated 
negligently. 
 
Superstructure. The part of a vessel that is constructed above its sheer line. 
 
Tanker. A ship designed, constructed and fitted-out for the carrying of liquid 
cargoes. 
 
Tourist boat. A usually small ferry used to carry tourists to view or experience 
local marine attractions. 
 
Trimaran. A triple hulled vessel. 
 
Tug. A powerful, usually small, vessel used for towing or pushing other 
vessels. 
 
Unseaworthy. A vessel that is unfit to go to sea because of deficiencies in 
design, construction, maintenance, equipment or crew competencies. 
 
Vessel. A ship or boat capable of navigation while carrying a cargo or 
passengers or both. 
 
Voyage planning. Utilising a navigational plan to ensure the safety and 
predictability of a voyage. 
 
Wake. The area of disturbed water behind a vessel caused by the vessel‟s 
progress through the water. 
 
Wash. Similar to wake above. 
 
Waterjet. A pump-like device used to propel a vessel by forcing water astern 




Watertight compartments. Sections of a vessel‟s hull separated by watertight 
bulkheads. 
 
Wharf. Similar to a jetty in being a man-made structure providing access to 
vessels. Usually constructed parallel to the shore. 
 
Work Boat World. International maritime trade magazine specialising in non-
cargo commercial and government vessels. {Disclosure: WBW is owned by 






Adamson, Lee, Head, Public Information Services, IMO 
 
Andrew, Warwick, Judge, Chairman of the PNG Government‟s Commission of 
Inquiry into the sinking of the Rabaul Queen.  
 
Arroya, Gloria Macapagal, The Hon. Vice President of the Republic of the 
Philippines 1996-2000. President from 2000-2006. 
 
Augustin, Carlos, Commodore Retd. Republic of the Philippines Navy. 
Founding Commandant of the Philippines Coast Guard. 
 
Ballantyne, Stuart, Dr(Hon). Principal of Sea transport Solutions Pty Ltd, naval 
architects, Queensland, Australia. Strong advocate of sensible, affordable sea 
safety. 
 
Bateman, Sam, AM, PhD, Commodore RAN Retd. Professor (Emeritus), 
Founder of Australian National Centre for Oceanic Security and Research, 
University of Wollongong. 
 
Boisson, Philippe, PhD, Author and legal counsel to Bureau Veritas. 
 
Clifford, Robert, Dr (Hon), AO, Founder and Chairman, Incat Pty Ltd, ship 
builders, Tasmania. 
 
Corrigan, Michael, Chief Executive Officer of INTERFERRY from January 
2017. Previously CEO of BC Ferries, Canada. 
 
De la Cruz, Gualterio, Commodore Retd.  Republic of the Philippines Navy. 
Former Chief of Staff of the Philippines Coast Guard. 
 
Go family, Owners of Cebu based Sulpicio Lines, now Philippine Span Asia, 
the world‟s worst, in terms of passenger fatalities, ship owning company. 
 
Grainger, Michael, Chairman Interferry 2015-2018, Chairman TT Line 
(Tasmania) 2012 -, Founding Managing Director Liferaft Systems Australia. 
 
Grech, Michelle, PhD, Australian academic specialising in human error 
especially as it relates to shipping operations and fatigue. 
 
Grey, Michael, MBE. Master mariner, journalist, former editor of Lloyd‟s List, 
columnist. Strong exponent of maritime safety and common sense. 
 
Islam, A.K.M. Fakhrul, Chief Engineer and Ship Surveyor, Department of 





La Jiminez, Dante. Filipino. Maritime educator. Commodore Philippine Coast 
Guard Reserve. Crime and corruption fighter. Founder of Volunteers Against 
Crime and Corruption. Founder/Owner of numerous maritime schools. 
 
Lim, Ki Tack, The Hon, Secretary-General of the International Maritime 
Organization, 2016-. 
 
Mahapatra, Ashok, Director of the Maritime Safety Division of IMO, 2015 - 
 
Mitropoulos, Efthimios, The Hon. Secretary-General of the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO), 2003-2010. 
 
Morris, Peter, The Hon, OAM. Former Minister of Transport in the Australian 
Government. Instigator of the “Ships of Shame” parliamentary inquiry and 
convenor of the “ICONS” inquiry into ship safety. 
 
O‟Neil, William, The Hon. Secretary-General of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO), 1990-2002. 
 
Pastrana, Christopher (Chet), Founder, Chairman and Chief Executive of 
Archipelago Ferry Corp, owners of FastCat ferries, Manila Philippines. 
 
Penny, David, Manager Ship Safety – East and North, Australian Maritime 
Safety Authority, seconded to raise safety standards of domestic shipping in 
Indonesia. 
 
Pike, Dag, Master mariner, journalist, author. Campaigner for better 
seamanship and safety. 
 
Plimsoll, Samuel, MP. British Member of Parliament mid-nineteenth century. 
Ceaseless campaigner for shipping safety. Promoter of the “Plimsoll (load) 
Line”. 
 
Rahman, Nurur, (Captain), Executive Manager– Maritime Operations, Papua 
New Guinea National Maritime Safety Authority. Important researcher and 
contributor to the Rabaul Queen Inquiry. Bangladeshi national. 
 
Richardson, Toby, Managing Director of Richardson Devine Marine Pty Ltd, 
ship builders, Tasmania. 
 
Roos, Johan, Director of Regulatory Affairs for INTERFERRY, 
Represents INTERFERRY at IMO. 
 
Roueche, Len, Chief Executive Officer of INTERFERRY 2002-2016. Strong 
advocate of greater ferry safety. 
 





Sharp, Peter, Owner and CEO of PNG based Rabaul Shipping. Ultimately 
responsible for the Kris and Rabaul Queen ferry disasters. 
 
Sheen, Justice Sir Barry, Chaired the very revealing formal inquiry into the 
Herald of Free Enterprise capsize for the Marine Investigation Branch, UK, 
1987. 
 
Stehr, Hagen AO, Chairman Stehr Group. Noted Australian fisherman, fish 
farming pioneer, columnist and Founder/Chairman of Australian Maritime and 
Fisheries Academy. Strong advocate of improved maritime training and 
education to improve safety. 
 
Stokke, Torleif, Managing Director Servogear AS, Norway. 
 
Walker, James, American lawyer. Publisher of www.cruiselawnews.com, a 
blog. Specialist in litigation against cruise lines. General maritime lawyer. 
 
Weisbrod, Roberta, PhD. Founder and Convenor of the Worldwide Ferry 
Safety Association. 
 
Yoo Byung-eun, Owner of the South Korean ferry Sewol which sank in 2014 
killing 304 passengers and crew. He was found negligent and was to have 





FATAL FERRY ACCIDENTS, THEIR CAUSES, AND HOW TO 
PREVENT THEM 
 
Neil Baird, PhD Candidate 
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security 
Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts 
University of Wollongong 
 
Supervisors: 
Professor Stuart Kaye and Dr Anthony Morrison, ANCORS 





Almost 2,000 deaths are known to occur annually as a result of passenger vessel 
accidents. Practically all of them (91%) involve ferries. Because of reporting 
deficiencies it is estimated that the actual total toll could well be at least 50 per cent 
higher. While even that number is relatively insignificant compared with the numbers 
of deaths caused by cigarette smoking, road accidents, Hepatitis, Malaria, 
Tuberculosis, illegal drug use, American guns and similar preventable causes of 
death, it still involves considerable personal tragedy and substantial economic cost. 
The accidents occur more frequently and their impacts are significantly more severe 
than, for example, aviation and railway accidents. 
 
Importantly, some 76% of those known accidents and 95% of their resulting deaths 
occur in the poor, tropical regions of the world. Indeed, 80% of them have occurred 
in just ten developing countries. Some 93% of them occur on usually unavoidable 
domestic voyages. Their victims are thus the least able to prevent or avoid them. 
Moreover, by the author‟s estimate, about 88% of the accidents and 98% of the 
deaths are directly attributable to human error. This is mainly in the form of 
unseaworthy vessels, poor lookout, overloading, general negligence and poor 
seamanship. These factors are exacerbated by evacuation, lifesaving equipment and 
search and rescue deficiencies. Put simply, the causes are overwhelmingly 
behavioural and cultural rather than structural or mechanical. 
 
This multi-disciplinary study is based on an analysis of a database of passenger 
vessel accidents that the author has compiled since 1985 and which, in total, covers 
all known passenger vessel accidents that have occurred in the world since 1800. In 
attempting to make objective and valid assessments of the causes of the accidents, 
the period covered has been reduced to the final 50 of those 215 years. The study 
has then been further focused on ferries and tourist boats. Some 681 fatal ferry 
accidents, resulting in nearly 60,000 deaths, have occurred over that half century 




Thanks to the introduction of the Internet a much greater availability and accuracy of 
data has enabled an even more intense focus to be made on the most recent sixteen 
years since 1 January 2000. This means, particularly, that the vessels concerned are 
comparatively modern and are more likely to be operating under current national and 
international rules and regulations. It also means that many more accidents that 
occur in remote parts of the world are being reported. 
 
The analysis is wide-ranging and comprehensive even if somewhat subjective in 
attributing accident causes. In any case, no more objective method has been found 
or can be envisaged. The statistics derived from the database show conclusively that 
as the great majority of deaths are the result of human error, they should be 
preventable.  
 
Those figures are compared with those arising globally from commercial aircraft 
accidents, oil tanker shipping accidents and from road accidents occurring in 
developed countries. Those modes of transport have far superior accident reduction 
records than does the ferry sector, particularly over the past three decades. Their 
accidents, too, have been incomparably better recorded than have ferry accidents. 
They provide valuable ideas as to how the latter sector could improve significantly. 
 
The careful historical statistical analysis involved has exposed some previously 
unforseen facts. For example, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries, especially older 
vessels, are disproportionately dangerous. Their sale to developing countries should 
be banned. Conversely, however, fast catamaran ferries are disproportionately safe. 
Their adoption and use should, therefore, be encouraged. 
 
Taking a holistic approach, the study has involved elements of history, politics, 
economics, psychology, sociology, law, naval architecture, ergonomics and 
geography. The summary and conclusion describes and recommends a number of 
improvements to ferry design, construction, outfitting, and, most particularly, 
regulation, enforcement and operation.  
 
It strongly urges major reforms to the International Maritime Organisation, using the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation as a model. The objectives of those reforms 
are to assist and encourage developing nations in reducing their incidence of 
domestic ferry accidents.  If widely implemented, those reforms and improvements, 
most of which should not be prohibitively costly, should lead to significant reductions 
in the number of passenger vessel accidents and the death toll arising from them. 
 






The creation of this thesis has involved a very lengthy voyage. It commenced in 
1975 when, enjoying our honeymoon in the Aegean Sea, I noticed the dangerous 
physical state and the sometimes poor handling of many of the ferries my wife and I 
sailed on. I was so concerned that we remained on deck throughout our Greek 
„Odyssey‟ with some buoyant material close by. I certainly did not trust the lifeboats.   
 
By the mid-eighties our maritime publishing company was becoming well-established 
and had gone „global‟. In 1986 we published a series of articles by Dag Pike, a well 
known and respected master mariner, adviser to the British Royal National Lifeboat 
Institution, and maritime journalist. They exposed the design, equipment and 
operational deficiencies that were then rampant on many North Sea and English 
Channel ferries. We did not name any of the ferry owning companies individually. 
 
However, our articles upset one company in particular. Despite having already lost a 
ferry and six people a few years previously, mainly due to the deficiencies 
highlighted in our articles, its lawyers threatened to sue us for  defamation unless we 
retracted our very general allegations and apologised. Shortly thereafter, another of 
their ferries capsized killing nearly 200 passengers and crew. While, probably 
unsurprisingly, we never heard from that company again, the experience certainly 
piqued my interest in ferry safety. Albeit perversely, I thank them for that. 
 
I have been particularly fortunate in my choice of career because it has enabled me 
to travel frequently and extensively to maintain contact with the global maritime 
industry. Among many other vessels from canoes to nuclear aircraft carriers, I have 
travelled on vast numbers of ferries of all types, shapes and sizes in many parts of 
the world. I have come to know numerous ferry designers, builders, equipment 
suppliers and regulators. Almost invariably they have politely and very informatively 
answered my many queries about ferries and their operations. There are too many of 
them to thank individually but they know who they are. 
 
Regrettably, I cannot say the same for a minority of the ferry owners I have queried. 
While most have been politely forthcoming, some have been, to put it generously, 
guilty of obfuscation. That, of course, further piqued my interest in their operations. 
 
That interest was maintained throughout my subsequent maritime publishing career 
and, when I „semi-retired‟ in 2013 I realised that the material I had compiled would 
make a good basis for a book on the subject. A friend, who had recently completed 
an „advanced age‟ doctorate, suggested that I follow the same course to ensure its 
disciplined completion. 
 
Accordingly, in early 2015, I contacted another friend, Professor Sam Bateman, a 
former Commodore in the Royal Australian Navy and, subsequently, the founding 
director of the Australian National Centre for Oceanic Research and Security 
(ANCORS) at the University of Wollongong (UOW). He put me in touch with his 
successor, Professor/Captain Stuart Kaye, who agreed to supervise my doctoral 
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efforts. Stuart turned out to be both very knowledgeable and enthusiastic about the 
subject.  
 
At ANCORS and the wider UOW I have been fortunate to meet other interested 
people whose input I value. Professor Alistair McIlgorm and Associate Professor 
Marijke Batterham advised me on statistical analysis and Dr Heather Jamieson and 
her colleagues provided invaluable „how to‟ advice in their pre-doctoral tutorials. Ms 
Myree Mitchell, the „Queen Bee‟ of ANCORS, always knew where everyone and 
everything were to be found. The UOW librarians were helpful despite the obscurity 
of my thesis subject. 
 
Dr Roberta Wiesbrod, New York based Executive Director of the Worldwide Ferry 
Safety Association, and one of the very rare people who shares my obsession with 
the unfortunately too obscure subject of ferry fatalities, has very generously shared 
information and ideas with me for many years. 
 
I have also been very fortunate in my choice of sons. All three have been interested 
in and contributed ideas to this project. Andy, in particular, has given me 
considerable advice about the information technology it has involved. Given how little 
I knew at the outset, that has been invaluable. Cam has filled in gaps in my 
knowledge of naval architecture and Alex has helpfully published many articles that 
have arisen from this work. 
 
Rose, my partner in both life and business has, as always, supported me strongly 
throughout this undertaking and, very importantly, kept us solvent. She has 
contributed many valuable ideas, a steady hand and endless common sense. She 
has also endured considerable neglect from a husband who has probably been 
boringly over focused on this work. I trust that some of the conferences we have 
attended and the more interesting ferry trips we have undertaken have, at least 
partially, compensated for that. 
 
My late parents imbued me with a great love of and fascination with the sea,  ships, 
boats and literature. Without that, this work would never have commenced. 
 
This research has been conducted with the support of the Australian Government 
Research Training Program Scholarship. 
 
Neil William Baird 
 









The best-built, equipped and „safest‟ ship is doomed if its 
commander and officers fail to exercise good seamanship 




In 1901 Captain J.C. Voss sailed a primitive eleven metre dugout canoe most 
of the way around the world from Vancouver in Canada.1 Eleven years later 
the world‟s acclaimed safest, fastest and most luxurious ship, the „unsinkable‟ 
Titanic, collided with an iceberg off Newfoundland and sank with massive loss 
of life.2 
 
Image 1.1. The sinking of the „unsinkable‟ Titanic significantly raised the 
wealthy world‟s awareness of maritime safety and led to some important 
improvements (Willy Stower painting ex Wikipedia). 
 
These two events highlight the dichotomy with respect to maritime safety that 
has seemingly always existed. That is between behavioural and cultural 
approaches and structural, mechanical and regulatory ones. Put simply, good 
                                                     
1  Voss, J. C. The Venturesome Voyages of Captain Voss (Century Hutchinson, first 
published 1913, Third ed, 1989) 
2 Gardiner, R. The Great Titanic Conspiracy (Ian Allan Publishing, 2010) 
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seamanship and common sense can ensure the safe navigation of almost 
anything that can float. Conversely, the best-built, equipped and „safest‟ ship 
is doomed if its commander and officers fail to exercise good seamanship and 
common sense. 
 
Fortunately, good or, at least, adequate seamanship and seaworthiness are 
the norm. Of the 2.2 billion ferry passenger voyages estimated by industry 
body INTERFERRY to be made annually (probably more like 5 billion), only 
about 36 voyages are known to have resulted in disaster. 3 The record for the 
cruise and tourist vessel sectors is even better. Indeed, cruise ships, cargo 
liners and casino ships have been involved in only eight per cent of the fatal 
accidents and were responsible for only 1.2 per cent of the fatalities described 
in the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database.4 Arguably, a 
significant proportion of those fatalities could be attributed to suicides. It is 
nearly impossible, in most cases, to determine whether a „person overboard‟ 
is an accident or a suicide. It should be noted, though, that sea travel is the 
third safest mode of public transport after aviation and rail. It is far safer than 
travel by road. 
 
1.2.1. The problem in proportion. 
 
About 2,000 „known‟, and possibly as many as 3,000,5 deaths have occurred 
annually from 2000 to 2015 as a result of passenger vessel accidents.6 That 
figure comprises the deaths known to have occurred from January 2000 to 
December 2015 when, thanks largely to the widespread adoption of the 
Internet, the average number of known fatalities recorded in the BMPVA 
database nearly doubled from the average of the previous 34 years.7  
 
The author estimates, by very careful and conservative extrapolation, that the 
actual figures for both accidents and fatalities must be at least 50 per cent 
higher than the „known‟ figures. As described in chapters 2 and 5, and in item 
1.3.1, accidents were significantly under-reported in many of the countries 
discussed. It is believed that is still the case in some such as DR Congo, 
Myanmar, Brazil, Peru and the Philippines.8 It must be emphasised that 
reports from remote places in developing countries, while much more prolific 
than in pre-Internet days, are still believed to be far from comprehensive.  
 
                                                     
3 The international association of ferry owners, operators and suppliers. Even that figure is 
probably little more than a guess. The real number is probably considerably higher, most 
likely at least double. In an internal memo, the Chairman of the Interferry Domestic Ferry 
Safety Committee noted in December 2017 that the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration 
presented a ferry ridership figure of 1.8 billion in China alone. Unfortunately, little accurate 
global data is available. www.interferry.com. 
4 Appendix, A. Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database, 1966-2015, Baird 
Publications, Melbourne, 2015. 
5 Author estimate. See comments on Gabon, Congo and Nigeria on next page and on the 
Philippines in 1.3.1. and 1.3.2 
6 Appendix A, Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Described in 1.3.1. 
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For example, no reports of ferry fatalities have been found for Gabon and 
Congo. They adjoin DR Congo and have very similar geographic, cultural and 
economic conditions and ferry activities but smaller populations. It seems very 
unlikely that no fatalities have been occurred there. Similarly, a recent paper 
analysing boat and ferry fatalities on inland waterways in Nigeria, without 
providing details, lists numerous fatal accidents that have not been recorded 
elsewhere. That list comprises accidents that occurred between 2004 and 
2009.9 The BMPVA database lists three fatal accidents resulting in 323 
fatalities over that period. That compares with 308 fatal accidents with an 
unknown but obviously much larger number of victims listed in the Nze paper. 
 
There is no evidence to indicate that a sudden and dramatic increase in the 
number of accidents has occurred since 1 January 2000. The most likely 
reason is a dramatic, Internet facilitated, reporting improvement. 
 
While even 3,000 fatalities is relatively insignificant compared with the 
numbers of deaths caused by cigarette smoking, road accidents, Hepatitis, 
Malaria, Tuberculosis, illegal drug use, American guns and similar preventable 
causes of death, it still involves considerable personal tragedy and substantial 
financial cost. The accidents occur more frequently by every measure than do, 
for example, aviation and internally caused railway accidents described in 
Chapter 4. 
 
Unfortunately, though, the accidents that do occur mostly do so in the poorest, 
most ferry dependent parts of the world. In fact, in the half century to the end 
of 2015, eighty per cent of fatalities arising from passenger vessel accidents 
occurred in just ten poor or comparatively poor developing countries.10 
Indeed, 90 per cent of ferry fatalities occurred in just 20 countries from 1966 to 
2015 and from 2000 to 2015 that percentage rose to 91 per cent of all global 
fatalities.11 Those fatalities almost invariably (93%) occur on domestic 
voyages.12 Fifteen of those countries were included in both periods.13 The 
dangers to passengers there are both very real and very preventable. They, 
and their potential solutions, are explored in detail here and especially in 
Chapters 5 and 10. 
 
It should be noted that fewer than ten per cent of fatal passenger vessel 
accidents involved cruise ships, casino vessels or cargo liners. They resulted 
in 688 or 1.2 per cent of fatalities over the half century described and 
analysed.14 Almost all cruise ships, casino ships and cargo liners have been 
engaged in international voyages when involved in accidents. They tend to 
carry wealthier passengers. That ensures that cruise ship accidents are 
accorded much more publicity than ferry accidents. Since 1988 there has only 
                                                     
9 Nze, I.C. Analysis of the Fatality Rates of Boat and Ferry Accident(sic) on Inland Waterways 
in Nigeria, IOSR-JBM, Lagos, 2013. 
10 Appendix A, Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. Bangladesh, the Philippines, Indonesia, DR Congo, India, China, Tanzania, Haiti, 
Egypt, Greece, Senegal, Peru, Brazil, Myanmar, and USA. 
14 Appendix A, Ibid.  
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been one cruise ship accident resulting in the deaths of more than nine 
people, the 2012 grounding and capsize of the Costa Concordia which led to 
32 deaths.15 The great majority of cruise ship fatalities have been individual 
person overboard incidents.16 There is very little the cruise lines can 
realistically do to prevent those. 
 
 
Image 1.2. Coffins of some of the 4,386 victims of the Dona Paz collision, fire 
and sinking off Mindoro Island in the Philippines in December 1987. It was the 
world‟s worst passenger vessel disaster in peacetime (Wikipedia). 
 
It should be noted here, however, that this work most emphatically does not 
look at the problem of maritime fatalities affecting refugees or illegal 
immigrants. There is no realistic solution to the dangers posed by the vessels 
they voyage on except by totally preventing their operation. Tragically, going 
to sea on „people smuggling‟ boats operated by criminal gangs is akin to 
playing Russian roulette. If refugee and illegal immigrant fatalities were to be 
included in this study, the death toll would be considerably higher.  
 
This thesis, which has drawn extensively on its author‟s study of more than 
two centuries of maritime accidents, has focused most intensely on and more 
closely examined and analysed all known fatal passenger vessel accidents 
that have occurred globally in the fifty years from 1966 to 2015.17 This 
obviously subjective but very careful analysis of the causes of those accidents 
led to the author‟s assessment that 88 per cent of the fatal accidents and 98 
per cent of the resulting fatalities were the result of some kind of human error. 
Human error can be defined as wrongful decisions, mistakes, blunders, 
carelessness, miscalculations or negligence. This is higher, but not 
significantly so, than the estimate of 88 per cent of fatalities derived by a 
                                                     
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid. 
17 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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similar but less extensive study published in 2014.18 That study, by the 
Worldwide Ferry Safety Association covered only ferries and not all passenger 
vessels and was for a shorter period.. 
 
The data in the BMPVA database has largely been compiled from 
contemporary newspaper, trade magazine and, more recently, Web news 
reports. They have been cross-referenced and verified wherever possible 
from other sources including IMO and national government reports, books, 
directories, academic papers and other databases. The latter include the IMO 
Global Integrated Shipping Information Service (GISIS) database19 and that of 
the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association.20 The Lloyd‟s Casualty Reports,21 
IHS Fairplay22 and International Union of Marine Insurers (IUMI)23 casualty 
databases have also been consulted although they tend to focus on larger 
vessels and are somewhat “North Atlantic centric” in focus. 
 
This project, therefore, has become a very wide-ranging one that has involved 
a comprehensive study across a number of disciplines including: psychology, 
sociology, economics, law, ergonomics, education, naval architecture, political 

























                                                     
18 Golden, A. 'Ferry Fatalities: Statistics and Causation of Major Accidents 2000-2012' (Paper 
presented at the Worldwide Ferry Safety 2015 Conference, New York City, 2014) 
19 Accessible through the IMO website, www.imo.org. 
20 Refer to www.ferrysafety.org. 
21 See www.maritimeintelligence.informa.com. 
22 Obtainable through www.maritime.ihs.com. 
23 From www.iumi.com/statistics/. 
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Figure 1.1 Author assessed causes of fatal passenger vessel accidents 1966-
2015. By accidents on the left and by fatalities on the right. (BMPVA 
database). 
 
The most common cause of fatal maritime accidents is vessels that are 
unseaworthy due to poor design or construction and inadequate maintenance. 
That, along with collisions, groundings, allisions, overloading, negligence and 
poor seamanship comprise the great majority of factors that can clearly be 
attributed to human error. From the frequently scant facts available from the 
news sources cited in the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident 
database, the author has carefully assessed the cause of each accident.24 
 
Obviously, however, there can be no argument about the underlying cause in 
cases involving collisions, allisions, groundings and overloading. The often 
related factors of negligence, inadequate seaworthiness and poor 
seamanship are more subjective and perhaps nebulous assessments but they 
have been based on a careful review of the only known facts available to the 
author. 
 
This, as described in 1.2.1, has involved compiling as much information as 
possible from numerous diverse sources. That have been further verified and 
cross-referenced using government reports, focussed histories, books, 
academic studies and other marine casualty databases.25 More recently, 
                                                     
24 Appendix A. Ibid. 
25 The books, reports, directories and academic papers are all cited here as appropriate but 
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since about 2000, considerably more information has become accessible via 
the Internet. In many cases this data is still considered to be inadequate but it 
is all that is publicly or, even, privately available.  
 
1.3.1. Inadequate reporting or recording of accidents. 
 
Sparse reporting of fatal accidents, particularly prior to the widespread 
adoption of the Internet around the year 2000, means that the statistics 
analysed are not globally comprehensive because reports from poorer, more 
accident prone, regions or countries were even rarer in the earlier period. For 
example, the BMPVA database26 records five accidents resulting in 303 
fatalities in China in 1999 whereas Fairplay News online quotes China‟s 
communications minister mentioning 249 „sinkings‟ and 769 deaths in the 
same year.27 Similar comments have been made by officials of the Philippines 
Navy about fatal ferry accidents in that country.28 They have apparently been 
significantly under reported as have, similarly, fatal ferry accidents on inland 
waterways in Nigeria.29 
 
By contrast, fatal accidents aboard cruise and casino ships tend to be widely 
reported and have been throughout the study period. Those ships are large 
and conspicuous and tend to be engaged in international voyages. More 
importantly, they tend, obviously, to be populated with passengers from richer 
countries. Thus the „Clapham Omnibus‟ hierarchy of relative news importance 
prevails. 
 
Tellingly, the BMPVA database records only 176 accidents in the 34 years 
from 1966 until the end of 1999 whereas it shows 570 occurring over the next 
sixteen years.30 Obviously and logically that cannot possibly be an accurate 
reflection of reality, hence the estimate of at least 3,000 fatalities per annum. 
The author, however, has been unable to find a more extensive or 
comprehensive accident database anywhere.  
 
Certainly, the International Maritime Organisation‟s GISIS database is wholly 
inadequate.31 GISIS lists accidents and fatalities that occurred in western 
developed countries quite comprehensively although it tends to focus most on 
those that were most extensively covered by the news media. Beyond the 
OECD member countries, however, its coverage declines significantly. 
Similarly, other databases are limited by vessel size. Lloyd‟s List Casualty 
Reports ignore anything under 100gt and IUMI under 500gt.32  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
www.maritimeintelligenceinforma.com (Formerly Lloyd‟s List Casualty Reports), 
www.maritime.ihs.com (Formerly Fairplay), and www.iumi.com/statistics/. 
26 Appendix A, Ibid. 
27 Report in Fairplay News (online) 31 January 2000. 
28 Retired Rear Admiral, Feliciana G Salonga, Chairman of the Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority, suggested there are around 40,000 marine fatalities annually in the Philippines. 
29 Nze, I. C. Ibid. 
30 Appendix A, Ibid. 
31 Accessible through the IMO website www.imo.org  
32 Refer to www.maritimeintelligence.informa.com and www.iumi.com/statistics/. 
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They and Fairplay also tend to record only very major accidents in developing 
countries. Their exclusion of smaller vessels inevitably ignores a large 
proportion of the accidents described in this work. For example, they record 
the Dona Paz and Princess of the Stars accidents in the Philippines but not 
those involving the Kim Nirvana or the Catalyn D.33 The absence of reliable 
confirmatory data is a major factor in the difficulty of defining the real extent of 
the problem and has been commented on elsewhere.34  
 
Indeed, as recently as 27 November 2017, at the opening of IMO‟s 30th 
Assembly Session in London, the Secretary-General, Mr Kitack Lim, admitted 
that: “For IMO, we need to have more detailed and deeper analysis of 
statistics and data so that we can really understand underlying trends and 
causal factors behind shipping casualties…”.35 That comment reflects very 
badly on the strange and completely unrealistic manner whereby IMO 
compiles the data for its GISIS database. 
 




Figure 1.2. Fatal accidents reported annually worldwide. Note the dramatic 
increase from around the year 2000. The Internet Effect. (BMPVA database). 
 
The realities of inadequate reporting of accidents are starkly highlighted by the 
dramatic increase in the number of fatalities recorded each year since 1 
January 2000 in the BMPVA database. For the first 34 years of the study the 
average known annual global death toll was 818 whereas for the next sixteen 
years it was 1,975. The advent and widespread adoption of the Internet has 
led to much more extensive and comprehensive reporting of maritime 
accidents. Further, as noted in IHS-Fairplay in December 2015, the 
                                                     
33 Appendix A, Ibid 
34 See, for example, Shettar, G. EU maritime casualty rise „due to improved reporting‟, IHS-
Fairplay, London, 1 December 2015. 
35 From a speech delivered by the Secretary-General of IMO at the opening of its 30th 


















































































































establishment of the European Marine Casualty Information Platform in 2011 
has brought about a more than doubling of reported accidents per annum on 
that continent in the four years from 2011-2014.36 The author, however, 
believes very strongly that because of continuing under-reporting, the real 
annual global death toll would be more than 3,000 on average and that it 
would have been so for the full 50 years examined .  
 
For example, there are only three accidents recorded in the BMPVA database 
for Myanmar/Burma from 1966 until 2006.37 They resulted in 667 fatalities (an 
average of 17 fatalities per annum) and all three vessels involved were 
nameless. Since the once „pariah‟38 state started to open to the outside world 
in 2007, twelve accidents affecting named vessels and causing 584 fatalities 
have been recorded (an average of 65 fatalities per annum). 39 The earlier 
data, obviously, is wholly inadequate. Extrapolating from the 2007-2015 
statistics, a case can be made for more likely figures of at least 75 accidents 
and 3,250 fatalities in Myanmar/Burma over the period 1966-2015. 
 
Whatever the true number, however, the information that is available about 
the known accidents is sufficient to enable sensible decisions to be made as 
to causality, underlying trends and practical preventative measures. 
 
1.3.3. Poor, hot, „wet‟ developing countries are hit hardest. 
 
Further, the figures for the first 34 years show a much higher proportion of 
fatalities occurring in so-called „developed‟ countries than in the next sixteen 
years. Overall, though, and as illustrated clearly in Figure 1.3 below, 76 per 
cent of accidents and 95 per cent of fatalities over the complete fifty-year 
study have occurred in poor, hot and mostly wet, archipelagic, riverine and 
Lakeland „developing‟ countries. 
 
Because the numbers of accidents and fatalities occurring in developed 
countries have marginally declined over the last two decades, it could be 
assumed that the rate has increased in poorer countries over the same 
period. That seems to be a reasonable assumption even allowing for the 
Internet effect on reporting. As described in Chapter 2, the total numbers of 
„known‟ fatal ferry accidents globally are clearly not declining and are in fact 
significantly increasing as people in developing countries seem to be travelling 







                                                     
36 Shettar, G. EU maritime casualty rise „due to improved reporting‟, IHS-Fairplay, London, 1 
December 2015. 
37 Appendix A, Ibid. 
38 Myanmar country profile, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12990563, BBC, London, 
30 March 2016.  
39 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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Figure 1.3  Geographical analysis of accidents and fatalities. By accidents on 
the left and fatalities on the right. 1966-2015 inclusive. Note the absence of 
Myanmar/Burma from this data. (BMPVA database). 
 
So, the much higher incidence of fatal accidents in developing countries is at 
the crux of the problem that will be addressed here. While ferry accidents will 
continue to occur in developed countries, at least some constructive attempts 
are being made to reduce their incidence and effects. Voyages in the 
developed world are still not totally free from danger, especially if conventional 
monohull Roll On-Roll Off (Ro-Ro) or Ro-Pax ferries with wide-opening bow 
doors and full-length, low vehicle decks cannot be avoided, as is explained in 
detail in chapters 2 and 6. However, the risks in the developed world are, in 
reality, now very low thanks partially to better on board responses and  






































1.5.1. The „Danger Zone‟. 
 
 
Map 1.1. The „Danger Zone‟. The poor, hot equatorial belt where the majority 
of fatal passenger vessel accidents occur. 
 
In developing countries, however, reductions in their ferry accident death tolls 
are especially difficult to achieve. Obviously, less developed countries suffer 
also from very high road and rail accident death tolls. A similar lack of success 
is evident with respect to reducing those. This lack of remedial results is a 
product of cultural and behavioural problems that can largely be blamed 
ultimately on poverty. This can also be attributed to all the poverty driven 
reasons of overloading, negligence, lack of maintenance, poor training, 
fatalism, corruption, panic, absence of life-saving equipment and inability to 
swim.40 It is obvious that most developing countries will require considerable 
assistance from the wealthier world before they achieve significant reductions 
in their numbers of ferry fatalities. 
 
1.5.2. Authorities appear unconcerned. 
 
While national and local governments in developing countries must be well 
aware of the problem of such preventable accidents, they do little or nothing 
about them. That phenomenon is described in detail in the national case 
studies in Chapter 5 and in the consideration of national and international 
regulatory and enforcement deficiencies in Chapter 9. Of the ten worst 
countries for passenger vessel accidents only the Philippines pays any 
serious attention to them and its responses are far too little and much too late.  
 
At the INTERFERRY conference in Cebu in 1999 the author spoke at length 
with the then Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines (Later 
President), Hon. Gloria Macapagal Arroya who was well aware of her 
country‟s high incidence of ferry disasters.41 She claimed the government was 
“working on it” by trying to reduce the corruption of the Marine Industry 
Authority (MARINA) and the Philippines Coast Guard and by implementing 
more transparent and effective Marine Boards of Inquiry.  
 
Now, nearly eighteen years later and after six years with Ms Arroya powerfully 
in charge as President, there has been a small, albeit welcome, improvement. 
In 2015, for example, there were four known fatal ferry accidents in the 
Philippines. A total of 154 people perished in them.42 2015 was a 
                                                     
40 See Appendix A generally. 
41 Hon. Gloria Macapagal Arroya. Discussion with author, Cebu, October 1999. INTERFERRY 
is the international trade association of ferry owners. 
42 Appendix A, Ibid 
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comparatively good year. However, more recently, there has been impressive 
improvement. In 2016 there were three known fatal accidents producing 24 
fatalities. In 2017 there was only one known fatal ferry accidents in the 
Philippines with 11 fatalities resulting.43 
 
The same lack of concern is evident internationally. On a number of occasions 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s the author met with the Hon William O‟Neil, 
then Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organisation in 
London.44 Questioned on what IMO could do to bolster the obviously 
inadequate efforts of many national governments with respect to passenger 
vessel safety, his response was to the effect that: “We are not able to interfere 
in the internal affairs of sovereign member nations”. When pressed on the fact 
that the IMO‟s sister organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) was doing just that with respect to purely internal airline companies, 
the response was, ”they operate under a different charter from us”. 
 
Subsequent enquiries made indirectly of Secretary-General O‟Neil‟s 
immediate successor, Rear Admiral Efthimios Mitropolous, and various of his 
senior colleagues elicited much the same answer. Further, when asked 
whether IMO‟s charter could be changed to something more like ICAO‟s, Mr 
O‟Neil‟s response was, “our member countries wouldn‟t wear that”. 
Realistically, until very recently, IMO has only shown interest in international, 
as opposed to domestic, passenger vessel activities.45 Even now, IMO seems 
to recoil from accepting any responsibility for or involvement with domestic 
ferry activities. 
 
There is no doubt that the IMO mandate is restrictive. It describes itself thus:-  
 
IMO is the global standard setting authority for the safety, security and 
environmental performance of international shipping. Its main role is to create 
a regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair and effective, 
universally adopted and universally implemented. Further, it describes, …its 
role is to create a level playing-field so that ship operators cannot address 
their financial issues by simply cutting corners and compromising on safety, 
security and environmental performance.46 The key word here is 
„international‟, it most definitely does not mean “domestic”.  
 
In a 2008 Secretary-General‟s Report on the Contribution of IMO on maritime 
safety and security, IMO defines its Mandate as follows:- 
 
Since 1959, the International Maritime Organization(“IMO”). As the sole 
United Nation‟s (sic) specialized agency exclusively devoted to maritime 
affairs, has been providing a forum for co-operation among Governments in 
the field of government regulations and practices relating to all kinds of 
                                                     
43 Ibid. 
44 Hon. William O‟Neil. Various discussions with author, London, 1998-2002 
45 IMO‟s 2015 Manila Statement on Enhancement of the Safety of Ships Carrying Passengers 
on Non-International Voyages is a small but very encouraging change of approach (See 
Appendix G). 
46 From Introduction to IMO, www.imo.org/en/About/. 
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shipping engaged in international trade, facilitating the adoption of 
comprehensive multilateral treaties for a wide range of technical measures 
and, in particular, the adoption of the highest practicable standards, designed 
to enhance safety, security and efficiency in shipping engaged in international 
trade”.47 Again, the key word here is „international‟, as opposed to „domestic‟. 
 
The same document, in claiming the “wide acceptance and legitimacy of 
IMO‟s mandate”, states that there are 167 sovereign member states of IMO 
and that between 138 and 158 have adopted various of its conventions. While 
IMO has undoubtedly achieved that wide acceptance and legitimacy of its 
mandate among all, or at least the great majority, of developed nations, it has 
clearly failed to do so in any of the developing nations discussed here. 
Further, in practice in many developing countries, „adoption‟ of conventions 
does not mean that they will be implemented, much less enforced. 
 
In fairness to Mr O‟Neil, he did publicly urge domestic ferry safety reforms on 
a number of occasions. He publicly offered IMO‟s assistance to national 
governments but none are known to have taken up his offers except in the 
most limited fashion.48 His hands were tied, in effect, by the fact that in 
practice IMO is a secretariat. Its member states control it. Its system requires 
that in order for new rules to be considered, any states proposing such 
changes must demonstrate a compelling need for them. 
 
Regrettably, his successors have been less forthcoming and, apart from a 
handful of small conferences and seminars, attended by carefully chosen 
delegates, in developing countries, nothing notable seems to have been 
achieved except for the laudable, but severely limited by its small number of 
participating countries, Manila Statement of 2015.49 Regrettably, its effects 
have been negligible to date. 
 
This attitude contrasts sharply with the sentiments expressed on the 
establishment of IMO in 1948 as the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organisation (IMCO)50. IMO is self-described as: “…the United 
Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and security of 
shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships”.51 On the same web 
page, IMO describes itself further as: “…the global standard setting authority 
for the safety, security and environmental performance of international 
shipping. Its main role is to create a regulatory framework for the shipping 
industry that is fair and effective, universally adopted and universally 
implemented”.52 The word „international‟, as opposed to „domestic‟ keeps 
creeping in as a very effective „escape clause‟. 
 
                                                     
47 See paragraph 1 in, Contribution of the International Maritime Organization(IMO) to the 
Secretary-General‟s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2008, IMO, London, 2008. 
48 Most notably IMO‟s assistance and guidance was offered via the 8 November 1999 
Technical Assistance Subprogramme in Maritime Safety. 
49 IMO‟s 2015 Manila Statement, Appendix G, Ibid. 
50 Details from www.imo.org generally.  
51 From Introduction to IMO, www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/ . 
52 IMO, Ibid. 
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It also contrasts strongly with IMO‟s civil aviation counterpart, the International 
Civil Aviation Organization‟s (ICAO) “core mandate” which, “…was to help 
States achieve the highest possible degree of uniformity in civil aviation 
regulations, standards, procedures, and organization”.53 
 
In even stronger contrast: “ICAO works with the Convention‟s 191 Member 
States and industry groups to reach consensus on international civil aviation 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPS) and policies in support of a 
safe, efficient, secure, economically sustainable and environmentally 
responsible civil aviation sector. These SARPS and policies are used by  
ICAO Member States to ensure that their local civil aviation operations and 
regulations conform to global norms, which in turn permits more than 100,000 
daily flights in aviation‟s global network to operate safely and reliably in every 
region in the world”. Note the use of the very important word „local‟.54 It very 
effectively and unfortunately differentiates ICAO from IMO. 
 
Reinforcing that: “ICAO also coordinates assistance and capacity building for 
States in support of numerous aviation development objectives; produces 
global plans to coordinate multilateral strategic progress for safety and air 
navigation; monitors and reports on numerous air transport performance 
metrics; and audits State‟s civil aviation oversight capabilities in the areas of 
safety and security”.55 
 
In practice, ICAO takes an inspirational leadership role in an endeavour to 
improve aviation safety globally. IMO avoids that and appears largely to do as 
its member states direct. 
 
1.5.3. Few others appear to care or even notice. 
 
There lies a large part of the problem. No one in a position to do anything 
about the problem cares enough to do so. It has much to do with the clichéd 
and probably apocryphal but true joke about the hierarchy of news, viz: An 
article was allegedly published prominently on page 1 of The Times of London 
headed “Three killed in Clapham omnibus tragedy”. In the same issue on the 
bottom of page 8 there was a small article headed “Earthquake in Chile, 
36,000 dead”. It may be apocryphal but that is the attitudinal reality. 
 
This arrogant and ignorant, North Atlantic centric attitude is exemplified in the 
prestigious Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History which, published in 2007, 
lists only the Titanic, Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star and 
Estonia in its item on Ship Disasters involving passenger ships. It fails to 
mention any of the far worse accidents that occurred elsewhere until that 
time.56 Remarkably, but perhaps not surprisingly, the Dona Paz tragedy, that 
                                                     
53 From The History of ICAO and the Chicago Convention, www.icao.int/about-icao/History/ 
and, directly, Convention on International Civil Aviation done at Chicago on the 7th Day of 
December 1944. 
54 Described in About ICAO, www.icao.int/about-icao/. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Hattendorf, J. B. Editor, The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History, Vol 3, pp. 601-602, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. 
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resulted in far more fatalities than in all four of those accidents combined, is 




Image 1.3. The developing country problem: massive overloading of 
unseaworthy, incompetently crewed ferries (Wikipedia). 
 
Of course, when North American, Australasian, Japanese or European 
tourists die in passenger vessel accidents in developing countries, we quickly 
learn about it from their hometown newspapers and, increasingly commonly, 
on news websites. At least such reports alert us to the fact of the accident. 
 
In fairness, it must be pointed out that in conjunction with INTERFERRY and 
the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association, and at their initiative, the International 
Maritime Organisation has made some tentative approaches aimed at safety 
improvements to local vessel owners and regulators in the Philippines, 
Bangladesh and Indonesia since 2006.58 Sadly, apart from in the Philippines, 
little seems to have come of that well-intentioned initiative. Perhaps it raised 
awareness minutely in some of the world‟s richer countries. No measurable 
change has been noted in the other two target countries. There has simply 
been a re-arrangement of their fatality rankings.59 
 
1.6.0. Data and reporting deficiencies conceal real toll. 
 
While the data in the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database is 
not comprehensive, it is the best available and is estimated to be at least 66 
per cent accurate in terms of numbers of accidents and their resulting 
fatalities. It has been compiled for longer than all but the Lloyd‟s List Casualty 
                                                     
57 Ibid. 
58  Refer to www.interferry.com for details. 
59 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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Reports and the Lloyd‟s register of Shipping (LRS) Casualty Review and also 
covers smaller vessels that are not included in the Lloyd‟s List statistics. It has 
been cross-referenced against all the other known databases revealed in 
literature and Google searches. The numbers, though, are conservative and 
probably underestimate the real totals by about 50 per cent. It is estimated, 
therefore, that probably at least 3,000 people die in passenger vessel 
accidents annually compared with the 2,000 per annum listed for the past 
sixteen years in the BMPVA database. 
 
Even after acknowledging the deficiencies in available data, the world still has 
a serious problem in that as many as 3,000 innocent, mostly fare paying, 
public transport passengers are dying at sea or in inland waters each year. 
They are dying miserable deaths in accidents that are mostly preventable. 
The majority of victims appear to be women, children and the elderly, the 
reports listed in Appendix A tell us. They are less likely to be able to swim and   
usually not strong enough to beat men to whatever floating debris may be 
available to save them. 
 
Further, the accidents usually also result in many injuries and considerable 
property damage even if only to the vessels involved. Obviously, this, too, 
affects poor people more than their richer counterparts. Environmental 
damage, while slight, is also a factor. 
 
1.7.0. Ferry accident rates compared with road, rail and 
aviation 
 
It is estimated that nearly 1.3 million people die each year in road accidents 
world-wide.60 That is more per day than ferry deaths per year. Again, the vast 
majority – around 90 per cent – of them occur in low to middle-income 
countries. Indeed, as could be expected, the worst affected countries are the 
same as those similarly affected by ferry accidents.61 The causes similarly 
arise from poverty and are mainly overloaded, unroadworthy vehicles driven 
by incompetent, negligent and/or fatigued drivers. 
 
As well as having the best safety record of all modes of public transport, the 
aviation industry has the best reporting and most accurate data. It is also 
significantly more safety-conscious than the other modes and its international 
regulator, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), more 
determined than its United Nations counterpart IMO to have a positive 
influence at the local level. According to the Aviation Safety Network, a 
division of the Flight Safety Foundation, which appears to have the most 
comprehensive statistics, there have been an average of 32 fatal accidents 
involving scheduled commercial aircraft carrying 14+ passengers each year 
since 2000. The average death toll per annum over the same period has been 
713.62 That is less than a quarter that of ferries. 
 
                                                     
60  From www.asirt.org. 
61  See www.worldlifeexpectancy.com. 
62  See www.aviation-safety.net/statistics/period/stats.php?cat=A1 
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Railway accidents are more problematic. A significant proportion of them 
involve suicides. Many others are the result of road vehicle driver stupidity 
manifested in driving over railway tracks in the face of oncoming trains. 
Discounting those to look at derailments, train-to train collisions and similar, 
train only events, the numbers of accidents and their resulting deaths fall 
significantly.  
 
 As with passenger vessels, though, accurate data is difficult to find. It is also 
very difficult to obtain direct comparisons. Every data compiler approaches 
their project differently. One comparison that covers the three main streams is 
Numberwatch.63 It compares fatalities per kilometre travelled, per journey and 
per hours travelled.  
 
Probably the most accurate list of fatal railway accidents is provided by 
www.list25.com.64 It is supported by figures compiled by the BBC which show 
that railway passenger accident fatalities at an average of about 300 per 
annum from 1966 to 2015 inclusive are negligible compared with ferries at 
about ten times as many.65 That figure is confirmed by www.infoplease.com.66 
 
While not highly accurate, the statistics comparing the accident and fatality 
rates of road, rail, air and water transportation of passengers are accurate 
enough to show their relationships starkly. As will be shown in more detail in 
Chapter 3, passenger vessel travel is very much safer than road travel, other 
than, arguably, by bus, but significantly less safe than rail or air travel. Bus 
travel, perhaps surprisingly, according to Numberwatch, is the safest means. 
The author, however, finds that difficult to believe and refutes it in Chapter 3. 
 
km journeys hours 
Air 0.05 Bus 4.3 Bus 11.1 
Bus 0.4 Rail 20 Rail 30 
Rail 0.6 Van 20 Air 30.8 
Van 1.2 Car 40 Water 50 
Water 2.6 Foot 40 Van 60 
Car 3.1 Water 90 Car 130 
Pedal cycle 44.6 Air 117 Foot 220 
 
Table 1.1. The Numberwatch table showing the numbers of fatalities per 
billion kilometres, journeys and hours of travel. The bus and rail figures 






                                                     
63  www.numberwatch.co.uk/risks_of_travel 
64 See www.list25.com/25-worst-train-wrecks-in-history/. 
65 Refer to World‟s worst rail disasters, www.news.bbc.co.uk/I/hi/world/south-asia/. 
66 See Railroad Accidents at www.infoplease.com/world/disasters/railroad-accidents. 
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1.8.0. Geographic, cultural, behavioural and economic factors. 
 
1.8.1. The poverty factor. 
 
Geographic, cultural, behavioural and economic factors, the author has 
concluded, are the predominant reasons why human error dominates the 
causes of passenger vessel accidents. An economic factor, poverty, is 
common to all the regions and countries where the most frequent and most 
deadly accidents occur. Poverty appears to be the most important factor. As 
will be shown in detail in Chapter 5, the poverty factor can be seen to apply 







Road Fatalities per 
100,000 motor 
vehicles 
Libya 73.4 128.2 
Thailand 36.2 74.6 
Malawi 35  1,310.4  
Liberia 33.7  133.4  
DRC 33.2  6,405.4  
Tanzania 32.9  1,073.7  
CAR 32.4  4,336.5  
Rwanda 32.1  3,521.1  
Iran 32.1 92.7 
Mozambique 31.6  1,507  
 
Table 1.2. The poverty factor. The world‟s ten worst countries for road 
accidents on an annual basis. Of the countries listed, only Iran and Thailand 
could be described as middle income (Source: World Health Organisation – 
Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015). 
 
Poverty can be causally linked to cultural and behavioural factors in terms of 
education, training, awareness and care as well as purchasing, maintenance 
and operational disciplines. A significant factor in that causal link is poverty 
induced malnutrition. It, unsurprisingly, has been found to lead to cognitive 
weaknesses that cause low levels of situational awareness, slow reactions 
and illogical responses to problems.67 While not the only cause of such 
deficiencies, it is undoubtedly a significant contributor to them. Poverty, 
obviously, is also directly linked to the poor seaworthiness of vessels and their 
lack of even the most basic life-saving equipment. Safe new vessels and 
equipment are comparatively expensive. 
 
Even in terms of the health of vessel crews, poverty is a factor. An ill or 
fatigued crewman is unlikely to be an alert or careful crewman. Further, the 
sanctity of human life is inevitably accorded a much lower priority in poorer 
                                                     
67 There is considerable literature on this subject. Some concise descriptions can be seen 
in:www.who.int/features/qa/malnutrition/, www.ncbi.nlm.gov/pmc/articles/, 
www.orphannutrition.org, and www.richmondvale.org/effects-of-malnutrition/. 
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countries than in richer ones. Having travelled extensively by sea and river in 
poorer countries, the author has noted the disdain with which crews have 
treated fellow human beings who were obviously in trouble. Rather than 
helping fellow mariners in trouble, which is almost an instinctive reaction in the 
wealthier world, the attitude often appears to be: “He‟s got into that trouble 
himself so he should get out of it himself. I don‟t want to be involved”.68 
 
1.8.2. The fatalism factor. 
 
An attitude of resigned neglect or fatalism seems to be common in the 
countries where accidents are more frequent.69 If some form of reward is not 
on offer, many seem to believe that assistance is not worth the effort or risk. 
Perhaps that, as well as poverty, is the reason for an almost complete 
absence of organised, search and rescue facilities or services from poorer 
jurisdictions. Poverty does, thanks to its resultant malnutrition, seem to be a 
major contributing factor to cognitive weakness, fatalism and a negligent state 
of mind in much the same way as drug and alcohol addiction are in the 
wealthier world.70 
 
Poverty also contributes to another factor in that employees who question the 
status quo are usually penalised with the result that few do so. Such 
employees fear losing their jobs in areas of high unemployment. 
 
As well as by poverty, behavioural factors are strongly influenced by culture 
and religion as will be shown in more detail in Chapter 5. These can be 
particularly important after the event of an accident when a strong belief in 
karma or similar can make it difficult to encourage rescue and recovery 
efforts. 
 
There is much, though, that can be done, even in the absence of a poverty 
reduction, economically and practically to modify and improve the human 
behaviour that leads to the vast majority of passenger vessel accidents. 
 
1.9.0 Technical factors – mechanical and structural. 
 
A careful review of the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database 
shows that mechanical and structural failures represent only a minute 
proportion of the reasons for passenger vessel accidents.71 Almost without 
exception such failures can be fairly attributed to the human error factors of 
poor seaworthiness or neglect. Engine breakdowns, fires and structural 
failures rarely occur without some form of human assistance or influence 
either positive or negative, mainly incompetence, neglect or, even, sabotage. 
 
                                                     
68 Personally observed by the author in Tanzania, Thailand and Malaysia. See video in 
Appendix F. 
69 Discussed in greater detail in 5. 4. 2. 
70 See articles cited in Footnote 68 above. 
71 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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For example, structural failures involving vessels of even the most primitive 
kind are extremely rare. There are, however, certain types of vessels that are 
prone to suffer from them with alarming frequency. Most notable of those are 




Image 1.4. The wreckage of the large motor banca Kim Nirvana which 
capsized in the comparative calm of Ormoc harbour in 2015 when an 
outrigger broke off while turning. There were 113 fatalities (Wikipedia). 
 
When poorly maintained and or negligently operated, these simple vessels, 
that are effectively canoes stabilised by two outrigger floats, tend to shed an 
outrigger and, in the ensuing panic, capsize. Such accidents can be fatal, 
especially when the vessel is comparatively large as in the July 2015 case of 
the Kim Nirvana which capsized when an outrigger broke off close to shore in 
Ormoc harbour on Leyte Island.72 The result of that capsize was 113 fatalities.  
 
Other vessel types that have suffered structural failures are conventional 
monohull Ro-Pax ferries that have shed bow door visors as in the case of the 
Estonia.73 However, as is discussed below, such failures can usually be 
attributed to poor seamanship in sailing too fast for the conditions or operating 
with vehicle deck doors open.74 
 
It is indeed encouraging that non-human caused structural and mechanical 
failures are so rare. There is probably little practical that can be done about 
reducing them as is explained in Chapter 6. 
 
1.10.0. Search and rescue deficiencies. 
 
This is a very important factor in passenger fatalities. Even in the wealthier 
world, such deficiencies have been major causes of death. If survivors can be 
found and recovered quickly, their chances of long-term survival are obviously 
considerably higher. Drowning, shark attack, thirst, starvation or hypothermia 
are all less likely to kill if survivor recovery operations are quick and efficient. 
 
                                                     
72 Appendix A, 2 July 2015, Ibid. 
73 See detailed report in Chapter 3, 3.13.  
74 See case studies on Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia in 3.6. and 3.13.  
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Despite the considerable attention paid to this subject and the government 
and charity money directed at it in wealthier countries, there are still significant 
capacity deficiencies in most parts of the world. IMO has developed a Search 
and Rescue Code (SAR) that guides the maritime world in such matters.75 
While undoubtedly well-intentioned, and widely-adopted in principle, in reality 
it suffers from the inability or unwillingness of IMO to interfere in the internal 
affairs of its sovereign member states to encourage its implementation.76 
 
The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association (WFSA) has sponsored and co-
ordinated considerable research on this problem in conjunction with the 
International Maritime Rescue Federation. A paper it presented at the  IMRF‟s 
World Maritime Rescue Congress in Bremerhaven, Germany in 2015 
highlighted some of the search and rescue deficiencies that fail ferry accident 
survivors, particularly in poorer countries.77 
 
Chapter 8 examines these deficiencies in considerable detail and that 
examination leads on to a number of simple and economical solutions that are 
proposed in Chapter 10. The important fact that arises from the study of SAR 
deficiencies is that there are numerous effective solutions that are currently 
being worked on by dedicated people in a number of parts of the world. 
 
There are many examples of SAR failures but one of the more notable was 
the multi-national mess that followed the sinking of the Estonian Ro-Pax ferry 
Estonia in September 1994.78 This accident occurred in the Baltic Sea in an 
area where the Estonian, Finnish and Swedish jurisdictions overlapped. 
Essentially, the various rescue services used different radio channels and 
were largely unable to communicate. Worse, some of the rescue helicopters 
were overloaded with press photographers and, so, unable to retrieve 
survivors from the very cold sea.79 
 
Even where supposedly high quality, well-equipped rescue services are 
available as in South Korea with the Sewol and Belgium, with the Herald of 
Free Enterprise, they were remarkably ineffectual in the face of a real 
disaster. The Belgians and British, though, were much more effective than the 
Koreans. 
 
                                                     
75 International Maritime Organisation, International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue (SAR), IMO, London, 1979, www.imo.org. 
76 Discussion by the author with Hon. William O‟Neil, Ibid. 
77 Golden, A. Statistics, Analysis, and Trends of Major Ferry Accidents Worldwide, 2000-
2014. Presented at the World Maritime Rescue Congress, Bremerhaven, 2015 
78 Bjorkman, A. Lies and Truths about the M/V Estonia Accident (Editions EGC, 1998) 





Image 1.5. Search and rescue efforts vary enormously in availability and 
quality. The Bangladeshi approach has not been notably successful. It is 
usually poorly organised and too little, too late (news.cn). 
 
Of course, as could be expected, in the poorer parts of the world SAR 
services are practically non-existent. Survivors have to rely on the awareness, 
observation and benevolence of the crews of any passing vessels. Better than 
nothing but hardly dependable. 
 
1.11.0. Human factors – the roles of training, enforcement, 
education, psychology and insurance 
 
As this thesis strongly emphasises, human error in its many manifestations 
has been the primary cause of 88 per cent of passenger vessel accidents and 
of 98 per cent of the deaths arising from them. Poverty, and its often resultant 
malnutrition, is generally likely to be the ultimate reason for many such 
errors.80 
 
Human error in the maritime industry has been the subject of considerable 
study, particularly over the last half century. Indeed, human error is probably 
the most closely studied, inquired into and commented upon phenomenon in 
all forms of maritime operations. Some very important and informative books 
have delved into the subject. One of the most illuminating is Human Factors in 
the Maritime Domain.81 
 
Much has been done in the wealthy world to encourage improvements in 
human behaviour but there is still a long way to go even there. In developing 
countries, regrettably, maritime human performance remains a very serious 
problem indeed. The Philippines, notably, has 140 maritime training and 
                                                     
80 See footnote 67 on page 19. 
81 Grech, M. R., Horberry, T. J. and Koester, T. Human factors in the Maritime Domain, CRC 
Press, Boca Raton, 2008. 
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educational institutions, more than any other country, but, until very recently, 
still suffered from one of the worst rates of fatal marine accidents.82 
 
While the outlook is discouraging, it is not beyond hope. The aviation industry 
offers a very encouraging model. It has seen dramatic safety improvements in 
rich and poor countries alike over the last three decades. These have been 
described very well against a maritime background in an excellent handbook 
published by The Nautical Institute.83 
 
The London based, Nautical Institute is an international association of master 
mariners that works diligently to improve the professionalism of mariners 
globally. It is an organisation that provides hope for this thesis. Because of it, 
worthwhile improvements in mariner performance and behaviour can, are 
being, and will be made. It has made significant and very valuable 
contributions to mariner education, training and even psychology. It clearly 
illustrates what can be achieved when serious, professional industry 
participants work together to achieve positive behavioural change.  
 
Most developed countries have made major advances in Occupational Health 
and Safety (OH&S) regulation, enforcement, training and encouragement. It 
has become an accepted component of employment activity in many such 
countries and has contributed substantially to significant reductions in 
employment related death and injury rates. 
 
Insurance is another important motivator of human behaviour. It can have 
either positive or negative effects. It can insist that insured vessels are 
seaworthy and their crews competent. That, after all, is what the classification 
societies that arose from the marine insurance business are meant to ensure. 
On the other hand, awareness that a vessel is well insured can lead to 
negligence because of the moral hazard „safety-net‟ that insurance provides. 
In Chapter 7 the role of marine insurance is reviewed in detail. The author 
believes that the insurance industry could do more to positively modify 
mariner behaviour, particularly with respect to domestic ferry operations in 
developing countries. 
 
So also could the role of classification societies be extended into developing 
countries, perhaps even as a philanthropic activity. Classification societies 
promote themselves as experts on vessel and operational safety. They are 
mostly structured as not-for-profit businesses that, in reality, make very useful 
surpluses, read profits. Some pro bono contributions to the maritime industries 
and relevant government bodies in poorer countries would seem to be a 





                                                     
82 Members of the Philippine Association of Maritime Institutions (PAMI). www.pami.org.ph 




1.12.1. Regulatory and enforcement deficiencies. 
 
These, the author contends, are the most important ultimate reasons for the 
high frequency of fatal ferry accidents in developing countries. Where there is 
inadequate enforcement of such local regulations as do exist, combined with 
an almost total disdain for international regulations, it is almost guaranteed 
that passengers will suffer.84 
 
Corruption, inevitably, is a close relative of poverty. When bureaucrats, police 
and coastguard personnel who are responsible for ensuring ferry safety, are 
poorly remunerated, they will inevitably seek other sources of income. 
Unfortunately, that can be easy to come by from corrupt ship owners who 
want to reduce their maintenance, safety equipment and crewing expenses. 
That kind of corruption is obviously endemic in the poorer tropical countries 
where a disproportionately large number of the world‟s passenger vessel 
fatalities occur.85 Its corrosive effects are probably matched by the callous 
lack of concern shown by the national and international regulators mentioned 
above. In an ideal world, unseaworthy vessels and incompetent crews would 
be prevented from operating by professional and ethical authorities. 
 
The author has personally observed some of the worst examples of such 
corruption in jurisdictions such as Tanzania. There, the ferry route between 
Dar-es-Salam and Zanzibar is both busy and highly dangerous despite the 
usually relatively benign prevailing weather. The death toll from ferry 
accidents on that route is horrifying. Over the past twenty years it has been 
more than 5,000.86 Even on some of the modern and seaworthy vessels 
operating there, severe fatal accidents have occurred due to appalling 
seamanship. 
 
The near-new and very seaworthy and safe catamaran fast ferry Kilimanjaro 
II, for example, was driven into a wave at speed on 5 January 2014. At least 
25 passengers were swept off the foredeck, where they should not have been 
riding, and lost.87 No serious effort seems to have been made to recover them 
even though the ferry remained completely seaworthy. In the thirty months 
prior to that accident 3,270 passengers perished when the old and 
unseaworthy ferries Skagit and Spice Islander capsized and sank.88 The 
existence and enforcement of safety standards were certainly not evident 
there. Rather, the behaviour of local, passenger-carrying mariners showed an 
almost total absence of safety-consciousness or good seamanship. 
 
 
                                                     
84 See 9.1.1. Chapter 9. 
85 See 5.2. 
86 Appendix A, Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 





Image 1.6. Where corruption prevails, passenger safety or survival is not a 
major consideration. The Spice Islander capsized and sank near Zanzibar on 
10 September 2011 with the loss of 2,976 lives. Apart from being old and 
grossly overloaded, it was in very poor condition and badly „hogged‟ as this 
image shows. It should never have been permitted to go to sea (Wikipedia). 
 
The Philippines is another jurisdiction where, while facts are generally known, 
thanks to a comparatively free press, the official details of ferry accidents are 
often difficult to obtain. One difficult to comprehend and accept fact that is 
very well known is that over an eighteen year period one family of ship 
owners, under its various guises, lost about 6,000 of its passengers.89 Most of 
them died in the biggest peacetime maritime disaster in history, the 1987 
sinking of the Dona Paz that killed about 4,386 people.90 In any jurisdiction 
where the Rule of Law really applied, that would not be allowed to happen. 
 
Indeed, callous, unscrupulous owners have much to answer for. Many of the 
human error factors that lie behind almost all of the fatal accidents are 
ultimately the result of the greed and negligence of such people. While the Go 
family‟s Sulpicio Lines, of Dona Paz infamy stands out, there have been a 
number of other serially offending owners such as Rabaul Shipping, 
Townsend Thoresen/P&O Ferries, Negros Navigation, Aboitiz Shipping, Al 
Salam Maritime Transport, Sydney Ferries, the Indonesian Government, 
Minoan Flying Dolphins, and many more as shown below. They should more 









                                                     
89 The Go family of The Philippines, owners of, among others, Sulpicio Lines Inc. 
90 Appendix A, Ibid. 
91 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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1.12.2. The World‟s ten worst offending ferry owners. 
 
Owner Deaths % of total Country 
Sulpicio Lines  5,925  9.86% Philippines 
Makame Hasnuu  2,976  4.95% Tanzania 
Senegal Government  1,863  3.10% Senegal 
Lucky Magloire  1,800  3.00% Haiti 
Negros Navigation  1,056  1.76% Philippines 
Al Salam Maritime Transport  1,032  1.72% Egypt 
Tanzania Railways Corp  933  1.55% Tanzania 
Estline Marine Co  912  1.52% Estonia 
Pelayaran Nasional Indon  580  0.97% Indonesia 
Prima Vista  568  0.95% Indonesia 
 
Table 1.3. The worst offending companies by total deaths. Notably, three of 
the ten are government owned (BMPVA database). 
 
Owner Incidents % of total Deaths % of total Country 
Carnival Cruise Lines 23 3.0% 77 0.13% USA 
Royal Caribbean Cruise Line 11 1.5% 14 0.02% USA 
Sulpicio Lines 10 1.3%  5,925  9.86% Philippines 
BC Ferries 5 0.7% 7 0.01% Canada 
Norwegian Cruise Lines 5 0.7% 12 0.02% USA 
WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz 5 0.7% 423 0.70% Philippines 
Carlos A Gothong Lines 4 0.5% 370 0.62% Philippines 
Minoan Flying Dolphins 4 0.5% 112 0.19% Greece 
San Nicholas Shipping Line 4 0.5% 121 0.20% Philippines 
Stena Line 4 0.5% 6 0.01% Sweden 
 
Table 1.4. The worst offending companies by total fatal accidents. Note that 
Carnival, Norwegian Cruise and RCCL are very large cruise lines. Apart from 
the notable exception of the Carnival owned Costa Concordia with 32 
fatalities, most of their fatalities have occurred in very small numbers. About 
50% are suspected of being suicides. Of course, nothing is known of serial 
offending owners in countries like Myanmar, Bangladesh, DR Congo and 
Senegal as vessel owners‟ names rarely appear in accident reports (BMPVA 
database). 
 
The reality, though, is that in many developing countries repeat offenders are 
barely even censured let alone punished and prevented from operating. This 
can only happen when there is an almost complete absence of enforcement of 
whatever regulations exist there. Corruption is a major problem in many parts 
of the world and will be one of the most difficult problems to overcome.92 
 
1.13.0. The aviation model. 
 
Fortuitously, there is an excellent model that the maritime industry can easily 
access to guide a significant improvement in its safety consciousness and 
performance. First, unlike its sister organisation, IMO, the ICAO is not 
reluctant to involve itself in the internal affairs of sovereign member nations. It 
                                                     
92 Refer to 5.2. 
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endeavours to encourage, educate, lead and enforce a global approach to 
safety as a discipline. As is explained in Chapter 4, ICAO has, through 
persuasion, co-operation, encouragement and enforcement, made remarkable 
progress, particularly over the last three decades. Apart from an obvious and 
disappointing absence of will, perhaps accentuated by local corruption at 
worst or negligent complacency at best, there is no reason why IMO could not 
emulate the leadership role of its aviation counterpart. 
 
Obviously, the performances of national governments vary enormously in the 
rigour of their approaches to maritime safety. In many very obvious cases 
their approaches are much less rigorous than those they apply to their local 
aviation industries. IMO should and could encourage them to improve even if 
only on that basis. 
 
Similarly, aviation insurers seem to take a much more rigorous approach to 
their customers than do their maritime counterparts. 
 
The aviation industry and its regulators have spent substantial amounts of 
time and sums of money on researching ways to make flying safer. It has 
been an excellent investment and provides the maritime industry with a 
practical and encouraging guide or benchmark as to how to similarly improve. 
 
1.14.0. Some possible solutions – What is to be done? 
 
1.14.1. Solutions must be economical. 
 
Given that the large majority of ferry accidents and the deaths arising from 
them occur in developing countries, it must be accepted that any solutions 
must be very economical.  Developing country national governments are 
rarely willing or able to apply rich country levels of expenditure to poor country 
ferry safety problems. 
 
Implementing and enforcing regulations and raising safety awareness need 
not be expensive activities. They seem likely, though, to be the most effective 
solutions. Richer countries‟ OH&S, road safety and public health campaigns 
have been very effective even with comparatively little expenditure. So has 
the reform of the oil tanker sector. As the great majority of passenger vessel 
fatalities are ultimately caused by human error (as will be shown below) any 
improvements to be made will mostly involve behavioural modification rather 
than technical improvements. That will be significantly less expensive. 
 
First, and most important, the IMO must be pushed by its richer country 
members into emulating the approach of its ICAO cousin even if only to 
protect their own tourist citizens from developing country ferry accidents. It 
should also be encouraged to emulate its own successful efforts in 
encouraging the reduction of oil spills from tankers. It is imperative that IMO 
makes more than just token efforts to persuade member governments to 
adopt rich and middle income country standards and regulations and enforce 
them rigorously. An analysis of the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel 
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database shows conclusively that those regulations are effective provided that 
they are properly enforced. There is more than adequate existing national and 
international maritime regulation. The problem is that it is too often 
inadequately enforced.  
 
1.14.2. Developing countries will not take the safety initiative. 
 
Very little or no improvement will be achieved if the world relies on developing 
country governments, with the notable exception of the Philippines, to take the 
initiative in this regard. They must be encouraged to regulate vigorously in 
favour of maritime safety and to enforce those regulations very rigorously. 
Severe punishments must be imposed on transgressors so as to encourage 
the others. 
 
1.15.0. Much can be done, practically and economically, to 
improve ferry safety. 
 
As is explained in detail in Chapter 10, there is much that can be done, 
especially in developing countries, to improve the safety of passenger 
vessels; the competence and behaviour of their operators; and, the 
effectiveness of SAR responses. Significant technical, behavioural and 
psychological improvement is economically and politically achievable. 
Developed countries have largely achieved them as have other industries and 
maritime sectors. All that is required is the global will to bring such vitally 
needed improvements about. It is hoped that this thesis will help draw global 






Defining the problem 
 
Data and reporting inadequacies make accurate definition 
of the dimensions of the problem very difficult 
 
2.1.1. Defining the problem.  
 
While anecdotal evidence general and electronic media reports abound as to 
the extent of the problem of fatal ferry accidents, it is difficult to obtain recent, 
detailed and accurate information from primary sources about most of the 
accidents that have occurred in the developing world. It is impossible also, for 
example, to learn how many ferry voyages are undertaken; how many 
passengers travel on each; the specifications of the vessels concerned; and, 
what is the duration or length of voyage. We can, therefore, only deal in 
absolutes. Comparative analyses are impossible because of the absence of 
such data. There is no statistical denominator. 
 
Developed nations in northern Europe, North America, Australasia and Japan 
have much more useful statistics available. They also have a free press, 
functioning legal systems and a process of government inquiries into the 
reasons for and outcomes of serious passenger vessel accidents. Those 
inquiry findings are usually publicly available. Those countries, however, 
particularly more recently, are not where the real problems of ferry fatalities 
lie. 
 
Such official inquiries are often superficial or unfocused and their published 
results sometimes late and misleading but, at least, they are usually open to 
the public and the evidence presented to them is recorded permanently and 
reported on. They can provide a useful, even if biased, basis for the analysis 
of the events that they enquire into. As Joseph Conrad described them in Lord 
Jim in 1900, “However, an official inquiry could not be any other thing. Its 
object was not the fundamental why, but the superficial how, of this affair”.93  
 
The „how‟ is usually easily determined but the „why‟, which is far more 
important, is far more difficult. So difficult, indeed, that many inquiries do not 
even try to delve into it. However, so as to try to learn from the accident 
experience, the „why‟ is imperative in order to avoid it happening again in 
similar future circumstances. 
 
Very importantly, though, a comparatively free press in developed countries 
can normally be relied upon to expose criminal behaviour or attempts by 
vessel operators and authorities to conceal facts. 
 
                                                     
93 Conrad, J. Lord Jim, The Easton Press, New York, 1977, p.54, originally published in 1900. 
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It should be noted, however, that even a free press may be muzzled to some 
extent by the aggressive use of defamation laws. The author has personal 
experience of this, most particularly after publishing warnings of safety 
shortcomings in North Sea ferries shortly before the Herald of Free Enterprise 
capsized in 1987.94 Needless to say, that threatened defamation litigation 
ceased immediately following the capsize of that vessel. He also published 
comments on the Rabaul Queen sinking that inspired a threatening letter from 
the vessel‟s owner.95 
 
Two of the most informative and effective inquiry reports examined were those 
concerning the Marchioness96 and Estonia97 accidents both of which occurred 
in “developed” jurisdictions. Both revealed enormous amounts of detail and 
could only be described as extremely thorough. However, while the 
Marchioness inquiry was very thorough, it suffered from being conducted 
eleven years after the accident occurred in 1989. Its recommendations, 
though, would appear to have had some positive effect as no similarly tragic 
accident has happened in the United Kingdom since. 
 
The Estonia Commission reported less than three years after the accident.98 
However, the author believes that its very comprehensive and detailed report 
was marred by focusing too intently on technical detail at the expense of 
human factors. That focus did, though, lead to worthwhile improvements in the 
design, construction, equipping and operation of Ro-Pax ferries in northern 
Europe and Scandinavia at least. That has undoubtedly been generally 
beneficial. The Estonia report was also marred by a bias toward placing blame 
on participants from beyond Estonia, Finland and Sweden, the three countries 
behind the commission. To its credit, though, the fact of it closely following the 
very timely and much more searchingly effective Herald of Free Enterprise 
inquiry report undoubtedly increased its impact.99  
 
The very comprehensive and plainly transparent Rabaul Queen inquiry report 
showed very impressively that developing countries can conduct such 
inquiries effectively.100 However, such exemplary reports have been 
disappointingly rare. 
 
Further fatal Ro-Pax ferry accidents have, of course, occurred but not in 
Northern Europe where the new Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star 
and Estonia accident inspired „Stockholm Rules‟ were implemented quickly 
                                                     
94 Baird, N. & Pike, D. Various articles and columns in Work Boat World, Baird Publications, 
Melbourne, 1985-1987. 
95 See Appendix D. Letter to the editor from Captain Peter Sharp, managing director of 
Rabaul Shipping, to the author. 
96 Clarke, A.P. et al. Marchioness/Bowbelle – Formal Investigation under the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995, Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office, London, 2001. 
97 Laur, U. et al. Final report on the M V Estonia Disaster of 28 September 1994, Joint 
Accident Investigation Commission, Tallin, 1997. 
98 Laur, U. Estonia report, Ibid. 
99 Sheen, J. Wreck Commissioner. MV Herald of Free Enterprise – Report of Court No 8074 
Formal Investigation, Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office, London, 1987. 




and rigorously from 1996.101 They have proved to be very effective in that 
region but less so in the Mediterranean and much less so in Asia and Africa 
as is described at length in Chapter 6. 
 
2.1.2. Even a free press is too frequently powerless in 
developing countries. 
 
Unfortunately, developing countries normally lack functional or transparent 
legal systems and tend to suffer from “cronyism” whereby friends or relatives 
of the rulers, who tend to own the vessels involved, are protected from 
government investigations into any misbehaviour or negligence on their 
part.102 These problems are widespread and generally afflict most of the 
countries where larger numbers of passenger vessel accidents occur.  
 
Of those, only Bangladesh, India, the Philippines and Thailand can be said to 
enjoy the benefit of a largely free press to at least expose criminality or cover-
up. However, even they do not have fully functioning systems of marine 
boards of inquiry as developed countries know them. Their court systems, 
similarly, could hardly be described as fair and objective in the western 
developed country sense. 
 
That has led to Sulpicio Lines in the Philippines remaining unpunished until 
2008 despite losing in excess of 6,000 of its paying passengers in four 
separate „accidents‟ including the obscene Dona Paz sinking when 4,375 
people lost their lives.103 Finally, following the sinking of the Princess of the 
Stars in 2008, Sulpicio Lines‟ operations were suspended by the Maritime 
Industry Authority of the Government of the Philippines (MARINA). However, 
phoenix like, the company simply changed its name to Philippine Span Asia 
Carrier Corporation and re-commenced operations.104 Effectively, it was given 
no more than a „slap on the wrist‟ by the Philippine Government. It is, then, 
still operating although without further known fatal accidents since then. Its 
punishment has in reality been little more than an inconvenience. 
 
                                                     
101 The Stockholm Rules became applicable to Scandinavian and North-West European 
countries from 1996 as a response to the major Ro-Pax ferry disasters of the previous 
decade. See www.gard.no/web/updates/content/51837/ferries-ro-ropassenger/. 
102 Anon. The party winds down – Our crony capitalism index, The Economist, London, 7 May 
2016. 
103 See Appendix A for details. 
104 Agence France-Presse (18 August 2013), Ferry disaster is 5th tragedy for Philippine firm. 





Image 2.1. The sinking of the Sulpicio Lines owned Princess of the Stars in 
2008 with the loss of more than 800 lives resulted in little more than a “slap on 
the wrist” from the Philippines Government. It was the last of a series of 
accidents over 18 years that led to the deaths of more than 6,000 people 
before the company changed its name to something less notorious 
(Wikipedia). 
 
To further illustrate the extent of the arrogance engendered by the „cronyism‟ 
that is rampant in the Philippines, Sulpicio Lines petitioned the Manila 
Regional Trial Court with a claim that the Board of Marine Inquiry had no right 
to investigate the sinking of the Princess of the Stars which caused about 860 
fatalities. That aggressive approach failed, however, and Sulpicio‟s petition 
was rejected.105 Things, as noted below, are very slowly improving in that 
respect in that country. 
 
Cronyism was discussed at length in a feature article in The Economist in 
2016.106 It showed the malign influence enjoyed by the declared billionaire 
friends of rulers in a number of countries. Obviously, with their dearth of 
known billionaires, all African countries and Bangladesh were excluded from 
the Economist‟s survey but The Philippines, unsurprisingly, was in third place 
following Russia and Malaysia. Indonesia, India, China and Thailand were all 




                                                     
105 www.tradewinds.no. 8 October 2008, Oslo. 
106  The Economist, Ibid. 
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2.1.3.  Maritime and general media provide more and better 
information than do developing country governments. 
 
Much of the information about developing country ferry accidents that does 
exist has been revealed and recorded by the general and maritime media 
rather than by government authorities. Thus the Baird Maritime Passenger 
Vessel Accident database predominantly comprises reports sourced from 
newspapers, journals, books, directories, other databases, and from online 
news services.107 Most recently, in 2015, there have been brief and poor 
quality films of the fatal accidents involving the Pura Vida Princess in Costa 
Rica and the Marina Baru in Indonesia presented on YouTube.108 There are a 
further two YouTube videos presented in Appendix F that very graphically 
illustrate the reality of ferry accidents in Bangladesh. An interesting and useful 
development. In the „Western‟ developed world reports of marine boards of 
enquiry can normally be accessed with respect to all accidents involving 
significant loss of life. Regrettably, this has been practically impossible 
elsewhere. 
 
Globally, Lloyd‟s Register of Shipping (LR), a classification society, publishes 
the most useful and comprehensive reports on casualties or accidents. 
However, its Casualty Review only lists losses of ships larger than 100 grt.109 
That excludes many of the vessels in the developing world that are the subject 
of this thesis. The other useful global source is the Institute of London 
Underwriters (ILU). It publishes an Annual Report listing ship and aircraft 
accidents although it unfortunately excludes ships smaller than 500 grt except 
for war casualties.110 The IMO‟s Global Integrated Shipping Information 
System (GISIS) is claimed to list the world‟s shipping casualties and incidents 
and to record the findings of the resulting MBOIs.111 So far, regrettably, it does 
so partially and very inadequately and is practically devoid of developing 
country ferry accident data. It is disappointingly revealing to compare its 
content with that of the BMPVA database. 
 
2.1.4. IMO data grossly misrepresents reality. 
 
Even more revealing was the 2012 published International Shipping Facts and 
Figures – Information Resources on Trade, Safety, Security, Environment 
from the IMO Maritime Knowledge Centre.112 It showed how North Atlantic 
centric IMO is in that it cites a number of UK and USA based publications but 
not one from the Asia-Pacific, African or South American regions. Worse, it is 
simply and grossly wrong in its figure of lives lost in maritime accidents. While 
considerably more accurate than its cited source, IHS-Fairplay, it understates 
the true figures by more than 50 per cent.  
 
                                                     
107 Appendix A, Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident Database 1966-2015. 
108 Google. YouTube. 2015 and view Appendix F. 
109 Casualty Review, Lloyd‟s Register of Shipping, London, Ongoing. 
110 Annual Report, Institute of London Underwriters, London, Ongoing. 
111 Global Integrated Shipping Information System, IMO London, Ongoing. 
112 International Shipping Facts and Figures, IMO, London, 6 March 2012. 
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The figure published by IMO for the five year period 2006-2010 inclusive is 
5,938 fatalities. The author‟s BMPVA database shows 9,283 „known‟ fatalities 
for the same period. That, of course should be increased by about 50 per cent 
to reflect the estimated unreported fatalities. 113 IMO‟s subsequent estimated 
ratios of lives lost to numbers of seafarers and passengers are, therefore, 
ludicrously low.114 In any event, IMO would have no idea of the numbers of 
seafarers or passengers involved. Applied globally, IMO‟s statistics grossly 
misrepresent reality. 
 
Promisingly, however, as noted in Chapter 1(1.3.1), in his speech delivered at 
the opening of the IMO‟s 30th Assembly in November 2017, IMO Secretary-
General Kitack Lim made a plea for more comprehensive and better data and 
statistics about marine casualties.115 That offers some hope that IMO is 
becoming aware of its information deficiencies. However, while the author 
offered his extensive data to IMO without charge, apart from an initial positive 
response, no attempt has been made by IMO to avail itself of his offer. 
 
Considerable detailed analysis of the available accident statistics has been 
carried out by the International Union of Maritime Insurance (IUMI) which has 
been compiling data since 1993. The protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs 
generally have been compiling similar data but, again, on the wider subject of 
all vessels, particularly larger ones. 
 
Maritime lawyer Philippe Boisson, on behalf of the French classification 
society Bureau Veritas (BV), has made a wide study of the safety of all kinds 
of vessels, not just passenger vessels.116 He has noted similar difficulties in 
sourcing information about accidents in developing countries. He states: “LRS 
takes account only of passengers and seamen who have died or are missing 
in a total loss, not the huge numbers of accidents in the perilous seas of the 
Third World. The ILU surveys only loss of life caused by accidents to ships of 
more than 500 grt, whereas certain national sources reveal that most deaths 
and injuries occur on board small craft…”117 
 
Further, Boisson commented: “Of course, it is also possible to turn to the 
reports issued by flag administrations after an accident at sea, but the 
information they contain usually remains inconsistent and unequal in value 
from one state to another”.118 The experience of the author is that little if 
anything has changed since M. Boisson‟s book was published in 1999. 
 
2.1.5. Probably 50% of fatal PV accidents go unrecorded. 
 
These realities mean that significant numbers of fatal passenger vessel 
accidents must never have been reported on or recorded at all. Figure 2.1, 
                                                     
113 Appendix A, Ibid. 
114 IMO, GISIS, Ibid. Table 8, Ratio of lives lost… to total number of lives at risk. 
115 Lim, K. T, Ibid. 
116 Boisson, P. Safety at Sea – Policies, Regulations & International Law, Bureau Veritas, 
Paris, 1999. 
117 Ibid. Page 33. 
118 Boisson, P. Ibid. 
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below, makes that fact particularly obvious.119 However, and very importantly, 
the widespread adoption of the Internet around the turn of the Millennium has 
seen a very dramatic increase in the numbers of fatal accidents recorded. It is 
particularly significant that practically all of this increase has been in the 
developing world. This data has been of considerable value in the 
development of this thesis. 
 
The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association (WFSA) has urged the adoption of 
mandatory reporting of ferry accidents. It “…found that only a small fraction of 
the world‟s ferry accidents were voluntarily reported to the IMO‟s Global 
Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS)120, and hypothesise that 
mandatory reporting would improve the frequency and quality of nations‟ 
accident investigations, which could help prevent future accidents”.121 Indeed, 
as to GISIS, the author randomly sampled 20 accidents from the BMPVA 
database from 2001 to 2012, the cause of some 5,480 fatalities and could find 
only 12 of them listed on GISIS despite some of them having been very 
extensively publicised. Of those listed, most were described very 
inadequately. 
 
On querying this deficiency, the author was advised that IMO Member States 
“…are regularly reminded and requested to make sure they put good and 
comprehensive information up there but it does sometime seem that is not 
always high on their priorities (sic)”.122 This is remarkable given the timely, 
accurate and comprehensive data that is available from the IMO‟s sister 
organisation ICAO describing aviation accidents.123 
 
2.1.6. Available data is disproportionately focused on 
developed countries. 
 
Consequently, the data recorded in the BMPVA database prior to 2000 is 
disproportionately focused on accidents that occurred in developed 
countries.124 It is similarly disproportionately focused on cruise ships because 
their clientele tend to be well off and, therefore, of more interest to the general 
media. 
 
While it makes little or no difference to the overriding trends in the causes of 
such accidents, it significantly distorts the records of the particular states in 
which they occurred. So, because the data gathered over the period 2000-
2015, is far more comprehensive, it has been used here for more detailed 
analysis. 
 
                                                     
119 For example, for Myanmar/Burma there is very little information available for the period 
1962 -2007 because the country was effectively closed to the outside world for most of that 
period. 
120 IMO, GISIS, Ibid. 
121 Worldwide Ferry Safety Association. Annual Report, New York, 2015. 
122 Email from Mr Lee Adamson, Head Public Information Services, Legal and External 
relations Division, IMO, to the author. 10 June 2016. 
123 See, for example, the ICAO Safety Report 2016 Edition, ICAO, Montreal, 2016. 
124 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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The Internet, also, helps to provide us with multiple sources of news that 
effectively confirm or, at least, further validate the data that has to be utilised 
in the absence of any other information. There is thus usually sufficient data 
available to corroborate the descriptions of almost all of the accidents listed.  
 
Unfortunately, however, there is insufficient data available to enable a 
statistical denominator to be created in terms of, for example, fatalities per 
voyage, or fatalities per passenger mile, or per numbers of vessels in service. 
Such figures simply do not exist. 
 
In other words, while much of the data that is available is not strictly empirical, 
it is sufficient to work with for the purpose of this thesis. Put simply, there can 
be very little doubt as to who is at fault or why in the event of a collision, 
allision or grounding or when a vessel proceeds to sea against a very 
definitely predicted typhoon.  
 
2.1.7. Internet dramatically improved data availability.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Fatal accidents reported worldwide. Note the dramatic and 
sustained increase around the year 2000. This coincides with the advent of 
widespread use of the Internet (BMPVA database). 125 
 
Despite the approximately four-fold increase in the numbers of fatal accidents 
per annum reported in the years since 2000, it cannot be assumed that the 
statistics in the BMPVA database are in any way all-encompassing. The 
author believes that due to under-reporting, the real figures for the number of 
accidents and the resulting death toll could be as much 50 per cent higher 
than shown.  
 
Indeed, Philippe Boisson, commenting on the death toll arising from all 
maritime accidents wrote: “This shortage of internationally comparable data 
suggests that official figures could be multiplied by at least ten”.126 
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Given that as the likely situation for the period since the year 2000, it is 
equally likely, because of much worse under-reporting, that the true figures 
could be at least seven or eight times those recorded in the database for the 
prior 34 years from 1966 to 1999. It is distinctly possible that the reality could 
be even worse than that speculated figure as vessels and their equipment 
and, even, governance in some jurisdictions, have improved somewhat over 
the same period. For example, note the relative reductions in numbers of both 
accidents and fatalities in The Philippines shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 below. 
It may be speculated that this improvement is at least partially due to 
increased publicity about ferry accident fatalities leading to a demand from 
passengers/customers for better vessels and behaviour from ferry owners in 
that country. It may also be due, in part, to the improved reporting of accidents 
in other poorly performing countries 
 
As will be seen below and in Chapter 10, such a demand for improved vessels 
has been created and new competitors are entering the industry in the 
Philippines with significantly better and safer vessels. 
 
It is acknowledged, therefore, that the following analysis is somewhat 
restricted by the information that is available. The author is unaware, however, 
of any more comprehensive source of information and has had to work with 
what is available. It is unlikely, therefore, that the trends presented are 
inaccurate in any way other than an under-reading caused by this paucity of 
information. In other words, the extent of the problem will generally be worse 
than shown here. It is very unlikely that the causes of accidents will be any 
different. 
 
2.2.1. Causal analysis of fatal accidents 2000-2015. 
 
Given the much greater availability of reports of accidents and the data arising 
from them since 1 January 2000, it became obvious that, apart from the 
timeliness of the information, its greater quantity provided a much better 
sample for both causal and geographic analyses. Compared with the data 
presented in Chapter 1, which covers the full fifty years of the database, those 
covering its most recent sixteen years provide information that is undoubtedly 
more comprehensive and accurate globally.127  
 
That more recent and more voluminous information, however, largely confirms 
the trends indicated by the full fifty-year statistics. The major author assessed 
causes are generally similar in both the fifty-year and sixteen year samples 
despite the massive change in sample numbers. Probably unsurprisingly, the 
same also applies generally to the geographical analysis of accidents. Apart, 
notably, from the significant relative improvement of the Philippines. An 
improvement which, incidentally, proves that change for the better is 
achievable given the right approaches. Of course, the increase in the volume 
of reporting from Bangladesh, Myanmar and some African countries will be a 
major factor in this change. 
                                                     




It is possible, too, that the relative performance of the Philippines may not 
have been as bad as the BMPVA database statistics indicate. This is a result 
of the relatively greater under-reporting of accidents, pre-Internet, in other 
countries, most notably Myanmar, that do not benefit from the relatively free 
and virile press that is a major attribute of the Philippines. While it is 
impossible to empirically confirm that anomaly, it should be carefully borne in 
mind by anyone analysing relative safety performances between countries, 
particularly in the period prior to 31 December 1999. 
 
Of course, while there has been a distinct improvement, relative to other 
countries, in the performance of the Philippines, in absolute numbers of 
fatalities, the Philippines averaged 149 per annum from 1966 to 1999 but 166 
per annum for the 16 years thereafter. This may simply indicate that the 
Internet factor may have been relatively less important in the Philippines than 
in other countries such as Tanzania, Myanmar and DR Congo, for example. 




































2.2.2. Causal analysis illustrated. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Author assessed causes of fatal passenger vessel accidents 2000-
2015. By accidents, left and fatalities, right. They have changed from the full 
fifty-year survey (below) but not dramatically so except for the marked 






                                                     























Figure 2.3. By comparison, author assessed causes of fatal passenger vessel 
accidents 1966-2015. By accidents, left and fatalities, right (BMPVA 
database).129  
 
2.3.1. Geographical analysis revisited. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Geographical analysis of passenger vessel accidents and fatalities 
2000-2015. By accidents, left and fatalities, right (BMPVA database). 130 
                                                     













































Figure 2.5. By comparison, geographical analysis of passenger vessel 
accidents and fatalities 1966-2015. By accidents, left and by fatalities, right 
(BMPVA database). 131 Note that, because of an absence of data, Myanmar is 
not included in either of these comparisons. 
 
2.3.2. National fatality rates have remained largely consistent. 
 
Notably, the ten most dangerous nations for ferry travel measured both by 
numbers of accidents and numbers of fatalities remained the same over both 
the fifty and sixteen year periods studied although their rankings did change 
somewhat. They are: The Philippines, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Tanzania, DR 
Congo, China, India, the United States and Haiti. With the exception of the 
United States and the possible or partial exception of China, all are classed as 
developing countries. Of the ten, only India, the United States, Indonesia and 
The Philippines enjoy the benefit of a mostly free press. None, except perhaps 
the United States, could be described as having an independent, objective 
and usually corruption-free bureaucracy. This, as noted above, can be an 
impediment to the timely, accurate and detailed reporting of accidents of any 
kind. 
 
Generally, developing countries tend to be dangerous countries. This applies 
to all forms of transport, except, generally, aviation, and to many other 
aspects of daily life. However, even the United States is home to a significant 
underclass of comparatively poor people, much more so than most other 
developed countries. Perhaps that is the reason why it is the only so-called 
                                                                                                                                                        
130 Ibid. 

























„developed‟ country to appear in these statistics. It should be noted, also, that 
the USA has a far worse record of road accident fatalities than most other 
developed nations.132 There would appear to be a definite cultural/behavioural 
connection there. 
 
An interesting and encouraging improvement that emerged over the final 
sixteen years of the survey is that the Philippines improved from worst place 
for fatalities with 18.2 per cent to fifth place with 8.4 per cent.133 However, 
more comprehensive accident reporting in other developing countries is 
probably the main reason for the improvement in the relative position of the 
Philippines. The reported number of ferry fatalities per annum there actually 
increased from 2000 to 2015. 
 
The statistics from the BMPVA database illustrate that relative improvement 
well.134 Over the same period, by contrast, Tanzania saw many more and 
worse accidents. It is suspected, though, that this may have largely been 
because of more complete recording of accidents in that country since 1999. 
Meanwhile, Bangladesh experienced no noticeable improvement with an 
average of four fatal accidents per annum with an average of 379 fatalities 
arising from each. 
 
Tanzania has commenced to introduce larger vessels on a number of its 
coastal ferry routes, particularly from Dar-es-Salam to Zanzibar. Two of them, 
Spice Islander and Skagit, sank with massive loss of life in 2011 and 2012 
respectively. It seems that larger or even newer vessels do not always 
guarantee greater passenger safety.  
 
Even brand new ferries have not engendered any notable improvement in 
safety consciousness in Tanzania. The tragic „nose-dive‟ in 2014 of the 2010 
built Kiliminjaro II  provided a clear illustration of that.135 
 
2.3.3. Statistics are generally significantly understated. 
 
It must again be emphasised that the figures listed above are almost certainly 
significantly underestimated, Indeed, in April 1988, Feliciana G. Salonga, then 
president of the Philippines Shipyard and Engineering Corporation, estimated 
that 40,000 people died in Philippine waters each year.136 The Philippine 
Government disputed that and suggested the real figure was more like 20,000 
to 30,000 per annum!137 
 
There are, obviously, numerous small accidents that are not regarded as 
newsworthy.138 And, if a senior officer of the Philippine Coast Guard conceded 
                                                     
132 Refer to Figure 4.2. 
133 Appendix A, Ibid. 
134 Ibid 
135 See Appendix A. 
136 Refer to 1.3.1. Feliciana G. Salonga. 
137 Subsequent comment to the author from Commo Gueltiero dela Cruz, PCG retd. See 
Personnae. 
138 Hooke, N, Maritime Casualties 1963 – 1996, Second edition, LLP, London, 1997, P.174. 
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that such large numbers were correct, it can be assumed that the totality is 
considerably worse than the available statistics concerning the Philippines 
and a number of similar countries suggest. 
 
It seems very reasonable to assume that the same realities apply in most of 
the other developing countries examined here and thus that the overall 
accident and fatality statistics presented here significantly underestimate the 
actual figures.  
2.3.4. Known fatal ferry accidents. 
The Worst Five Countries: 1 January 2000-31 December 2015 
           
                      
YEAR BANGLADESH INDONESIA TANZANIA D.R.CONGO PHILIPPINES 
                      
  Accd Fatal Accd Fatal Accd Fatal Accd Fatal Accd Fatal 
2000  4   560   3   611  0     0     0     0     7   384  
2001  1   100   3   41   0     0     1   143   3   36  
2002  3   537   4   128   2   160   0     0     5   94  
2003  8   1,284   3   91   1   33   1   282   5   149  
2004  6   441   1   273   0     0     3   452   2   191  
2005  7   950   3   226   2   49   3   250   2   8  
2006  8   224   9   1,246   1   28   3   250   4   94  
2007  3   238   3   188   0     0     1   39   5   112  
2008  3   212   1   9   1   37   1   13   5   1,001  
2009  4   310   6   390   3   56   1   110   4   164  
2010  4   138   2   33   0     0     4   493   0     0    
2011  4   173   8   186   1   2,976   3   300   3   6  
2012  2   320   3   105   1   293   0     0     3   33  
2013  2   69   3   37   1   33   0     0     2   250  
2014  2   370   3   33   1   25   3   569   1   8  
2015  4   203   4   220   0     0     2   107   3   154  
Total  65   6,129   59   3,817   14   3,690   26   3,008   54   2,684  
Average 




94 65 264 116 50 
 
Table 2.1. A comparison of fatal accident and fatality data from the five most 
dangerous countries (That represent about 61% of the known total) for ferry 
accident fatalities - 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2015. The Philippines 
improved from worst to fifth worst country in terms of fatalities per annum in 
that period (BMPVA database).139 Note that Myanmar should be on this list. 




                                                     
139 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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2.3.5. Data analysis inadequacies 
 
This is why considerable caution must be exercised when analysing and 
interpreting the data compiled in the BMPVA database. While it is undoubtedly 
the best available, it is, equally undoubtedly, incomplete. Further, this data, 
while it is largely based on newspaper and online news service reports, has, 
as far as undeveloped nations are concerned, no official status such as might 
enhance the veracity of reports of Marine Boards of Inquiry and similar 
investigations in developed countries. 
 
Given these constraints, though, there is sufficient consistency of information 
to enable usefully accurate conclusions to be drawn. It seems very unlikely 
that, even if full and detailed reports were available on all accidents, the 
trends on which this thesis is based would be any different. They are 
overwhelmingly consistent worldwide and over both the sixteen year and fifty 
year time spans. There is also a remarkably close correlation between the 
author-assessed causes of the accidents and their geographical locations. 
 
2.3.6. Analytical methodology. 
 
Similarly, the fact that the causes attributed to all the accidents recorded in the 
database are „author-assessed‟ inarguably implies subjectivity. This is not 
disputed but the assessments have been made consistently and, while the 
author in no way claims to be in a position similar to that of the chairman of an 
MBOI, it is impossible to argue that a collision, overloading or grounding, for 
example, could have any cause other than human error. Judgements as to 
seaworthiness are more nebulous but, if a vessel disintegrates or catches fire 
while in service, there is very little doubt as to that reality. 
 
In an endeavour to present as much detailed information as possible about 
each known accident, the data has been presented across 22 fields. They are: 
Day, Month, Year, Region, Country, Detailed Location, Type of Incident, 
Number of Deaths, Vessel Name, Flag State, Vessel Type, Hull Construction 
Material, Tonnage (GRT), Length (Metres), Year Built, Ship Builder, Ship 
Owner, Claimed Cause, Author Assessed Cause, Inquiry Adjudication, 
Explanatory Notes, and Information Sources. Obviously, in many cases, not 
all fields could be completed because of information scarcity. 
 
This process became something of a „jig-saw puzzle‟ in that information often 
had to be extracted from a number of sources and, in many cases, interpreted 
to facilitate its useful presentation. Indeed, information continues to be 
discovered even many years after the event concerned. A significant 
variability exists, therefore, as to the accuracy of the data presented. The 
processes applied to the data gathering were consistent, however, and the 
author firmly believes that no more extensive or accurate data exists. The 
absence of significant inconsistencies in the data collected and analysed 
confirms that, taken across the whole database, the figures used to determine 





2.4.1. Causes of passenger vessel accidents. 
 
While the data available was frequently sparse and somewhat nebulous, the 
investigatory process eventually uncovered sufficient information for the 
author to assess, admittedly subjectively, the most likely cause of almost 
every accident. In addition, an even greater number of non-fatal accidents 
were also examined and the causal trends were precisely consistent with the 
fatal accidents. The substantial quantity of data collated provides good 
grounds to believe that the trends that it reveals are accurate. Any resulting 
inaccuracies are considered, therefore, to be immaterial. The BMPVA 
database has been seen by many people with an interest in the subject of 
ferry safety. Not one has pointed out any inaccuracies. 
 
Across the total of 750 accidents examined and assessed, practically all had 
been the subject of some kind of media or government report.140 While the 
reported details varied significantly in both quantity and quality, in almost 
every case enough information was available to enable the author to sensibly 
and objectively assess the likely cause.  
 
Again, the consistency of the trends revealed tends to confirm the overall 
accuracy of the data. In the case of almost every accident examined and 
assessed, the facts were clear and the cause obvious. The accidents that 
were the subject of really nebulous reports have been classed in the „All 
Others‟ category. They amounted to fewer than eight per cent of the accidents 
listed. 
 
Indeed, the statistics for author-assessed causes as to total numbers of 
accidents and fatalities over both the full fifty-year period surveyed and the 
most recent sixteen years are practically identical. Over both periods the 
figure for numbers of accidents assessed to be caused by human error is 
identical at 88 per cent. The percentages of fatalities believed to have arisen 
from human error caused accidents were 99 per cent in the period 2000-2015 
and 98 per cent for the fifty years from 1966 to 2015.141 It must be noted, 
though, as shown below, that the detailed reasons for those human errors 












                                                     




2.4.2. Human error, undoubtedly, is overwhelmingly and 
consistently the major cause of fatal accidents. 
 
The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association has analysed, ”… 147 ferry accidents 
worldwide to determine what proportion of accidents are caused by human 
error(HE)”.142 In summary, it determined that 61 per cent of accidents and 75 
per cent of fatalities were caused by human error using a „conservative‟ 
approach. However, taking a „liberal‟ approach, it attributed 85 per cent of 
accidents and 92 per cent of fatalities to human error. Although gained from a 
considerably smaller sample (147 cf. 570) over a similar period (14 cf.15 
years), the results are similar to those estimated by the author who takes a 
more rigorous approach to seaworthiness in particular than does the WFSA. 
 
A more recent study Statistical analysis of ship accidents and review of safety 
level, by Eleftheria, E. et al,  looked at accidents involving all ship types above 
100gt from 2000 to 2012. It concluded that: “…an overwhelming part of 
marine accidents (more than abt. 80%) is attributable to human factors…”.143 
 
As the author has commented elsewhere: 
 
 Their causes are primarily unseaworthy vessels, poor lookout, overloading 
and downright negligence, none of which can be blamed on anything but 
human error. 
 
Structural and mechanical failures, of which there are remarkably few, cannot 
be blamed for collisions, allisions, groundings and capsizes due to 
overloading. They can all be put down to human error. So, in other words, the 
main problems are predominantly behavioural and cultural rather than 
mechanical or structural. Our naval architects, ship builders and engine 
manufacturers do a pretty good job.144 
 
Numerous other commentators have come to similar conclusions with respect 
to the importance of human error or human factors in maritime, particularly 
passenger vessel, accidents. Indeed, some have even gone so far as to 
suggest that it is the only cause of accidents. In a sense, perhaps an extreme 
one, it could be argued that such a proposition is reasonable. However, most 
commentators allow for the possibility that there can be some other causal 
factors. 
 
A very useful, comprehensive and extensively researched government 
document that examines the human element in shipping was published in 
2010 by the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency. It concurs with the author‟s 
assertion that practically 100 per cent of maritime accidents are directly or 
indirectly attributable to human element issues. It, “…explains the 
                                                     
142 Golden, A.S. & Weisbrod, R.E. Trends, Causal Analysis, and Recommendations from 14 
Years of Ferry Accidents, Journal of Public Transportation, Vol 19, No 1, 2016. 
143 Eleftheria, E. et al. Statistical analysis of ship accidents and review of safety level, Safety 
Science 85 (2016), pp. 282-292, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 2016. 
144 Baird, N.W. Passenger vessel accidents are preventable, Work Boat World, March 2016, 
Baird Publications, Melbourne 2016, Editorial, p.5. 
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fundamental aspects of human behaviour and the complex interactions of 
human element issues in the maritime industry”. More specifically, “It shows 
how the human element needs to be managed simultaneously at all levels in 
the industry, on board ship, within companies and amongst regulators, and it 
provides effective, pragmatic guidance on how these issues can be 
addressed”.145  
 
2.4.3. Defining human error. 
 
Human error has been well defined by Michelle Grech and colleagues as: “An 
inappropriate or undesirable human decision or behaviour that leads to 
undesirable outcomes or has significant potential for such an outcome. 
Accumulation of errors may result in accidents”.146 IMO defines human error 
as: “… a departure from acceptable or desirable practice on the part of an 
individual or group of individuals that can result in unacceptable or 
undesirable results”.147 
 
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) describes the related concept of 
„human factors‟ as “the study and analysis of the design of the equipment, the 
interaction of the equipment and the human operator, and most importantly 
the procedures the crew and management follow”.148 
 
Over the fifty year period examined in this thesis considerable work, analysis, 
study, evaluation and promotion has been directed at the specific problem of 
human error and, more generally, at human factors, human behaviour and 
safety. A considerable part of that effort has been set against a background of 
transportation activity of which, of course, maritime transport is a major 
component. That effort has resulted generally in impressive and important 
improvements in terms of reductions in the numbers of accidents and of their 
resulting fatalities. 
 
Eleftheria et al highlight the “remarkable example” of “the improvement of 
safety of tanker operations after year 1990…”.149 Given IMO‟s key role in 
those reforms, they offer an excellent example or model of what could be 
achieved if IMO were to cooperate similarly with the ferry sector. 
 
While its performance has improved, the maritime industry, apart from the oil 
tanker and cruise ship sectors, has generally not enjoyed the same dramatic 
rate of improvement that has benefitted the aviation and road transport 
sectors, especially in the developed world, over that same period. The 
passenger vessel sub-sector has, unfortunately, been similarly slow to 
improve as the wider maritime sector.  
 
                                                     
145 Anon. The Human Element – a Guide to Human Behaviour in the Shipping Industry, MCA, 
Southampton, 2010. 
146 Grech, M.R., Horberry, T.J, and Koester, T. Human Factors in the Maritime Domain, CRC 
Press, Boca Raton, 2008, Glossary. 
147 IMO. Human Element Taxonomy. MSC 67/12/3, 12 Sept. 1996. Annex 3. 
148 Boisson, Ibid. 
149 Eleftheria, E, et al., Ibid. 
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 The London based Nautical Institute (NI)150 has published an excellent 
handbook on this subject.151 It describes how: “A system of examinations for 
aviation pilots in human performance and limitation has produced great 
advances in safety for that sector”. It shows how those developments can be 
adapted to the maritime sector to effect similar improvements in human 
factors. As is described in chapters 1, 4 and 7, there is much to be gained by 
the maritime industry from emulating aviation industry practices. 
 
2.4.4. Considerable attention accorded to human error. 
 
Given their importance as contributing factors in maritime accidents, 
considerable attention has been accorded to human error, human factors and 
human behaviour by organisations such as the Nautical Institute, the 
classification societies, numerous national authorities and IMO. Numerous 
seminars and conferences on the subject have been presented and resulting 
reports published as can be seen in the Bibliography herewith. These events 
have not been wasted and considerable progress made, particularly in the 
field of cognitive psychology. This is discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
Undoubtedly the single most effective initiative on the part of IMO since the 
imposition of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS)152 a century ago 
was its adoption of the International Safety Management Code (ISM) 
in1993.153 This followed soon after the Herald of Free Enterprise and 
Scandinavian Star accidents and its implementation was hastened by the 
Estonia sinking in 1994. Notably, all three of these accidents occurred in 
European waters and their significant loss of life over a six-year period 
inspired rapid reform in northern Europe at least.154  
 
Paragraph 1.2.2 of the ISM Code lists three main objectives for safety 
management. They are: to “…provide for safe practices in ship operation and 
a safe working environment; establish safeguards against all identified risks; 
and continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and 
aboard ships, including preparing for emergencies both to safety and 
environmental protection”.155 
 
Importantly, the ISM Code covers all passenger vessels with no lower gross 
tonnage or age limits although non-SOLAS vessels may be exempted from 
mandatory compliance.156 As explained in Chapter 8, however, its 
enforcement in poorer countries has been patchy, to say the least, with the 
result that safety improvements have been less impressive than in the 
                                                     
150 The Nautical Institute is a London based, international institution for master mariners that 
supports and encourages research into nautical operations, particularly safety. 
151 Squire, D. et al, Human Performance and Limitation for Mariners, Nautical Institute, 
London, 2015. 
152 Safety of Life at Sea Convention, IMO, London, 1919. 
153 International Safety Management Code, IMO, London, 1993. 
154 Appendix A, Ibid 
155 IMO. International Safety Management Code and Guidelines on the Implementation of the 
ISM Code, London, 1997. 
156 IMO ISM Code, Ibid. 
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developed world. Poverty and its accompanying corruption make 
improvement much more difficult there.   
 
The author has commented further on this factor elsewhere: 
 
So, the blame for all this death and destruction can pretty much be sheeted 
home to owners, crews and regulators. They are failing dismally and mostly, 
but not entirely, in the poorer parts of the world. Never forget, though, the 
Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star, Estonia, Express Samina, 
Staten Island Ferry, Sewol, and Costa Concordia, for example. You can still 
be killed in a passenger vessel accident in the western „developed‟ world but 
your chances of survival are much better there.157 
 
Examining the major causes of passenger vessel fatalities, that is: 
overloading; inadequate seaworthiness; poor lookout; negligence; and, poor 
seamanship, such as sailing into hazardous weather, we find that those 
various forms of human error comprise 98 per cent of the causes of such 
fatalities over the full fifty years examined. If we look at numbers of fatal 
accidents, rather than fatalities, they are almost exactly 88 per cent human 
error induced for the same period. Despite having more comprehensive and, 
presumably, accurate reporting, since 2000, we have not noticed a decline in 
the percentage of fatal accidents caused by human error. That is not 
encouraging. However, in terms of fatalities, the percentage of known deaths 
attributable to human error has become slightly worse since 2000. That is 
thought provoking. 
 
An interesting comment on the problem comes from a non-mariner source. 
The following was published in the 2015 edition of Lonely Planet – 
Philippines, a travel guide, under the heading „Ferry Safety‟: 
 
 For the most part ferries are an easy, enjoyable way to hop between islands 
in the Philippines, but ferry accidents are not unknown. Bad weather, lax 
regulations and maintenance, equipment breakdowns, overcrowding and a 
general culture of fatalism are to blame.158 
 
A „culture of fatalism‟ or the „karma‟ factor is an interesting concept that seems 
worth investigating and will be in Chapter 5. Suffice to say that it is probably 
endemic in most if not all the cultures that prevail where the majority of the 
world‟s fatal ferry accidents occur. It may well be a significant contributor to 
some of the human error factors that seem to be behind so many of the 
accidents examined here. 
 
There are those, though, who believe that a high percentage of human error 
causes is a good thing because it means that technical causes are fewer and 
that human errors can be eliminated. This view is, perhaps, not so perverse 
as it may seem at first glance. In fact it has been well argued by Captain Ed 
Verbeek, an Amsterdam marine pilot, in the Nautical Institute‟s magazine 
                                                     
157 Baird, N. W. Passenger vessel accidents are preventable, Op cit. 




Seaways. He commented, “… I am shocked that after thousands of years of 
designing, building and equipping ships, the technology is still so frail that one 
out of five (Vandeek‟s figure) accidents has technical causes”.159  
 
Most would dispute his view but there is a certain odd logic to it. Others, 
again, believe that all accidents are the result of human error or human 
factors. Self-evidently, if you investigate far enough back, almost every 
technical, mechanical or structural cause must be the result of human error in 
design, manufacturing or maintenance if not just in operations. 
 
This, obviously, is the key to the whole problem of maritime accidents whether 
they involve cargo ships, naval vessels, cruise ships or ferries. Practically 
every accident is ultimately caused by human error of some kind. That, at 
least, gives reformers something to work with. Fortunately, human behaviour 
can be modified and improved to a considerable extent. The aviation industry, 
the oil tanker sector in shipping, and the developed world‟s road traffic 
authorities, in particular, have shown that there are many ways in which such 
human errors can be significantly reduced, if not eliminated entirely. That is 





























                                                     




2.5.1. Human errors that cause passenger vessel accidents. 
 






Image 2.2. Typical examples of gross overloading of top-heavy ferries in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh. This is the norm in all the developing countries where 
most ferry accident fatalities occur (www.nigerianmonitor.com). 
 
Overloading of ferries and the associated falsification or total absence of 
passenger manifests is undoubtedly the most deliberate or wilful type of 
human error that leads to passenger vessel accidents. Overloading has been 
and remains the major cause of the fatalities that arise from passenger vessel 
accidents. Such accidents normally happen in the form of capsizing or sinking 
or both. Overloading is widely practiced in developing countries and it is 
probably only good luck and generally benign sea or river conditions that 
prevent many more accidents occurring with their resulting fatalities. It is the 
factor that consistently leads to the greatest number of fatalities per accident. 
 
The incidence of overloading caused accidents has remained almost constant 
over the full fifty years of the survey but, in the final sixteen years, the 
percentage of fatalities arising from overloading caused accidents has 
increased from the long-term figure of 34 per cent to 39 per cent. This is 
significant and can probably be attributed to more widespread ferry travel 
accompanying recently improving economic conditions in some developing 
countries. It is particularly disappointing given that all the efforts of IMO, 
inspired and goaded by INTERFERRY and the WFSA are not bearing even a 
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small amount of fruit.160 It is to be hoped, though, that IMO will not be so 
disappointed as to desist from its efforts. Better focused and directed, they will 
be able to make a difference. 
 
Reductions in or elimination of the overloading problem will only come about 
with improvements in the training and education of crews and the introduction 
of practical regulations and their rigorous enforcement. Those regulations will 
be required to control the behaviour of owners and masters as well as local 
authorities as they are often corruptly complicit in such overloading. Better 
designed vessels such as those advocated by Stuart Ballantyne that “run out 
of deck space before they run out of buoyancy or stability” will also lead to 
significant reductions in fatalities when they are eventually brought into 
service.161  
 
Some incidents of overloading noted in the BMPVA database could not be 
blamed on owners or masters.162 At least two were the result of passengers 
forcing masters to put to sea against their better judgement by threats or by 
simply untying the vessel‟s mooring lines. Nevertheless, the majority of such 
incidents are due to greedy owners who also, on occasion, have forced 
reluctant masters to put to sea. In many of those cases the owners have been 





Image 2.3. Overloaded ferries are nothing new. This 1649 painting of a Dutch 
river ferry by Salomon van Ruysdael (1600-1670) illustrates the problem well 
(Rijksmuseum). 
 
                                                     
160 INTERFERRY, Press release, IMO head to address INTERFERRY conference in boost for 
safety campaign, London, 3 February 2016 (He eventually failed to attend the conference). 
161 Ballantyne, S. Ibid. 
162 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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Melbourne broadcaster Jon Faine and his son Jack, in their book From Here 
to There – A Father and Son Road Trip from Melbourne to London, described 
an Indonesian ferry voyage from Kupang on West Timor to Larantuka on 
Flores that took place in 2009 under the chapter heading „Scary Ferry‟.163 
Commencing with their description of the need for bribery to even board the 
ferry, the poor condition of the ship and its gross overloading of people, cargo, 
vehicles and animals, the whole experience is dystopian. No-smoking signs 
are blatantly ignored and rubbish is continually thrown over the side. It is, 
indeed, a scary ferry but it is the well-described reality of ferry travel in much 
of the developing world. 
 
2.5.3. Unseaworthy vessels. 
 
As assessed by the author from a very careful examination of the information 
contained in the BMPVA database over the full, fifty-year, period of this study, 
unseaworthy vessels have been the second most important factor in that they 
have been blamed for 36 per cent of fatal accidents and 31 per cent of 
fatalities. That factor also worsened in the final sixteen-year period when the 
percentages increased to 40 per cent and 38 per cent respectively.164 
 
While the information in the database is often limited, it is difficult to argue that 
capsizes can have causes other than overloading, collisions, groundings, 
allisions or inadequate seaworthiness. All can only be due to human error. 
 
Unseaworthy vessels are usually made that way by negligence and, for the 
purposes of this thesis, are described separately because they remain a 
specific form of negligence. Almost without exception, unseaworthy vessels 
are older vessels that have not been properly maintained or have been badly 
modified to increase their carrying capacity.  
 
The exceptions, which are usually newer vessels, have invariably been poorly 
– read negligently – designed or constructed. Such vessels, also almost 
invariably, have been insufficiently carefully surveyed or examined by the 
appropriate government authority or a classification society if they have been 
surveyed at all. Further, even younger vessels can be poorly maintained. 
Again, this factor is closely related to negligence and frequently involves 
corruption of maritime authority or classification society surveyors.165 
 
Vessels can become unseaworthy as a result of structural, mechanical or 
equipment deficiencies often caused by corrosion or rust. Structural and 
mechanical deficiencies are normally the result of inadequate maintenance or 
of poorly designed and often illegal modifications. They are usually in the form 
of adding extra decks that adversely affect stability as can be seen in Image 
2.5.166  
 
                                                     
163 Faine, J. & J. From Here to There, ABC Books/Harper Collins, Sydney, 2010. 
164 Appendix A, Ibid. 
165 As described in the Rabaul Queen and Sewol  inquiry reports, described in 3.24 and 3.25. 
166 See, for example, the Al Salam Boccaccio, described and pictured below in Image 2.5. and 
in Chapter 3. 
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Others are inherently unseaworthy thanks to poor conception and detailed 
design and inadequate construction. The Filipino motor bancas, or bangcas, 
are examples of this problem. They have been involved in numerous fatal 
accidents. Bancas are essentially built around a narrow, canoe-bodied central 
hull that is inherently unstable without the flimsy wooden or bamboo 
outriggers that are, often poorly, attached for the purpose of making the 
vessels stable. These structures are often insufficiently strong when 
constructed, often held together by string or fishing line, and then are poorly 
maintained. This can be made worse by the, sometimes careless, operation of 
such vessels. So, unseaworthy vessels can be, and frequently are, made 
even more dangerous by poor seamanship. 
 
Fortunately, motor bancas, as seen in Image 2.4, rarely exceed 30 metres in 
length so, while they are too frequently involved in fatal accidents, the number 
of fatalities arising is generally fewer than 100 in each case. They could easily 
and quite inexpensively be more substantially constructed so as to make them 
safer but, as with all such dangers in the Philippines, culture, tradition and 
poverty are the ultimate sources of such problems. There is nothing inherently 
wrong with the design concept, just their flimsy construction, inadequate 
maintenance, insufficient outrigger float buoyancy and careless operation. 
They could, relatively easily and inexpensively, be made significantly safer. 
 
A major cause of accidents in many developing countries is that a high 
proportion of ferries, particularly in more remote areas, were never designed 
to carry large numbers of people. Often they are not much more than dinghies 
or canoes intended for purely inshore work carrying very small loads. They 
are unseaworthy by reason of being too small and completely unfit for 
purpose and are made much more so by gross overloading. 
 
It should be noted, too, that even large, comparatively modern vessels can be 
inherently unseaworthy. As described at length in Chapter 6, conventional 
monohull Ro-Pax ferries, with their large vehicle access doors and their open, 
low vehicle decks, have a disproportionately poor accident record (See, for 
example, Image 2.5.). Some 30 per cent of the fatalities listed in the Baird 
Maritime Passenger Vessel accident database occurred in such vessels 
(Thirty-two per cent in the 2000-2015 period).167 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is entirely possible that an inherently 
unseaworthy vessel could be safely sailed around the world by a competent 
seaman.168 The problem in many developing countries is that unseaworthy 
vessels are often combined with less than competent, or even careful, 
captains. Indeed, as mentioned elsewhere, even some very modern, properly 
designed and constructed and well-equipped vessels have come to grief 
because of operator errors. Costa Concordia, Kilimanjaro II and Sliepner are 
good examples of those.169  
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Image 2.4. A Filipino motor banca. Note the flimsy structure, mostly utilising 
string or monofilament fishing line, attaching the “outriggers” to the central 
“canoe” hull which combines with the almost complete absence of buoyancy 
in the outrigger floats to make the vessel dangerous in all but the most benign 
conditions (Wikipedia). 
 
In Bangladesh the ferries tend to be larger and more substantial than in Africa 
or Southeast Asia but they are often poorly modified to increase their 
passenger capacity by adding decks at the expense of reducing their stability. 
 
 This problem has not been confined to Bangladesh, it is simply more 
common there. Indeed, the author recalls travelling on Greek ferries in the 
Aegean Sea in the mid-1970s when he always slept and stayed on deck. This 
was due to his fear that the stability of those ships had been compromised by 
the addition of extra decks with very inadequate, if any, compensation in the 
form of sponsons added at the ship‟s waterline. Few, if any, such ships 
continue to operate in the northern Mediterranean. If not yet scrapped, they 
are likely to be operating in Africa. 
 
This flow of elderly vessels of declining seaworthiness from northern and 
richer countries to poorer southern ones has been a significant contributing 
factor in some of the major and most deadly accidents in Greece, parts of 
Africa, the Philippines and Indonesia. The Dona Paz, Le Joola, Spice Islander, 
Skagit, Princess of the Stars, Al Salam Boccaccio 98, Superferry 14, Filipino 
Princess, Princess of the Orient, Dashun, Senopati Nusantara, Express 
Samina, Teretai Prima, and St Thomas of Aquinas are examples of mostly 
conventional monohull Ro-Pax vessels listed in the BMPVA database that 
served safely for years in their countries of origin but, thanks to age, neglect, 
dangerous modifications and, often, poor seamanship, were involved in 
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deadly accidents in their new homes and roles.170  That phenomenon has 




Image 2.5. The Al Salam Boccaccio 98 was a typical example of a 
dangerously modified former European, in this case Italian, ferry with 
additional, stability robbing decks added, theoretically counterbalanced by 
sponsons added at the waterline. Its wide-opening, low vehicle access doors 
and unobstructed, full length, low vehicle deck made it particularly vulnerable. 
It was involved in a deadly accident resulting in 1,022 fatalities in February 
2006 in the Red Sea (Wikipedia).  
 
There was and, to some degree still is, a clear movement of elderly ferries 
from north to south. When ferries become obsolete, worn out or redundant in 
northern Europe or North America they tend to be sold to poorer countries in 
the Mediterranean and then on to Africa. In the case of elderly Japanese 
ferries, they tend to be sold to the Philippines and then on to Indonesia. With 
every transaction they seem to become more decrepit and more dangerously 
modified so as to pack in yet more passengers. Many of the vessels involved 
in fatal accidents in the Philippines, Korea and Indonesia had been „retired‟ 
from Japan some years previously. The same applies to former Baltic ferries 
that are „handed down‟ through Greece, Italy, Spain and, later, Africa and Iran. 
 
Seaworthiness deficiencies, then, have many parents. Poor design and 
construction, inadequate maintenance and stability robbing modifications are 
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some of the more obvious ones. They are all due to human factors, mostly 
negligence and greed. 
 
2.5.4. Poor lookout. 
 
Poor lookout is the third most important cause of accidents across the whole 
fifty years of the survey at 22 per cent and has led to an equal percentage of 
fatalities. However, in the most recent sixteen-year period this reduced to 20 
per cent of accidents and only nine per cent of fatalities (See Figures 2.2. and 
2.3.) This is the most encouraging area of recent improvement and would tend 
to indicate an increase in crew training and educational standards. It is too big 
a discrepancy to be attributable to increases in information availability. 
 
Collisions, allisions and groundings are all and can only be the result of the 
common human errors of failing to maintain a good lookout or, much more 
rarely, the removal of a navigation aid. They cannot be blamed on any other 
technical or behavioural cause. They have been a major cause of maritime 
accidents throughout history but the effects of such events have worsened as 
vessel speeds have increased, particularly over the past half-century. 
 
While it is pleasing to note the recent declines in both the numbers of poor 
lookout caused accidents and, particularly, their resultant fatalities, an 
alarming new trend has been drawn to the author‟s attention. That is the 
mesmerising effect of modern electronic navigation instruments on, mostly 
younger, officers. A number of senior ship‟s masters and coast guard officers 
have complained to the author and in the maritime media of the unwillingness 
of junior navigating officers to „look out the bridge window‟.171 It seems that too 
many of them prefer to focus on radar and GPS plotter screens rather than to 
use their own eyes to achieve situational awareness. This trait has led to the 
increasingly widely accepted and ironically described phenomenon of „radar  
assisted collisions‟ or „GPS assisted groundings‟.172  
 
Renowned master mariner and maritime journalist Michael Grey has written 
on the subject including recently under the heading: “The eyes have it”. There 
he commented on a neatly printed sign he saw in a ship‟s bridge. It read: 
“Don‟t forget to look out the window”. As he added, “Generation Y officers still 
need to use their eyes”.173 
 
It has also led to groundings such as the January 2013 incident involving the 
American mine hunter USS Guardian on a coral reef in Visayas region of the 
Philippines. That has been blamed on an over reliance on insufficiently 
accurate electronic charts.174 Two subsequent fatal collisions between 
American destroyers and merchant vessels in the Pacific Ocean and South 
                                                     
171 For example, Commodore Gueltiero dela Cruz, former Chief of Staff of the Philippine 
Coast Guard. 
172 Grech, M.R, et al. Op cit. p. 5. 
173 From the “Grey Power” column written by Michael Grey, Work Boat World, Baird 
Publications, Melbourne, June 2017, P 6. 
174 Couttie, R. Lessons from The Guardian Grounding – Don‟t Trust Charts, Marine Accident 
Casebook, Manila, 19 January 2013, www.maritimeaccident.org/tags/philippines/  
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China Sea and a grounding off Japan in 2017 have been attributed to poor 
lookout and inadequate bridge management.175 
 
The aviation industry has noted this phenomenon of „automation overreliance‟ 
and is working vigorously to overcome it. Indeed, in January 2016, the United 
States Department of Transportation issued a recommendation suggesting 
that, “…enhanced Federal Aviation Authority oversight was needed by way of 
guidance to train and evaluate pilots and to develop standards to determine 
whether pilots received sufficient opportunities to maintain and demonstrate 
their manual flying skills”.176 
 
The problem of maintaining an adequate lookout can be the result of many 
behavioural deficiencies commencing with poor training and running through 
poor bridge discipline; fatigue; the health problems of poor eyesight and 
weakness due to influenza, malnutrition and similar ailments; and, the 
electronic distractions mentioned above.177 All such deficiencies can be 
reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by better management, training, discipline 
and leadership. The significant reduction in the percentage of fatalities due to 
poor lookout over the final fifteen years illustrates the benefits of such 
improvements quite convincingly. 
 
Grech, Squire and others, as we shall see in Chapter 8, have analysed the 
problem of the fatigue that leads to poor watchkeeping and considerable work 
has been done by the United States Coast Guard and IMO, among others, to 
ameliorate it. The Nautical Institute has continued to organise conferences 
and publish on the human element and its relationships to maritime accidents. 
Its influence is both beneficial and effective. Typical of the NI‟s efforts was a 
two-day conference held in New Delhi in 2008. It focused on the subjects of 
“Human Element and People” and “Human Element and Resources” under 
the general heading of “Modern Watchkeeping and the Human Element”.178 
That kind of event does contribute to the general raising of awareness of the 
problem. It was helpful that it was held in Asia and, so, was closer to the 
epicentre of the problem. 
 
The reduction in fatalities attributable to poor lookout, encouraging as it may 
be, still shows that while better crew training is certainly effective, it has only 
reduced the importance of poor lookout as a cause of fatalities from second 
most important to fourth. There is a long way to go but it is clear that 
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2.5.5. General negligence. 
 
This factor has remained almost constant in rankings of importance as a 
cause of accidents over the fifty-year period surveyed but has declined 
somewhat as a cause of fatalities.179 It would seem there has been a slight 
improvement in the provision of lifesaving and fire-fighting equipment and of 
its maintenance since the start of the third millennium. 
 
Certainly, the author has noted a tightening of regulations and their 
enforcement in, for example, Thailand and the Philippines. In both, it has 
recently been made compulsory, in the case of smaller boats, not only for 
lifejackets to be on board but worn by all passengers.180 
 
In the Philippines, too, it has been noted on the more modern and faster 
ferries, at least, that aviation-like safety briefings are given and that clean new 
lifejackets are stowed in appropriate, well-signed and obvious places. 
Inflatable liferafts, that appear to be properly maintained are also accessibly 
fitted. This is an important and encouraging development. In contrast, the 
author observed two vessels recently in the United Kingdom where the 
inflatable liferafts were stowed so as to require a crane to launch them. How 
those vessels passed MCA survey is a mystery.181 
 
It is interesting, in this context, to compare the noticeable improvement over 
the past fifteen years in the Philippines with the continuing death toll in 
Bangladesh. Indonesia and Tanzania where few or no such improvements 
seem to have been made.182 (See Figures 2.4. and 2.5.). Similarly, no notable 
improvement has been seen in the cruise ship sector where fires, suicides 
and viral epidemics continue to occur at much the same rates as previously. 
They are all, ultimately, the result of negligence. 
 
 
                                                     
179 Appendix A, Ibid. 
180 While the carrying of lifejackets and even wearing them is now enforced in much of the 
Philippines, China and Thailand, from recent observation by the author, many of those 
lifejackets are of poor quality and ill-fitting. Few would be acceptable in developed countries. 
They are, however, better than nothing. 
181 Observed on ferries operating from Penzance to the Scilly Isles and Ilfracombe to Lundy 
Island in June 2013. 
182 Indeed, in April 2008, the author chartered a small ferry in Zanzibar and had to wait an 
hour for the owner to search Stone Town (the capital) for sufficient life jackets for those 





Image 2.6. Modern, well-designed and constructed ferries that have been built 
and equipped to international standards, such as this FastCat Ro-Pax are 
contributing to a significant improvement in the ferry safety record of the 
Philippines. They are not, however, immune from grounding due to poor 
lookout as happened in December 2016 (Archipelago Ferries). 183  
 
It is particularly disappointing that this clearly behavioural and culturally 
caused problem of general negligence has not even been reduced in so many 
developing countries. At least Thailand and the Philippines have shown what 
even modest reform can achieve.  
 
Large cruise ships or „liners‟ are involved in fewer fatal accidents than ferries, 
if only because there are fewer of them. Those fatal accidents, too, have 
resulted in remarkably few deaths.184 However, they do suffer from a 
disproportionately high number of fires. These originate in engine rooms, 
galleys and sometimes passenger cabins. From 1984 to 2007 the BPVA 
database records 16 instances of fatal fires on cruise ships that resulted in 
108 deaths.185 Over the whole period surveyed there were many more non-
fatal fires on cruise ships.  
 
The majority of the fires have been attributed to maintenance deficiencies. 
This problem also manifests itself in the frequent viral epidemics that afflict 
cruise ships. They are invariably due to inadequate hygiene, in reality yet 
another maintenance problem which leads to unsafe or unseaworthy ships. 
 
Obviously, given their very size, large crews of culturally disparate people and 
large numbers of inexperienced, often elderly and poorly briefed passengers, 
cruise ships are very vulnerable to human errors. Their potential for creating a 
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new passenger vessel fatality „record‟ is disconcerting. Some such vessels 
can have as many as 7,000 people on board at one time. That is a frightening 
scenario. 
 
Another serious problem common to cruise ships lies with the number of 
apparent suicides of both passengers and crew members that occur on or 
from them. The psychological reasons for this bear examination given that in 
the case of passengers, at least, they are on holiday and assumed to be 
enjoying themselves on board. That, obviously, has nothing to do with 
seaworthiness, or probably even negligence, but it is a statistical oddity that 





Image 2.7. “Only” two died following an engine room fire on the Norwegian, 
Hurtigruten Line owned cruise ferry Nordlys off the Norwegian coast. That 
generally well-regarded line has suffered many „accidents‟. Almost all of them 
have been blamed on human error (Wikipedia). 
 
All aspects of vessel management, operation, equipment and maintenance 
are negatively affected by general negligence. Obviously, negligence is a 
cultural and behavioural problem that starts at the top with government 
regulation and company management and „trickles‟ down through all levels of 
a ship owning company. It is probably the least costly problem to eliminate but 








2.5.6. Poor seamanship. 
 
Closely related to general negligence and poor lookout, poor seamanship is a 
separate causal category of its own. It has been author assessed as a cause 
of around four per cent of fatalities over both periods studied.186  
 
Seamanship has been defined as, “The art or skill of handling a vessel. Skill in 
using deck equipment, boat handling and the care and use of line and 
wire”.187 Clearly, this art or skill was absent in the cases so assessed. 
 
Inferior or inadequate boat handling capabilities and the ignorant or untrained 
use of deck or lifesaving equipment has been the cause of a significant 
number of fatalities. It is usually the result of either or both of insufficient 
training or experience or inadequate procedural disciplines. In other words, of 
poor management. 
 
The large majority of accidents assessed as being due to poor seamanship 
were the result of ships being sailed into clearly and publicly predicted 
dangerously bad weather, usually typhoons. A number of these were Sulpicio 
Lines ferries that capsized and or sank in typhoons. 
 
By a remarkable coincidence, every ten years, in 1988, 1998 and 2008, 
Sulpicio Lines sent vessels to sea in the face of predicted major typhoons. 
That resulted, in each case, in the capsize and sinking of their ships with the 
loss of 1,583 lives in total. That, of course, is in addition to the even more 
notorious collision, fire and sinking of the Dona Paz that was attributed to poor 
lookout. That “accident” resulted in 4,386 fatalities. The total death toll at 
Sulpicio Lines exceeds 6,000 people.188 
 
Sulpicio Lines, sadly, has been far from the only offender in that regard as can 
be seen in the BMPVA database.189 There have been numerous other 
examples of vessels putting to sea in the face of predicted dangerous 
weather. 
 
Even modern, sound and well-maintained vessels are not immune from poor 
seamanship. The recent example of the high speed nose-dive of the Dar-es-
Salam to Zanzibar ferry Kiliminjaro II  off Tanzania in 2014 resulted in the 
deaths of 25 passengers who were washed off the foredeck where they 
should not have been in the first place. Not only was the ferry driven far too 
fast for the conditions, the subsequent „recovery‟ operation of the passengers 
washed overboard was completely botched.190 
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More recently, a brand new Fastcat of Archipelago Ferries grounded near 
Cebu, in the Philippines, on its maiden voyage.191 Showing that even the most 
fastidious companies are not immune from the problem of poor lookout! 
Thankfully, their vessel was sufficiently safe as to have caused neither injuries 
nor fatalities. 
 
Other examples of poor seamanship are spread through the BMPVA 
database. Some involved sailing too fast for the conditions. Another saw a 
„whale watch‟ boat getting too close to a whale that bumped and capsized it. 
Others were when crews failed to respond to distress calls or failed to sound 
alarms on their own vessels. Still others involved attempts to berth vessels in 
dangerously strong winds and pilotage errors such as taking „short cuts‟. 
 
All can only be blamed on foolishness or stupidity that is the result of making 
ill-considered decisions that fly in the face of common sense. Common sense, 
after all, is really what good seamanship is all about. 
 
2.6.0. Human factors are the predominant cause of passenger 
vessel accidents. 
 
Despite the paucity of comprehensive, accurate, proven and objectively tested 
information, it has become very obvious that human factors, more specifically 
human errors of the various kinds described, are the cause of more than 88 
per cent of passenger vessel accidents and at least 98 per cent of their 
resulting fatalities. The positive information arising from that fact is that 
structural, mechanical and other causes are comparatively insignificant. Also, 
while suicide and the extremely rare „freak‟ accidents are probably impossible 
to reduce significantly, structural and mechanical causes are declining from an 
already low base and could, with minimal effort and expense, be reduced yet 
further. 
 
It should be noted, however, that all the major, and most minor, cruise line 
companies appear from their records to be well managed from a safety 
perspective. It is clear from the statistics contained in the BMPVA database 
that the greatest risks to passengers remain with ferries operating on 
domestic routes in the twenty countries having the worst records for 
passenger safety. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Examples of major fatal ferry accidents 
 
It is remarkable how many common causal factors and 
types of human errors continue to re-present themselves. 
Even more remarkable is the fact that so many serially 
offending ship owners remain unpunished and in 
business. 
 
3.1.0. Examples of major fatal ferry accidents. 
 
To better illustrate and clarify how and why many of the fatal ferry accidents 
described briefly in the BMPVA database actually occurred, the following 
twenty-five more detailed case studies have been prepared to describe major 
accidents where enough useful facts are known to be able to provide the 
necessary information to do so.192 The selection of cases is otherwise 
arbitrary except for an attempt to present a geographic and historic range as 
well as a range, as far as possible, of vessel, location and accident types. 
 
Some of the accidents are well known but most, less so. They range in 
severity from 143 to 4,386 fatalities and cover 18 national jurisdictions and the 
full period from 1966 to 2015. Regrettably, none describe any of the multitude 
of smaller accidents in smaller vessels in countries such as Myanmar, 
Bangladesh and DR Congo which, combined, comprise the greater part of the 
global fatality toll. Where the death toll is comparatively small, accidents will 
usually receive very little, if any, media coverage or local government interest 
in the form of a Marine Board of Inquiry (MBOI) or similar. 
 
As noted in chapters 1 and 2, The BMPVA database shows us that those 
accidents occur frequently but mostly in relatively remote places where few 
reports are made or records kept. It is usually difficult in such cases to obtain 
many details of the vessel concerned. Normally, the best that can be 
expected is a newspaper or newsagency report of the accident and an 
estimated number of fatalities arising along with a very brief description of the 
circumstances such as whether it involved a collision, grounding, fire or 
capsize. As can be seen from the BMPVA database, this varies according to 
the size of the vessel and the country of occurrence. For example, in the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Tanzania, Egypt and even Haiti, the name and 
specifications of the vessel are usually known. In Bangladesh, Myanmar and 
DR Congo they usually are not. This offers a very stark contrast to the very 
comprehensive reporting of accidents that occur in developed countries.193 
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The author estimates that the grounding and subsequent capsize of the 
Carnival Cruise Lines vessel Costa Concordia off Italy received more 
developed country media coverage than all the fatal accidents in the 
Philippines combined. That despite the Costa Concordia accident resulting in 
33 deaths compared with many thousands in the Philippines including more 
than 4,300 in one incident. The difference between „developed‟ Europe and 
„developing‟ Asia. 
 
Twenty-five cases, or 3.3 per cent, of a total of 750, have been drawn from 
the BMPVA database.194 In each case, a number of contemporary media 
reports and, where available, MBOI proceedings have been distilled and 
summarised. Of the 25 cases studied, interestingly, 15, or 60 per cent, 
involved conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries.195 Most of those were 
substantial vessels. Seven of those, or 28 per cent, occurred in OECD 
nations. Clearly, accidents have continued to occur, even in reputedly safe 
developed countries, especially where Ro-Pax ferries are involved. However, 
there have been distinctly fewer in developed countries since 1994 when the 
Estonia sinking provided an awakening.  
 
In fact, from 1966 to 2015, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries have been 
involved in 16.4 per cent of fatal accidents that have resulted in 31.5 per cent 
of total known fatalities. From 2000 to 2015 they were the vehicles for 32 per 
cent of fatalities. That, clearly, is because they tend to be larger vessels but it 
also reinforces the argument that the conventional Ro-Pax concept is 
fundamentally unsafe.196 This is due to low, wide opening vehicle access 
doors, usually at both ends of the vessel, combined with a long, wide, largely 
unobstructed vehicle deck located close to the vessel‟s waterline. If significant 
quantities of water get on to the deck because of a sharp turn or a vehicle 
door malfunction, the vessel is particularly susceptible to capsize thanks to 
the „free surface effect‟ of that water sweeping across the deck. 
 
In developing countries they have often been poorly modified to increase their 
carrying capacity. They are particularly vulnerable to fires on their vehicle 
decks as described below. Even without dangerous modifications, they 
require very competent, alert and disciplined crews to ensure their safe 
operation. Such crews are not always available in developing countries. 
 
As can be seen from a perusal of the database, while the cases described 
here are worse than average in terms of death toll, they are very typical in 
circumstances. 197 They have simply been reported in more detail. That has 
facilitated the creation of these case studies. It should be noted, though, that 
none of the case studies describes fatal accidents involving multihull fast 
ferries. They have simply not been involved in any significant accidents.198 
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It is remarkable how many common causal factors continue to re- present 
themselves. It is even more remarkable how many types of human errors 
keep repeating themselves. Most remarkable of all is the fact that so many 
serially offending owners remain unpunished and continue in the ferry 
business.199 The accidents are listed in ascending date order commencing 
with December 1966. They are most definitely not comprehensive, merely, 
illustrative. The case studies have been compiled and summarised from 
numerous sources that are mostly cited in groups in the text. 
 
It must also be emphasised that the „known‟ accidents recorded in the 
BMPVA database unfortunately omit probably hundreds of additional 
accidents that have not been accorded any media coverage. Those accidents 
would, of course, add many thousands to the total of fatalities 
 




Image 3.1. S.S. Heraklion as S.S. Leicestershire under prior ownership and 
before conversion to a Ro-Pax (Wikipedia). 
 
Causing an estimated total of about 231 fatalities, the actual number is 
unknown because there were allegedly far more passengers aboard than the 
219 who held tickets, the single screw steam ship Heraklion was an accident 
waiting to happen. Although built by the reputable Fairfields Shipbuilding & 
Engineering Company of Glasgow, she was 17 years old and inadequately 
maintained following a poor conversion to Ro-Pax by its second owner the 
Greek company Aegean Steam Navigation Typaldos (ASNT).200 
 
The 8,922 grt, 152 m LOA steel passenger/cargo ship had been owned by 
ASNT for two years during which she had been cheaply and poorly converted 
to a Ro-Pax ferry by the simple expedient of cutting holes in its side to enable 
vehicle access to its holds directly from the quay. 
 
After loading delays, she put to sea from the southern island of Crete heading 
for the Athenian port of Pireaus in a Force 9 gale. Some hours later she 
capsized and sank in the Aegean Sea off the islet of Falkonera in “enormous 
seas”. Survivors reported that a poorly secured truck, that had caused the 
loading delay, came adrift and smashed open the newly cut and badly sealed 
vehicle loading door in the side of the ship. This allowed the sea to pour in 
causing the ship to capsize in fewer than twenty minutes. 
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The Hellenic Coast Guard was slow to respond and, due to radio frequency 
inadequacies, was unable to communicate with a number of British and 
American warships that were exercising in the area and which could have 
assisted. While chaotic, the rescue operation still managed to save about 50 
people. 
 
The subsequent MBOI listed clear cases of poor seamanship and 
management as well as negligence. Obviously, the ship should have been 
seeking shelter rather than putting to sea in such a gale. The inquiry 
discovered that the owner did not mandate abandon ship drills and that the 
ship‟s distress call was delayed.201 
 
The inquiry inspired rule changes in Greece such that ships were prevented 
from departing in Force 9 or greater wind strengths and the HCG‟s 
procedures were reformed. ASNT‟s fleet was inspected and 12 of its 15 
vessels were found to be unseaworthy and required to be scrapped. 
 
The owner, Haralambos Typaldos, and his general manager were imprisoned 
for manslaughter. Significantly, a near sister ship to the Heraklion, the 
Wahine, which had been converted to a Ro-Pax-Train ferry, grounded and 
sank near Wellington, New Zealand, 16 months later with the loss of 51 
lives.202 Yet another case of bad seamanship and an unseaworthy ship made 
worse by a poor modification and the gross negligence of the owner. All 
human factors. 
 
3.2.1. Hongxing 240 and Hongxing 245, 432 fatalities, 4 August 
1975. 
 
The Hongxing 240 and Hongxing 245 both belonged to the same Chinese 
Government owned ferry line that carried passengers between Hong Kong 
and Guangzhou via the Pearl, Zhuyiang and Xi rivers. They were substantial 
triple deck steel ferries of unknown size and travelled overnight. 
 
The two ferries collided and sank during a „heavy storm‟ on the night of 4 
August 1975 on the Zhuyiang River between Guangzhou and Zaoqi. A 
reported 432 of the approximately 800 people on board the two ferries were 
lost.203 Another clear case of poor lookout and, probably, inadequate 
seaworthiness and search and rescue facilities. 
 
Due to the strict media controls and news management prevailing at the time 
under the People‟s Republic of China Government, no other information is 
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Image 3.2. Don Juan (Wikipedia). 
 
The Ro-Pax ferry Don Juan, was built in Japan in 1971 by Niigata 
Engineering, a reputable and prolific shipyard. She was a fast and, by 
contemporary Philippine standards, luxurious ship of 2,311 grt and 96 m LOA. 
 
In Tablas Strait, north of Mindoro Island en route from Manila to Bacolod City, 
Negros Island, on a clear, calm, moonlit night Don Juan collided with the small 
tanker MT Tacloban City. They were in one of the Philippines‟ busiest sea 
routes. The masters of both vessels blamed each other for the collision. The 
tanker had right-of-way but, in reality, to conform with COLREGS, both 
vessels should have stopped to avoid colliding. These „blame games‟ are 
seemingly standard procedure in the Philippines with the objective of 
confusing the already cursory PCG Marine Boards of Inquiry.204 
 
The ferry sank in about fifteen minutes during which time a distress signal was 
transmitted and some lifejackets handed out while Carley floats, but no 
lifeboats, were launched. The tanker stood by and reportedly rescued many 
survivors as did another nearby tanker, the Laoag City that was owned by the 
same company as the Tacloban City.  
 
While it is estimated that there were more than 1,000 fatalities, the exact 
number is unknown. The owners of Don Juan, Negros Navigation Co, claimed 
there were 890 passengers and 110 crew aboard, a total of 1,000 people, but  
896 were rescued and 121 bodies recovered, a total of 1,017. They admitted, 
however, that many latecomers and small children “may” have been omitted 
from the passenger manifest. Later reports from relatives of the missing tend 
to support the local media‟s estimate of more than 1,000 fatalities. 
 
Significantly, the Don Juan sank less than 40 nautical miles from the site of 
the later collision and sinking of the Sulpicio Lines owned ship Dona Paz from 
which there were 4,386 fatalities in similar circumstances involving a collision 
with a small tanker. The masters of both ships „stood on‟ in that they 
maintained their course and speed despite the possibility of a collision. They 
                                                     
204 Described in Reyes, G.  Don Juan Tragedy…, below. 
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showed a complete disregard for the International Collision Regulations 
(COLREGS). 205 
 
Negros Navigation Co has since merged and changed its name to 2GO 
Travel. On 16 August 2013 another vessel of that new company‟s fleet, St 
Thomas Aquinas, collided with a cargo ship and sank in Cebu Strait off the 
port of Cebu with the loss of 205 lives.206  
 
In both cases, as seems to be becoming a common theme, the vessel was 
overloaded, seamanship was bad, lookout poor, COLREGS ignored, and 
passenger manifests, safety equipment and rescue responses all inadequate. 
It seems amazing that after 33 years such lessons continue to be ignored. 
 





Image 3.3. The Indonesian Government owned ferry Tamponas II on fire 
shortly before sinking. Rescue vessels could have safely approached much 
closer than they did (www.lautanindonesia.com). 
 
The official death toll in this accident was 431 but contemporary local media 
reports, based on interviews with families of missing passengers, indicate 
about 580 fatalities. Fire broke out on the Indonesian conventional monohull 
Ro-Pax ferry Tamponas II at night and in heavy rain while the ship was off the 
southern coast of Kalimantan (Borneo) en route from Jakarta to Ujung 
Pandang on Sulawesi Island in Indonesia. 
 
                                                     
205 Appendix A, Ibid, Reyes, G. Don Juan Tragedy: Years passed and Negrenses still mourn, 
www.experiencenegros.com, Hooke, N. Maritime Casualties 1963-1996, LLP, London, 1997, 
p.169, and Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987, LLP, London, 1989, p.130. 
206 www.bbc.com and www.gcaptain.com. 
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Tamponas II  was only ten years old, having been built in 1971 by the 
reputable Japanese shipyard Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as a conventional 
steel Ro-Pax ferry for a Japanese owner. A substantial vessel of 6,139 grt, 
she was 129 metres long. She was purchased in 1980 by Peleyaran Nasional 
Indonesia, an Indonesian Government owned company, for USD 8.5 million 
and was then believed to have been in good, seaworthy condition. 
 
The ship‟s manifest claimed it was carrying a crew of 82, 1,054 ticketed 
passengers, 190 cars, 390 motor-cycles and cargo including mail. The 
subsequent MBOI accepted there were 1,184 people on board but it seems 
probable that there were in excess of 1,300. Many passengers were reported 
to have boarded without tickets. That happens, apparently, even on military 
aircraft in Indonesia.207 In any event, the ship was considered to have been 
badly overloaded. Interestingly 70 of the ship‟s crew of 82 survived the sinking 
but the master apparently went down with his ship. 
 
The officially accepted cause of the accident was that a discarded cigarette 
butt ignited spilt fuel on the vehicle deck. That conflagration quickly spread 
through the vehicles carried there causing numerous explosions and a major 
fire that eventually sank the ship.208  
 
The rescue operations were not well co-ordinated or effectively carried out. 
Numerous other vessels were in the vicinity but would not move in close 
enough to the flaming and exploding, but still floating, ship to pick up the 
mainly non-swimming victims. Many passengers reportedly panicked and 
jumped into the sea despite being non-swimmers and not wearing life jackets. 
Despite the heavy monsoonal storms in the area, a number of survivors were 
rescued up to five days later.209 
 
Obviously, fire safety regulations were not taken seriously in 1981 and, nearly 
thirty years later, in 2009, Jon Faine noted, as mentioned in Chapter 2, that 
they were still being ignored on Indonesian ferries.210 Equally obviously, the 
ship carried insufficient life-jackets or other life-saving devices such as life 
rafts, Carley floats or life boats. Furthermore, secondary as well as primary 
fire-prevention and control systems were inadequate. 
 
Effectively Tamponas II was a victim of a combination of most of the causes 
of maritime accidents including, negligence, overloading, an unseaworthy 
vessel, insufficient life saving and fire-fighting equipment and poor 
seamanship as well as a chaotic and inadequate rescue effort. 
 
Tellingly, the ship presented as yet another example of a conventional 
monohull Ro-Pax ferry „sold south‟ from a developed country to a developing 
                                                     
207 Described by Alford, P. Medan crash fare-rort claims investigated, The Weekend 
Australian, Sydney, 4-5 July 2015. 
208 See a vivid description of such behaviour in Faine, J. & J. Scary ferry Chapter 7 in From 
Here to There, Harper Collins Publishers, Sydney, 2010. 
209 Case study derived from reports in Hooke, N. Modern Shipping Disasters etc. Op cit. p. 
613; Appendix A, Ibid; www.shipsea.blogspot.com.au; and, www.simplfact.weekly.com. 
210 Faine, J & J. Ibid. 
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one where maintenance, business and crewing standards were inadequate to 
maintain and operate it safely. Further, it was government owned and suffered 
from the wholly inadequate enforcement of the regulations of that same 
government. 
 




Image 3.4. The Herald of Free Enterprise, aground and capsized with bow 
doors still open, one nautical mile outside Zeebrugge Harbour 
(www.bbc.news.com). 
 
While the death toll was comparatively modest at 193, all British citizens, the 
fact that Herald of Free Enterprise was sailing between Zeebrugge in Belgium 
and Dover in England and was owned by the well known and then still British 
P&O Group meant that its sinking made headlines globally. 
 
A seven year old ship, the Herald was built by the reputable German shipyard 
Schichau Unterweser as a 7,951 grt conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry of 
132 m LOA. So was the also Townsend Thoresen owned European Gateway 
which capsized in similar circumstances off Felixstowe five years earlier with 
the loss of six lives. Herald was owned by Townsend Thoresen Ferry Co 
which had been taken over by the P&O Group three weeks before the 
accident. She was fully compliant with the, now obviously inadequate, 
international and European standards for Ro-Pax ships that applied at the 
time.  
 
The ferry departed Zeebrugge on a cold, calm day with 500 passengers, 80 
crew members, 84 cars and 42 trucks aboard. The bow doors remained open 
and, as the ship turned into the open North Sea, water flooded through the 
door onto the unobstructed vehicle deck. The „free surface‟ effect of that 
capsized the ship in about 60 seconds. Fortunately, she capsized in shallow 
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water and so did not completely sink. This undoubtedly prevented even more 
fatalities. Her lifeboats, notably, could not be launched. 
 
The rescue response was faster and more effective than usual with a 
combination of small craft and helicopters from Belgium, The Netherlands and 
Britain all contributing to a remarkably small death toll in the circumstances. 
The surviving crew of the ship were praised for their efforts in assisting 
passenger survival. 
 
Townsend Thoresen (P&O Ferries), however, was held responsible for the 
accident by the subsequent MBOI.211 Indeed, had the subsequently 
implemented British law on Corporate Manslaughter been in force at the time, 
the company‟s directors would, it seems, have been charged accordingly. 
Many operational safety deficiencies, some of which the company and its 
competitors had been warned against in a series of articles published shortly 
before the accident in Work Boat World,212 were criticised in the inquiry.213 
 
The inquiry findings, combined with those involving the earlier European 
Gateway and later Scandinavian Star and Estonia accidents, led to worthwhile 
improvements in operational, construction and design safety in Ro-Pax ferries 
especially in Northern Europe. The United Kingdom Corporate Manslaughter 
law was implemented soon after. 
 
Inspired or driven by the sinkings of the Herald of Free Enterprise, 
Scandinavian Star and Estonia, among other conventional monohull Ro-Pax 
ferries, a number of north European nations co-operated to introduce the so-
called “Stockholm Rules” to improve the safety of Ro-Pax ferries in the Baltic 
and North seas and in the English Channel.214 Those rules eventually proved 
to be effective but, notably, only in Northern Europe. The Mediterranean Sea 
and beyond were specifically excluded. 
 
However, the Herald capsize itself was yet another testament to poor 
seamanship, an unseaworthy ship, cronyism and owner negligence and 
arrogance. Notably, the expressed fears of a number of the company‟s senior 






                                                     
211 Sheen, J. Wreck Commissioner. MV Herald of Free Enterprise – Report of Court No 8074 
Formal Investigation, Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office, London, 1987. 
212 Pike, D. Work Boat World, Baird Publications, Melbourne 1987, 1988 and, particularly, 
March 1988. 
213 There is a detailed report on the inquiry in 7.4.1. and considerable further description in 
Hooke, N. Ibid, p. 272; The Naval Architect, RINA, London, March 1988; and, Watson,M.H, & 
Miller, W. H. Disasters at Sea – Every ocean-going passenger ship catastrophe since 1900, 
Patrick Stephens, Sparkford, UK, 1995, p.188. 
214 Council of the European Union, Safety Rules and Standards for Passenger Ships, Council 
Directive 98/18/EC of 17/03/1998 on safety rules and standards for passenger ships (OJ 
L144,15/05/1998, p.1), Brussels, 17 March 1998. 
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3.2.5. Dona Paz, 4,386 fatalities, 20 December 1987. 
 
 
Image 3.5. The collision, fire and sinking of the Dona Paz made it the world‟s 
worst peacetime maritime tragedy (www.maritimedanmark.dk). 
 
The world‟s worst ever peacetime maritime tragedy, the collision, fire and 
sinking of the Philippines cargo ferry Dona Paz, resulted in 4,386 fatalities. 
The 24 year old ship, previously known as Don Sulpicio, had already been 
gutted by fire, re-conditioned, re-named and returned to service. That fire, 
which occurred when the ship was carrying 1,100 passengers, happened in 
June 1979. It was allegedly caused by a lit cigarette butt thrown into a cargo 
hold. All passengers and crew were rescued on that occasion. 
 
Originally built by Onomichi Zosen of Japan, Dona Paz was 2,324 grt and 93 
m LOA and certified to carry 1,518 passengers. She was owned by Sulpicio 
Lines of Cebu which, in turn, was owned by the notorious Go family.215 They 
have a uniquely appalling record in that over a period of 21 years from 1987 
their ships have been involved in at least eight fatal accidents that have 
resulted in more than 6,000 fatalities in total. The company‟s ships 
experienced numerous accidents prior to 1987 including another involving a 
previous Dona Paz which capsized and sank in 1977 killing at least 30 
people.216 
 
At 10 pm on the moonless night of 20 December 1987 Dona Paz was en 
route from Tacloban City on Leyte Island to Manila via Catbalogan on Samar 
Island. In Tablas Strait, the busiest sea route in the Philippines, off Dumali 
Point on eastern Mindoro Island, she collided with the small (629 grt) parcel 
tanker Vector, which was loaded with 8,800 barrels of „petroleum products‟. 
There was a violent explosion and fireballs passed between the two ships and 
then ignited the spilt fuel covering the surface of the sea surrounding both. 
 
Both ships were consumed by the fire and eventually sank in 530 metres of 
water. The Dona Paz at midnight and the Vector two hours later. Of the 
estimated 4,412 people aboard both ships, only 26 were rescued and most of 
them were badly burnt. 
 
                                                     
215 See also 1.12.2. 
216 Refer to Anon. Killer on the loose, www.manilastandard.net/opinion/editorial/117148/killer-
on-the-loose/, Manila Standard, Manila, 19 August 2013. 
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The nearby ship Don Claudia saw the flames and approached to assist and 
stood by at a distance because of the flames. Her master transmitted a 
distress signal – the Dona Paz did not as, apparently, it had no operating 
radio. The response from the PCG and MARINA was reportedly, “Later”. As it 
happened, later, meant eight hours later as that was how long it took the 
authorities to respond. By then there was not a sign of the disaster. U.S. Navy 
helicopters flying over the scene next morning could see nothing. 
 
It is alleged that the final death toll may have been as high as 5,000. No one 
really knows but the best estimate of the subsequent MBOI was 4,386. At 
least 1,000 of those were young children. The passenger manifest indicated 
1,493 victims but it was regarded as meaningless. MARINA stated that 1,586 
passengers were manifested and 2,755 were un-manifested plus 58 crew, a 
total of 4,399 on a ship limited to 1,518 passengers. 
 
The inevitable „blame game‟ followed the accident and into the MBOI. The two 
vessel owning companies blamed each other. Surviving crewmen from the 
Vector claimed that the Dona Paz had rammed it. A surviving passenger said 
that the Dona Paz captain was watching videos in his cabin while the two 
mates were dinking beer. A young, inexperienced rating or cadet was 
allegedly on watch. Caltex, the charterer of the Vector was not finally cleared 
of blame until 2000. Meanwhile, the Vector‟s owner was ordered to “indemnify 
the families”. 
 
The inquiry blamed Vector but also blamed Sulpicio for many deficiencies 
involving bad management, overloading, inadequate and locked life saving 
equipment and more. Both vessels were clearly in breach of COLREGS. A 
number of senior and junior PCG officials were deemed to have been 
complicit in the gross overloading and were dismissed or „re-assigned‟. 
 
The total cost to Sulpicio‟s insurers was less than USD 10 million. The ship 
was „in class‟ and had passed survey so the classification society and 
surveyors could also be accused of complicity in the disaster. Some years 
later Philippine ship survey standards were reviewed by insurers, as were the 
nation‟s maritime safety standards.217 
 
Little, however, seems to have been learned from this sad tale of human 
error, collusion, corruption, poor lookout, bad seamanship, poor 
seaworthiness, bad management, and inadequate rescue efforts. Nine 
months later another Sulpicio Lines vessel, the Dona Marilyn sailed into the 





                                                     
217 There has been considerable coverage in Hooke, N. Ibid. p.172; www.tradewinds.no, 2 
October, 1998: www.ships-register.com/Welcome.asp?Ship_ID=21471; Tritton, R. Maritime 
Safety in the Philippines, in Australasian Ships and Ports, Baird Publications, Melbourne, 
March 2000, p.14; and, Barista Uno. The Dona Paz tragedy 25 years on, in Marine Café Blog, 
www.marine-café.com/the -dona-paz-tragedy-25-years-on/?. 
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3.2.6. Baccha Singh, 438 fatalities, 6 August 1988. 
 
Almost no details are known about this the world‟s thirtieth worst passenger 
vessel disaster in the twentieth century. It seems that the Baccha Singh was a 
wooden ferry operating upstream on India‟s famed and „sacred‟ Ganges 
River. The vessel hit a sandbar and capsized near Manihari Ghat near Bihar. 
There were 438 fatalities. The river may have been dirty but it could not have 
been deep. An orderly evacuation would have saved many more.218 
 
This was yet another case of poor seamanship, poor lookout and an 
unseaworthy vessel. All made worse by inadequate life saving equipment and 
a poor rescue response. Indeed, all the usual elements of human error. 
 




Image 3.6. The Scandinavian Star was a substantial, nineteen year old,  
conventional Ro-Pax vessel running on a busy route between two highly 
developed countries, Denmark and Norway. She was struck by a very 
dedicated arsonist who succeeded in practically destroying the ship‟s 
accommodation along with 160 of its complement on his second attempt 
(Wikipedia). 
 
The 10,513 grt conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry was built in 1971 by 
Dubigeon-Normandie SA in Nantes, France. The ship had three previous 
owners and names before being chartered to the Da-No Line at the time of 
the disaster. It had suffered a serious engine room fire in March 1988. 
 
While en route from Frederikshaven to Oslo, in the Skagerrak, 30 nautical 
miles from the mouth of the Oslo Fjord, the arsonist‟s second attempt was 
successful and, despite the assistance of several passing ships, the vessel 
                                                     
218 Appendix A, Ibid and New York Times/Associated Press, 14 August 1988. 
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was extensively damaged and at least 159 passengers and crew perished. 
The exact number is unknown as the passenger manifests and crew lists 
were destroyed in the fire. 
 
Despite being operated in two of the world‟s most safety-conscious 
jurisdictions, the vessel‟s safety equipment and procedures were found 
wanting. There were major language and communication difficulties that led to 
panic. The ship‟s sprinkler system was ineffective and most lifeboats could not 
be launched even though seas were calm at the time. Apparently, no one 
knew how to launch them. Nor had there been any fire drills. The bulkheads 
and walls were covered with an inflammable plastic that gave off poisonous 
gases when burning. The ship continued to burn for four days. The ship‟s 
owner and his wife were among the dead. 
 
The two subsequent inquiries, when combined with those following the Herald 
of Free Enterprise (3.6.) and Estonia (3.13) disasters, among others, led to 
the implementation of the Stockholm Rules on passenger vessel safety in 
1996.219 Since then there have been no further major ferry accidents in 
Northern Europe/Scandinavia.220 
 
While, as a conventional Ro-Pax ferry, the Scandinavian Star was particularly 
vulnerable to mishap, the ship‟s owner and officers were obviously unusually 
negligent as were its flag state, classification society and the two port states 
concerned. 221 The ship was poorly equipped and its crew inadequately 
trained and led. The Danish and Norwegian maritime authorities must bear 
some of the responsibility as should the classification society Lloyd‟s Register. 
Notably, the ship had been issued with a passenger safety certificate by its 
flag state, the Bahamas, and had passed inspection by the U.S. Coast Guard 













                                                     
219 Well described in Ferries – Ro-Ro/Passenger vessels – Improved safety concept for Ro-
Ro passenger vessels, www.gard.no/web/updates/content/ferries-ro-ropassenger/. 
220 From Appendix A, Ibid. 
221 The Scandinavian Star fire and subsequent inquiries have been accorded considerable 
media coverage. Among that has been, the IFSMA Newsletter, London, June 2000; 
Tradewinds, Oslo, 5 May 1995; Eastlake, K. Sea Disasters, Brown Partworks, London, 1998, 
p. 48; Hooke, N. Maritime Casualties, Ibid, pp. 547-548; Time, New York, 16 April 1990, p. 
22; and, Evening Times Saturday, Glasgow, 7 April 1990, pp. 1 & 7. 
222 Edwards, B. S.O.S. Men against the sea, New Era Writer‟s Guild, Wimborne Minster, UK, 
1994, pp. 192-197. 
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Image 3.7. The Italian Ro-Pax ferry Moby Prince after the collision and fire 
(www.humansatsea.com). 
 
En route from the Port of Leghorn, on the west coast of mainland Italy to 
Olbia, on the east coast of Sardinia, the Moby Prince had not even departed 
the Livorno Roads, three miles outside the port, when it collided with the 
anchored 186,506 dwt, 286 metre tanker Agip Abruzzo. Formerly the Koningin 
Juliana, the 23 year old, Cammell Laird built Moby Prince was a 6,187 grt, 
131 metre LOA, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry. 
 
Sailing at 18 or 19 knots and without radar, despite thick patches of fog, the 
ferry drove into the starboard bow of the tanker and breached one of its crude 
oil cargo compartments. Oil poured into the sea and ignited all around the 
ferry so that it quickly caught fire. All 36 crew members on the tanker were 
rescued unhurt by harbour launches but only one of the 144 people aboard 
the ferry survived the conflagration. That passenger described the situation on 
board, which he endured for two hours, as chaotic. 
 
It took seven days for the fire on the tanker to be controlled. By that time the 
ferry was completely and irreparably gutted, having had its fire extinguished 
within 24 hours. Thick oil fouled the nearby Tuscan beaches that were closed 
for some time. Both ships were declared to be constructive total losses 
although 90 per cent of tanker‟s cargo was salvaged.  
 
An Italian Ministerial Commission declared in January 1993 that the 
Navigazione Arcipeligo Maddalenino owned ferry was principally at fault due 
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to its excessive speed and failure to use radar. Fog was also cited as a cause 
as was the failure of the tanker to display correct lighting in fog. Some 
negligence among duty officers in the Port of Leghorn was referred to.223 
 
Again, quite clearly, the main factors were human errors involving bad 
seamanship, poor lookout and inadequate safety procedures and equipment. 
 




Image 3.8. Salem Express submerged in deeper water having slid off the reef 
and sunk in the Red Sea outside Safaga Harbour (www.holidaycheck.pl). 
 
The Haj pilgrimage ferry Salem Express was returning across the Red Sea  
from Jeddah in Saudi Arabia to Safaga and then Suez in Egypt with 644, 
mainly Egyptian, people on board when she struck a coral reef, was holed, 
then slid off and sank in deeper water. 
 
The 25 year old, 4,771 grt and 115 metres LOA conventional monohull Ro-
Pax ferry was less than six nautical miles from Safaga Harbour when it 
grounded in stormy weather. There were 470 fatalities according to official 
Egyptian Government figures. It is alleged, though, that the correct figure may 
be considerably higher. Insurance claims amounted to less than USD 20 
million.224 
 
                                                     
223 Well described in Hooke, N. Op cit. p.16; Reuters, 12 April 1991; and, Williams, D. L. A 
Dictionary of Passenger Ship Disasters, Ian Allan Publishing, Hersham, UK, 2009, p.159. 
224 Hooke, N. Op cit, p.533. 
 
   79 
From photographs the ship appeared to be in good condition under the 
Egyptian owners, Samatour Shipping Co, however, under previous 
ownership, the vessel allegedly appeared very dilapidated. 
 
No further details are known of the circumstances of the sinking although, 
obviously, the ferry was significantly off course due to a navigational error 
and, probably, a poor lookout. Equally obviously, safety equipment and life 
boats/rafts were inadequate as were the evacuation and rescue efforts.225 
 
3.2.10. Neptune, 1,700 plus fatalities, 17 December 1993. 
 
Sadly and ironically, the 39 year old Haitian wooden, 256 grt, 45 metre LOA, 
triple-deck, motor cargo ferry Neptune was owned by a company called 
“Lucky Magloire”! 
 
Licensed to carry only 250 passengers plus 10 crew members, she was 
alleged to have been carrying more than 2,000 people when she capsized 
and sank in a „sudden squall‟ off the west coast of Haiti, near Miragoane, 
during an overnight voyage from the port of Jeremie and the capital, Port au 
Prince. It was neither the first nor the last fatal ferry accident off Haiti, merely 
the deadliest. It is estimated that more than 1,700 people died and that there 
were 285 survivors. There are no official figures. 
 
Allegedly „officially‟ there were only 820 ticketed passengers aboard a ferry 
licensed to carry 250. There were no passenger manifests or crew lists. The 
ferry sailed on a regular 150 nautical mile voyage that normally took about 12 
hours. 
 
The captain, who swam safely ashore, blamed passengers for the capsize. 
He said they rushed to one side of the ship to shelter from torrential rain. That 
destabilised the ship and caused it to capsize and, eventually, sink. As well as 
passengers, the ferry carried livestock and bagged charcoal. Fortunately so 
because the dead animals and bags of charcoal were buoyant and provided 
refuge for most of the survivors. 
 
There were no life jackets, life boats or life rafts, nor was there a radio. 
Allegedly, the crew failed completely to assist with the evacuation. Indeed, it 
took 36 hours for authorities in Port au Prince, only 60 nautical miles from the 
accident, to respond and despatch two naval launches to assist. It was the 
sixth significant fatal ferry accident to occur in Haiti in five years. There have 
been numerous similar events since including one involving the La Fierte 
Gonavienne that capsized and sank in 1997 killing about 300 passengers.226 
 
Yet another example of poverty induced human error involving a grossly 
overloaded, unseaworthy ferry with no life saving or communications 
                                                     
225 See Hooke, N. Op cit, p. 533; Williams, D. L. Op cit, p. 217; www.contenttime.com; and, 
www.egyptianchronicles.blogspot.com. 
226 Described in detail in Freed, K. Nearly 2,000 Die as Ferry Sinks off Coast of Haiti, Los 
Angeles Times, 19 February 1993; and, Hooke, N. Op cit, p. 435. 
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equipment. The vessel, obviously, was manned and owned by negligent 
incompetents. 
 




Image 3.9. The Estonia photographed shortly before her sinking and clearly 
showing the controversial bow door and visor (www.estoniaferrydisaster.net). 
 
The largest, in terms of number of fatalities, and one of the most controversial 
passenger vessel catastrophes involving developed countries since World 
War II, the causes and targets for blame as to the capsize and sinking of the 
Estonia are ongoing. Numerous books, magazine articles, conference papers, 
additional regulations and academic papers in learned journals have been 
inspired by it. Ironically, by motivating responses, it has probably contributed 
more to improvements in ferry safety than any other accident. 
 
Although there were considerably fewer fatalities than in any number of 
accidents in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, this ferry, sailing as it was 
between north European and Scandinavian cities was far more newsworthy. 
The Clapham omnibus syndrome, mentioned in Chapter 1,227 seems to 
prevail. As does its mention in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History.228 
Its importance must, then, be kept in proportion. 
 
During the night of 28 September 1994, the 21,794 grt, 157 metre LOA 
conventional monohull Ro-Pax/Cargo ferry Estonia capsized and sank in the 
Baltic Sea off Turku, Finland, during a voyage from Tallin, Estonia, to 
Stockholm, Sweden. A total of 1,049 crew members and ticketed passengers 
were aboard the ship that was licensed to carry 2,000. Only 137 survived the 
                                                     
227 Refer to 1.5.2.  
228 See Hattendorf, J.B. et al. The Oxford Encyclopedia of Maritime History, Vol 3:pp. 601-
604, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007. 
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sinking, so 912 died. Only 93 bodies were recovered and it is assumed, 
therefore, given that there are few, if any, predators in the Baltic Sea, that 819 
were entombed in the ship. However, those figures remain somewhat moot. 
 
Although only fourteen years old and apparently in good condition, the ferry 
which was built by the reputable German ship builder, Jos. L. Meyer of 
Papenburg, had three previous but also reputable owners. At the time of the 
accident the ship had been owned for two years by the Estonian company 
Estline Marine Co. It was fully compliant with all the then prevailing port and 
flag state regulations and standards related to Ro-Pax ferries. 
 
The night was dark, stormy and cold. Seas were estimated at nine metres and 
the water temperature was eight degrees Celsius. On such a night you would 
think and expect that mariners would be cautious. Not so on the Estonia. It 
proceeded at its standard operating speed into the big seas and gale of wind. 
 
The Estonian, Finnish and Swedish governments established a Joint Accident 
Investigation Commission (JAIC) to examine the circumstances of the sinking. 
Its preliminary findings were very controversial when released three years 
later.229 This was particularly because they seemed to unfairly apportion much 
of the blame to the builder/designer. Others, most particularly this author, 
believe the owner and, especially, the master should have been accorded 
much more responsibility for the tragedy.230 
 
While there is no doubt that the ferry‟s bow door failed, it can well be argued 
that the vessel was being pushed much too hard in the conditions. The 
master, it seems, took little or no notice of reports from inspectors prior to 
departure that there were leaks around the bow door. Nor did he slow down 
when his own engineers reported bigger leaks an hour after departure. 
Further, his distress signal transmission was tardy and he failed to warn 
passengers of the impending abandonment. Few were able to reach or board 
the lifeboats or don the plentiful life jackets. Some of the lifeboats floated free 
but many of them capsized, others sank with the ship. The ship was equipped 
with EPIRBs but apparently no one on board thought to activate them. 
 
Further, the rescue response by the authorities of the three countries 
concerned was slow and inadequate. Radio communications among vessels 
and helicopters was poor to non-existent and some of the helicopters were so 
laden with press photographers that they could not rescue anyone. 
 
The findings of the JAIC certainly appeared strongly prejudiced against the 
German shipbuilder and the French classification society (Bureau Veritas) and 
in favour of the deceased master and local inspection and rescue authorities. 
                                                     
229 Refer to Laur, U, et al. the Final Report on the Capsizing on 28 September 1994 in the 
Baltic Sea of the Ro-Ro Passenger Vessel MV ESTONIA, The Joint Accident Investigation 
Commission of Estonia, Finland and Sweden, Government of Estonia, Tallin, December 
1997. 
230 See, especially, Bjorkman, A. Lies and Truths about the M/V Estonia Accident, Editions 
EGC, Beausoleil, 1998. 
 
   82 
Many experts, other than the carefully chosen expert witnesses who testified 
before the inquiry, still hold very strong opposing views.231 
 
This author is firmly of the view that there were many other causal factors 
than just the allegedly badly designed and constructed bow door and visor. 
They, incidentally, fully complied with the prevailing regulations when built, 
passed survey and numerous subsequent inspections. The whole 
conventional monohull Ro-Pax concept could equally be blamed. 
 
Despite its many failings, the JAIC did make some useful and thoughtful 
recommendations as to the future design, construction and operation of Ro-
Pax ferries. It certainly led to the rapid implementation of IMO‟s ISM Code and 
to the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement into European Ferry 
Stability Regulation.232 
 
The sinking, its circumstances and its aftermath remain controversial. A 
Google search reveals numerous further reports and commentaries as well as 
books published on the subject. Even IMO has published a twenty-page 
bibliography of material published on the subject.233 Something of a contrast 
with the coverage it accorded to far more deadly accidents that have occurred 
in developing countries. 
 
The insurance cost of the Estonia disaster was USD 135 million. The accident 
was a stark illustration of human error involving a chain of design, 
construction, regulatory, management, seamanship, seaworthiness, search 
and rescue and investigatory factors. It was hardly a good example of the 
















                                                     
231 Described in considerable detail in Bjorkman, A. Ibid. P,198; Williams, D.L. Op cit, p. 93; 
www.estoniaferrydisaster.net; Savvides, N. „Explosion‟ claim rocks Estonia theories, Lloyd‟s 
List Daily Commercial News, Informa Group, Sydney, 20 December 2000; www.estline.ee/en; 
and, www.multi.fi/estonia/estorap. 
232 Refer to Anon. Ferries Ro-Ro/Passenger vessels – Improved safety concept for Ro-
Ro/passenger vessels, Gard, Oslo, 1996, www.gard.no/web/updates/. 
233 See Information Resources on “The Estonia”, Maritime Knowledge Centre, IMO, London, 
2010, www.imo.org. 
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Image 3.10. Bukoba capsized just before sinking off the Tanzanian shore of 
Lake Victoria. Some passengers, trapped inside, were still alive and tapping 
on the hull at that stage (www.dailynews.co.tz). 
 
Bukoba was an 800 grt steel cargo ferry of 60 metres LOA and a maximum 
passenger capacity of 430. Prefabricated by Belgian Shipbuilders Fulton in 
Belgium and re-constructed beside Lake Victoria in1979 she was, at 17 years, 
not very old by African lake ship standards. 
 
Owned by the Tanzanian Government‟s Tanzanian Railways Corporation 
(TRC Marine Division), the ferry was on a regular overnight voyage of 110 
nautical miles from Bukoba to Mwanza along the Tanzanian shore of Lake 
Victoria, the world‟s second largest freshwater lake. Departing Bukoba at 10 
pm, in smooth conditions, the vessel called at an intermediate port where 
many more passengers rushed aboard. There was no ticketing or control and 
the clearly overloaded vessel was very obviously listing as it left the port. 
Some time afterwards it reportedly hit a rock and capsized some 30 nautical 
miles from Mwanza. 
 
No distress call was transmitted and, by the time any rescue vessels arrived, 
the ship was nearly submerged. An attempt at rescue/salvage was botched 
and, when a hole was cut in the still floating hull to evacuate passengers who 
were still alive and tapping on the hull at the time, the remaining buoyancy 
was lost and the ship sank completely. 
 
The official death toll was 894 but local media reports indicate it was at least 
1,000. That was more than double the ferry‟s licensed capacity. The manifest 
showed 433 first and second-class passengers but there was no manifest for 
third class. Only first and second-class passengers were issued with 
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lifejackets and there appears to have been no other life saving equipment 
aboard. 
 
The master and nine TRC Marine Division officials were arrested and charged 
with murder but soon released. The Tanzanian Government appointed a 
Commission of Inquiry but there is no public record of its findings apart from a 
press release blaming gross overloading.  
 
Contemporary local press reports indicate that all Lake Victoria ferries at the 
time were in deplorable condition, badly manned, inadequately equipped and 
with little or no loading controls. Their owners and crews ignored regulations 
and maintenance was hopelessly inadequate. Inspections were non-existent 
as were crew qualifications and rescue services. Bureaucrats were allegedly 
ignorant, corrupt and incompetent.234  
 
Judging from recent events on the Tanzanian coast, little has changed in the 
intervening twenty years. (See reports on the Spice Islander, Skagit, 
Kilimanjaro II et al in the BMPVA database and below). 235  
 
There have been numerous fatal accidents involving ferries on the large 
central African lakes including Lake Victoria, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Albert 
and Lake Nyasa. Ugandan, Tanzanian, Rwandan, Kenyan and DR Congolese 
vessels have been involved. The causes are invariably similar and all involve 
most of the usual forms of human error with overloading, unseaworthy 





















                                                     
234 The details have been well reported in Hooke, N. Op Cit, p.106; Herald-Sun, Melbourne, 
24 May 1996; The Times, London, 22 May 1996; www.nytimes.com/1996/06/02; and, 
www.bukoba.weebly.com/mv_bukoba_disaster/. 
235 Appendix A, Ibid. 
236 For details see Appendix A, Ibid. 
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3.2.13. Bimas Raya II, 275 plus fatalities, 19 October 1999. 
 
 
Image 3.11. Bimas Raya (left) in Merauke in 1996. Apparently she was even 
more dilapidated when she sank in 1999 (www.rosencranz-shipphotos.de). 
 
The tiny steel coastal cargo ferry Bimas Raya II, which appeared to be a 
converted fishing boat, caught fire, capsized and sank off the south coast of 
Indonesia‟s Irian Jaya province near the town of Merauke, just west of the 
Papua New Guinea border. It is in a low-lying, swampy, crocodile and malarial 
mosquito infested region. 
 
Owned by Merauke based Bimas Raya Lines PT, the 196 grt, 1991 built 
vessel was constructed in Indonesia by Bina Bahtera to Biro Klasifikasi class. 
When pictured in 1996 and only five years old, the vessel already appeared 
dilapidated and poorly maintained. 
 
Details, as usual, are sparse but it appears that the ship, which, had a 
licensed carrying capacity of 125 passengers, was grossly overloaded with in 
excess of 300 people on board. It suffered an engine room fire that spread 
and caused the vessel to capsize and sink. There were only 26 survivors so 
there were somewhere between 275 and 361 fatalities. No one really knows 
how many. 
 
Apparently, no distress signal was transmitted and a search only commenced 
when the vessel became overdue. One of the owner‟s other ships along with 
a workboat from the Port of Merauke and some local fishing boats conducted 
a search with little success.237 
 
Obviously, the fire fighting equipment was inadequate as were the 
communications and lifesaving equipment. The ship was overloaded by at 
least 200 per cent.  As in so many cases, the causes of the Bimas Raya II 
sinking were an unseaworthy vessel, incompetent crew, poor seamanship, 
gross overloading and managerial neglect. All human errors. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Bimas Raya Lines was still operating as at the end of 2017. It 
appears to have suffered no penalty or restrictions as a result of this appalling 
accident. 
 
                                                     
237 Details derived from www.fairplay.co.uk/ 22 October 1999; The Times, London, 21 
October 1999, p.18; www.iol.co.za/news/world; www.wrecksite.eu;  
www.thejakartapost.com/news/1999/10/21/; and, www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details. 
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Image 3.12. The wreckage of Salahuddin II being salvaged a few days after 
her sinking. Large numbers of bodies were found trapped inside (Tribune 
India). 
 
Salahuddin II was a typical triple decked, steel hulled Bangladeshi river ferry 
of indeterminate provenance and ownership. It was about 60 metres LOA and 
of unknown age. Large numbers of similar vessels operate from the Dhaka 
Launch Terminal serving the riverine areas of southern central Bangladesh. 
 
The ferry collided with another vessel, capsized and sank in a „sudden storm‟ 
at the mouth of the wide and often „turbulent‟ Meghna River, near Shalna, 
about 85 nautical miles south-east of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. The 
accident occurred just before midnight on 3 May 2002, not an unusual time for 
such a disaster. 
 
Newspaper and Internet reports indicate that there were in excess of 500 
passengers on board and only 100 survived the accident. There were, of 
course, no passenger manifests. The estimated fatalities range from 370 to at 
least 450. The vessel was clearly badly overloaded as is the norm in 
Bangladesh. Also, as normal, there was little or no safety equipment and the 
crew unskilled, un-trained and, probably, malnourished and fatalistic. 
 
Shortly after the accident the Bangladeshi Government promised to set up 
two inquiries into both that particular accident and the wider problem of 
Bangladeshi ferry safety. The Salahuddin II  accident was blamed on 
„technical inadequacy‟ and the Government ordered a tightening of safety 
standards.238 
 
Inevitably, there were at least two further fatal ferry accidents in Bangladesh 
in 2002. They lifted the death toll there for that year beyond 537. From then 
                                                     
238 Reports derived from www.fairplay.com. 4 May 2002; Lloyd‟s List Casualty Reports, 4 May 
2002; www.reuters.com/article/idUSDHA11372/; www.news.bbc.co.uk, 4 May 2002; and, The 
Washington Post, 7 May 2002. 
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until the end of 2015 there have been a further 56 accidents and 4,868 
fatalities.239 
 




Image 3.13. Le Joola shortly before her sinking, one of the worst ferry 
disasters in history. Her overloading exploits were notorious. This image 
shows why (www.grijalvo.com). 
 
The 2,087 grt and 80 metres LOA conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry Le 
Joola was designed, built and licensed to carry 536 passengers, 44 crew 
members and 35 cars. On the night of 26 September 2002 when the ferry 
capsized and, ultimately, sank, the ferry was carrying at least 2,000 people, of 
whom, 1,034 were ticketed. Of those, at least 1,863 died including many who 
were trapped in the hull and still alive when it sank about fifteen hours after 
the capsize. Some 551 bodies were eventually recovered. 
 
Until September 2011, when it was surpassed by the Tanzanian monohull Ro-
Pax ship Spice Islander, this was Africa‟s worst peacetime shipping disaster 
and the world‟s second worst.240 
 
Apparently well built in Germany in 1990 by Schiffswerft Germersheim, the 
ship was reportedly well-equipped with safety gear but was allegedly very 
poorly maintained. It had just returned to service after a year of major repairs 
including the replacement of the port engine. The ship was owned by the 
Senegalese Government, through its Ministere de l‟Equipement, and operated 
by the Armed Forces of Senegal. It plied a regular route from the capital 
Dakar in the northern sector of the country to Casamance in the south but, 
allegedly, made unscheduled and irregular stops to serve unmanifested 
passengers as a matter of course. 
                                                     
239 Appendix A, Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
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On 26 September 2002 Le Joola sailed from Zuiginchor, the regional capital 
of southern Senegal, bound for Dakar, the capital of the West African nation. 
Departing around 9 pm, the ship transmitted a radio signal saying it was 
sailing in calm seas at 10 pm. Reports vary but it was claimed by the owning 
department that the ship sailed into a storm about 11 pm. The subsequent 
inquiry disputed that claim but, in any case, the ship capsized about 11.05 
pm. It was then well out to sea off the mouth of the Gambia River which flows 
through the nation of The Gambia which effectively bisects Senegal. It 
actually sank inside the Exclusive Economic Zone of The Gambia. 
 
Le Joola was badly overloaded as was normal practice. It is believed that too 
many of the excess passengers were on the upper deck trying to escape the 
heat and their movement capsized the vessel. Apparently, many of them 
survived the sinking only to drown while awaiting rescue. 
 
While small fishing boats arrived a few hours after the capsize and rescued a 
few people, government vessels did not arrive until many hours after the 
capsize. The ship remained capsized but still afloat until 3 pm on 27 




Image 3.14. Le Joola capsized but still afloat and with people still alive inside 
the hull. AFP (www.bbc.com). 
 
The Senegalese Government commissioned a Marine Board of Inquiry as did 
France because there were French citizens on board. The President of 
Senegal dismissed the Prime Minister and most of her cabinet shortly after 
the event for miss-handling the rescue. Some other officials were also 
dismissed. However, despite accusations of negligence, poor maintenance, 
sailing beyond the ship‟s limits, and gross overloading during the 12 month 
inquiry, no one was prosecuted and there was no trial.241 
                                                     
241 Combining and summarising a selection of reports from www.iht.com, 28 September 2002; 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-197117929/; www.allafrica.com/RIN/06/11/02,19/09/08/; 
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Again, a grossly overloaded, poorly maintained ship being operated in a badly 
unseamanlike manner capsized and sank taking almost 2,000 people with it.  
Although the sinking technically occurred in international waters, on an 
international voyage, actually within the EEZ of a second country (The 
Gambia), the IMO was disinclined to act or, indeed, even to comment.242 
 




Image 3.15. The main reason there are so many fatalities associated with 
Bangladeshi ferry accidents is the gross overloading that is normal there. 
Here the families of passengers await confirmation of their fate. 
(www.devastatingdisasters.com). 
 
Claimed to be the worst of a large number of Bangladeshi ferry disasters, the 
capsize and sinking of the Nasreen/Nazren/Nasrin was a typical example of 
the accidents that happen so frequently in that now rapidly developing but still 
poor country. 
 
The Nasreen, a typical Bangladeshi triple decked steel passenger ferry, 
operated from the Dhaka Launch Station on voyages along the Meghna River 
to Lalmohan and Barisal, about 90 nautical miles south, south-east of Dhaka. 
At the common disaster hour of around 11pm, the ferry reportedly nose dived, 
capsized and sank in what has been variously reported as „turbulent waters‟, 
a „whirlpool‟, and a „confluence of monsoon swollen rivers‟. The sinking 
occurred on the Meghna River near Chandphur close to where the 
Salahuddin II sank 14 months previously. 
 
Licensed to carry 300 passengers, Nasreen was allegedly carrying well over 
600 at the time of her sinking. It is claimed that 200 swam to safety or were 
rescued by fishing boats so that 400 plus were missing. The figures do not 
                                                                                                                                                        
www.shipwreckology.com/2012/09/26/; www.tradewinds.no/22Sept2008/; www.tht.com; and, 
www.fairplay.com.AP(05/11/02). 
242 www.imo.org  The IMO GISIS database was searched but no mention of Le Joola found. 
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compute but between 400 and 600 are believed to have died. The vessel 
sank only 600 metres from the Chandphur launch terminal. It capsized quickly 
and passengers inside the ferry had no means of escape. 
 
Allegedly illegally carrying 35 tonnes of cargo, the ferry had no life saving 
equipment and an untrained, unqualified crew and master. The master and 
owner both died in the accident or, perhaps, went missing subsequently. 
 
The subsequent MBOI blamed overcrowding or incompetence. Two marine 
surveyors were deemed responsible for failing to properly check the vessel. 
They were fined less than USD 200 each.243 
 
Once more, a dangerously unseaworthy ship, manned by incompetents and 
allowed to be grossly overloaded by a negligent owner and complicit 
authorities, sank with massive loss of life. For a very stark illustration of the 
realities of these problems readers are referred to Appendix F where two 
YouTube videos of recent Bangladeshi ferry accidents may be seen. The 
complete failure of lookout; response to an impending collision; and, attempts 
to rescue survivors of the capsized vessel, despite the availability of life 



























                                                     
243 Summary derived from reports in www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/07/09/; 
www.china.org.cn/english/international/69403/; 
www.news.bbs.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3066885.stm/; www.dawn.com/news/112444/; 
www.ipsnews.net/2003/07/; and, www.en.prothorn-ato.com/bangladesh/news/52034/. 
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Image 3.16. Al Salam Boccaccio 98, an Italian built, Egyptian owned, 
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry looking decidedly unstable and 
unseaworthy with her four obviously additional decks and vehicle access door 
cut in the starboard side forward. The sponsons added at the waterline were a 
feeble attempt to improve the ship‟s stability (www.shipspotting.com). 
 
Originally built in 1970 for Italy‟s Tirrenia Lines by Italcantieri‟s Monfalcone 
shipyard which, several bankruptcies and government „bail outs‟ later, is 
known as Fincantieri, the 131 metre LOA, conventional Ro-Pax ferry Al Salam 
Boccaccio 98 was later considerably enlarged from 6,450 grt to 11,779 grt. 
This was mainly by the expedient of adding four accommodation decks and 
waterline sponsons to then stabilise the ship. 
 
The ship was allegedly sold from Italy to Egypt because it failed to meet the 
Stockholm Rule requirements introduced following the sinking of the Herald of 
Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star and Estonia.244 It was legally prevented 
from operating in European waters – quite correctly as things turned out. 
 
Owned by Egypt‟s Al Salam Transport, Al Salam Boccaccio 98 (ASB98) 
operated as a Ro-Pax ferry carrying vehicles and passengers, mainly Haj 
pilgrims and Egyptian workers between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. She was one 
of a number of vessels engaged in that trade. 
 
                                                     
244 Refer to 2.1.1, 2.4.4, 2.5.3, and 6.2.1.  
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The ship was not the first of the Red Sea ferries to sink. In December 1991 
the Salem Express (See 3.11.) grounded and sank with 470 fatalities. Only 
four months prior to the ASB98 sinking, another vessel owned by Al Salam 
Transport sank following a collision in the Red Sea. There were two fatalities. 
Also, in June 2002 another Al Salam Transport owned Ro-Pax ferry Al Salam 
90 caught fire soon after departing Dhuba. A crewman died.245 
 
ASB98  was en route across the Red Sea from Dhuba, Saudi Arabia, to 
Safada in Egypt with about 1,410 people, mostly returning Haj pilgrims and 
Egyptian workers, as well as 220 vehicles on board. Contact was lost and it is 
believed there was a fire about 60 nautical miles and four hours from Dhuba 
at 10 pm. It is believed the ship sank at 11.33 pm. No distress signal was 
transmitted but an EPIRB was activated at 11.58 pm. Conditions were windy - 
around 24 knots wind speed – but the sea was slight. 
 
There was more than adequate life saving equipment with ten lifeboats and 
90 life rafts capable of supporting more than 3,000 survivors. Five of the 
lifeboats and an unknown number of liferafts were launched. It is believed that 
about 1,026 people perished but the numbers are still being debated. Even 
the number of survivors is not definite. 
 
Equally debateable is what actually happened and why. Both the Egyptian 
(Port state) and Panamanian (Flag state) authorities held inquiries. The 
Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) was recovered and provided further 
contradictory information. The ship was not fully laden and the fire burnt for 
four hours. It started on the vehicle deck and has been blamed by some, 
because of water used to extinguish the fire, for having caused the already 
top-heavy ship to capsize. Some blamed blocked scuppers and some alleged 
sabotage. 
 
The Egyptian MBOI blamed a „wicked conspiracy‟ and imprisoned the owner 
Mandouh Ismail for seven years. Two of his employees were sentenced to 
three years in prison. Ismail was accused of ordering the captain to proceed 
despite his doubts being expressed per radio.246 
 
The indisputable facts are that the ship was unseaworthy in the first place, 
having been banned from Southern European waters some years before. 
Even to a casual observer, the ship appeared dangerously top heavy (the 
author observed it in Genoa before the accident). Seamanship was obviously 
poor without even a distress signal being transmitted even though the fire had 
been burning for more than four hours before the ship sank. The only signal 
sent was via a float free EPIRB which transmitted after the ship sank. Despite 
the recovery of the VDR, we are unlikely to ever learn the whole story. 
 
 
                                                     
245 All recorded in Appendix A, Ibid. 
246 Described comprehensively in www.fairplaydailynews.com; 
www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/02/; www.heiweico.tripod.com/as98.htm/; 
www.redseawreckproject.com; and International Maritime Organization, Information Resource 
on the Al Salam Boccaccio 98, London, 2010, www.imo.org. 
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Image 3.17. The inter-island conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry Senopati 
Nusantara was 31 years old when it sank in a “violent storm” in the Java Sea 
(Wikipedia). 
 
The bluff bowed, landing barge like, conventional Ro-Pax ferry Senopati 
Nusantara capsized and sank in a storm while en route from Kumai in 
Kalimantan (Borneo) to Tanjung Emas in Semarang, East Java. Fatalities are 
difficult to ascertain as reports vary from 46 to 600. Local newspaper reports 
indicate the likely figure is between 400 and 600, most probably around 560. 
 
Similarly, the age of the vessel is in some doubt with estimates ranging from 
16 to 37 years. The 77 metre LOA, 2,718 grt, steel vessel was built in Japan 
and owned by local company Prima Vista PT. It operated scheduled voyages 
on the Kumai to Tanjung Emas route and had been doing so for some years 
until sinking in a „violent storm‟ 25 nautical miles off Mandalika Island in the 
Java Sea. 
 
Licensed to carry 850 passengers, it is estimated there were between 628 
and 800 on board as well as 29 buses and trucks and the usual mass of 
motor-cycles. There were 219 known survivors, some of whom were found 
250 nautical miles and seven days from the wreck. 
 
Immediately following the accident, the Indonesian Minister of Transport 
claimed the vessel was seaworthy, carried sufficient lifesaving equipment and 
was “not old”. There was a wide-ranging aerial search as well as efforts by 
local fishing boats and six ships of the Indonesian Navy. 
 
Survivors, however, reported bad seamanship, chaos and fights for 
lifejackets. Following the subsequent MBOI, the master was convicted of 
navigating improperly and “careless manouvering” as well as ignoring the 
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weather. Found guilty in the Semarang Court, he was imprisoned for two 
years and four months. The court praised the owner for promptly 
compensating the victims.247 
 
With great respect to the court, it would appear that its verdicts were neither 
fair nor objective. The owner would seem to be just as culpable as the master. 
The ship was obviously neither seaworthy nor properly equipped with 
accessible life saving equipment. The master, equally obviously, did sail into a 
storm but it is very likely he was ordered to do so by the owner. 
 




Image 3.18.  Princess of the Stars at the Manila ferry terminal 
(www.wakanatsu.com). 
 
The Sulpicio Lines owned conventional monohull Ro-Pax “cruise” ferry 
Princess of the Stars, ignoring frequent, adamant and obvious warnings, 
sailed into the face of Typhoon Fengshen (Frank). Midway through her 
voyage from Manila to Cebu City she lost power, grounded, capsized and 
sank off San Fernando Island in Roblon Province near Mindoro Island in the 
Visayas in the central Philippines. She had sailed directly into the eye of the 
typhoon. An estimated 870 passengers and crew died as a result. 
 
                                                     
247Information compiled from www.lloydsregisterfairplay.com; www.abc.net.au/news/; BBC 
News, 4 & 8 January 2007; The Indian Express, 31 December 2006; and ANTARA, 1 January 
2007 and 31 December 2006. 
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The death toll, added to those from several previous accidents, amounted to 
more than 6,000 „known‟ fatalities arising from accidents involving ships 
owned by Cebu based Sulpicio Lines over a period of twenty years. 
Undoubtedly a world record for one company!248 
 
The steel Ro-Pax ferry was the largest in the Sulpicio fleet and in the 
Philippines. It was 23,842 grt and 193 metres LOA. Built by the highly 
regarded Ishikawajima-Harima shipbuilding company of Aloi in Japan in 1984, 
it was purchased by Sulpicio in 2001 and converted from a pure cargo vessel 
to a Ro-Pax ferry. Its regular route was Manila to Cebu City and return. 
 
As usual with developing world ferry disasters the ship capacity and final 
fatality figures are nebulous and often deliberately obscured. In this case, 
passenger capacity has been variously described as 1,992 and 2,876 with up 
to an incredible 978 crew! The crew list and passenger manifest are just as 
vague. The owners claimed there were 862 people on board but there were 
almost certainly many more. The official death toll was 862. However, there 
were 56 survivors, 67 bodies were found and 747 listed as missing, a total of 
870. The first in a long list of arithmetic discrepancies. 
 
The Philippines MBOI found that passengers were ordered to don life jackets 
at 11.30 am. The abandon ship order was given at 11.45, a distress signal 
transmitted at noon and contact lost at 12.30 pm. Some passengers managed 
to get into liferafts but survivors accused the crew of being more interested in 
saving themselves. The sinking ship capsized at 6 pm. 
 
Interestingly, another Sulpicio Lines ship put to sea through Manila Bay 
shortly before the Princess of the Stars departed. Noting the conditions, the 
master turned around before leaving the entrance to the bay. He was roundly 
and loudly abused by many of his passengers for doing so, especially as the 
Princess passed them. However, upon berthing back in Manila and learning of 
the fate of the Princess, he was suddenly regarded as a hero.249 
 
The Philippines Navy tried but gave up rescue attempts in the face of 
„enormous waves‟. The first rescue ship arrived more than 24 hours after 
contact was lost. MARINA “grounded” all Sulpicio Lines‟ vessels and the 
government established “Task Force Princess Stars” to handle the accident. 
Even the normally supine President Gloria Macapagal Arroya roundly 
criticised Sulpicio. 
 
In turn, Sulpicio blamed the Philippines Coast Guard and Bureau of 
Meteorology for the inadequacy of their warnings even though most other 
ships in the Philippines, including a number of Sulpicio vessels, had cancelled 
voyages or taken shelter because of the impending typhoon.250 Sulpicio 
offered bereaved families compensation of about USD 4,500 each. 
 
                                                     
248 See 1.12.2. 
249 Described in Appendix C in a letter to the author from Commodore Gualterio Dela Cruz, 
PCG (Retd). 
250 See Appendix C, Ibid. 
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The Philippines MBOI reported promptly on August 25. It found Sulpicio Lines 
and its deceased captain jointly liable and recommended that Sulpicio‟s 
licence be suspended. It blamed human error, particularly by the captain. 
Sulpicio was found to be negligent. Sulpicio blamed an „Act of God‟ and again 
blamed the weather forecasters, accusing them of negligence.  
 
The company appealed and threatened that because it carried more than 40 
per cent of the country‟s internal cargo, it would cause major national 
economic damage if its operating licence were to be suspended. Sulpicio‟s 
owners, the Go family are very powerful both economically and politically in 
Cebu, the country‟s second city. 
 
Seven years later, the Manila trial court awarded USD 6.6 million (About USD 
7,000 each) to be paid by Sulpicio in compensation to the victims‟ families. At 
least it was more than the original Sulpicio offer. In January 2015 MARINA 
revoked the Certificate of Convenience of Philippine Span Asia Corp, formerly 
known as Sulpicio Lines, for its failure to comply with the ISM Code.251 
 
While Sulpicio Lines is without any doubt the world‟s worst behaved 
shipowner, its repeated deadly performances simply illustrate most of the 
usual human errors comprising negligence, poor seamanship, an 
unseaworthy ship and general incompetence. They also illustrate the power of 
such companies in developing countries and the inability of regulators to 
withstand such power. Sulpicio Lines continues to operate as Philippine Span 





















                                                     
251 Case study compiled from reports by Williams,D.L. Op Cit, p. 200; Safety at Sea, London, 
19 June 2009; Reuters, 22 June 2008; www.rappler.com/more-ph/issues/disasters/; 
www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?58695/; ABS-CBN, 22 June 2008; and, www.tradewinds.no 22 
June 2008. 
252 See Google/Philippine Span Asia Corp. 
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Image 3.19. Teratai Prima Dua alongside (www.shipspotting.com). 
 
Owned by PT Nur Budi, the 1999 built steel conventional monohull Ro-Pax 
cargo ferry Teratai Prima Dua was a typical example of a locally and rather 
roughly built inter-island vessel in the intra-Indonesian fleet. She was of 700 
grt and plied a regular scheduled route across Makassar Strait from Pare 
Pare on the south-west corner of Sulawesi Island to the major town of 
Samarinda on Kalimantan (Borneo). 
 
At 4 am on the morning of 11 January 2009 the ferry was reportedly hit by two 
large waves which caused it to heel about 30 degrees. Then a wave hit from 
another direction and that capsized and soon sank the vessel. It is believed 
that 255 of the passengers and crew perished as a result. 
 
The passenger manifest that, like most such documents in Indonesia, was 
probably inaccurate, listed 250 passengers. The crew list stated 17. There 
were probably more since there were 42 survivors and the subsequent MBOI 
recorded 255 fatalities. As usual, the figures do not compute. 
 
The small number of survivors confirms their evidence before the MBOI that 
“high waves flipped the ferry” quickly. The Indonesian Navy and Coast Guard 
conducted a search the following day but it was still rough and the search was 
not successful. 
 
The master was accused of ignoring the weather warnings, of overloading his 
vessel and of having inadequate lifesaving equipment available. He was 
convicted and imprisoned for nine years. There was no news of any penalty 
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being applied to the owner who appears to have been equally culpable in 
every respect.253 
 
The usual human errors were evident. 
 




Image 3.20. Spice Islander was, as this picture shows, in appalling condition 
before she set out on her fatal voyage. It was badly „hogged‟ showing that its 
back was broken, among other deficiencies. It should never have sailed at all, 
let alone carried large numbers of passengers (www.shipsnostalgia.com). 
 
Thanks, largely, to the Internet, more news about Tanzania‟s dreadful ferry 
safety record has begun to be published since 2000. This has seen the East 
African country decline from being barely noticed to third worst country in the 
world for ferry fatalities in the ten years from 2005 to 2015. 
 
To date, its worst accident involved the Spice Islander an ancient, steel 
landing barge style monohull Ro-Pax ferry of 60 metres LOA and 836 grt. 
Already forty years old when she arrived in Tanzania from Greece in 2007, 
the badly battered ferry capsized and sank around 1.00 am on September 
2011. Depending on which report is the most accurate, there were between 
1,573 and 2,976 fatalities as a result. Most reports tend to favour the latter 
figure. 
 
On a short voyage from Stone Town on Unguja, the main island of the 
Zanzibar group, to the northern island of Temba, the grossly overloaded 
vessel lost power, capsized and sank. There was very little lifesaving 
                                                     
253 Compiled from reports in BBC News, !6 January 2009; Bangkok Post, 13 January 2009; 
International Herald tribune, 13 January 2009; CBC News, 12 January 2009; and, BBC News, 
11 January 2009. 
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equipment and the crew were of virtually no assistance to the panicking 
passengers. 
 
The ship was in disgraceful condition. It was battered, rusty and, worst of all, 
badly hogged in that effectively its back was broken. It appeared that little or 
no maintenance had been done on the vessel for many years. It in fact broke 
down off Somalia on its delivery voyage due to contaminated fuel. It should 
never have been allowed to go to sea. It was, however, probably a very 
profitable ship for its owner, Makame Hasnuu. It would have cost practically 
nothing to buy and very little, if anything, had been spent on maintenance. 
 
Apparently licensed to carry 645 passengers and 45 crew, which seems 
excessive anyway, the ferry was believed to be carrying 3,586 people when it 
sank. It was so overloaded that a number of passengers were concerned 
enough to disembark in Stone Town to avoid the onward voyage to Pemba. 
 
The Tanzanian Government convened a MBOI shortly after the sinking. There 
was, of course, much contradictory evidence presented. The numbers of 
passengers and fatalities were disputed but the Government confirmed in 
October 2011 that the vessel had been carrying 3,586 of whom 2,764 were 
unaccounted for. Some 620 people had been rescued and 203 bodies 
recovered. The survivors were rescued by other ferries. 
 
The MBOI adjudication was one of negligence and murder. The ferry had 
been badly overloaded. The master, owner and ten of the crew were charged 
with murder.254 It is not known whether they were ever convicted or punished. 
 
Clearly, whatever penalties were imposed failed to act as a deterrent to other 
local operators. Only eight months later, the much newer, American sourced 
Skagit  capsized and sank between Dar es Salam and Stone Town causing 
293 fatalities. Interestingly, the travel advisory website 
www.tripadvisor.com.au did not mention the safety record of Tanzanian ferries 
in its advice on the reliability of ferries on the Dar es Salam to Zanzibar route 
as of July 2016. That is grossly irresponsible. 
 
Yet another case of a grossly overloaded, unseaworthy, badly maintained 
ferry managed by a negligent owner and crewed and commanded by 









                                                     
254 Contemporary reports compiled from Lloyd‟s List, 24 January 2012; www.bbcnews.com; 
Sydney Morning Herald, 10 September 2011; www.theguardian.com/comment-is-
free/2011/sep/13/; www.geocoaching.com/geocache/GC58F7P/; and, 
www.tripadvisor.com.au. 
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Image 3.21. Rabaul Queen (Wikipedia). 
 
The small, 259 grt, 30 year old cargo ferry Rabaul Queen sailed into a 
forecast strong gale in Papua New Guinea‟s Bismark Sea on 1 February 
2012. She capsized and sank causing the deaths of as many as 300 
passengers and crew. 
 
The 47 metre LOA ship was launched in Japan in 1982 by Kawamoto 
Shipbuilding. It was designed and built to operate in the benign conditions of 
Japan‟s northern Inland Sea. It was purchased in 1998 by Captain Peter 
Sharp‟s Rabaul Shipping to operate in the considerably more boisterous 
waters of the Bismarck Sea around northern PNG. 
 
The vessel‟s normal route was from Kimbe, the capital of West New Britain 
province, to Lae, on the north side of the mainland of PNG, a 280 nautical 
mile voyage. For voyages of such duration the vessel was licensed to carry 
295 passengers and 16 crewmembers. Technically, it was in survey. 
 
On the afternoon of 1 February 2012 the ferry proceeded to sea in spite of 
gale warnings predicting winds up to 48 knots from the north-west and very 
rough seas. As the gale built, passengers began to get wet and started to 
move to one side for shelter. This caused the ship to heel, acquiring a list of 
about five degrees to port. About 6.15 am on 2 February the ship was hit by 
some very large waves and capsized so quickly no distress signal could be 
transmitted. A float free EPIRB, however, was activated as the ship sank 
about 6.30 am. The first rescue ship MOL Summer arrived around 9.40 am 
and recovered 116 survivors. Other vessels later recovered 130 more.  
 
From this accident we have the benefit of undoubtedly the best, simplest and 
clearest report of a BMOI yet seen by the author, the Commission of Inquiry 
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into the sinking of Rabaul Queen.255 It is a credit to the PNG Government, its 
Marine Advisor, Captain Nurur Rahman, and its Commissioner, Judge 
Warwick Andrew. 
 
The COI found numerous deficiencies in the ship, its owner, its crew and their 
operations. Essentially, it was grossly overloaded, unseaworthy, badly 
maintained, unstable, unsafe and manned by poorly trained incompetents. 
 
The ship was unfit to go to sea in the forecast and actual conditions. It did not 
carry enough lifejackets and the crew were untrained in the use of what safety 
equipment was fitted. The master was negligent in many respects and the 
owner, Captain Peter Sharp, even more so. The COI found that between 142 
and 161 people perished in the sinking. Local media claim many more 
fatalities. 
 
The COI found that Captain Sharp had behaved negligently for many years. 
As far back as 1993 he had sent a ferry Kris to sea when it was obviously 
unsafe. That vessel sank with the loss of five lives. It found him arrogant and 
that he had no regard for the safety of passengers. Another of his vessels 
Kimbe Queen had run aground on coral reefs twice including once only days 
after the Rabaul Queen disaster.  
 
The COI also found the National Maritime Safety Authority (NMSA) to have 
been incompetent and ineffective and in need of drastic reform. It deemed the 
search and rescue operation to have been competently conducted by the 
Maritime rescue Coordination Centre in Port Moresby (MRCC POM) in 
cooperation with the Australian Maritime Safety Authority‟s (AMSA) Rescue 
Coordination Centre in Canberra (RCC Australia). 
 
Arising from the COI‟s report, a number of charges, mostly of manslaughter, 
were laid against Sharp, the vessel‟s master and mate and another employee 
of Rabaul Shipping. Also, a maritime safety officer has been charged with 
negligence. The manslaughter charges were dismissed on 31 July 2017 but 
charges of sending or taking an unseaworthy vessel to sea were yet to be 
heard as at 6 December 2017.256/257 
 
The COI into the sinking of the Rabaul Queen inspired a devastating report 
which highlights many of the similar deficiencies that afflict so many of the 
vessels, owners and operators that have been described in this chapter. All 
the usual ingredients of negligence, incompetence, an unseaworthy vessel, 
absence of seamanship, lack of maintenance, overloading, corruption and 
panic were there. 
                                                     
255 Case study compiled from reports in Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the sinking 
of the Rabaul Queen, Port Moresby, www.coi.gov.pg/rabaul-queen/; 
www.pngexposed.wordpress.com/tag/rabaul-queen/; www.abc.net.au/news/2014-05-02/; 
and, www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-13/. 
256 Appendix D. Letter from Captain Peter Sharp, managing director of Rabaul Shipping to the 
editor of Work Boat World magazine, Baird Publications, Melbourne, 3 February 2015. 
257 Tlozek, E. Rabaul Queen trial: Court dismisses manslaughter charges against Australian 
ferry owner, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-31/. 
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Image 3.22. Sewol showing the additional accommodation decks at the stern 
that contributed to its instability (www.abc.net.au). 
 
Although it resulted in „only‟ 304 fatalities, the capsize and sinking of the 
South Korean conventional monohull Ro-Pax cargo ferry Sewol has probably 
received more international media coverage than any other Asian passenger 
vessel accident. This is likely due to the fact that most of the victims were 
teenaged school students as well as the political machinations and legal 
drama that followed the accident and that South Korea is generally regarded 
as a „developed‟ country. 
 
The Sewol was yet another „accident waiting to happen‟. All the ingredients 
were there: corrupt, negligent officials; a corrupting, negligent owner; 
incompetent and cowardly officers and crew; insensitive politicians; an 
unseaworthy ship; subsequent suicides; overloading; inadequate lifesaving 
equipment; and, a slow and not particularly competent rescue effort. It 
provided the South Korean Government, the Korean Register of Shipping and 
the South Korean Coast Guard with a very nasty awakening. 
 
Built in 1994 in Japan by Hayashikane Shipbuilding and Engineering, the 
6,825 grt vessel was 146 metres long. The owner, Chonghaejujin Marine 
Company, in turn owned by Yoo Byung-eun, purchased it in 2012 and 
immediately added additional superstructure, thus reducing the ship‟s stability. 
It operated on three round trips weekly from Incheon, the port of Seoul, to Jeju 
on Korea‟s south coast. The ship was reported to have been dilapidated when 
purchased.  It was classed by and in survey to the Korean Register of 
Shipping and passed a South Korean Coast Guard inspection in early 2014. 
 
On 16 April the ship was outward bound from Incheon when it heeled over 
and sank during a sharp turn 0.9 of a nautical mile off Douggeochado near the 
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south-west corner of South Korea. The ship was carrying 476 people, mostly 
teenage high school students, 124 cars, 56 trucks and 1,157 tonnes of cargo. 
Nearly twice its legal limit. 
 
The subsequent MBOI, conducted by the South Korean Board of Audit and 
Inspection was sensational in its findings and devastating in its 
recommendations. It found the KRS license was based on falsified 
documents. It revealed the ship‟s previous master had resigned following 
threats of dismissal after informing the owner his ship was unstable and 
unsafe.  
 
The helmsman was inexperienced and, while the master was off the bridge, 
made the fatal sharp turn. The master ordered passengers to remain in their 
cabins as the ship sank. The master was one of the first to abandon ship. The 
ship‟s modifications were illegal. There was a “questionable relationship” 
between the operator and regulator. The owner had been issued with 
warnings as to the seaworthiness of his ship. The rescue operation was slow 
and inadequate. Many passengers were still alive when trapped inside as the 
ship sank. The master fled after abandoning ship. Finally, two divers were 
killed during the rescue effort. 
 
Following the inquiry, the 69 year old master was imprisoned for 36 years for 
negligence; the chief engineer for 30 years; a corrupt SKCG official for four 
years; and, the president of the owning company for seven years for homicide 
by wilful negligence. The owner‟s body was found later after committing 
suicide. The vice-principal of the school who had organised the trip for his 
students also, tragically, suicided.258 
 
Again, all the usual ingredients were involved: greed, corruption, negligence, 
incompetence, illegal and dangerous modifications, overloading, an 
unseaworthy ship and appalling seamanship. It must be highlighted that this 
„accident‟ occurred in a so-called developed country in 2014. The political 
„cover-up‟ that followed simply made the whole disgraceful incident even 










                                                     
258 Compiled from reports in The Economist, London, 26 April 2014; 
www.cnn.com/04/26/2014/; www.bbc.com; and, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/16/. 
259 The callous response of President Park Geun-hye was cited in the ultimately successful 
impeachement trial which led to her dismissal and subsequent imprisonment on 10 March 
2017.  See Murray, L, South Korean president impeached, Australian Financial Review, 
Fairfax Media, Sydney, 11-12 March, 2017. 
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3.2.24. Dongfang Zhi Xing/Oriental Star/Eastern Star, 442 




Image 3.23. Dongfang Zhi Xing capsized in the Yangtze River. Passengers 
were still alive and trapped in the hull when this image was taken 
(www.wunderground.com). 
 
Forty years on from the similarly storm caused collision and sinking of the 
Hongxing 240 & 245, China experienced another river cruise ferry disaster 
resulting in a similar number of fatalities. The 1975 accident occurred near 
Guangzhou on a tributary of the Pearl River and resulted in about 432 
fatalities. The Chinese government was better able to suppress the news in 
those days. Despite its best efforts, much has been revealed about the 
Oriental Star capsize and sinking that saw ten more people killed than in the 
previous event. 
 
The Dong Fang Zhi Xing or Eastern or Oriental Star was one of a number of 
four deck steel cruise ferries that take tourists along the Yangtze River from 
Nanjing to Chongqing via the Threes Gorges. At 3,900 grt and 77 metres LOA 
and with accommodation for about 450 tourists, she was typical of the breed. 
Built in 1994 by the Chongqing Chandong Shipbuilding Corp, she was owned 
by the Oriental Shipping Co and operated by Xihe Travel. 
 
On the night of 2 June 2015, while most of its elderly Chinese passengers 
were asleep, the ship capsized and sank near Jianii in Hubei province. There 
were 442 fatalities and only 12 survivors including the master and chief 
engineer. The authorities were not notified of the capsize until two and a half 
hours later by survivors who had swum ashore.  
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It is notable that the ship was lengthened by 11 metres in 1997. In 2013 the 
Nanjing Maritime Bureau found that six of ten Yangtze cruise ships had safety 
problems among which was a significant difficulty in recruiting trained crews. 
 
At the subsequent inquiry, the master and engineer claimed the ship had 
been hit by a tornado. That was proved to be untrue although it was found 
there had been a severe thunderstorm with strong downbursts. Ships had 
earlier been warned of severe weather. 
 
The rescue effort was unimpressive and it was noted that many passengers 
were tapping on the hull when salvage commenced. However, they were all 
dead by the time the ship was righted. 
 
On 30 December 2015 the Chinese Government released the report arising 
from its inquiry. It found that the owner and local authorities had “flaws in their 
daily management” and suggested that 43 people be punished.260 
 
Yet another poorly enlarged, unseaworthy ship crewed by incompetents and 
managed and regulated negligently caused the deaths of more than 400 
innocent passengers. 
 
3.3.0. Similarities abound in these case studies. 
 
These case studies are replete with similar stories. The reasons for the 
accidents are remarkably similar and were each caused by some form of 
human error. It is significant that fifteen (60%) occurred at night. That, 
undoubtedly, increased the likelihood of greater fatalities as it made 
evacuation and rescue more difficult. 
 
They confirm that practically all the accidents have essentially human error 
causes and that little seems to have been learnt over the past fifty years with 
the notable exception of in Northern Europe. The same causes continue to 
reappear. They also illustrate that, while more fatal accidents (76%) occur in 
developing countries, they still do happen in developed ones (24%) albeit with 
less catastrophic results in terms of numbers of fatalities per accident. 
 
While human errors are the major cause of fatal passenger vessel accidents, 
there is no doubt that certain types of vessels suffer from vulnerabilities that 
exacerbate the problem and make accidents more likely to be fatal. 
Obviously, conventional Ro-Pax ferries, motor bancas and modified vessels 
that are so made less stable can worsen the effects of human error.261 Sixty 
per cent of the 25 vessels in the cases studied here were conventional 
monohull Ro-Pax ferries.262 
 
                                                     
260 Well described in The Age, 4 June 2015; The Australian, 3 June 2015; 
www.shipwrecklog.com/log/2015/06/03/; and, www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/. 
261 No motor bancas are included among these case studies because they are too small to 
have carried sufficient passengers to have caused more than 150 fatalities in one accident. 
262 All percentages derived from a statistical analysis of Appendix A, Ibid. 
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There is much that can be learnt from such accidents. The problem lies in 
applying that knowledge to the task of reforming the behaviour of the people 
employed in the ferry industry to significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the risks 
involved in their operations. Reform can be achieved, however, even in 
developing countries, as the aviation industry and oil tanker sector have 
shown. 
 
Despite an increased international focus on training and education and ever 
more stringent safety requirements, fatal accidents continue to occur. Unlike 
the airline and oil tanker industries, there has been no significant reduction in 
the overall annual numbers of ferry fatalities since 2000. Indeed, although the 
data is nebulous, nothing seems to have changed – except in Northern 
Europe – over the past half century. 
 
Astonishingly, a number of repeat offenders (24%) among owners have been 
revealed in this chapter. The major causal factors, despite much 
encouragement by governments, the maritime media and IMO, continue to 
be: negligence (100%), overloading (72%), poor lookout (24%), badly 
modified vessels (24%), unseaworthy vessels (76%), incompetent crews 
100%), regulatory corruption, collusion between owners and survey officials 
and classification societies, poor seamanship (unknown percentages but 
common), insufficient lifesaving and fire-fighting equipment (72%), inadequate 
maintenance (unknown percentage but probably most), and late and 








                                                     
263 All statistics derived and analysed from Appendix A, Ibid. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Comparisons with other transport modes 
 
Improvements in aviation, oil tanker and road accident and 




4.1.1. Comparisons with other modes of transport. 
 
To determine how ferry travel compares with other modes in terms of 
accidents and fatalities it is necessary to examine the risks associated with 
those other modes. This has the important additional benefit of providing 
valuable lessons as to how other modes, particularly road vehicles, oil tankers 
and aviation, have been able to very significantly reduce their incidence of 
both accidents and their accompanying fatalities. In the case of car travel that 
has mostly been in developed countries but with aviation it has been almost 
world wide as have oil tankers. Fortunately, all have been well documented 
and recorded. 
 
Other modes, again, including both rail and bus were reviewed but rejected 
for the purposes of this study. Rail travel is obviously quite different from 
water, road and air, if only because trains, running on rails, cannot divert from 
the very precise direction laid out for them. Practically all railway accidents are 
the result of external causes rather than errors on the part of the actual train 
operator or driver.  
 
Rail fatality statistics incorporate large numbers of suicides and the   
carelessness of significant numbers of car, bus and truck drivers and 
pedestrians who misjudge their ability to cross tracks in front of oncoming 
trains.264 As these are not usually defined separately in most available 
statistics it makes it nearly impossible to calculate which fatalities have been 
the direct result of rail travel in the sense of passenger and crew deaths. 
Errors on the part of train drivers and their controllers and overloaded trains 
have undoubtedly caused fatalities but they have been rare and, so, are not 







                                                     
264 For a detailed study of this phenomenon, in the Australian context, refer to Rail accident 
costs in Australia, Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics, Canberra, 2002.The 
conclusions contained in that document undoubtedly have international relevance. 
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4.1.2. Inconsistent railway statistics. 
 
In addition the statistics available from developing countries are inconsistent, 
vague and uninformative in the extreme. For example, India has large 
numbers of fatal railway accidents but obtaining anything more than sketchy 
press reports about them is practically impossible. The likely fatality reality is 
considered by the author to be very much higher than the official statistics that 
are published. Even in developed countries such as the United States, where 
there are comparatively large numbers of fatal railway accidents, it is very 
difficult to distinguish between victims who were actually on a train and those 




Image 4.1. Despite the obvious risks associated with this kind of overloading 
seen in India, train travel, for ticketed train passengers at least, is 
comparatively safe (www.therewillbeasia.com). 
 
Nevertheless, the vast majority of rail accident fatalities involve pedestrians 
being run down by trains, often as suicides, or road vehicles colliding with 
trains due entirely to driver incompetence or panic.265 Very occasionally a 
major accident occurs but they are very rare and usually result in fewer than 
100 fatalities. They are simply not comparable in either their frequency or their 
fatality severity with ferry accidents.266 The worst ever train accident occurred 
in India, killing nearly 800 people in 1981.267 
 
                                                     
265 Rail accident costs in Australia, Ibid. 
266 A spectacular example was of a train derailment near Lucknow in India in November 2016 
killing an estimated 146 passengers. See Scores die after train runs off the tracks in India, 
The Australian (AP), Sydney, 21 November 2016, P. 9. 
267 Ibid. 
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4.1.3. Bus accident data are scarcer and more nebulous. 
 
Bus travel is even more difficult to evaluate. Many bus accidents in developing 
countries are accorded no publicity and are not even recorded by the 
appropriate authorities.268 The same, generally, applies to travel by car or 
motorcycle. Many buses operate illegally in developing countries in a kind of 
grey market similar to many ferry operations in the same kinds of countries. 
Even if an accident results in more than 100 fatalities, as some do, it is not 
considered newsworthy. However, as with car accidents, the incidence of bus 
accidents and fatalities has been falling significantly in developed countries for 
the past forty years. This is almost certainly due to stricter controls on 




Image 4.2. The problem with buses. A typical grossly overloaded bus in a 
developing country, in this case, India. The statistics on fatal accidents 
involving such vehicles are very hard to come by (Wikipedia). 
 
The author has seen the aftermath of several bus accidents in India, 
Bangladesh, Egypt and Indonesia. When a heavily overloaded bus, with 
passengers on the roof and hanging on to the sides and rear, rolls over an 
embankment, the number of fatalities can be very high. As they occur so 
                                                     
268 The author has observed the aftermath of bus accidents in India, Bangladesh, Egypt and 
Indonesia that must have resulted in many tens of fatalities each. They were not recorded in 
the local media. 
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frequently, the response from the general public, the local media and local 
authorities is unlikely to be much more than a shrug of the shoulders.269  
 
The death rate arising from bus accidents is also considered likely to be 
significantly higher than from ferry accidents but official global statistics as 
collated by Numberwatch, in Figure 1.4. in Chapter 1, do not show that. 270 
Those statistics tend not to distinguish between buses, trucks and cars.  
 
4.1.4. Available rail and bus statistics appear erroneous. 
 
Indeed, that table shows that rail and bus travel are considerably safer than 
travel by ferry or even by aircraft. In the case of bus travel that seems most 
unlikely and, from his own observation, the author strongly refutes those 
figures.  
 
There are, self-evidently, many more buses than ferries in the world and they 
suffer from many of the same problems. They are: unroadworthy vehicles; 
poor lookout; overloading; general negligence; poor accident recovery 
responses; and, poor driving skills. These accord precisely with the main 
causes of ferry fatalities. While it is impossible to accurately estimate the 
numbers of either passenger vessels or buses operating globally, the author 
estimates from personal observation that there would be at least three times 
as many buses as ferries. Therefore the Numberwatch figures seem very 
unlikely to be accurate. 
  
Bus travel in the developing world is not for the faint hearted. It is a Hobbesian 
activity in which life is likely to be “… nasty, brutish and short”.271  
 
4.1.5. Comparisons restricted to car, oil tanker and aviation 
sectors. 
 
So, for the purposes of this study, comparisons and benchmarking have been 
restricted to the car, oil tanker and aviation sectors where the statistics appear 
to be far more accurate and useful. They also, especially in the developed 
world, show the distinctly improving trends of the past forty years. The tried 
and proven techniques that led to those improving trends appear to mostly be 
quite readily and economically adapted to the ferry industry. For the purposes 
of this work, then, the statistics covering road travel will generally be restricted 
to car travel in the developed world. They remain useful, however, because 
they illustrate how various behavioural and technological improvements have 
contributed to a marked decline in road fatalities in most developed countries. 
 
For aviation the very useful and complete statistics provided by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation, Boeing Corporation and 
                                                     
269 Personal observation by the author. In Bangladesh there were numerous examples. 
During a two hour drive through the countryside outside Dhaka in late 1978 at least six 
wrecked buses were observed. 
270 Numberwatch, Op cit. 
271 Hobbes, T. Leviathan, J. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1973. 
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www.aviation-safety.net have been extensively referred to.272  The ICAO has 
shown conclusively that a global approach where “no country is left behind” 
can be very effective.273  A process of encouragement, assistance, bench-
marking, propaganda and, when necessary, enforcement by banning, has led 
to significant world-wide improvements in civil aviation safety. 
 
ICAO, however, is not afraid to „name and shame‟ individual countries or even 
airlines when it believes their safety procedures are unsatisfactory. For 
example, Thailand was “red-flagged” in 2015 and took ICAO‟s criticisms very 
seriously. The Thai Government took strong, effective and immediate action 
to rectify the problems pointed out by ICAO. It would presumably do likewise if 
IMO were to publicly shame it about its unsafe ferries and tourist boats.  
 
Other, more permanent, defaulters have been Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Georgia, Haiti, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Malawi, 
Nepal, Sierra Leone and Uruguay. They have all required extensive ongoing 
attention from ICAO.274 Notably, three of them also have very poor ferry safety 
records. Aviation is still far from perfect, particularly in much of Africa and the 
former Soviet Union, but it has shown very significant improvement over the 
past three decades. It is now the safest transport mode by a considerable 
margin. 
 
IMO, impressively, worked very effectively in conjunction with INTERTANKO, 
the oil tanker industry equivalent of INTERFERRY, to dramatically reduce the 
number and consequences of oil tanker accidents.275 That development was 
largely inspired by the marine pollution that followed the groundings of the 
Torrey Canyon in 1967 and the Exxon Valdez in 1989. It is notable that IMO 
appeared to be more interested in the problems of oil pollution that followed 
tanker accidents than in their human consequences or, indeed, in the fatalities 
arising from ferry accidents. However, the co-operation between IMO and 
INTERTANKO showed the potential for significant safety improvement that 
could be achieved with similar co-operation between ferry owners and IMO 
with the ferry industry. 
 
An interesting commentary on the paucity of useful statistics on the safety of 
various modes of travel and the difficulty in comparing the safety or risks 
inherent in each mode was published on the blog www.artchester.net by 
Arthur Chester.276  Mr Chester asserts that:  
 
Data on travel fatalities are noteworthy for their lack of completeness. He says 
that, In the U.S. and other industrialized countries, aircraft accidents are 
                                                     
272 Aviation Safety Network presents some very clear and up-to-date data on its website. 
www.aviation-safety.net. 
273 International Civil Aviation Authority, in www.icao.int/about-icao, Montreal, 2015. It 
provides excellent, detailed, timely and very extensive data. 
274 Cripps, K. Thailand „red-flagged‟ for aviation safety concerns, CNN, Atlanta, 19 June 2015. 
www.edition.cnn.com/2015/06/19/travel/thailand 
275 Refer to Introduction, Legal affairs, IMO, London, 2017, 
www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Legal/Pages/Default.aspx/. 
276 Chester, A. Travel Fatalities by Car, Air & Ship, in www.artchester.net, USA, 6 September 
2015. 
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thoroughly investigated and documented, and motor vehicle accidents are 
almost as well reported. However, many countries are inconsistent about 
collecting and reporting their data. Foreign air travel fatalities in particular are 
often under-reported. A similar situation holds for cruise ships, with the 
additional complication that almost all cruise ships are registered in countries 
that rely primarily on voluntary reporting by the cruise lines.277 
 
This was discussed at length in Chapter 2, but, allowing for those statistical 
deficiencies, there is sufficient information available about global aviation, oil 
tanker and developed country car accidents to enable worthwhile 
comparisons to be made with the risks associated with ferry travel. Despite Mr 
Chester‟s comments, the author has found that cruise ship accidents are 
comparatively well recorded. They do, after all, mainly affect developed 
country passengers. The less accurate, and more limited, information about 
fatal ferry accidents that is available is far more useful than no information. It 
does facilitate the illustration of quite clear trends that enable lessons to be 
drawn from successful improvement initiatives that have been made in those 
other modes and which are adaptable to ferry travel. 
 
4.2.1. Aviation presents a particularly relevant and useful 
model. 
 
The aviation industry, particularly, presents a useful, and undoubtedly the best 
documented, model for improvement of ferry industry safety. Apart from 
organic internal industry improvement, there has been considerable 
internationally driven improvement thanks to the encouragement of ICAO. Its 
contribution, influence and performance have put those of IMO to shame. 
Many national authorities, working in conjunction with ICAO, particularly in 
Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and the UAE have also made significant contributions to 
improvements in aviation safety both domestically and to poorer neighbouring 
countries in their wider regions.278 ICAO clearly appears to deliberately play 
an assisting, cooperative and supportive leadership role with its member 
nations. That role seems to have generally eluded IMO despite their largely 
similar mandates and mission statements. 
 
Indeed, ICAO states in its mission statement, as published on its website, that 
its mission is: “To serve as the global forum of States for international civil 
aviation. ICAO develops policies and standards, undertakes compliance 
audits, performs studies and analyses, provides assistance and builds 
aviation capacity through many other activities and the cooperation of its 
Member States and stakeholders” (note the final seven words in bold).279 
 
 
                                                     
277 In other words, they are registered in tax havens and under “flags of convenience” such as 
Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Cayman Islands and Marshall Islands, among others. 
278 For details of the worst ten aviation accidents, refer to www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/travel-
truths/the-deadliest-aviation-plane-crashes-disasters-in-history/. 
279 Refer to www.icao.int/about-icao/Pages/vision-and-mission/. 
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IMO, however, surrounds its mission statement with more legalistic „escape‟ 
words. It states that its mission: “…is to promote safe, secure, environmentally 
sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through cooperation. This will be 
accomplished by adopting the highest practicable standards of maritime 
safety and security, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of 
pollution from ships, as well as through consideration of the related legal 
matters and effective implementation of IMO‟s instruments with a view to their 
universal and uniform application”.280  
 
Both organisations are mandated to improve safety on an international basis. 
Neither body, as international subsidiary organisations of the United Nations, 
has a mandate to interfere with domestic matters.  However, while ICAO 
seems to interpret its mission as it being required to work globally „with‟ its 
member nations to assist and support them to improve safety on both 
international and domestic flights, IMO interprets its mandated role quite 
differently and more literally. IMO, in its rigid adherence to its „non-
interference in domestic matters‟ policy, evinces no apparent interest in 
adopting the same kind of leadership role that ICAO carries out so effectively. 
It largely restricts its mission to international voyages although even those 
tend be ignored by IMO if, for example, they occur in Africa as in the case of 
Le Joola.281 The difference between the two bodies, then, is clearly one of 
interpretation and approach. 
 
Annual numbers of passenger aircraft accidents, too, are rather more 
comparable with ferry accidents although the latter tend to have much greater 
numbers of fatalities per accident, as can be seen in Table 4.1, below. The 
world‟s worst ever aviation accident, for example, involved a collision between 
two Boeing 747 aircraft at Tenerife airport on 27 March 1977.282 That resulted 
in 583 fatalities. Indeed, even the combined total of fatalities from the world‟s 
ten worst aviation accidents at 3,561 is far fewer than the 4,386 deaths arising 
from the one ferry collision involving the Dona Paz in the Philippines Sibuyan 
Sea in 1987.283  
 
Most importantly, annual fatal airliner accidents have reduced from 100 in 
1949 to 18 in 2015 in a steady progression.284 In 2017 there were no fatal jet 
airliner accidents.285 This has been achieved against the background of a 






                                                     
280 Refer to www.imo.org/en/About/HistoryofIMO/Pages/Default/. 
281 Refer to 3.17. 
282 www.planecrashinfo.com and www.edition.cnn.com/2014/03/08/travel. 
283 See 3.8. for case study. 
284 See Fatal Airliner Accidents Per Year 1946 -2016 at www.aviation-
safety.net/graphics/infographics/  
285 See www.airlineratings.com. 
286 See Airliner Accidents Per 1 Million Flights 1977-2016, Aviation Safety Net, Ibid. 
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4.2.2. ICAO accident database is an excellent guide. 
 
The author has been unable to find any comprehensive list of accidents and 
fatalities kept by IMO, even though its GISIS (Global Integrated Shipping 
Information System) database is claimed to perform that function, that is 
comparable with that of Aviation Safety Net.287 Nor has he been able to find a 
„naming and shaming‟ list comparable with that published by ICAO. It is 
incomprehensible that IMO has not even been able to achieve either of those 
despite its spurious, negligent and unimpressive claim to be, “…unable to 
interfere in the internal affairs of our sovereign Member States”.288  
 
Those Member State governments and IMO should start to emulate ICAO and 
its member states and learn how to effectively “Regulate, educate, encourage 
and enforce” better behaviour. Establishing a comprehensive database 




Image 4.3. Aviation accidents, while very rare, tend to result in large numbers 
of fatalities because, obviously, of the speeds at which they usually occur. 
They also attract considerable publicity. This was the crash of an Air Asia 
Boeing 777 at San Francisco airport. It actually resulted in very few fatalities 
and was attributed to pilot error (www.incolors.club.com). 
 
IMO did promulgate its Casualty Investigation Code (Code of International 
Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a 
Marine Casualty or Marine Incident) on 1 January 2010.289 This became 
mandatory from 1 January 2016.290 However, to date, more than seven years 
later, the author has been unable to find any evidence of the CIC Code being 
followed except in western developed countries where it was happening 
anyway. The only known exception is the excellent Rabaul Queen inquiry 
conducted for the Government of Papua New Guinea which is described in 
Chapter 3. 
 
                                                     
287 Examine and compare GISIS at www.imo.org. 
288 Hon. William O‟Neil, Various discussions with the author. London, 1998-2002. 
289 IMO, Casualty Investigation Code, London, 2010. 
290 Detailed in IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS), www.imo.org/en/OurWork/MSAS/. 
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Regrettably, IMO has failed to publish an annual report for its Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) since 1996.291 This compares with ICAO which published 
its 2016 ICAO Safety Report during 2016. It incorporates data current to the 
end of 2015.292 
 
4.3.1. Aviation safety statistics. 
 
Aviation accidents by their comparative rarity and spectacular nature tend to 
attract considerable public interest and, inevitably therefore, media coverage. 
Hence, apart, perhaps, from in the Soviet Union and China of more than two 
decades ago, the vast majority of aviation accidents have been recorded and 
generally well reported. ICAO has published extensive and detailed statistics 
on the subject and maintains a useful database of accidents with details of 
their causes and lessons to be learnt from them.293 
 
ICAO divides the world into six regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America 
and the Caribbean, North America and, Oceania. It presents accident 
statistics in the fields of: Traffic, Number of accidents, Rate or number of 
accidents per million departures and, number of fatal accidents. Interestingly, 
in ICAO‟s 2011 edition of its State of Global Aviation Safety report, Asia was 
the region with the lowest rate of accidents per million departures.294 Africa 
was more than five times as bad. 
 
ICAO also, usefully, compares accidents with traffic distribution and, here, 
Africa also performs worst. As always with regional comparisons, there are 
peculiarities that should be noted and allowed for. For example, Oceania 
includes New Zealand, Australia, Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya. Of those 
New Zealand and Australia have excellent safety records which are distorted 
by the appalling records of PNG and Indonesian Irian Jaya.295 
 
 
4.3.2. ICAO actively encourages safety intelligence gathering. 
IMO, regrettably, does not. 
 
ICAO has been encouragingly proactive in promoting and initiating safety 
intelligence and in 2010 “…initiated a risk-assessment approach to enhance 
aviation safety based on safety intelligence”.296 It explains that it “… 
accomplishes its objectives in this regard through identification and analysis of 
heterogeneous data sources, such as: 
*Accident statistics. 
*USOAP Audit results. 
*Economic indicators. 
*Traffic volume and traffic growth. 
                                                     
291 From IMO website, IMO Maritime Safety Committee(MSC). As of 26 March 2017, the most 
recent MSC Final Report presented was dated 1996. 
292 ICAO Safety Report 2016 Edition. 
293 Available at www.icao.int/Safety/Stars/Pages/Accident-Statistics.aspx. 
294 ICAO, 2011 State of Global Aviation Safety, ICAO, Montreal, 2011. 
295 See note 23, above. 
296 ICAO Safety Report, Ibid. Page 17. 
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*Traffic distribution factors, including the proportion of flights flown by a 
State‟s Air Operator‟s Certificate (AOC) holders vs foreign operators”. 
Very importantly, and in strong contrast with IMO‟s lack of initiative, it says: 
“This Safety Intelligence enables the Organization to cultivate a holistic 
understanding of safety issues and opportunities to assist Member States and 
regional and sub-regional organizations”. 
 
Further, ICAO has established and maintains the Integrated Safety Trend 
Analysis and Reporting System (iSTARS) which is described as “… a web 
based utility which combines different safety-related datasets and allows for 
effective and integrated safety analysis”. It also, in partnership with 
EUROCONTROL, maintains SKYbrary, an electronic repository of safety 
information which is made available to users world-wide and includes 
information sourced from across the wider aviation industry. It even 
incorporates information on operational issues and individual aircraft 
airworthiness.297 
 
Obviously, intelligence is imperative. It would be difficult, if not impossible to 
make substantial safety improvements if you don‟t know the extent of the 
problem and where, how and why it occurs. ICAO has and makes generally 
available to the interested public vast amounts of information on the subject of 
aviation safety. It conducts and encourages and assists other authorities to 
conduct thorough and searching inquiries into aviation accidents as a very 
important component of its accident prevention effort.  
 
There are a number of other sources of aviation accident statistics such as 
the Flight Safety Foundation,298 the European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA),299 the NLR Air Transport Safety Institute,300 AirSafe.com, 
Planecrashinfo.com, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)301 and 
the Australian Bureau of Air Safety Investigation (BASI).302 All operate in 
developed countries or in regions of developed countries.  
 
Their roles are similar but subsidiary to that of ICAO and they contribute 
statistics to ICAO‟s global accumulations. They are interesting to examine in 
the context of this study because they all work slightly differently and take 
slightly different approaches to reach similar objectives.  
 
Thus, the statistical reports of all the organisations have been studied in 
addition to the voluminous and very informative material published by ICAO. 
They make for very interesting and illuminating comparisons with the scarce 
statistics available about passenger vessel accidents. 
 
 
                                                     
297 ICAO Safety Report, Ibid. Page 17. 
298 Flight Safety Foundation. www.flightsafety.org 
299 European Aviation Safety Agency. www.easa.europa.eu 
300 NLR Air Transport Safety Institute. www.nlr-atsi.nl 
301 Australian Transport Safety Bureau. www.atsb.gov.au 
302 Bureau of Air Safety Investigation. www.basi.gov.au 
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4.4.1. Comparing 16 years of comprehensive Passenger 
Airliner and „known‟ Passenger Vessel Fatality Statistics. 
     
               
YEAR Passenger Airliners Passenger Vessels 
          
  Accidents Fatalities Accidents Fatalities 
2000 43 1,148 40 1,805 
2001 35 801 24 729 
2002 43 1,112 38 3,303 
2003 33 703 46 2,509 
2004 34 453 23 1,831 
2005 40 1,074 42 2,376 
2006 33 905 49 3,445 
2007 31 773 51 1,305 
2008 33 588 36 1,869 
2009 31 760 41 1,605 
2010 32 943 34 1,059 
2011 36 524 34 4,059 
2012 23 475 27 1,669 
2013 29 265 20 615 
2014 20 691 20 1,729 
2015 14 186 30 1,492 
Total 510 11,401 555 31,400 
Average P/Annum 32 713 35 1,963 
Average fatalities per 
accident 22 56 
 
Table 4.1. A comparison of fatal accidents involving passenger aircraft and 
passenger vessels from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2015. The aviation 
figures were obtained from the Flight Safety Foundation303 and the passenger 
vessels from the BMPVA database.304 The author contends that the real 
passenger vessel fatality numbers are about 50% higher than shown here. 
 
Very importantly, the aviation accident and fatality statistics show a significant 
downtrend over the past sixteen years by both measures. This, generally, 
continues the improving trend that has been evident over more than three 
decades. The current risk of dying in a commercial jet airliner accident in 
almost all parts of the world is now so small as to be practically non-existent. 
  
In theory, because ships travel at about four per cent of the speed of aircraft 
and operate in two dimensions, rather than three, ferry and tourist boat travel 
should be even less risky. The fact that it is not so reflects very badly on IMO, 
the national and regional governments involved as well as the owners and 
operators of the vessels concerned.  
 
                                                     
303 Flight Safety Foundation, Ibid. 
304 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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The comparison above is obviously somewhat general but it has been made 
in a very deliberate effort to compare „apples with apples‟ as far as possible. 
All involved fare paying passengers and extraneous factors such as 
hijackings, terrorism and people smuggling activities have been excluded. As 
with so many of the statistics associated with fatal ferry accidents, it is 
emphasised that the figures, while incomplete, are most likely to be very 
conservative. In reality, the ferry fatalities are estimated to be as much as 50 
per cent higher than shown here (See Chapter 2). Given the source of the 
aviation accident figures and some cross-checking against other databases 
mentioned above, it is believed that the aviation figures are distinctly more 
accurate. 
 
Aviation fatalities are in continuous downtrend but ferries, while varying from 
year to year, have remained near constant when averaged over the whole 
sixteen-year period since the widespread adoption of the Internet from about 
1 January 2000.305  Of course, because of significant data deficiencies, it is 
impossible to know accurately the trends in ferry fatalities. 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Airliner accidents per 1 million flights 1977-2016 (Aviation Safety 
Network). 
 
4.4.2. Continually improving aviation safety performance. 
 
Nevertheless, for all its deficiencies, the comparison quite clearly illustrates 
important trends both in the outright comparison between passenger aircraft 
and passenger vessel safety and in the continuing improvement in the safety 
performance of the commercial aviation industry. Obviously and 
fundamentally, thus far in the Third Millennium, it is considerably more 
dangerous to travel by ferry than by commercial passenger aircraft. 
 
                                                     
305 Compare Figure 4.2. with Table 4.1. and Figure 1.2. 
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This reality raises an interesting conundrum. If it is so much more dangerous 
to travel by ferry than by airliner, why has so much more research effort and 
statistical and behavioural analysis been directed at airliner accidents rather 
than at their ferry counterparts? Could it simply be because wealthier people 
tend to travel by air and poorer ones by sea? Could it be because, unlike 
aircraft manufacturers, many, but not all, ship and boat builders take very little 
interest in their products after they have been delivered to their first owners 
and even less when they have passed to second and third owners? Is it 
because many, but again, not all, ship and boat builders tend to construct 
„one-off‟ vessels and have little or no brand or reputation to protect? Or, is it 
simply because, outside the more developed countries, no one really cares? 
 
Whatever the answer, all the research effort and money directed at the study 
of aviation safety provides the researcher into maritime safety with much in 
the way of both ideas and “benchmarking” opportunities. It offers almost 
endless ideas as to how passenger vessel safety could be improved as well 
as almost innumerable proven examples as to how to do so. The large 
numbers of both small and major safety improvements made by the aviation 
industry and its global, regional and national regulators provide many of the 
keys to making passenger vessel travel very much safer. 
 
Despite what Mr Chester wrote above, the information gathering and analysis 
undertaken globally by the aviation industry is incomparably better and more 
useful in efforts to improve safety than that of any other transport sector. That 
intelligence gathering effort is enhanced by the competition that exists 
between the various government and commercial organisations that are 
involved with it. Above all, the record of ICAO highlights what could be 
achieved by IMO if it were to follow ICAO‟s example. An abundance of data 
makes achieving reforms much more likely than where such data is scarce. 
 
Even if IMO possesses similar information related to maritime safety, which is 
very doubtful, it certainly fails to make it widely available. ICAO is proactive 
and positive in its intelligence gathering and dissemination. Unfortunately, 
IMO is not. This is one of a number of related reasons why the safety record 
of aviation has improved significantly since 1980 while that of ferries, 
generally, has not. 
 
4.5.1. IMO‟s inadequate ferry safety intelligence data. 
 
The author has examined IMO‟s GISIS database and found it lacking in useful 
information. He has corresponded with Mr Lee Adamson, Head – Public 
Information Services of IMO, to question that information deficiency and to 
offer assistance in providing more. Mr Adamson‟s response was: “…the 
problem with that idea is that it is the Member states‟ own database; we just 
host it for them, We don‟t have any authority from them to add data from any 
other source”.306  
 
                                                     
306 Email correspondence between the author and Lee Adamson, Head – Public Information 
Services, IMO, London, June 2016. 
 
   120 
Again, we return to the problem of IMO being unwilling, uninterested in or 
unable to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign member states. Are 
those states trying to conceal something? This also tends to confirm the fact 
that the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database is the most 
comprehensive and accurate available. 307 
 
In its Secretary-General‟s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2008, 
IMO defined its mandate thus, under the heading, Maritime Safety and 
Security – Functions and current Activities of IMO: 
 
MANDATE OF IMO 
 
Since 1959, the International Maritime Organization(“IMO”), as the sole United 
Nation‟s specialized agency exclusively devoted to maritime affairs, has been 
providing a forum for co-operation among Governments in the field of 
governmental regulations and practices relating to all kinds of shipping 
engaged in international trade, facilitating the adoption of comprehensive 
multilateral treaties for a wide range of technical measures and, in particular, 
the adoption of the highest practicable standards, designed to enhance 
safety, security and efficiency in shipping engaged in international trade.308 
 
That very lengthy sentence encapsulates the problematic nature of IMO‟s 
involvement with ferry safety. The key words are “engaged in international 
trade”. The problem is that practically all (at least 93%) fatal ferry accidents 
have occurred on domestic rather than international voyages.309 Of the 681 
fatal ferry accidents recorded in the BMPVA database, only 47 or fewer than 
seven per cent occurred on international voyages.310 
 
So, while IMO may well have, as it claims, 167 sovereign states as members, 
it is doing very little to inform itself of the extent of the domestic ferry fatality 
problem in developing countries. Nor is it doing anything constructive to 
reduce or eliminate that problem. Its reluctance to collect or even evince 
interest in the statistical data describing the extent and causes of developing 
country domestic ferry accidents is symptomatic of a very regrettable malaise. 
That, combined with a similar reluctance on the part of the national 
governments of the most dangerous countries for ferry travel represents a 
very significant component of the total problem. 
 
4.5.2. Impressive, well-documented improvements in oil 
tanker safety. 
 
Distinctly contrasting with IMO‟s apparent lack of interest in domestic ferry 
safety problems has been its serious, constructive and continuing efforts 
aimed at improving the safety of oil tankers. Those efforts have largely been 
                                                     
307 Appendix A, Ibid. 
308 From The Secretary-General‟s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, 2008 _ 
Maritime Safety and Security, IMO, London, 2008, P 1. 
309 Refer to Appendix A, Ibid for details. 
310 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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made in conjunction and co-operation with INTERTANKO, the international 
tanker owners association as well as flag and port states. Given the heading 
of its background paper on Maritime safety/Oil Tankers, Tanker safety –
preventing accidental pollution, it could well be asked if IMO‟s focus is more 
on oil pollution prevention than on ferry fatality prevention, on pollution rather 
than people?311 
 
The measures described in that document are thorough, detailed and have 
been very widely and effectively implemented in co-operation with industry, 
flag and port states. They have led to a remarkable reduction in both tanker 
accidents and their resulting pollution since the early 1980s.312 Despite the 
numbers of oil tankers more than doubling from 1970 until 2007, the number 
of oil spills annually reduced from 120 at their peak in 1974 to fewer than ten 




Figure 4.2. Reduction in numbers of marine oil spills from tankers compared 
with the number of tankers in service (from www.worldoceanreview.com/ 
ITOPF/Fernresearch). 
 
This was achieved through a concerted campaign of awareness, education, 
training, vessel design and construction improvement, procedural 
improvement, regulation and rigorous enforcement and punishment. It was 
obviously very effective and provides another proven template for the kinds of 
measures that would significantly improve ferry safety.314 
                                                     
311 For a summary of IMO‟s substantial and constructive work on tanker safety, refer to 
Tanker safety – preventing accidental pollution, www.imo.org/en/Ourwork/Safety/. 
312 For details of progress, refer to, FACTBOX-Oil tanker regulations, facts and figures, 
Reuters, London, 2007; Swift, P. M. Port Entry Issues, INTERTANKO, London, 2005; and, 
generally, www.intertanko.com. 
313 See Figure 4.2. from www.worldoceanreview,com/en/wor-1/pollution/oil/. 
314 Details of effective techniques may be obtained from, IMO, Tanker safety, Ibid; and, 
Unknown, A summary of tanker safety improvements already announced since 2012, 
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A useful comment on this success was made in an article Statistical analysis 
of ship accidents and review of safety level.315 The authors stated: “A 
remarkable example in this respect is the improvement of safety of tanker 
operations after year 1990…the introduction of new regulations and 
guidelines, of safety codes and improved crew training schemes which all 
contributed to a drastic reduction of accident frequencies thereafter…” This 
was very well illustrated using a graph showing a “Timeline of navigational 
accident rates vs. Introduced international maritime regulations, safety 
guidelines and codes”. 
 
Ironically, perhaps, but tellingly, IMO‟s GISIS database contains considerably 
more comprehensive data on oil tanker spills than on ferry accidents. 
INTERTANKO also has a very comprehensive database on the subject that 
has been used very effectively in the promotion of tanker accident 
reduction.316 It must be asked, then, that if IMO has been so successful in its 
campaign to prevent pollution from oil tankers, why it has been so dilatory in 
its efforts to improve ferry safety? 
 
4.6.1. Useful road safety statistics in the developed world. 
 
Obviously, road safety statistics must be kept in perspective. There are 
hundreds of millions more road vehicles in existence than there are aircraft or 
commercial vessels, particularly ferries. The exact numbers are impossible to 
calculate, except in the case of aircraft, but the relativities are common 
knowledge. So, it is only possible, practically, for the purpose of this thesis, to 
use the road accident figures from developed countries. In most less 
developed countries such figures are not compiled comprehensively if they 
are kept at all. 
 
Ironically, however, Ralph Nader in his seminal Unsafe at Any Speed, 
published in 1965 complained of the paucity of road accident statistics 
available at that time.317 His very timely and influential work strongly criticised 
the approach to safety of the American car industry and its regulators. It 
undoubtedly led to very significant improvements in road safety that 
commenced with the compiling of significantly more comprehensive, focused 
and useful data in the developed countries at least. 
 
The developed country statistics, then, especially the trends that they reveal, 
are useful. Mostly that is because they highlight the successes and failures of 
the various international, national and regional road safety enhancement 
campaigns that have been attempted over the past half-century. In most 
developed countries those campaigns have been notably successful overall. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Transport Canada, Ottawa, 22 December 2015, www.tc.gc.ca/eng/mediaroom/infosheets-
menu-7673/. 
315 Eliopoulou, E.et al. Statistical analysis of ship accidents and review of safety level, Safety 
Science, 85 (2016), pp. 282-292, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2016. 
316 Refer to GISIS at www.imo.org. 
317 There are a number of significant parallels between cars then and ferries fifty years later. 
See Nader, R. Unsafe at Any Speed, PB Special, New York, 1965. 
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Despite rapidly and significantly increasing numbers of vehicles, the absolute 
numbers of accidents, injuries and fatalities have declined and continue to 
decline substantially.  
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
World Health Organisation (WHO) and many national governments produce 
excellent statistics recording what has happened in developed countries. Less 
developed countries are less forthcoming but a useful global comparison 
utilising WHO statistics is shown in Appendix B.318 
 
 
4.6.2. Data shows effectiveness of „carrot and stick‟ approach. 
 
Those successes provide us, in addition to those achieved by the aviation 
industry and oil tanker sector, with proven techniques and accurate 
benchmarks that can be applied directly to the passenger vessel industry. 
They have incorporated both “carrot and stick” approaches in that vehicle 
drivers, tanker captains and air pilots are encouraged through educational and 
propaganda programmes to behave sensibly. On the other hand, a system of 
penalties for bad behaviour, usually in the form of fines, loss of licence or 
even imprisonment, has been applied to remind such people of their 
responsibilities. 
 
For vehicle drivers, for example, the improvements have started with better 
driver education and stricter licensing requirements.  Stringent drink and drug 
driving regulations are applied with frequent spot checks carried out. Speed 
limits are rigorously enforced as are rules banning the use of mobile 
telephones while driving. Vehicles above specified ages are checked for 
roadworthiness. Drivers and passengers are required to wear seatbelts at all 
times.  
 
The comparable aviation regulations are even more stringent and more 
rigorously applied. Pilots are required to be regularly checked for health and 
fitness, as are the aircraft they command checked carefully for 
airworthiness.319 Much the same, as described in the above mentioned IMO 
publication Tanker safety, applies to oil tankers and their captains.320 
 
At the same time, the structural, operational, fire and evacuation safety of 
aircraft and road vehicles has been improved significantly. Seat belts were 
required to be fitted to vehicles in most countries during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Predicted crumple rate structures were introduced soon after. Then came 
much-improved tyres, brakes and suspensions to the point that during the 
1980s and beyond, vehicle safety became a major selling point. Vehicle 
manufacturers started to compete on the safety of their products more even 
than on their appearance or performance. In the 1990s air-bags, then multiple 
                                                     
318 Appendix B, List of countries by traffic related death rate, WHO statistics. 
319 In all jurisdictions. 
320 IMO, Tanker safety, Ibid. 
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air-bags, became compulsory as did anti-skid braking systems and much 
more.321 
 
Another important contributor to improved road safety in developed countries 
has been the significant improvements in the roads themselves in terms of 
width, surfaces, curvature and banking. Road infrastructure such as lighting, 
signage and safety barriers has also been substantially improved. Similarly, 
air traffic control technology and procedures are continually being 
improved.322 It could also be fairly claimed that marine weather forecasting 
has become impressively accurate and timely. 
 
These kinds of structural, equipment, infrastructural and operational 
improvements and requirements obviously still have a long way to go in the 
ferry industry, particularly in developing countries, but at least the aviation, oil 
tanker and road sectors have set an obvious course for it to follow. They have 
all contributed to a very significant reduction in the road accident and fatality 
rates in more developed countries as the statistics presented below clearly 
show. 
 
The psychology profession has devoted considerable study to these aspects 
of human behaviour that could, presumably, be adapted to ferry operations. 
Its analysis and approaches to primary, secondary and tertiary aspects of 
safety are well described in The Oxford Handbook of Prevention in 
Counselling Psychology.323 
 
The road safety equivalent of ICAO is IRTAD, the International Traffic Safety 
Data and Analysis Group. It is a permanent working group of the Joint 
Transport Research Centre of the OECD and the International Transport 
Forum. Its influence clearly illustrates the imperative of having high quality 
data and statistics as the basis of any campaign or movement to change 
human behaviour. There is an obvious need for an IRTAD for the global 
passenger vessel industry. 
 
The IRTAD/International Transport Forum “Road Safety Annual Report 2015” 
offers considerable encouragement to this thesis.324 The first paragraph of its 
Executive Summary states: “ The number of road fatalities declined by 42% 
overall between 2000 and 2013 in the 32 countries in the International Road 
Traffic and Accident Database (IRTAD) for which data are consistently 
available”.325 
 
It continued: “The IRTAD countries with the lowest road mortality rates are 
located in Europe: Sweden and the United Kingdom recorded fewer than 
three fatalities per 100,000 inhabitants in 2013”. However, it noted, more 
                                                     
321 Described in www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_traffic/strategies/en/. 
322 Details in ICAO, 2011 State of Global Aviation Safety, Ibid. 
323 At page 149, in particular, Vera, E. M. et al. The Oxford Handbook of Prevention in 
Counseling Psychology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2012. 
324 Wegman, F, et al. Road Safety Annual Report 2015, International Transport Forum and 
International Traffic Safety Data and Analysis Group of the OECD, Paris, 2015. 
325 Ibid. P. 11. 
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depressingly, that: “Also, road crash fatalities in IRTAD countries only 
represent a small share (6%) of the 1.3 million global road deaths. A full 90% 
of casualties occur in low and middle-income countries”. A very similar 
situation to that prevailing with ferries except, of course, that there are about 
400 times as many road crash fatalities as ferry fatalities. Indeed, traffic 
accidents kill more people each day than do passenger vessel accidents in a 
year. 
 
As shown earlier in this presentation with passenger vessels, however, IRTAD 
is well aware that reporting rates in various countries are not equal. Indeed, it 
went to considerable trouble to try to understand the extent of that problem in 
a study conducted in 2007. The findings of that study were published in an 
IRTAD Special Report, Underreporting of Road Traffic Casualties that was 
released by the OECD in June 2007.326 It is a most interesting report that 
recognises and offers some solutions to the problems of data collection 
described in Chapter 2. 
 
As mentioned above, the WHO has compiled an illuminating list of countries 
by traffic-related death rate which compares the road traffic accident fatality 
statistics for all the UN member states. Too long to reproduce here, it is 
incorporated as Appendix B.327 It compares road fatalities per 100,000 
inhabitants per year; road fatalities per 100,000 motor vehicles; road fatalities 
per 1 billion vehicle-km; and, total fatalities latest year.  
 
It shows some interesting disparities. For example: Only one per cent of the 
world‟s registered cars produce 16% of the world‟s road traffic deaths. A 
quarter of the world‟s road traffic deaths occur among motorcyclists (23%), 
pedestrians (22%) and cyclists (5%) with 31% among car occupants and the 
remaining 19% unspecified.  
 
The risk of dying as a result of a road traffic injury is highest in the African 
region (An increasing annual rate of 26.6 per 100,000 population), and lowest 
in the European region (A decreasing annual rate of 9.3 per 100,000 
population). Such figures coincide remarkably with the geographic analysis of 
passenger vessel fatalities in Chapter 2. 
 
The Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Regional 
Development has presented the OECD statistics in a useful format.328 It 
compares the annual road deaths per 100,000 population of OECD nations 
and Australian states and territories and illustrates the disparities that exist 
within even a relatively homogenous and wealthy federation, albeit with a 
wide geographical, cultural and climatic spread and varying road regulations 
and enforcement efforts (See Graph 4.1. below). 
 
                                                     
326 Derriks, H.M. & Mak, P.M. Underreporting of Road Traffic Casualties, An IRTAD Special 
Report, OECD, Paris, 2007. 
327 Appendix B, Ibid. 
328 Anon. International Road Safety Comparisons – Annual, Australian Government 
Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development, Canberra, 2015. 
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The OECD median number of road deaths per 100,000 population per annum 
is five (See Graph 4.1 below) but the comparable figures for Bangladesh are 
13.6, D.R. Congo is 33.2, Indonesia is 15.3, Philippines is 10.5, and Tanzania 
is 32.9.329 Obviously, those developing countries have far fewer vehicles per  
head of population than do OECD member countries. So, let us compare 
those countries on the basis of fatalities per 100,000 motor vehicles. Australia 
is roughly in the middle of the OECD range in terms of annual road fatalities 
per 100,000 motor vehicles. Its figure on that measure is 7.3. Comparing 
Australia with our five developing countries that are most dangerous for ferry 
travel, we have figures of 1,020.6 for Bangladesh, 6,405.4 for D.R. Congo, 
36.7 for Indonesia, 135 for The Philippines, and 1,073.7 for Tanzania.330 
 
These figures, particularly for the African countries and Bangladesh are 
frightening and serve to highlight the cultural and resulting behavioural 
differences between such developing countries and the developed member 
countries of the OECD. Their road fatality records, while much higher, are 
roughly proportional to their passenger vessel fatalities as compared with 
developed countries. Their approaches to road safety culture and maritime 
safety culture are distressingly similar. 
 
As can be seen below, most of the OECD nations have achieved impressive 
success in reducing their road tolls. They have developed many proven 
techniques that enable them to do so. Many of those are not necessarily 
costly. Why then, if so many people in developing countries can afford to buy 
and operate vehicles, is their safety record so appalling?331 Why can they not 
apply those same simple, low cost techniques to reducing the horrifying 
fatality rates in their countries?  
 
The same question can well be asked of ferry and tourist boat owners in those 
same countries. This dichotomy between rich and poor countries exposes a 
cultural or attitudinal problem that appears to be more significant than simply 
the rather more obvious problem of poverty and its resultant malnutrition. It 
will be considered in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Such data, combined with the WHO statistics in Appendix B, confirm the 
problem of traffic accident fatalities in poorer countries that essentially parallel 
those of ferry accidents in the same countries. More encouraging figures 
come, again from the OECD, which show the strong but steady decline in 







                                                     
329 Appendix B, Ibid. 
330 Ibid. 
331 Refer also to Appendix B to compare OECD with non-OECD statistics. 
332 OECD, Road accidents – Deaths, per 1,000,000 inhabitants, 1970-2014, OECD, Paris, 
www. data.oecd.org/transport/road-accidents. 
 






4.6.3. Road Deaths per 100,000 population 2013 OECD nations 




Graph 4.1. Road deaths per 100,000 population – OECD nations and 
Australian states and territories 2013 (OECD/Australian Government 











4.6.4. Decline in Road Accident Fatalities 1970-2014 




Graphs 4.2. Steady reduction in road accident fatalities per million inhabitants 
from 1970 to 2014 in nine developed OECD member nations (OECD). 
 
Clearly, these nine developed countries have made impressive improvements 
over the 45 year period shown. They show what a relentlessly applied effort 
can achieve. Most have seen their road accident fatality numbers decline by 
around 80 per cent over that period. Between 2004 and 2013, for example, 
the OECD median rate fell by 51.6 per cent.333 The rates and degree of 
improvement are similar although the starting points were quite different.  
While it has certainly improved, the United States stands out as being far 
worse than its developed country peers. Its road accident fatalities per million 
inhabitants rate is almost exactly double that of France, for example. The 
reasons for that will be examined in Chapter 5 where cultural factors are 
described. 
 
4.7. Aviation, oil tanker and road safety successes provide 
grounds for optimism. 
 
Overall, though, and despite one or two exceptions, the declining trends in 
road accident fatality numbers in developed countries are very encouraging. 
They provide a basis for optimism such that if similar techniques and 
approaches were to be applied to domestic ferry operations in developing 
countries, worthwhile reductions in the numbers of both accidents and 
fatalities could be achieved. 
                                                     
333 OECD – Road accident deaths, Ibid. 
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So, too, do the very significant reductions in oil tanker pollution incidents 
globally which, encouragingly, have involved a significant IMO contribution. 
 
Aviation safety successes provide even greater grounds for optimism because 
they have been achieved on a practically global basis. They are also more 
similar to ferries in an operational sense than are private car or taxi travel, if 







Behavioural, cultural, economic, educational and geographic    
factors 
 
It is clear that poverty and its resulting malnutrition are the most 
significant over-riding contributing factors in domestic ferry 
accidents and the fatalities that arise from them 
 
5.1.0. Economic considerations. 
 
5.1.1. Poverty, the over-riding factor. 
 
It is clear that poverty and its resultant malnutrition are the most significant 
contributing factors in ferry accidents and the fatalities that arise from them. The five 
nations with the highest fatality rates are all comparatively poor and have performed 
consistently badly from 1966 to 2015 with 60 per cent of the world‟s known fatalities. 
They have shown a very slight relative improvement in the most recent sixteen-year 
period when they produced 59 per cent of the known fatalities.334 
 
Obviously, none of those five countries: Bangladesh, DR Congo, Indonesia, 
Philippines and Tanzania, could be considered „developed‟ but, nor are they at the 
absolute bottom of the World Bank‟s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
rankings. Indeed, with GDP per capita figures in 2015 of USD 3,347 and USD 2,900 
respectively, Indonesia and the Philippines must be classed as „developing‟ rather 
than „undeveloped‟ or „least developed‟ countries where the per capita GDP was less 
than USD 955 in 2015.335 That compares with a GDP per capita of USD 35,783 in the 
35 developed nations that are members of the OECD.336  
 
Of course, by the same ranking, Bangladesh, DR Congo and Tanzania are 
considerably poorer at USD 1,212, 456, and 865, respectively. DR Congo is very 
much in the World Bank‟s „Low Income‟ bracket and Tanzania can only be classed as 
a „least developed country‟. While Bangladesh‟s per capita income is rising rapidly at 
5.3 per cent per annum, it is a country that is developing from a very low base.337  
 
There are other nations with similarly lamentable records of ferry accident fatalities. 
China, Egypt, Haiti, Senegal and Myanmar (formerly Burma) have been responsible 
for a further 15 per cent of the world‟s known ferry fatalities in the fifty years to 
December 2015. The worst ten countries, therefore, have been responsible for more 
than 76 per cent, probably 80 per cent, of the world‟s ferry fatalities over that 
period.338 The worst twenty countries have been responsible for 90 per cent of 
                                                     
334 See Figures 1.3 and 1.4 in Chapter 1, above. 
335 GDP per capita (Current US$) 2015, World Bank, Washington DC, 2016. 
www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP 
336 www.oecd.org/about 
337 World Bank, Ibid. 
338 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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fatalities over that period.339 Generally, their problems are quite similar in that they 
are fundamentally economic, cultural, geographic, educational and behavioural. 
Poverty and its almost inevitably resultant malnutrition, corruption and fatalism are at 
its root. All are also unusually dependent on ferry transport for geographic reasons. 
 
The Economist described the causal connection well in an April 2012 article: Social 
status and health- Misery index. It summarised it that “Low social status is bad for 
your health. Biologists are starting to understand why”.340  
 
Ironically, of the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities, two of them, China and the 
Philippines are among the world‟s four leading shipbuilding nations in terms of 
construction gross tons.341 Bangladesh, too, has a rapidly developing shipbuilding 
sector. They should be capable of designing and building safer ferries. 
 
Myanmar has more recently become known as a very dangerous country for ferry 
travel. As the nation was essentially closed under a military dictatorship for five 
decades342 until 2011, very little information about ferry or other accidents was 
forthcoming from 1962 until 2007. We do know that ferry accidents in Myanmar have 
been responsible for 2.1 per cent of the world‟s total accidents and at least 2.6 per 
cent of all ferry fatalities. However, extrapolating from the final nine years for which 
we do have data, it seems likely that Myanmar would have been the scene of at least 
six per cent of the world‟s ferry fatalities over the past half century343. That would 
make the total percentage of fatalities occurring in the ten worst countries closer to 
80 than the 76 per cent mentioned above. 
 
Myanmar is a neighbour of and is economically, geographically and climatically, if not 
culturally, similar to Bangladesh so it could be expected to have similar ferry safety 
problems. It should be included in any table of the worst countries for ferry travel 
despite the absence of data because of strict media controls, which prevented the 
publication of „bad news‟ for most of the period studied.344  
 
It is inconceivable that there could only have been three fatal accidents in 
Burma/Myanmar from 1966 until 2007.345 This is especially so given that the same 
source reveals 12 „known‟ fatal ferry accidents producing 584 fatalities in the eight 
years from 2007-2015. That is an average of 1.5 accidents per annum and an 
average of 49 fatalities per accident.  
 
Adding Myanmar, allowing for the absence of news until about 2007, to the previous 
worst ten countries makes it highly likely that at least 80 per cent of ferry fatalities 
occurred in the ten worst performing countries. It is notable, and probably not 
coincidental, that all ten of those countries spent at least some time under colonial 
                                                     
339 Ibid. 
340 The Economist, London, 14 April 2012. 
341 Largest shipbuilding nations in 2015, based on completions in gross tonnage, Statista, 
www.statista.com/statistics/263895/shipbuilding-nations-world/. 
342 Myanmar Country Profile, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific , London, 2016. 
343 Appendix A, Ibid. 
344 For an objective description, refer to,Zuckerman, E. My heart‟s in Accra, 
www.ethenzuckerman.com/bog/2014/03/12/myanmar-no-longer-closed-still-complicated/. 
345 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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rule. They have many other economic, cultural, social, geographic and climatic 
similarities. 
 




Map 5.1. The world‟s worst ten countries for ferry fatalities. They have consistently 
been the location of at least 80 per cent of the ferry fatalities over the past half 
century. Their main common factors are poverty and archipelagic, lakeland or riverine 
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5.1.3. Fatal ferry accidents by country. 
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Japan 4  Costa Rica 1      
 
Table 5.1. Known Fatal Ferry Accidents by country from 1966-2015. Total 675. It is 
estimated that, because of the paucity of data and even press reports prior to 2000, 
these figures probably represent fewer than 66 per cent of the actual total. Since 
2000 reporting has improved but with Myanmar, for example, the available statistics 
from between 1966 and 2008 are neither logical nor comprehensive. Much the same 
applies to China prior to about 1992. It must therefore be emphasised that the data 
presented here relates only to „known‟ accidents and fatalities. It is strongly believed 
that there have been a considerable number of „unknown as in un-reported or un-
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5.1.4. Ferry fatalities by country. 
 
Known Ferry Fatalities by Country 1966-2015 
 
Philippines  10,370  
 
Madagascar  185  
 
Canada  25  
Bangladesh  9,820  
 
Vietnam  185  
 
Cambodia  24  
Indonesia  6,213  
 
USA  166  
 
Cape Verde  22  
Tanzania  5,186  
 
Denmark  162  
 
Israel  22  
DR Congo  2,978  
 
Pakistan  162  
 
Norway  21  
China  2,426  
 
Hong Kong  161  
 
Belize  18  
Haiti  2,163  
 
Romania  161  
 
Chile  17  
Egypt  1,981  
 
Burundi  160  
 
Macedonia  15  
Senegal  1,863  
 
Djibouti  124  
 
Australia  14  
Myanmar  1,514  
 
Ghana  120  
 
Morocco  14  
India  1,505  
 
UAE  105  
 
Bahamas  13  
Nigeria  1,165  
 
Colombia  100  
 
Laos  13  
South Korea  956  
 
Guinea  94  
 
Ukraine  13  
Estonia  912  
 
Albania  91  
 
Iran  12  
Brazil  863  
 
Azerbaijan  89  
 
Mexico  10  
Sierra Leone  698  
 
Bahrain  87  
 
Panama  8  
Greece  372  
 
Turkey  86  
 
French Polyn  7  
Peru  361  
 
Guatemala  83  
 
Ireland  7  
Russia  348  
 
Tonga  78  
 
Spain  7  
Yemen  324  
 
UK  74  
 
France  6  
PNG  316  
 
New Zealand  63  
 
Malawi  6  
Somalia  307  
 
Turks/Caicos  61  
 
Gambia  5  
Saudi Arabia  301  
 
Zambia  58  
 
Japan  5  
Malaysia  287  
 
Sao Tome  56  
 
South Africa  5  
Kenya  273  
 
Germany  55  
 
Taiwan  4  
Thailand  259  
 
Rwanda  54  
 
Costa Rica  3  
Italy  257  
 
Unknown  53  
 
Hungary  2  
South Sudan  250  
 
Lebanon  44  
 
Latvia  2  
Uganda  243  
 
Dom Repub  38  
 
Netherlands  2  
Leeward Is.  233  
 
Sudan  35  
 
Sweden  2  
Cameroon  223  
 
Comoros  33  
 
Cyprus  1  
Nepal  195  
 
Kiribati  33  
 
Jordan  1  
Belgium  193   Maldives  27       
 
Table 5.2. Known Total Ferry Fatalities by Country 1966-2015. Total 58,764. Note: It 
is estimated that because of the paucity of available data these figures represent 
probably only about 66 per cent of the real total. The country proportions, though, 
except for Myanmar, are considered to be considerably more accurate (Appendix A, 
Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database).348 
 
Considerable care is required when analysing these figures. For example, Estonia is 
highlighted in fourteenth place as the result of just one accident with the capsize and 
sinking of the conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry Estonia in 1994. By contrast, 
Senegal appears to have experienced only one major accident with the capsize and 
sinking of the conventional Ro-Pax ferry Le Joola in 2002. There is no evidence of 
any other significant ferry accidents in Estonia but considerable anecdotal evidence 
of numerous fatal accidents in Senegal.349 
 
                                                     
348 Appendix A, Ibid. 
349 Refer to 5.13. 
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5.1.5. Fewer fatalities arise from each developed country accident. 
 
Poverty probably should not, of itself, always be accompanied by malnutrition, 
fatalism, corruption, low educational standards, poor regulation and inadequate 
enforcement . However, the correlation is consistently and remarkably close as Table 
5.3 clearly shows. Accidents do happen in richer countries and on better maintained 
and operated vessels but they happen far less frequently and their consequences are 
usually far less deadly than in poor countries. As described in Chapter 7, evacuation 
facilities, lifesaving equipment, SAR services and, even loading and crowd disciplines 
are generally considerably superior in developed countries. 
 
Nor are richer countries immune from corruption. The Sewol inquiry clearly describes 
instances of that.350 Indeed, the BMPVA database shows that from 1966 to 2015, 
24.6 per cent of fatal ferry accidents occurred in the 35 OECD member countries but 
they accounted for only six per cent of the total fatalities over the same period.351 
Thus, developing countries require far more urgent reform and will benefit most from 
that reform. Thus, it is obvious that those countries are where the ferry accident 
prevention process should commence and where international support is required 
and where it will be likely to have the best results. 
 
5.1.6. Domestic voyages are much more dangerous. 
 
In its Safety and Shipping Review 2016, Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty, an 
insurer, commented thus on passenger ship safety: “Significant concerns remain, 
particularly around non-international voyages. Some Asian routes are many years 
behind recognised international standards as evidenced by a number of recent ferry 
losses in South East Asian waters. Frequent sailings and profit pressures mean 
scheduling necessary maintenance can prove challenging”.352 The BMPVA database 
confirms that. It shows that 93 per cent of ferry fatalities have occurred on domestic 
voyages.353 
 
Travel advisories published by the governments of western developed countries such 
as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand give similar advice to 
their citizens who are travelling abroad.354 For each of the five most dangerous 
countries, that varies from: “Exercise a high degree of caution” for Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Tanzania; to “Reconsider your need to travel” for Bangladesh and DR 
Congo. In addition to the threats of crime, terrorism, kidnapping, traffic accidents, 
disease and political violence, all warn strongly against travel by boat or ferry. They 
all urge considerable caution on those who must travel on boats or ferries. 
 
Some travel advisory websites and guide books also recommend that tourists take 
great care when travelling by ferry in certain countries, most particularly the 
Philippines and DR Congo. The Silent Gardens website, for example, mentions that: 
“There are ferries in very good conditions (sic) and there are ships where only the 
                                                     
350 Refer to 3.24. 
351 Appendix A, Ibid. 
352 Dobie, G. Ed. Safety and Shipping Review 2016: An annual review of trends and developments in 
shipping losses and safety, Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty, Munich, 2016. 
353 Appendix A, Ibid. 
354 For example, www.smartraveller.gov.au  and www.travelgc.ca  
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paint prevents the rust from breaking apart”.355 The website also strongly urges its 
readers to study the weather before travelling on Filipino ferries. 
 
Obviously, those dangers are just as real for local citizens as for foreign tourists. 
Indeed, they are probably more so as tourists can usually afford superior and safer 
travel vehicles or vessels, if they are available, than can locals. 
 
5.1.7. Despite poverty, potential for reform exists. 
 
All the five worst countries are dangerous for ferry travellers, mostly for similar 
reasons.356 However, probably apart from DR Congo, all have considerable potential 
for reform. Notably, though, two of the worst five countries for ferry fatalities, DR 
Congo and Tanzania, are also on the World Health Organisation‟s ranking of the 
worst six countries for road traffic fatalities.357 Indeed, the DR Congo is the worst. 
Their citizens seemingly can afford large numbers of cars to the point of considerable 
congestion in their major cities.  
 
It would seem reasonable to assume that if the national economy has developed to 
the point that many citizens can afford cars, then the country should also be able to 
afford to upgrade its ferries. Such upgrading is being achieved to a limited and mildly 
encouraging degree in Indonesia, the Philippines, Tanzania and, even, Bangladesh, 
but there is a long way to go to ensure all vessels in those countries are relatively 
safe. 
 
Of the sixth to tenth worst countries for ferry fatalities: China, Egypt, Haiti, Senegal 
and Myanmar, only four can be considered to be really poor. China, obviously, should 
be capable of significant and rapid domestic organic improvement. Its railway and 
aviation sectors are now very safe. It is, however, still constrained mainly by the poor 
country problems of corruption and cronyism as has been shown following the recent 
major accident involving the Eastern/Oriental Star.358 
 
Again, as can be seen in Table 5.3, below, all of those countries, with the obvious 
exception of Haiti, are enjoying impressive rates of GDP per capita growth. They 
should, therefore, be capable of self-funding worthwhile domestic reform programs 
were they to be encouraged and supported rather than largely ignored by IMO.  
 
It is suggested that if IMO were to concentrate on assisting, encouraging and 
supporting the eight worst performing countries with the greatest potential for reform, 
that rapid life-saving improvements could be quickly achieved. It would probably be 
impractical to invest in reforms in DR Congo and Haiti until after worthwhile 
improvements, such as those suggested in Chapter 10, have been achieved in the 




                                                     
355 Anon. Ferries and Shipping – Fast and slow ferries, www.silent-gardens.com/sea-shipping.php/ 
Manila, 2015 
356 Appendix A, Ibid. 
357 www.statista.com/chart4394/the-worst-countries-for-road-traffic-fatalities  
358 Refer to 5.25. 
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High Income 39,577 1,187    1.9 0.892 0.800 
World Bank 




< 955 954    4.4 0.508  
Low Income 




35,783 1,281 1-35 1-35 6 2 0.887 0.800 
Bangladesh 1,212 161 99 122 17 5.3 0.579 0.447 
China 7,925 1,371 136 83 4.1 6.9 0.738 0.610 
D R Congo 456 77 109 139 5 3.6 0.435 0.372 
Egypt 3,615 92 111 77 3.4 4.2 0.691 0.374 
Haiti 829 11 107 141 3.7 0.3 0.493 0.374 
Indonesia 3,347 258 60 77 10 3.5 0.689 0.603 
Myanmar 1,204 54 114 147 6.0*  0.556 0.371 
Philippines 2,900 109 55 83 18 4.2 0.682 0.610 
Senegal 911 15 51 52 3.2 6.5 0.494 0.368 
South Korea 27,391 51 38 32 1.6 2.6 0.901 0.865 
Tanzania 865 53 67 103 9 3.7 0.531 0.426 
World 9,996 7,347   100 2.5 0.717  
 
Table 5.3. An economic, political, educational and cultural comparison of the ten 
worst performing countries with the OECD countries and selected others. Note that 
about 80% of the ferry fatalities occurred in just ten countries (WorldBank,359 
OECD,360 Transparency International,361 United Nations Development Programme,362 
World Audit.363). * Extrapolated from the figures from the final nine years.**HDI = Human 
Development Index. 
 
The focus, then, should be on Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, The 
Philippines, Senegal and Tanzania. Even a fifty per cent reduction in fatalities in 
those eight countries would reduce the annual global death toll by about forty per 
cent. And, of course, of those, China is wealthy enough to reform itself. Its airlines 





                                                     
359 From www.data.worldbank.org/indicators/. 
360 From www.oecd.org/about/. 
 
361 From www.transparency.org/countries/cpi2015/. 
362 For definition of HDI refer to www.hdr.undo.org/en/human-development-index-hdi and for UNDP 
Education index, see www.hdr.undp.org/en/content/education-index/. 




5.3.0. Geographic considerations. 
 
As to geographic reasons why the ten worst countries perform so badly in 
comparisons of passenger vessel safety. There are many other developing countries, 
some with per capita GDPs that are even lower than those of the most dangerous 
ten. That is where geography is a vital factor. 
 
Examining the maps and brief descriptions of the ten countries described below, it is 
obvious that they are unusually dependent on water transport. The Philippines and 
Indonesia are archipelagic to an extreme with a claimed 25,000 islands between 
them.364 Bangladesh is largely overlain by a massive river delta while the DR Congo 
is a riverine and lakeland nation, with very few and very bad roads. Tanzania is half 
surrounded by vast lakes, not to mention big rivers, as well as having major 
population centres on nearby islands off its Indian Ocean coast. 
 
Indonesia, Bangladesh, Myanmar and the Philippines are prone to natural disasters. 
Indonesia and the Philippines are located on the Pacific „Ring of Fire‟.365 They are in 
an area of considerable seismic activity with frequent volcanic eruptions, earthquakes 
and tsunamis.366 The coasts of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Tanzania and the Philippines 
are subject to severe tropical revolving storms, cyclones or typhoons.367 Numerous 
ferry accidents have occurred during such extreme weather events although, with 
reasonable skill, care and modern weather forecasting, mariners can avoid the worst 
effects of typhoons or cyclones. 368 Tsunamis, however, are very unpredictable but 
they have not yet been blamed for a fatal ferry accident, despite the high probability 
of some having been caused by the Aceh, or Indian Ocean, tsunami of 2004.369  
 
The five remaining countries are similarly largely dependent on ferry travel. China 
has significant large river and canal systems as well as a lengthy coastline and 
numerous islands. Haiti comprises half an island. Egypt sends large numbers of its 
citizens across the Red Sea to work in Saudi Arabia and on the Haj pilgrimage and 
has considerable ferry traffic on the River Nile and Lake Nasser. Senegal is a riverine 
nation that is bisected by The Gambia, thus necessitating significant amounts of sea 
and riverine travel. Myanmar has many similarities, except for religion, with 
Bangladesh. 
 
With roads and railways either impractical or essentially non-existent and air travel 
generally too expensive for the greater part of their populations, ferries and other 
boats have become the only economically feasible means of travel in such countries 




                                                     
364 World Atlas, www.worldatlas.com states that Indonesia comprises 18,000+ islands and The 
Philippines, 7,100. These figures are supported by www.travel.nationalgeographic.com and 
www.brittanica.com/place/Philippines/ . 
365 www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/ring-fire/. 
366 www.bom.gov.au/tsunami/info/ . 
367 www.jma.go.jp>home>Weather and earthquakes. 




5.4.0. Cultural and behavioural considerations. 
 
5.4.1. Poverty and corruption are closely related. 
 
Poverty, it seems, is usually accompanied by an absence of democracy. That, in turn, 
usually leads to commensurately high levels of corruption. All of our ten subject 
countries score poorly on both measures. World Audit compares 150 nations by 
measures of corruption and democracy.370 Indonesia appears at number 77 for 
corruption and 60 for democracy. The Philippines is 83rd and 55th. Tanzania 103rd 
and 67th, Bangladesh 122nd and 99th, and DR Congo 139th and 109th. China is 136th 
and 83rd while Myanmar is 114th and 147th. Senegal, at 51st and 52nd is the best 
regarded of the ten most dangerous countries for ferry travel. Their rankings are 
similar, if 10 to 20 places further down the scale, in the table published by 
Transparency International.371 It ranks 167 nations. Table 5.3 is revealing. 
 
Those rankings are obviously both subjective and very debateable. Even 
Transparency International, which is the most forthright of the two organisations, only 
claims its index to be a “Corruption Perception Index”. The perceptions, though, 
generally accord with those of the author who has travelled and conducted business 
in all the countries except Senegal and the DR Congo where his son worked for six 
months and reported, colourfully, back. They give a useful indication of attitudes to 
public safety, regulation and enforcement. 
 
In a recent article posted on Linkedin, maritime commentator Patrik (sic) Wheater 
referred to what he complained of as a “numbers racket”. He described the expensive 
problem of Port State Control corruption that affects so many internationally operating 
cargo ship owners, particularly when operating in Asia and Africa. It seems that “…it 
is not uncommon for a fee to be extorted at some ports „to help avoid problems‟”. 
Complaints by ship owners, apparently result only in buck passing. Offering a 
solution, Wheater suggests, “…we need uniformity and harmonisation. We need an 
internationally agreed ship inspection and detention regime…”.372 Much the same 
situation, obviously, also applies to ferry safety inspections. 
 
A blatant example of this was described in an October 2016 report in The Australian 
newspaper: “Indonesia promised a complete overhaul in the bureaucracy after five 
transportation ministry officials were arrested on suspicion that they systematically 
extorted sailors and shipping companies in exchange for ship and sailing permits”.373 
 
This situation has many similarities with that pertaining to ferry safety regulation and 
enforcement in all the countries described here. Again, IMO shows a similarly 
unhelpful reluctance to become involved. 
 
Another cultural problem that is rife in all the ten worst countries is that of „crony 
capitalism‟ which is usually legal but which The Economist magazine describes as 
happening where industries: “…involve a lot of interaction with the state, or are 
                                                     
370 www.worldaudit.org/corruption. 
371 www.transparency.org/countries/cpi2015. 
372 www.linkedin.com/pulse/numbers-racket-patrik-wheater-mcij.  
373 Rayda, N. Indonesia vows to end graft after raid, The Australian, Sydney, 13 October 2016, p. 9. 
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licensed by it…” That is obviously a factor with ferry operations in most of the 
countries discussed here. The magazine publishes “The crony-capitalism index” on 
which four of the ferry industry‟s ten worst countries are listed among the worst 
twenty nations.374 
 
5.4.2. So, too, are poverty and malnutrition and inadequate 
education. 
 
As described at length in Chapter 1 (1.8.1.), malnutrition is a direct result and close 
relative of poverty. It has been shown to retard brain development and reduce the 
capability for cognitive thinking.375  It is widely regarded as a direct cause of the 
insidious fatalism that is so widespread in developing countries. These are obviously 
significant factors in the more widespread inability to avoid accidents in such places. 
It also handicaps the ability of those so involved to recover from accidents.376 
 
So, too, is the generally low standard of education that is endemic in such countries. 
It contributes to the inability to avoid accidents and is obviously a close relative of 
retarded cognitive thinking development. Without at least elementary education, it is 
very difficult to implement even the most basic of safety training. 
 
While there is little evidence to show improvements in brain development and 
cognitive thinking in the ferry sector in Bangladesh, for example, the dramatic 
improvement in life expectancy in that country, described in 5.5.7., offers grounds for 
some optimism there in the longer term. 
 
5.4.3. Effects of religion and its also resulting fatalism. 
 
In terms of religion: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Senegal and Tanzania are 
predominantly Muslim with some animist, Hindu and Christian influences; the 
Philippines, Haiti, and DR Congo are predominantly Christian with some Muslim 
and/or animist influences.377 Myanmar is predominantly Buddhist with some Muslim 
and animist minorities. A mixed group culturally. While the main religions differ, in all 
the countries, except for China, the dominant religion appears to be practiced 
assiduously. All, when combined with actual or relative poverty, and its resulting 
malnutrition, seem to lead to a severe form of fatalism. The New Oxford English 
Dictionary defines that as: “Belief in fatality; the doctrine that all events are 
predetermined by fate”.378 In other words, as God or Allah wills or Karma. It seems 
that fatalism is an inevitable outgrowth of poverty combined with strong religious 
beliefs379. 
 
That fatalism would appear to provide little incentive to such people to try to reduce 
their potential for disaster, disease or other types of tragedy. In the Philippines and 
                                                     
374 Our crony-capitalism index – The party winds down, The Economist, London, 7 May 2016. 
375 See www.who.int/features/ga/malnutrition/ et al, Ibid. 
376 Ibid. 
377 www.infoplease.com/ipa/AO855613. 
378 The New Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, UK, 1993, Vol. 1, p. 921. 
379 Noted in Smith, K. B. and Stone, L. H. Rags, Riches and Bootstraps: Beliefs about the Causes of 
Wealth and Poverty, The Sociological Quarterly, Vol 30 No1, 1989, pp. 103-107. 
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Indonesia, in particular, the author has frequently seen people praying before or soon 
after boarding ferries. They would arguably be better protected in spending that time 
learning the location and operating instructions for the exits and the whereabouts of 
any items of lifesaving equipment fitted to the vessel. 
 
Fatalism manifests itself in a general lack of interest or lassitude that is obvious from 
the collisions and groundings that so regularly occur in developing countries. Quite 
simply, very few people seem to care. The videos in Appendix F illustrate this very 
starkly.380 This can also be clearly seen by the general ignorance or absence of care 
about the waste, filth and „fouling of their own nests‟ that is practically universal in 
such countries. The author has visited all countries discussed except for DR Congo, 
Haiti and Senegal and noticed the enormous and ugly amounts of garbage that fouls 
the waterways in each. This is symptomatic of the prevailing fatalism and its resulting 
lassitude. In reality, however, it seems the only effective cure for fatalism is the 
elimination of poverty and its resultant malnutrition.381 That, obviously, will take time. 
 
5.4.4. Irrational passenger behaviour. 
 
Similarly, there is a tendency in many developing countries to abnormal panic or 
thoughtless mob movement in the event of an emergency. This has frequently led to 
vessels capsizing and has caused major evacuation problems.382 It is not helped by 
the negligence and “save themselves first” approach exhibited by some vessel 
officers and crews as in the cases of Sewol and Costa Concordia.383 Both of those 
accidents, it should be remembered, occurred in developed countries. 
 
Further, passengers can sometimes urge vessel operators to act against their better 
judgement and against the passengers‟ own best interests. The BMPVA database 
records instances in China and Indonesia where passengers have themselves let go 
mooring lines in an effort to get ferries to depart. In the cases recorded, that action 
has turned out to be suicidal.384  
 
Passengers have also been known to abuse captains and demand that they not turn 
back to port in the face of obvious danger. The captain of a sister ship to the Princess 
of the Orient, which sank off the Philippines in September 1998 with massive loss of 
life, was roundly abused by many of his passengers when he turned back to port in 
Manila in the face of the storm that contributed significantly to the sinking of the 
Princess. Needless to say, those passengers rapidly changed their attitude when 





                                                     
380 See videos in Appendix F. 
381 Smith, K. B. & Stone, L. H. Ibid. 
382 Appendix A, Ibid. 
383 Ibid. 
384 Ibid, Sept 1969, Si Mawar Putih, Indonesia, 127 dead, Dec 2001, Private No.002, China, 24 dead, 
and, Anon, July 2002, Philippines, 5 dead. 
385 Appendix C, Personal email from Commodore Gualterio Dela Cruz, former Chief of the Philippine 
Coast Guard to the author, 7 October 2016. 
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5.4.5. Serially offending shipowners. 
 
Another problem is that some ferry owning companies such as Sulpicio Lines, in the 
Philippines; Rabaul Shipping, in Papua New Guinea; and Al Salam Transport in 
Egypt, have been serial offenders.386 This, obviously, is a problem of inadequate 
regulation or enforcement. It is, it seems, a problem in most of the countries 
considered.387 A 2013 article on the Philippine news website www.thediplomat.com 
described the situation in Malaysia and the Philippines with respect to both ferry and 
bus travel.388  
 
Lax enforcement ensures that many companies flaunt any regulations and continue 
to operate unchecked even after major fatal accidents. Even trials of offenders have 
been abandoned due to an absence of funding for prosecutions. It seems that may 
have happened in August 2017 in the case of the manslaughter trial following the 
Rabaul Queen inquiry.389 The BMPVA database is replete with examples of little or 
no legal action following even very serious accidents.390 
 
The ten nations discussed are not the worst in the world for poverty, disease, 
inadequate education, absence of democracy, corruption, excessive faith in deities, 
or extensive reliance on water transport, but all these factors are common to all 
except for China. That makes them both somewhat unusual and vulnerable to 
passenger vessel, particularly ferry, accidents. That combination of factors is 
undoubtedly why those ten countries have been responsible for about 80 per cent of 
the world‟s recorded passenger vessel fatalities over the past half century. 
 
 5.4.6. Human factors far more important than technical ones. 
 
That combination of factors also reinforces the view that passenger vessel accidents 
are far more the result of economic, educational, cultural and behavioural causes 
than structural or mechanical ones. The two latter factors are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
A closer examination of each of the countries concerned shows how those factors 
are common to each of them and much more so than in any other known country. It 
also leads to the conclusion that, probably apart from the DR Congo and Haiti, each 
of the ten most dangerous countries is achieving some improvements in ferry safety, 
albeit disappointingly slowly. They do, however, show real potential for such 
improvement if they can be encouraged and supported by external organisations 
such as a re-invigorated IMO, INTERFERRY, the Worldwide Ferry Safety 
Association, wealthier neighbouring nations and the classification societies. 
 
Such external encouragement and support, while expensive, can make for 
remarkable and very beneficial change. The Australian led Regional Assistance 
                                                     
386 Appendix A, Ibid. 
387 See Table 1.6. for a summary of the worst offenders. 
388 Palatino, M, Deadly Accidents in Malaysia and Philippines Expose Weak Transport Systems, 
www.thediplomat.com/2013/09, Manila, 2013. 
389 Refer to Anon. www.fairplay.ihs.com/safety-regulation/article/4272221/legal-twists-persist-in-rabaul-
queen-and-rena-cases. 
390 See Appendix A, generally and many of the case studies in Chapter 3. 
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Mission to Solomon Islands was an excellent example of what can be achieved when 
wealthy and benevolent neighbouring nations such as Australia and New Zealand 
make a determined effort to revive a so-called „failed state‟. That 14 year and USD 
2.25 billion project was impressively successful.391 It offers an encouraging and 
useful model of what could be done, on a much smaller scale, to improve ferry safety 










































                                                     
391 See Pryke, J. How we fixed up a failed state, The Australian Financial Review, Fairfax Media, 






Map 5.2. Bangladesh showing that a large proportion of the country is overlain on a 
major river delta. Its Bay of Bengal coast is frequently battered by significant tropical 
cyclones (University of Texas). 
 
5.5.1. Geography necessitates extensive ferry travel 
 
The major Himalayan sourced rivers, the Padma, Meghna, Brahmaputra, Ganges, 
Dharla, Teesta and Jamuna, among others, flow through much of the very fertile 
alluvial plains of Bangladesh as they empty, via a convoluted, island strewn, delta, 
into the Bay of Bengal. They make road and railway building difficult and expensive 
but they facilitate cheap “sheltered waters” ferry travel. Thus the country is a major 
centre of ferry operations, probably the world‟s busiest. It has been estimated that 
about 2,500 registered and the same number of unregistered ferries operate in the 
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country392. Other estimates suggest there are as many as 12,000393 or even 
21,000394 „motorised‟ vessels working on the country‟s rivers. 
 
Indeed, in 2004, the Bangladesh government estimated that “…the traffic density of 
the country‟s inland waterway network generates about 1.57 million passenger-
kilometres per route kilometre of waterway…”.395 Not coincidentally, it has been one 
of the world‟s two worst countries for „known‟ ferry fatalities over the past half century. 
 
5.5.2. Scarce official ferry accident data. 
 
Regrettably, official data describing Bangladeshi ferry accidents is scarce to the point 
of being practically non-existent. Indeed, a 2007 published paper on passenger ferry 
accidents in Bangladesh claimed that: “No relevant organisation, indeed, maintains a 
database of all these accidents”.396 The real situation is likely to be considerably 
worse than shown in the BMPVA database.397  
 
Other papers by some of the same authors refer to “thorough analysis of past 
accident data” which shows that, “…the main causes of intact stability failures have 
been determined: adverse weather conditions and overloading, likely resulting in 
crowding to one side”.398 This supports comments made in Chapters 2 and 3, above. 
However, this author, while agreeing with the conclusions drawn, doubts the rigour of 
such analysis because of the scarcity of useful data. 
 
5.5.3. An improving economy. 
 
Despite its considerable actual and potential agricultural, seafood and mineral 
wealth, the nation of 161 million, predominantly Muslim, inhabitants is comparatively 
poor with a 2015 per capita income estimated by the World Bank at USD 1,212. 
While it is generally regarded as enjoying a form of democracy, it is also perceived to 
be one of the world‟s more corrupt societies at positions 99 and 122 respectively on 
the Corruption Perceptions Index of democracy and corruption published by 
Transparency International399. It is constitutionally secular but 83 per cent of the 
population identify as Muslim with 16 per cent being Hindu.400  Malnutrition has been 
a considerable problem until recently. 
 
                                                     
392 Government of the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Economic Review-Chapter 11-
Transport & Communications, 127-158, Dhaka, 2004. 
393 Islam, F. Challenge to Establish a Comprehensive, Effective and Sustainable Water Transport Ship 
Registration, Survey and Inspection Regime, Abstract of paper presented at Interferry Conference, 
Manila, 2016. 
394 Islam, T. BANGLADESH: Latest Ferry Deaths Point to Old Problems, www.ipsnews.net/2003/07/ 
Dhaka, 2003. 
395 Iqbal, K. S. et al. Passenger Ferry Accidents in Bangladesh: Design and Socio-economic Aspects, 
Introduction, Springer, Tokyo, 2007.  
396 Ibid, Accident Data Analysis. 
397 Appendix A, Ibid. 
398 Iqbal, K.S. et al. A rational analysis of intact stability hazards involving small inland passenger 
ferries in Bangladesh, Journal of Marine Science and Technology, August 2008, Vol 13, Issue 3, pp. 
270-281, Springer, Japan. 
399 Iqbal, Ibid. 
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5.5.4. Violent and dangerous but improving. 
 
Bangladesh continues to suffer from religious and political violence as well as high 
crime levels and a bad record of industrial and road accidents.401 Diseases such as 
malaria, cholera, tuberculosis and typhoid were once rife but have been significantly 
reduced.402 Occupational health and safety, it seems, is a little known concept. 
Workplace accidents, particularly fires, are frequent and can be very deadly. The 
coast and near coastal rivers have frequently been affected and damaged by 
seasonal tropical cyclones. A number of fatal ferry accidents have been blamed on 
the effects of such weather events.403 The Bangladesh coast was also affected by 
the tsunami caused by the Aceh earthquake of December 2004 although only two 
people were known to have died as a result of it.404 
 
The water in the country‟s rivers and along the coast is, from the author‟s observation 
and independent reports, dangerously polluted.405 That is a further danger for anyone 
falling into the water following a ferry accident. Despite the pollution, large numbers 
of sharks and crocodiles are known to inhabit the estuaries and coast.406 
 
Since gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1947 and separating from 
India and, later, Pakistan, Bangladesh has suffered significant political instability 
often accompanied by violence. This has not, however, prevented its energetic and 
ambitious people from steadily improving their standard of living. Indeed, in the 33 
years from 1980 until 2012, the life expectancy of the average Bangladeshi improved 
remarkably from 49 years to 70.407 
 
While commencing from a very low base, the country‟s GDP has grown at a rate of 
5.3% from 1961 to 2015.408 The country is rapidly industrialising, starting with ship 
demolition and moving through textile and clothing manufacture, electronics and now 
ship building. Until recently a major source of national income has been remittances 
from Bangladeshi workers in the Middle East, Malaysia and Singapore. The recent 










                                                     
401 For details, see WHO, www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/90/2/. 
402 Anon. How Bangladesh achieved its “amazing” health statistics, 
www.irinnews.org/analysis/2013/11/26/. 
403 Appendix A, ibid 
404 A good overall description was published ten years after the event on www.abc.net.au/news/2014-
12-24/boxing-day-tsunami-how-the-disaster-unfolded/. 
405 WHO, Ibid.  
406 Refer to www.cms.int/sharks/en/country/bangladesh/. 
407 Anon. How Bangladesh achieved its “amazing” health statistics, Ibid. 
408 World Bank, Ibid. 
409 See, www.gulfbusiness.com/uae-ban-bangladeshi-workers-lifted-report/. 
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Image 5.1. Ironically, Bangladeshi shipbuilder Western Marine Shipyard has built a 
number of fine vessels for export. In this case, a substantial looking littoral Ro-Pax 
ferry to Denmark (WMS pic). 
 
Rather ironically, given the deplorable safety record of its domestic ferries, 
Bangladesh has exported a number of very high quality Ro-Pax ferries to Denmark 
and elsewhere.410 This shows that Bangladesh, or at least some of its shipyards, are 
building world-class vessels. The shipbuilding industry is expanding and the fact that 
it is capable of building for export must be encouraging for the local market in the 
long term. 
 
The country has more than four thousand nautical miles of navigable waterways 
although even that statistic is rarely cited consistently. That is about three times as 
long as its railway system. Most of the local ferries can be observed to be elderly, 
badly modified, poorly equipped and inadequately maintained. Many are unstable as 
a result of illegal and unwise modifications. Worse, they are routinely very badly 
overloaded.411 As described in Chapter 3, paragraph 5.5.2, above, and in the BMPVA 
database any extant maritime regulations are routinely ignored and properly qualified 
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 5.5.6. Few investigations, few trials, rare punishments. 
 
When accidents do occur, there is usually little or no response from government. No 
investigation. No trial. No punishments. While safety regulations do exist, they are 
rarely, if ever, enforced as the information sources cited in the BMPVA database so 
remorselessly record.413 Any punishments that are imposed are normally little more 
than a „slap on the wrist‟.414 Search and rescue services are haphazard at best.415 
 
The Bangladesh Government is well aware of its problem with ferry safety. It 
facilitates bureaucratic inquiries into the problem and makes strong statements 
condemning the activities of the perpetrators.416 Yet, seemingly, few, if any, reforms 
are ever achieved. Major and minor accidents continue to occur with obscene 
frequency. 
 
Unsurprisingly, Bangladesh has, for the past half century at least, been one of the 
world‟s two worst countries for ferry accident fatalities. Collisions, capsizes and 
groundings are the most common causes of fatal ferry accidents in the country.417 
Two dramatic and horrifying Bangladeshi ferry accidents are shown on video in 
Appendix F.418 They starkly illustrate the complete lack of interest in good 
seamanship and lookout keeping that is unfortunately so prevalent in Bangladesh. 
 
5.5.7. Considerable real potential for improvement. 
 
However, given its rapidly increasing per capita GDP (Table 5.3.) and the existence 
of at least two world class shipyards in the country, it appears to have considerable 
real potential for improvement in terms of reducing its number of ferry accident 
fatalities. Indeed, a handful of modern vessels are reported to have been introduced 
and more are believed to be on order.419 The government of Bangladesh is known to 
be importing modern ship designs for its own fleet.420 An encouraging development 
indeed. 
 
Further, given the nation‟s dramatic improvement in life expectancy thanks to the 
combined efforts of the private sector and a number of NGOs, it could be hoped that 
what has worked so well in the health sector could be adapted to transport.421 It 
would seem to be well worthwhile at least studying Bangladesh‟s health improvement 
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Map 5.3. China has a lengthy coastline, many islands and an extensive system of 
navigable rivers and canals. It is home to a very large number of ferry services, both 
domestic and international (University of Texas). 
 
5.6.1. Geography facilitates extensive ferry use. 
 
As the map shows, a number of major river systems flow through the eastern half of 
the country. They are extensively navigable and are utilised widely for both 
passenger and cargo transportation. There is also an extensive network of canals. All 
are heavily used, as is the coastal shipping system. There are conventional monohull 
Ro-Pax ferry services across the Yellow Sea and Bo Hai Gulf and to the numerous 
populated islands that dot almost the entire coastline. A number of very serious 
accidents have involved such conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries many of which 
have been elderly imported ships.422 
 
                                                     
422 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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5.6.2. Very rapid economic development.  
 
China, has developed very rapidly over the three decades to 2016. It has become a 
comparatively wealthy country with a GDP per capita of almost USD 8,000 in 
2015.423 However, it remains distinctly undemocratic and corrupt as can be seen in 
Table 5.3.  
 
The country has a significant shipbuilding industry in fact, the world‟s largest, and is a 
major exporter of ships.424 That industry is supported by numerous globally respected 
naval architecture and marine engineering schools. It has similarly numerous nautical 
colleges that train and educate seafarers at all levels.425 It should be capable of doing 
much better in terms of safety. Of course, despite its new wealth, it continues to 
suffer badly from the poor country problems of corruption and cronyism.426 
 
5.6.3. Accidents mostly involve domestic ferries. 
 
China‟s ferry accidents have almost entirely involved domestic ferries. They have, 
despite the nation‟s increasing wealth, mostly been due to all the poor country 
causes described throughout this chapter. While most aspects of life in China have 
improved dramatically, mainly thanks to a rapid rise in per capita GDP the country 
continues to experience major fatal ferry accidents.427 The latest involved the 
Eastern/Oriental Star that capsized and sank in the Yangtze River in June 2015 
killing 455, mostly elderly, local people. 428 
 
Part of the problem in assessing the Chinese ferry safety situation is that, until the 
late-1980s, China was largely closed to outside news services. The local Chinese 
Communist Party was unlikely to publicise deficiencies in its system.  We know very 
little about any of the accidents that must have occurred prior to that time. Even since 
then, we know little because the Chinese government generally will not permit the 
release of accident reports except in a very limited form on occasions when criminal 
charges arise. It can probably be safely assumed that the real figures, particularly for 











                                                     
423 See table 5.3. 
424 The world‟s biggest in 2015 according to Statista. www.statista.com/statistics/263895/shipbuilding-
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425 Worldwide Design Directory. www.world-design-directory.com/marine/schools  
426 See The Economist‟s Cronyism index, Ibid. 
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428 See case study 3.26. 
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5.6.4. Dilapidated, deplorably crewed vessels. 
 
Given the power of China‟s authoritarian government combined with its apparent 
national desire to be seen as developed, it is particularly disappointing that the 
country has been unable to noticeably improve the safety standards of its ferries. 
Having travelled on many of them across large parts of the country, the author has 
been unimpressed by the deplorable condition and poor crew work of most of them. 
Even modern ferries are often not well maintained and the lack of concentration and 
care evinced by crew members can be frightening. Most appear to be more 
interested in their cigarettes than the risks of collision or fire.430 No Smoking signs are 
routinely ignored by both passengers and crew personnel on vessels of all kinds. 
 
It seems that the lack of courtesy that combines with fatalism and lack of 
concentration among car and truck drivers in China has migrated to the ferry industry. 
The author was once involved in four road accidents while in a taxi during one short 
journey to central Beijing from the Great Wall of China. Despite its rapid rise 
economically, China still exhibits many of the developing country traits of poor 
maintenance, poor lookout and dangerous modification to facilitate overloading. It 
has a long way to go before it reaches fully developed country standards of maritime 
safety. 
 
Even the cross-river ferries in Shanghai, which the Chinese government promotes as 
a „First World‟ city are filthy and poorly maintained.431 It is apparent that corruption 
leads the otherwise powerful authorities to turn a „blind eye‟ towards ferry safety 
deficiencies. 
 
5.6.5. China will likely need to be „shamed‟ into improvement. 
 
This is particularly disappointing as Chinese railways, airlines and many bus services 
are of a very high standard. Given that such high standards can and are being 
achieved on land and in the air, it is disappointing that the same cannot be said about 
so many of its ferry services. Even allowing for its population of more than 1.3 billion 
people, China should have a much safer, cleaner and more comfortable ferry system 
than it currently does. The Chinese government and private companies are capable 
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Map 5.4. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a very large central African 
country through and around which run some major rivers including the Congo itself. It 
also has some very large lakes on its eastern border (University of Texas). 
 
5.7.1. Geography, economics and politics necessitate water travel. 
 
As with most countries of similar name, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
neither democratic nor really a republic. In reality, for much of its history it has been 
ruled by rather brutal dictatorships, both colonial and local. It remains a place of 
“indiscriminate violence”433 and developed country government travel websites are 
replete with warnings such as, “Reconsider your need to travel” or “Avoid non-
essential travel”.434 Thanks to an ongoing state of civil war, there are large groups of 
refugees in many parts of the country. 
 
                                                     
433 The UK Government advises only essential travel overall and “no” travel in many areas. See, 
www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/. 
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5.7.2. Corruption “strangles” waterway transport. 
 
DR Congo remains beset by corruption (Table 5.3) that afflicts all levels of society 
from the lowest. However, as Michael Brown and Phillipe Nowala et al explain in their 
2004 paper Combating Low-level Corruption on Waterways in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, while low level corruption pervades and “strangles” all 
commercial activities, including waterway transport, in the country, it is “possible to 
make significant reductions” in that corruption.435 Regrettably, it seems that such a 
reduction has not been achieved in the intervening thirteen years. 
 
Notwithstanding its vast mineral, rubber, palm oil and timber wealth, the DR Congo‟s 
per capita GDP is, thanks largely to very high corruption levels, very low at USD 456 
per annum.436 Some 70 per cent of Congolese citizens are claimed to be Christians, 
10 per cent Muslim and 20 per cent nativist or animist.437 DR Congo is a large 
country that requires vast distances to be covered. Internal travel is difficult and there 
is only a very short coastline except along the Rift valley lakes. There are few roads 
and railways. As can be seen in Table 1.5, the DRC is also the world‟s most 
dangerous country for road travel. Air travel is too expensive for the vast majority of 
Congolese citizens and, in any case, the country remains one of the most dangerous 
places to travel by air despite the best efforts of ICAO.438  
 
5.7.3. Water – the economical and convenient transport medium. 
 
There are, however, some 14,000 kilometres of navigable waterways spread through 
the country.439 The longest stretch of navigable water is 1,700 kilometres on the 
Congo River. This makes water, for both cargo and people, the most economical and 
convenient medium of transport for most people in the very large country. It is bigger 
than Europe. 
  
There is a chain of large lakes running through the Rift Valley in the eastern part of 
the country as well as numerous rivers, including the Congo itself. However, many of 
those rivers have numerous and dangerous rapids and waterfalls. One set of rapids 
in the River Congo, near its mouth, is named the “Cauldron of Hell”, apparently very 
appropriately.440 Upstream travel is limited.441 Infrastructure is sparse and made 
roads and railways are rare. Both are tediously slow and subject to interference by 
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5.7.4. Many ferry accidents go unreported. 
 
Because of poor communications in much of the country, it can be assumed that 
many, if not most, ferry accidents go unreported. It is therefore believed that their 
number is considerably higher than shown in the BMPVA database. 
 
“Known” fatal ferry accidents are more or less evenly spread between the Rift Valley 
lakes and the rivers. Usually the river boats are considerably smaller and less 
seaworthy than those navigating the lakes.443 So the numbers of deaths arising from 
each accident on the lakes are usually much higher although the numbers of 
accidents are fewer.444 All the usual poverty driven human error causes are cited for 
practically all the accidents that occur in DR Congo with overloading being the 
predominant cause.445 An abundance of crocodiles and hippopotamus in the rivers 
and lakes add to the hazards that are not helped by an absence of any formal search 
and rescue services. It is claimed that 170 people were “taken” by crocodiles along 
one small section of the Congo River, near the capital, Kinshasa, in 2012 alone.446 
 
Most of the river boats, called pirogues, are little more than large wooden canoes 
and, even the comparatively rare larger river vessels are mostly elderly, poorly 
maintained powered steel scows and barges. Their captains and crews generally 
have little or no formal maritime education or training. The lake ferries tend to be 
larger and were mostly pre-fabricated in northern Europe. When built, they were 
undoubtedly seaworthy. However, again, they are poorly maintained and mostly 
incompetently operated.447 All vessels, it seems, are commonly badly overloaded and 
largely devoid of life saving equipment. River and lake travel is really only for the very 
poor and very desperate. 
 
Apart from the numerous canoes and barge or scow-like, steel built, powered or tug 
pushed river boats very few significant vessels have been built in-country. There are 
a few relatively modern fast ferries called Carnot Rapides that operate on the Congo 
River near the nation‟s capital, Kinshasa. They are imported and tickets to ride on 
them are reported to be very expensive.448 
 
5.7.5. Water travel is still the safest and most reliable means. 
 
While travel by water in DR Congo is extremely hazardous, it is regarded by a 
leading in-bound tour company to be safer and more reliable than road, rail or air.449 
Of the five worst countries for passenger vessel accident fatalities, there is little doubt 
that DR Congo, a nation of 77 million desperately poor people, will be the most 
difficult in which to bring about reform. As with Haiti, it seems most unlikely to be able 
to be reformed in the sense of ferry safety, in the foreseeable future. It appears that 
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444 Appendix A, Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database, Ibid. 
445 Ibid. 
446 www.congotravelandtours.com. 
447 Appendix A, Ibid. 




little has changed there since Joseph Conrad wrote his novel Heart of Darkness, 






Map 5.5. Egypt with its lengthy Red and Mediterranean 6ea coasts, its important Nile 
River and its extensive delta as well as the large, man-made Lake Nasser, has a 




                                                     
450 Conrad, J. Heart of Darkness, Penguin Books, London, 1981. 
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5.8.1. Geographic, cultural and economic problems prevail. 
 
Egypt, with its mostly Muslim population of around 92 million is, with a per capita 
GDP USD 3,615 per annum in 2015, one of the wealthier of the ten nations 
described here despite its history of political instability.451 It is also notably 
undemocratic and corrupt as shown in Table 5.3. 
 
However, cultural problems, not the least of which appear to be political repression, 
corruption and fatalism, have ensured that it has a very poor record for ferry and 
tourist boat safety. It continues to experience frequent fatal accidents.452 The greater 
number of accidents have occurred on the River Nile and Lake Nasser in mostly 
small tourist vessels and river ferries. The major accidents, in terms of fatalities, have 
occurred mostly in the Red Sea. They involved large, poorly modified and unstable 
conventional Ro-Pax ferries that are engaged in the trade of transferring large 
numbers of Egyptian workers to and from Saudi Arabia and pilgrims travelling to 
Mecca for the Haj.453 
 
5.8.2. Modified, elderly Ro-Pax ferries make matters worse. 
 
The two worst accidents involved much-modified and elderly European conventional 
Ro-Pax ferries that had stability robbing, additional decks placed above those with 
which the ships had originally been designed and constructed. Neither the Salem 
Express nor the Al Salam Boccaccio 98 should have been permitted to operate in 
their modified condition.454 As described in Chapter 3, both ships were obviously, 
even to the non-professional eye, neither stable nor seaworthy. Notably, they failed 
to comply with the Stockholm Rules.455 
 
On the River Nile, vessels seem to have routinely been significantly overloaded and 
often badly mishandled. Even those owned by major international hotel companies 
such as Germany‟s Kempinski Group‟s Kempinski Ganna, which caught fire in 
October 2003 have not been immune from such problems.456 
 
5.8.3. Regulation of inland waterways vessels is non-existent. 
 
Many of the smaller vessels operating on the River Nile and Lake Nasser are simple 
wooden feluccas that are traditional, lateen rigged sail powered inshore boats that 
are picturesque and very attractive to tourists. They, cross river vehicular ferries and 
hotel cruise boats have been involved in numerous fatal accidents.457 It is probably 
only when tourists die in such accidents that they are noticed in the outside world. It 
is believed that many accidents go unreported. Most such vessels are unlicensed 
and their captains and crews lack formal qualifications. Indeed, from the author‟s 
                                                     
451 See Table 5.3, above. 
452 Appendix A, Ibid. 
453 See case studies on Salem Express and Al Salam Boccaccio in Chapter 3. 
454 Appendix A, Ibid. 
455 For details of the Stockholm Rules, refer to Kohn. R. Agreement reached on ro-ro ferry safety 
measures, IMO, London, 1995. 




personal observation, many are illiterate. That would preclude them from gaining 
such qualifications. 
 
5.8.4. Crowded waterways – collisions are common. 
 
The Nile is crowded with passenger, cargo and work boats. Collisions between them 
are common. As recently as January 2016, at least seventeen people were killed 
when a ferry sank in the Nile delta.458 This followed a collision in Cairo between an 
unlicensed party boat/ferry and a cargo boat in July 2015 that resulted in 36 
fatalities.459 As is the norm in developing countries, the local authorities profess 
concern and promise to tighten regulations and enforce them more rigorously but, 






Map 5.6. Haiti comprises about one third of the Caribbean island of Hispaniola. It is 
located in the tropical “Hurricane Belt” and relies extensively on water transport 





                                                     
458 Another unlicensed ferry. Anon. Ferry sinking kills 15 people in Egypt, 
www.sbs.com.au/news/article2016/01/02/ferry-sinking-kills-15/ . 
459  Anon. 14 drown in Egypt Nile boat accident, www.tribune.com.pk/story/1020248/14-drown-in-




5.9.1. Geography and poverty lead to reliance on water transport. 
 
Haiti, the poorest country in Latin America occupies the western third of the island of 
Hispaniola.461 It has a lengthy coastline and numerous rivers, lakes and islands. Its   
11 million inhabitants rely on water transport for much of their movement around their 
comparatively small country. 
 
Located in the Caribbean „Hurricane Belt‟, Haiti has been badly affected by a number 
of severe hurricanes over recent years.462 They and earthquakes kill large numbers 
of citizens annually in a country that is not at all robust in the face of such natural 
disasters. Even day-to-day sea voyages are made risky by the strong trade winds 
that blow regularly through the aptly named Windward Passage that separates the 
North West of the country from nearby Cuba. 
 
This former Spanish, Dutch then French colony, gained its independence after a 
devastating revolution in 1804 when it became the world‟s first nation comprising 
mainly black former slaves. While technically „free‟, Haitians have continued to suffer 
from poverty, natural disasters and political chaos and repression for most of the two 
centuries since independence. The original indigenous Carib inhabitants were 
practically wiped out in the fifty years following the Spanish settlement of the island 
by Columbus in 1493. It was essentially repopulated with African slaves managed 
and bred with by Spanish and, later French, masters. Finally, in the twentieth century, 
Haiti spent 19 years under American administration.463 
 
Inevitably, therefore, corruption and very restricted democracy are major handicaps 
to economic progress and its concomitant safety improvements. Table 5.3 shows 
Haiti at 107 in the Democracy Index and at 141 in its Corruption counterpart. 
 
Haiti‟s major, but obviously not very lucrative, industries include mining, mainly 
bauxite, and agriculture, mostly sugar, fruit and vegetables. However, it seems to 
have a largely subsistence economy. Hence, despite considerable foreign aid, mainly 
from the USA, the GDP per capita is only USD 829 per annum, the lowest in the 
Americas. GDP growth has averaged a depressing 0.3 per cent per annum over fifty 
years (See Table 5.3.). Malnutrition, it seems, is a significant problem. 
 
5.9.2. Ferries are commonly dangerously unseaworthy. 
 
As with most similarly impoverished countries, the vessels travelled on by the 
inhabitants are commonly unseaworthy, incompetently manned and often 
overloaded. Ironically, they often revel in optimistic names such as God‟s Will, Praise 
the Lord  and Lazarus.464 These, obviously, reflect the widespread Christian beliefs of 
the inhabitants, some of whom, it seems, also practice an animist variation known as 
Voodoo. Both sets of beliefs, combined with widespread malnutrition, no matter how 
                                                     
461 Refer to Table 5.3. 
462 Including Hurricane Matthew in October 2016 which killed around 900. See 
www.wunderground.com/hurricane/haiti.asp and www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-3754929 . 
463 Brief history drawn from Nations on Line, www.nationsonline.org/haiti  
464 All are listed in Appendix A, Ibid. 
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they are intermingled, would appear to give rise to a strong sense of fatalism, a 
common factor in most of the ten worst countries.465 
 
5.9.3. Little real prospect of ferry safety improvement. 
 
Given its history, its ongoing political chaos, its susceptibility to natural disasters and 
its depressed economy, it would appear that Haiti has few or no prospects for 
improving the safety of its passenger vessels in the short to medium term. Sadly, 
therefore, like DR Congo, it appears unlikely to benefit from any international efforts 
to support the implementation of such improvements in the short term. There are 






Map 5.7. Indonesia comprises an archipelago of a claimed 17,000 islands that 
necessitate considerable sea, and some river, travel for its citizens and visitors. While 
its main population centres lie in the equatorial belt, it still suffers from occasional 







                                                     
465 For a discussion on this phenomenon, refer to: Cidade, E. C. et al. Poverty and fatalism: Impacts 
on the community dynamics and on hope in Brazilian residents, Journal of Prevention & Intervention in 
the Community, Taylor & Francis Online, London, 2015; and, Bernard, T. et al. Beyond fatalism – An 
empirical exploration of self-efficacy and aspirations failure in Ethiopia, IPFRI Discussion Paper 1, 
2011, International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington DC, 2011. 
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5.10.1. Archipelagic geography necessitates water travel. 
 
With 258 million people spread over 17,000 tropical islands and a comparatively fast 
growing per capita Gross Domestic Product of USD 3,347, Indonesia is the third 
richest of the ten worst performed countries compared. It, like its neighbouring and 
similarly densely populated Philippines, is one of the fastest growing Southeast Asian 
nations. Both countries would seem to have good economic and social potential for 
rapid and substantial improvements in ferry safety. 
 
As their maps make clear, both countries depend heavily on marine transport for 
commerce, tourism and family contact. Apart from just their adjoining location, the 
two countries are similar in many ways. They are at approximately similar levels of 
development. Both are semi or near democracies and enjoy the benefits of a 
relatively free press. However, as Table 5.3. clearly shows, both are still significantly 
corrupt. While they both are subject to a dominant religion – Muslim in the case of 
Indonesia and Roman Catholicism in the Philippines – their practice is generally 
considered to be liberal.466 
 
Indonesia is particularly rich in extractive resources: minerals, oil and gas, rubber, 
palm oil, rice, timber and seafood, are the most important. Those resources are not, 
however, always very efficiently or cost effectively extracted compared with more 
developed countries. Industry suffers from frequent and sometimes dramatic 
government policy changes.467 
 
5.10.2. A resource rich but poorly managed nation. 
 
Although Indonesia is rapidly becoming richer, the riches are not always well or fairly 
distributed and many poor country problems remain in terms of, particularly, health 
and safety. Crime, corruption, terrorism, disease, occupational safety and poor 
education levels are ongoing problems. Travel safety on land, at sea and in the air 
remains problematic.468 Indonesia has continued to experience serious and deadly 
passenger vessel accidents right to the end of the period studied in 2015 and since 
with two in the first week of 2018.469 As with Bangladesh, DR Congo and the 
Philippines, developed country tourists continue to be warned on their countries‟ 
travel websites to avoid or at least be very careful about ferry travel. 
 
Overloading, inadequate maintenance and untrained crews continue to blight the 
Indonesian ferry industry. It would not be unfair to repeat claims made in a 1998 
article in the Norwegian shipping newspaper TradeWinds  that “… black market ticket 
sales are reported to be rampant”.470 And that the 2,200 passenger capacity ferry 
Bukit Siguntang , “… recently sailed carrying 4,800 passengers. According to the 
                                                     
466 Described in www.factsanddetails.com/Indonesia/History-andReligion/  and 
www.asiasociety.org/education/religion-philippines/. 
467 See Anon. www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/…/in-search-better-industrial-policy-indonesia.ht  
468 www.smartraveller.gov.au . Ibid. 
469 Anon. Indonesia speedboat explosion kills two, injures 18, www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-15/. 




official (quoted), passengers should not worry as the vessel was constructed in 
Germany and employs enough safety measures to face any emergency”.471 
 
5.10.3. Many Indonesian ferries are unsafe. 
 
According to The Jakarta Post, “More than half the ferries sailing from Merak port in 
West Java to Sumatra Island fail international safety standards…”.472 That was 
published in 2003. Despite considerable support from Australia from 2007 to 2010, 
during which USD 17 million was spent on the Indonesian Transport Safety 
Assistance Package that focused on passenger ferries and coastal Ro-Ro ships 
operating between Kupang and Rote island in West Timor, little, if any, improvement 
can be discerned.473 Indeed, as noted in Chapter 3, Australian broadcaster Jon Faine 
devoted a chapter in his book From Here To There to a voyage in that same area in 
2009.The chapter is titled, very appropriately, Scary Ferry.474 It very accurately 
encapsulates the dangers of ferry travel, not only in Indonesia, but in most poor, 
corrupt and undisciplined countries. 
 
Indonesia has a significant local shipbuilding industry but it is mainly focused on non-
passenger vessels except for very small ones. Its passenger fleet is very old 
comprising mostly cast-offs from Japan and Korea together with a few newer, but not 
new, fast ferries from Australia, Japan and Singapore.475 As can be gleaned from the 
case studies in Chapter 3, too many of them still are poorly maintained and 
negligently operated. The Indonesian Government  implemented a regulation in 2007 
that banned the purchase of foreign ships more than ten years old. It was then 
estimated that more than sixty of the 167 Ro-Ro/Ro-Pax vessels then operating in 
the country were more than 25 years old. Even the director of government owned 
ASDP Indonesia Ferry doubted that “…shipping lines will be able to meet the 
requirement”.476 He seems to have been completely correct. However, as can be 
seen in Table 1.6. even Indonesian government owned ships have not been not 
immune from fatal accidents. 
 
In 2010 Indonesia was estimated to have 210 internal Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax ferry routes 
along with eight landing craft Ro-Pax ferry routes and three routes utilising high 
speed ferries.477 This estimate seems low to the author who has travelled widely in 
Indonesia. Furthermore, it fails to take into account the numerous passenger-only 
ferry routes utilising mostly smaller vessels especially on lakes and rivers and close 
to coasts. Nor does it account for passenger only vessels operating from tourist 
resort areas such as Bali and Lombok and the Thousand Island group north of 
Jakarta. These disputed statistics merely highlight the lack of accurate information 
that makes it difficult to determine the real extent of the Indonesian ferry safety 
problem. 
                                                     
471 Anon. Indonesians don‟t mind packing their German ferries, TradeWinds, Oslo, December 1998. 
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5.10.4. IMO has tentatively tried but failed in Indonesia. 
 
IMO, at the behest of INTERFERRY and the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association, 
has made some token efforts to try to encourage improvements in ferry passenger 
safety in Indonesia.478 Working with the World Bank, IMO in 2009 set itself an 
ambitious goal of reducing ferry deaths by 90 per cent by 2019.479 No measurable 
improvements have been perceived to date.480 Indeed, further fatal accidents have 
occurred in 2016, 2017 and 2018481. Almost nine years later, at the end of 2017, 
there seemed to be no hope of the goal being achieved at all. There were two fatal 
ferry accidents in Indonesia in the first five days of 2018! 
 
Similarly, Indonesia‟s road and aviation accident statistics are deplorable. Indeed, a 
number of Indonesian airlines have been banned from most other countries‟ airspace 
and airports. Overcrowding of aircraft and the unauthorised boarding of passengers 
appears to affect both the aviation and maritime sectors. The fatal crash of a military 
cargo aircraft in 2015 that killed 141 people brought this to light. Some 29 of the 141 
fatalities were alleged to be illegal fare paying passengers.482 
 
That situation is slowly improving with the assistance and support of ICAO and the 
aviation departments of surrounding countries, primarily Australia and Singapore. 
However, its appalling road accident record at least shows the country is becoming 
wealthy enough to support a large fleet of cars.483 Presumably, that indicates there 
must be sufficient money available to devote some to improving the local ferry fleet. 
 
5.10.5. Potential for assisted improvement is evident. 
 
Again, most of the behavioural and cultural deficiencies that cause travel accidents 
remain common and widespread in Indonesia. They should gradually be eliminated 
as the country‟s wealth improves. The potential for change is evident. The recent 
improvements to its aviation industry and its rapidly improving health standards offer 
promise of similar improvements in sea travel safety. Regrettably, however, 
Indonesia continues to experience fatal ferry and tourist boat accidents that 
particularly affect its tourist industry.484 It is unlikely, though, that much will be 
achieved without urging and more effective support from external sources such as a 
reformed and revitalised IMO as well as Australia‟s Australian Maritime Safety 
Authority (AMSA) which has already provided considerable assistance in improving 
Indonesia‟s Ro-Pax ferry fleet.485 
 
                                                     
478 Lawson, C.T. & Wiesbrod, R.E. Ferry Transport: The realm of Responsibility for ferry Disasters in 
Developing Nations, Journal of Public Transportation, 8 (4): pp.17-31. 
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Map 5.8. Myanmar, formerly known as Burma, is located at the northern end of the 
Bay of Bengal between Thailand and Bangladesh. Apart from religion and population 
size, it shares many of the same cultural, geographic and economic characteristics 
as Bangladesh. It has a lengthy coast, numerous offshore islands and overlays a 







5.11.1. Politically repressed, geographically water dependent. 
 
Myanmar, spent most of the last fifty years of its history largely cut off from the world 
under the rule of a repressive and notoriously corrupt military dictatorship.486 Prior to 
that it was occupied for four years as part of the Japanese Empire and spent two 
centuries as a British colony.487 Until 2012, it had only experienced about six years as 
a semi-democracy.  
 
Despite its considerable mineral, timber, agricultural and oil and gas wealth, most of 
the 54 million ordinary citizens of Myanmar are poor with a GDP per capita of USD 
1,204 per annum as shown in Table 5.3.488 The economy is largely subsistence and 
for many years was dominated by a military facilitated opium and heroin industry. 
Because the country was effectively closed to the outside world for more than forty of 
the fifty years studied, its rate of economic growth is unknown. It is believed to have 
been negligible except for the uncounted illicit drug industry.489 
 
The same Table shows that Myanmar stands at 114 and 147, respectively on the 
Transparency International democracy and corruption perception indices. Despite 
considerable reform since 2011, the country remains backward, corrupt and only 
semi-democratic at best. It also suffers from significant ethnic and religious unrest.490 
The media is very tightly controlled. So, it shares most of the problems of all the ten 
worst performing nations for passenger vessel safety. The only real difference is that 
it is the only one of the ten whose religious affiliations are predominantly Buddhist. In 
all other respects, it is very similar to Bangladesh and, judging from its fatal ferry 
accident record since opening somewhat to foreign media in 2007, its fatality 
statistics will be similar if adjusted for their population differences and extrapolated 
over the full fifty-year period studied.491  
 
5.11.2. Geographically and climatically similar to Bangladesh. 
 
Geographically, in particular, Myanmar is very similar to Bangladesh. It is located at 
the head of the Bay of Bengal on which it has a lengthy coastline. The country is 
overlain with an extensive river system, primarily the Irrawaddy, Chindwin and 
Salween rivers that flow through Myanmar from the Himalayas to the deltas through 
which they enter the Bay of Bengal. There are numerous populated islands along the 
coast that can largely only be accessed by sea. 
 
Climatically, Myanmar is almost entirely tropical and the coast is subject to cyclonic 
storms as well as strong monsoon winds. While the coastal and low-lying areas in the 
centre of the country are hot, the northern highlands and mountain areas can be 
cool. Considerable rainfall ensures that floods are frequent and that the highland 
rivers flow very swiftly at times. With little road or rail infrastructure but rivers that are 
                                                     
486 From, www.infoplease.com/country/myanmar/ . 
487 Infoplease. Ibid.. 
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navigable for long distances, it is unsurprising that water transport is very important, 
particularly over longer distances492. 
 
5.11.3. Ferry fatality record is likely to be far worse than reported. 
 
Burma/Myanmar‟s effective closure from the remainder of the world from 1966 until 
2006/7 meant that very little news was available from the country.493 The ruling 
military dictatorship enforced rigorous censorship. Bad news, such as that reporting 
on fatal ferry accidents has been hard to come by.494 Indeed, the BMPVA database 
records only three fatal ferry accidents over that forty-year period. Some 667 fatalities 
arose from those three “known” accidents (an average of 17 fatalities per annum) and 
none of the three vessels involved was named. 
 
Since 2007, when the once „pariah‟ state started to open to the outside world, twelve 
accidents affecting named vessels and causing 584 fatalities have been recorded (an 
average of 73 fatalities per annum).495 The earlier data is obviously completely 
inadequate. The true figures must be considerably higher. By extrapolating from the 
2007-2015 statistics, a logical case can be made for more likely figures of at least 75 
accidents and 3,250 fatalities over the whole period from 1966 to 2015. 
 
5.11.4. Myanmar remains a dangerous place for ferry travel. 
 
A predominantly Buddhist and poverty driven fatalism completes the list of factors 
that have led to Myanmar being a dangerous place for ferry travel despite its almost 




















                                                     
492 ASPI, Ibid. 
493 See Myanmar Country Profile, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12990563/, BBC, London, 30 
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494 Ibid. 
495 Appendix A, Ibid. 
496 As described in 5.9 and accompanying footnote. 
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5.12.0. The Philippines. 
 
 
Map 5.9. The Philippines, like Indonesia, is an archipelago comprising more than 








5.12.1. Ferry travel unavoidable in the most archipelagic nation. 
 
The Philippines, with its population of 109 million, increasingly better-educated 
people also appears to have real potential for improvement in domestic ferry 
safety.497 The country has enjoyed rapid growth in GDP per capita, albeit from a low 
base. Thanks to remittances from the many Filipinos working overseas and from new 
industries, such as call centres, it is becoming steadily wealthier.498 While the 
collapse in oil prices in 2014 reduced the potential for Filipino employment in the 
Persian Gulf Arab countries and Singapore,499 improving local economic conditions 
appear to have ameliorated the detrimental effects arising from that development.500 
 
Despite its encouraging prospects, and significant recent improvement, it remains 
one of the world‟s ten deadliest countries for passenger vessel accidents.501 
However, it is, since 2000, no longer the deadliest mainly thanks to better information 
becoming available about other countries. A sad dichotomy is that the Philippines is 
home to about 190 maritime schools and universities providing their graduates to the 
global maritime industry, yet the manning and operation of local vessels clearly 
continue to be sadly lacking in skill and seamanship.502 
 
5.12.2. Ferries remain dangerous despite recent improvements. 
 
The Philippines, between 1995 and 2005, introduced a Domestic Shipping 
Modernisation Program. It was funded by the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
of Japan and administered by the Development Bank of the Philippines.503 Its 
objectives were fleet modernisation/renewal and port development. Despite many 
loans being made, not much seems to have been achieved except for facilitating the 
sale of elderly Japanese ships into the Philippines and the sale of Japanese 
earthmoving equipment for port development. Of course, it seems that most foreign 
aid, particularly Japanese sourced foreign aid, is intended to benefit the donor at 
least as much as the donee. 
 
The statistics recording known ferry accidents in the Philippines are considered to 
significantly underestimate the reality504. Indeed, officers of the Philippine Coast 
Guard have claimed that taking smaller vessel accidents into account would increase 
the numbers of fatalities by more than 100 per cent.505 A common comment is to the 
effect that: “…far-flung incidents sometimes does (sic) not catch the attention of the 
                                                     
497 From www.tradingeconomics.com/philippines/gdp/. 
498 See Table 5.3. 
499 From World Bank, www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GO.ZS/  
500 Chanco, B. Remittances are not forever, Demand and Supply column, The Philippine Star, Manila, 
21 October 2016. 
501 Appendix A, Ibid and 5.1.3. 
502 Anon. The Philippine Maritime Industry: Prospects and Challenges in 2013 and Beyond, Philippine 
Planning and Policy Office, Manila, 29 May 2103. 
503 Austria, M.S. Philippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry: State of  Competition and Market 
Structure, Philippine Institute for Development Studies, Manila, 2003. 
504 Ibalon. A Sorry Maritime Safety Record Indeed in the Philippines, 
www.ibalon.wordpress.com/category/ship-capsizes/ , Manila, 9 November 2008. 
505 Indeed, retired Philippine Navy rear admiral Feliciana G Salonga of the Subic Bay Metropolitan 
Authority suggested that there are around 40,000 marine fatalities annually in the Philippines.  
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national media (except where casualties are simply too many)”.506 There are some 
4,800 passenger vessels registered in the Philippines of which most are motor 
bancas. They operate over more than 1,700 routes.507 There are, of course, many 
more passenger carrying vessels that are unregistered. 
 
5.12.3. Fatality record is probably worse than it appears. 
 
It must also be emphasised that, while many of the accidents in the Philippines 
involve small vessels, those causing massive death tolls, while fewer in number, 
without exception, involve substantial steel, usually conventional Ro-Pax, vessels. 
Those, presumably, are largely crewed by graduates of those same maritime schools 
and universities mentioned in 5.12.1. If so, it can only be assumed that their training 
is deficient. 
 
The ferry safety situation in the Philippines is generally similar to that applying in 
neighbouring Indonesia. However, the Philippines appears to be benefiting from a 
more rapid introduction of new and safer ferries that is slowly putting it ahead of 
Indonesia in terms of ferry safety. These are very encouraging local initiatives that 
should, through the force of competition, lead to a general improvement in the 
standards of both the wider local fleet and its operators.508 The more influential local 
media in the Philippines would seem to be having a positive encouraging effect on 
that. 
 
5.12.4. Fast growing tourist and ship building industries will inspire  
safety improvements. 
 
The Philippines does have an active and growing local shipbuilding industry which is 
sufficiently competent to produce steel and aluminium vessels for export. Indeed, in 
tonnage terms it is the world‟s fourth largest shipbuilding nation. Its shipbuilding 
output includes large, high-quality cargo ships from builders such as Japanese 
owned Tsuneishi,509 Korea‟s Hanjin Heavy Industries and Keppel of Singapore and 
sophisticated aluminium fast ferries from Australian owned Austal,510 as well as 
smaller steel and aluminium vessels from Cebu based Colorado Shipyard511 and the 
Herme Shipyard in Bataam. It should, therefore, be able to produce safe and 
seaworthy vessels for the local market. So far, however, it seems that until very 
recently, most deliveries of safe modern vessels for domestic operations have been 
from Chinese and Japanese yards.512 
 
                                                     
506 Ibalon. Ibid. Page 1. 
507 www.thelibrarybook.net/pdf_philippine_transportation_statistics , 2013. 
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511 See Colorado Shipyard website, www.coloradoshipyard.com. 
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Both Indonesia and the Philippines are also noticing the economic and safety 
benefits accruing from a fast growing tourist industry.513 Fatal passenger vessel 
accidents involving foreign tourists can do enormous damage to a country‟s image. 
Most of those seriously invested in the tourist industry in both countries are well 
aware of that. They will undoubtedly work hard to ensure local ferries are world class 
in terms of safety. 
 
The considerable output from the country‟s maritime schools means that very large 
numbers of Filipinos are gaining experience on the generally better run vessels 
owned in developed countries. They are, through practical experience, learning the 
correct, safe way to operate ships. The author has observed Filipino officers and 
seamen working well and professionally on foreign flagged and owned ships. He has 
talked with numerous ship owners who seem satisfied with their Filipino crews. It is to 
be hoped that they will return to the Philippines to take up positions in the crews of 
the newer, safer vessels that are being introduced into the country. 
 
5.12.5. Government is well aware of the ferry safety problem. 
 
In conjunction with the Manila based Asian Development Bank, the Philippine 
Government created and published a strategic plan, Philippines: Transport Sector 
Assessment, Strategy and Road Map in 2012.514 That provided a framework for a 
transport infrastructure, economic and safety development plan for the period 
“through” 2016. The resulting 2011-2016 Philippine Development Plan (PDP), 
“…envisions a „safe, secure, efficient, viable, competitive, dependable, integrated, 
environmentally sustainable and people oriented Philippine transport system‟”. 515 
Noble intentions but, from the author‟s observations, the improvements may be 
happening but they are happening disappointingly slowly. 
 
As with Indonesia, increasing wealth and better health and education should help to 
lift the safety standards of Filipino ferries and their operators. Given some real 
support and encouragement by IMO, and wealthier neighbours such as Japan, 
Australia and Korea, the Philippines would seem to have considerable potential for 
substantial improvement. Again, the country has an overabundance of cars to the 
point of having to endure very bad traffic congestion problems. It should thus be able 
to afford much better ferries.516 
 
A significant advance has been the 2012 move by the government to amalgamate all 
the formerly uncoordinated government bodies that were once responsible for 
maritime matters into one, the Marine Industry Authority (MARINA) that is responsible 
for the safety, competitiveness and functional performance of the Philippine maritime 
industry.517 That provides hope and already some limited achievement. The PDP 
does provide at least an outline map for future improvement. 
 
The Philippines is starting to see some substantial investment in safe, modern and 
economical ferries. As described in Chapters 1, 2 and 6, a local company 
                                                     
513 For details of growth, see www.tourism.gov.ph/pages/industryperformance.aspx. 
514 Anon. Philippines: Transport Sector Assessment Strategy, and Road Map, ADB, Manila, 2012. 
515 Anon. The Philippine Maritime Indust, Ibid. 
516 See WHO, Global Health Observatory Country views, Ibid. 
517 MARINA, Ibid. 
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Archipelago Ferry Corp owned by the Pastrana family, has introduced a substantial 
fleet of “FastCat” catamaran Ro-Pax ferries that were designed by Sea Transport 
Solutions in Australia and built in China by the Bonny Fair Shipbuilding group. 
Notably, these inherently safe vessels are fully equipped with high-quality, modern 
safety equipment and passengers are thoroughly briefed in their use. They are also 
very well maintained. The company has ordered a number of similar but larger 
vessels. It should be noted, however, that the company‟s MV Fastcat  grounded, 
without significant damage and with no injuries, on its maiden voyage while departing 
Tubigon port in Bohol en route to Cebu on 16 December 2016.518 It appears that 
competent masters are still scarce in the Philippines. 
 
5.12.6. Some promising local examples of safety improvements. 
 
It is to be hoped that the example of the Pastrana family and their competitors, 
Starlite Ferries Inc,519 which is rebuilding its fleet with new conventional Ro-Pax 
ferries from Japan,520 and Oceanfast Fast Ferries, which is also re-building its fleet 
with modern Australian designed and locally built fast ferries,521 will be followed by 
many other Filipino ferry owners. Presumably, if Philippine airline companies can 
reach modern international standards, so too can their ferry companies. In 2017, the 
country, in a long awaited move, banned the importation of second hand ferries of 
any kind.522 It has, through MARINA, initiated numerous regulatory reforms since 
2005.523 They, despite several reverses, do appear to be having a positive effect on 
safety. 
 
It should be noted, however, that despite the best of publicly professed intentions to 
improve, accidents continue to happen. Indeed, Starlite Ferries‟ Starlite Atlantic sank 
off Batangas in a typhoon on 26 December 2016 with the loss of at least 19 lives.524 
The author has looked closely at a Starlite owned ferry, the Starlite Pioneer, in 
Caticlan port on Panay Island in February 2017. He was unimpressed. It appears to 
be the worst kind of conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry, bluff bowed and apparently 
unstable.525 
 
The Philippines appears to be the country most open to reform and where reform has 
actually commenced driven largely by the private sector. While it has a long way to 
go, it would probably be the best place to start a major ferry safety reform campaign 
supported by IMO, INTERFERRY, wealthier neighbouring nations, the classification 
societies, international development banks and, even some of the appropriate NGOs 
which claim to want to improve the life expectancies of poorer people. On the face of 
it, the Philippines has the greatest potential for the kind of rapid improvement that 
                                                     
518 See Anon. www.philstar.com/cebu-news/2016/12/17/1654291/  
519 See Bright stars, Work Boat World, Baird Publications, Melbourne, October 2016, p.38. 
520 Gamboa, R. Roro owners starting to see light, Bizlinks, The Philippine Star,  Manila, 29 January 
2015. 
521 See „Oceanjet 188‟, Work Boat World magazine, Baird Publications, Melbourne, September 2016, 
p. 34. 
522 The author was informed personally of this by Mr Chet Pastrana at the INTERFERRY 2017 
Conference in Split, Croatia, in October 2017. 
523 Listed in a summary of Memorandum Circulars published in 2017 on 
www.marina.gov.ph/policies/listMC/  
524 See www.maritimeherald.com/2016/0ne-dead-and-eight-missing/ and Appendix A, Ibid. 
525 While passing through Caticlan port en route to Boracay Island in February 2017. 
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Map 5.10. Senegal is almost bisected by the much smaller nation of The Gambia. 
The country has a long, exposed Atlantic Ocean coastline as well as numerous major 
rivers, their deltas, and lakes (University of Texas). 
 
5.13.1. Geographically and culturally vulnerable. 
 
Remarkably, and probably erroneously, Senegal, a West African former colony of 
France has achieved the notoriety of its ninth place on the „League Table‟ of 
passenger vessel fatalities entirely thanks to one accident. That involved the capsize 
and sinking of the grossly overloaded Le Joola off the mouth of the Gambia River 
which runs through the tiny nation of The Gambia which, in turn, effectively bisects 
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Senegal.526 The accident occurred in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the The 
Gambia which suggests the voyage involved was an international one. That fact 
should have aroused the interest of IMO but it failed to do so. 
 
5.13.2. Ferry accident data is inadequate. 
 
The Le Joola sinking of 26 September 2002, which killed 1,863 people, is the only 
fatal accident recorded in the BMPVA database to have involved a Senegalese 
vessel.527 That seems very unlikely to be correct. Despite the strong French influence 
over its former colony, it remains poor and geographically dependent on ferries 
thanks to its lengthy coastline and extensive river and lake systems. 
 
Senegal, located at the far western point of Africa has a similar 500 year colonial 
history to most of its neighbours. Commencing with the Portuguese in 1440, it then 
came under Dutch, French, British and, finally, French colonial rule again. It became 
independent in 1960. A country of some 13.5 million people, it is generally politically 
stable and has been described as “quasi democratic” by BBC News in its country 
profile.528 Indeed, it is widely regarded as one of the most stable and prosperous 
African nations. It is multi-ethnic and secular. 
 
Table 5.3 shows Senegal to be the most democratic and least corrupt of the ten 
worst nations for ferry fatalities. It has a fast growing economy based on tourism, 
fishing, agricultural products, oil and gas, fertilisers and, allegedly, manufacturing 
including shipbuilding and repair. That seems as dichotomous as the absence of data 
about passenger vessel accidents in the country. Much of the information gained 
about Senegal from an online search is unusually contradictory. It is very difficult to 
believe. 
 
5.13.3. Rich resources, poor people. 
 
Once primarily a slave marketing centre, Senegal, despite its strong French 
connections, is about 95 per cent Sunni Muslim and about five per cent Christian. 
Although its per capita GDP is growing impressively, as is so often the case in Africa, 
most of the population remains very poor. Diseases, mainly malaria, dengue fever, 
tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid, hepatitis and similar, are rife. Life expectancy is 60 
years from birth and literacy is only about 50 per cent with females being most likely 
to be illiterate. Road travel is particularly dangerous and petty crime common. 
 
The author has been able to find few local or international media, safety agency or 
government reports as to other fatal passenger vessel accidents. Indeed, those that 
do exist describe accidents with small numbers of casualties while mentioning the 
poor ferry safety record in the country. That reputation cannot, logically, be entirely 
due to one accident.529 
 
                                                     
526 Refer to 3.17. for details. 
527 Appendix A. Ibid. 
528 The most plausible source of information about Senegal comes from www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-14093674/. 
529 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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However, despite the absence of data, the country has a poor reputation for 
passenger safety. If the photographs of Le Joola prior to its sinking, such as that 
shown in Chapter 3, are any indication, gross overloading of ferries in the country 
would appear to be normal behaviour. Indeed, the Australian government‟s 
“Smartraveller” website warns Australians to exercise a “High degree of caution” in 
Senegal and to, “Reconsider your need to travel outside Dakar (the capital)”. 530 It 
also warns that: “The standard of public transport in Senegal is poor. Ferries, in 
particular, are often dangerously overcrowded”. The comparable British and 
Canadian websites offer similar warnings so there must be some basis for them. 
Perhaps fatal ferry accidents occur so frequently in Senegal that they are not 
considered newsworthy. 
 
It can be surmised that most of the accidents involve small local vessels known as 
pirogues and that they mostly kill local people. Presumably, if they were rich foreign 
tourists, much more publicity would ensue. Two YouTube reports on 2013 voyages 
on Ro-Pax river ferries confirm that massive overloading continues to occur.531 
 
5.13.4. Ferry accidents mostly kill local people. 
 
The author has seen photographs of river ferries in Senegal and neighbouring The 
Gambia. They starkly confirm the Smartraveller and similar comments regarding 
gross overloading. Recent reports of fatal ferry accidents during international 
voyages between The Gambia and Senegal mention eight deaths in 2013 and five in 
2014. On each occasion, there were Europeans among the dead.532 
 
The case of Le Joola, putting it among the world‟s worst ferry disasters made it 
internationally newsworthy, especially as a number of French citizens died in the 
sinking, but the subsequent inquiry was perfunctory at best. All blame was attributed 
to the ship‟s master and, since he sank with his ship, no criminal charges could be 
laid.533 Again, judging from earlier photographs of the Senegalese government 
owned ship, gross overloading was normal. Although two ministers were dismissed 
as a result of the sinking, it seems that safety standards were, and probably remain, 
very low. 534 While it does tend towards the cautious in its warnings, it appears that 
the Smartraveller website has good grounds for its comments on Senegalese ferries. 
 
Meanwhile, Le Joola was replaced in 2007 by an impressive new ship Aline Sitoe 
Diatta which was built by the highly reputable German shipyard Fassmer.535 It is of 
similar size to the sunken ship and was largely paid for by the German Government 
and the Euro Bank. It would be interesting to learn whether or not the overloading 
lesson has been learnt. 
                                                     
530 See www.smartraveller.com.au. 
531 They show Kanilai car ferry from Gambia to Senegal, July 2013, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh5d6jMeokM/. 
532 From, Anon. Tragedy at the Banjul Bara Ferry Crossing as 8 Passengers perished, and Warning 
over ferry travel in Gambia, www.gainako.com/tragedy-at-the-banjul-bara-ferry-crossing/  and 
www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/Warning-over-ferry-travel-in-Gambia/. 
533 Anon. No criminal charges over Senegalese ferry disaster, ABC News, Sydney, 8 September 2003, 
www.abc.net.au/news/2003-08-09/. 
534 Described in Le Joola case study in Chapter 3, 3.17. 








Map 5.11. Tanzania is surrounded by and dotted with very large lakes and rivers as 
well as having three significantly populous island groups located off its coast 
(University of Texas). 
 
5.14.1. Geographically and economically vulnerable. 
 
Tanzania, as can be seen in Table 5.3, is generally regarded as being of middle rank 
among developing countries in terms of both corruption and democracy. It also has a 
useful and encouraging rate of growth in GDP per capita and enjoys the benefits of a 
substantial and growing tourist industry. It has significant mining and agriculture 
sectors but the benefits of the growing economy are not well spread. The vast 




The country is surrounded on two sides by very large lakes and is dotted with many 
others and crossed by numerous large rivers. It also has a lengthy Indian Ocean 
coast off which lie three populous island groups, notably including Zanzibar and 
Pemba, to the north of Dar es Salam, which are popular and historic tourist 
destinations. It is a „wet‟ country that has considerable scope and need for water 
transport. 
 
5.14.2. Inadequate reporting conceals a bad safety record. 
 
Unfortunately, though, it has a very bad record for ferry safety. Although most of its 
recorded fatal ferry accidents have occurred over the past twenty years, it is among 
the five worst countries in that regard. Indeed, it comes in as fourth worst.536 It is 
suspected that, due to inadequate reporting of accidents prior to 1996 its real record 
could well be much worse. There is no obvious or known reason why it should 
suddenly have started to experience fatal passenger vessel accidents from when the 
Tanzanian Government owned Bukoba sank in Lake Victoria in 1996 with massive 
loss of life. 537 Perhaps the publicity arising from that accident alerted the outside 
world to the dangerous reality of Tanzanian ferries. 
 
While Tanzania remains a home for dilapidated old ferries on its lakes and coast and 
most of the local accidents have involved such vessels, it has imported a number of 
modern, well-equipped ferries since the mid 2000s. Illustrating the cultural and 
behavioural problems pertaining to the country, even a very fine example of a 
modern fast catamaran ferry the Kilimanjaro II was involved in a significant fatal 
accident that killed at least 25 people and was entirely due to very bad 
seamanship.538 
 
Tanzania has a very mixed and still dynamic ethnic and religious background. The 
populace includes traditional tribal Africans who practice a mix of animist and 
Christian religions. Along the Indian Ocean coast ethnicity is more mixed with 
Portuguese, Arab, Indian, German and English blood mixed in. The Muslim religion is 
stronger there but so is Catholicism and, increasingly, evangelistic Christianity. This 
seems to have led to the same kind of fatalism that is prevalent in all the other 
countries where passenger vessel accidents are abnormally frequent.539 
 
This fatalism is evident in the focus on praying before a voyage that takes 
precedence over studying the safety facilities of the vessel concerned. That is if there 
actually is any safety equipment on the vessel. The author has observed such 
behaviour and a complete lack of interest in such items as life jackets and rafts. In 
fact, on the island of Zanzibar he noted that lifejackets were very scarce and 
generally regarded as a waste of time and money. Life rafts were practically invisible 
except on the newest vessels. 
 
 
                                                     
536 Appendix A, Ibid. 
537 See case study 3. 14. 
538 Appendix A, Ibid. 
539 Described in 5. 9. 
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5.14.3. New vessel safety compromised by old operational failings. 
 
Also obvious was the absence of any interest in keeping a good lookout, even from 
high-speed vessels. The normal judgement and care required to safely berth vessels 
without damage was also obviously absent. Despite the generally, but not always, 
benign weather conditions applying in the region, all of the local ferries showed 
numerous dents and other minor damage. Most vessels were in poor to very 
dilapidated condition, even when less than twenty years old. Image 3.20 showing the 
Spice Islander illustrates this phenomenon very clearly in the case of an older vessel. 
 
As discussed in previous case studies describing other similarly developing 
countries, the vast numbers of cars in the capital, Dar es Salaam, indicate that some 
of Tanzania‟s growing wealth is being spread. That should mean that the country 
could afford to upgrade its ferries. In fact, a trickle of modern, well-equipped ferries is 
entering the country.  
 
The Kilimanjaro II is one of them. It is both modern and well equipped. It has six near 
sister-ships. However, it was once plainly the victim of very poor seamanship on the 
part of its crew. Driven too fast for the conditions, it nose-dived into a sea. Twenty-
five of the passengers sitting on its bow were swept overboard and, following a 
botched rescue effort, they drowned.540  
 
Normal, global standards of seamanship would have prevented the accident in the 
first place and then would have ensured the recovery of many more, if not all, of the 
passengers who were swept overboard. In any case, none of the passengers should 
have been permitted to travel on the bow in any conditions. 
 
Skagit, too, was comparatively modern but she had been dangerously modified and 
made unstable in order to enable greater carrying capacity. She had been badly 
overloaded and incompetently handled. Thus, some 293 people died when the 
vessel capsized in 2012 between Zanzibar and Dar es Salam.541 
 
5.14.4. Good reform potential once bad habits are eliminated. 
 
Tanzania has a long way to go in terms of ferry safety but, like the other seven 
promising countries mentioned above (excluding DR Congo and Haiti), and thanks to 
its improving economy, it appears to have real potential for improvement. Again, such 
reform is unlikely to be locally inspired or generated, even with a fast growing tourism 
industry. Any reform that comes about will require support and encouragement from 
IMO, European nations and, possibly, the classification societies and NGOs. 
 
 
5.15.0. The ten most dangerous countries in summary. 
 
With the probable, realistic and tragic exceptions of DR Congo and Haiti, the author 
considers that the remaining eight of the worst ten countries have very real potential 
for the reform of their ferry services. With the support of ICAO, those countries have 
                                                     




generally managed to achieve significant improvements in the safety of their civil 
aviation operations. Indonesia, though, is still regarded as a laggard by ICAO.542 This 
has been achieved through a combination of introducing better, more modern and 
safer aircraft with improvements in ground facilities, air-traffic control, and actual flight 
operations. 
 
Owing to data deficiencies, Myanmar has been included in this list but only by 
extrapolating from its record since 2007.543 Given its similarities with neighbouring 
Bangladesh and its appalling record over the years 2007-2015, it seems logical to 
have done so. As China is economically strong enough to fund and organise its own 
internal reforms, that leaves only seven nations, having real potential for reform, but  
require substantial assistance to achieve it.  
 
More positively, the economies of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar and the 
Philippines are all improving.544 Those countries are steadily becoming less poor. 
That should definitely assist in the improvement of their ferry safety records. 
 
The ten worst countries combined have been responsible for at least 78 per cent, 
and probably 80 per cent, of the world‟s ferry fatalities over the half-century to 2015. 
It is obvious that if IMO and other supporting organisations were able to bring about 
worthwhile reform in just seven of those ten countries, and encourage China to 
reform itself, it would make a very significant improvement in the global ferry fatality 
statistics. Haiti and DR Congo could be tackled later. 
 
Given their apparent potential for rapid reform, it would seem logical to attempt the 
Philippines first, followed by Bangladesh, Indonesia, Tanzania, Myanmar, Egypt and 
Senegal, in that order. 
 
If IMO could be persuaded to follow the example of ICAO, it seems reasonable to 
expect that similar improvements could be achieved with the ferries in those 
countries. First, though, IMO must be prepared to change its „mindset‟ or policy of 
“not interfering in the internal matters of its sovereign member nations”. Such 
activities need not represent interfering. Rather, they should be presented as 
assisting, supporting and encouraging those nations to bring about much needed 
reforms. What is required from IMO is leadership of the kind that ICAO has been 
demonstrating for decades. 
 
                                                     
542 ICAO, 2011 State of Global Aviation Safety, ICAO, Montreal, 2011. 
543 Appendix A, Ibid. 
544 All four countries have GDP growth rates of at least 3.5 per cent per annum for the past 50 years 






Technical factors – Mechanical, structural and design 
 
Fewer than eight per cent of fatal ferry accidents and two 
per cent of fatalities were caused by mechanical or 
structural failures. Human factors are almost invariably the 
cause of fatal accidents. 
 
6.1.0. Human factors are almost invariably the cause of fatal 
accidents. 
 
6.1.1. Technical factors have caused fewer than twelve per 
cent of fatal ferry accidents and two per cent of fatalities. 
Human error is the real problem. 
 
As described in Chapters 1 and 2, the majority of passenger vessel accidents 
have been caused by various forms of human error. Fewer than twelve per 
cent of the 750 known fatal accidents that occurred between 1966 and 2015 
were caused by technical factors, pure accident, sabotage, murder or 
suicide.545 Of those, fewer than eight per cent of fatal accidents resulted from 
mechanical or structural failure. In terms of numbers of fatalities, the figure 
was nearer two per cent.  
 
Similar proportions apply to the 91 per cent of passenger vessels that are 
ferries. Accidents attributed to non-human induced mechanical failure rarely 
result in fatalities. Even if a vessel‟s engine or engines break down, or if it 
catches fire, it will normally be able to be towed to a safe harbour. Such 
accidents are rarely reported in the general or, even, maritime media. 
 
Certainly, as a perusal of the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident 
(BMPVA) database makes clear, fatalities have on occasion arisen from such 
failures .546 However, examples of such accidents are rare. Of the 681 fatal 
ferry accidents listed, only 14 or 0.2 per cent were described as resulting from 
„engine failure‟ or „disintegration‟ as classified under Type of Incident. Of 
those, seven, or 50 per cent, involved the disintegration of Filipino motor 
bancas.547 However, all of those have ultimately been the result of poor 
maintenance, inadequate design or construction or general negligence, all 
human factors.  
 
Indeed, even the capsizes of various Filipino motor bancas following the loss 
of an outrigger float due to structural failure, could be construed as being due 
                                                     





to human errors in their design, construction or, more likely, maintenance. 
One, two or all three must surely be at fault. The disintegration of the large 
motor banca Kim Nirvana, described in Chapter 1, is a good example of that. 
 
6.1.2. Most structural or mechanical failures are due to human 
error, usually inadequate maintenance. 
 
Examining the database columns in the BMPVA database: Claimed cause; 
Author assessed cause; and, Inquiry adjudication, numerous references to 
„human error/unseaworthy‟ can be found.548 In almost every case, however, 
the only conclusion that can be drawn from the available facts is that any of 
the very few alleged mechanical or structural failings were primarily due to 
some form of human error such as negligence, inadequate design, dangerous 
modifications or poor maintenance. 
 
No cases of pure mechanical or structural failure that are entirely devoid of 
human influence are recorded in the BMPVA database.549 In fact, if a 
spontaneous mechanical failure occurs, except in the case of motor bancas, it 
is very unlikely that the vessel concerned will proceed into a catastrophic fatal 
accident. Similarly, there are very few known examples of spontaneous, non-
human induced structural failure that have led to fatal accidents. Pure 
technical failure simply does not happen. It is irrelevant as a cause of 
passenger vessel fatalities. 
 
Of the fourteen cases described in 6.1.1, seven were wooden motor bancas, 
one was an aluminium catamaran, one was constructed of FRP and another 
of steel. The remaining four were all of wooden construction. 
 
6.1.3. Fires, too, are primarily due to human error. 
 
Much the same applies to fires. While the database lists numerous examples 
of fires, there are none that have ignited spontaneously. All can be attributed 
to human errors of either omission or commission.550 Discarded cigarette 
butts have been a major cause of fires. They have been thrown onto oil or 
petrol puddles, paper and plastic furnishing material, among petrol fuelled 
cars and motor cycles, and into inflammable cargoes. Fires have, on rare 
occasions, been caused by collisions and by fuel, particularly petrol, being 
stored dangerously close to hot engines. It must be emphasised that such 
incidents are very rare and that discarded cigarette butts are the major cause 
of such ignition. Again, they are all, ultimately, caused by human error. 
 
Indeed, Melbourne broadcaster Jon Faine graphically describes his concern 
at such cigarette carelessness in the chapter titled Scary Ferry in his 2009 
book From Here to There.551 He was horrified by the carelessness of both 
passengers and crew on an Indonesian conventional Ro-Pax ferry on a 
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551 Faine, J & J. Ibid. 
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voyage during which they routinely ignored NO SMOKING signs and, indeed, 
threw smouldering cigarette butts onto an oil and petrol soaked vehicle deck. 
Personal observation by the author and anecdotal comments confirm that 
nothing has changed since in that regard. 
 
The impressive and active European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) has 
become so concerned about the problem of fires on conventional Ro-Pax 
vessels that it conducted a comprehensive inquiry into the subject. A very 
clear and remarkably practical report of that inquiry: Study investigating cost 
effective measures for reducing the risk from fires on ro-ro passenger ships 
(FIRESAFE), was published in 2016.552 Unsurprisingly, the main and most 
practical recommendation arising from that inquiry focused on the need for 
better training of mariners. Perhaps that was because only two of the report‟s 
eight authors were naval architects! They, presumably, would have 
recommended complex and expensive engineering solutions to an essentially 
human behavioural problem. 
 
IUMI, the International Union of Marine Insurers, too, has expressed its 
concern over the safety of Ro-Ro/Ro-Pax vessels particularly with respect to 
their vulnerability to vehicle deck fires.553 
 
6.1.4. Almost all vessels are at least adequately designed and 
built. 
 
The reality, as stated in Chapter 1, is that most vessels are at least 
adequately designed and built. Putting aside human errors, even the most 
basic of vessels can be navigated safely if they are operated in the manner 
and in the environment for which they were designed. A competent seaman 
can and one has even circumnavigated much of the globe in a log canoe.554 
 
It is incomprehensible, therefore, that IMO should waste significant quantities 
of time and money in arguing about mathematical formulae related to 
tolerance for damage resulting from a hole in a hull.555 This, in fact, happened 
in November 2016 during a meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee of 
IMO.556 It would be far more sensible if IMO were to focus its efforts on 
preventing the hull being holed in the first place.  
 
Given the foregoing, IMO could safely assume that the vast majority of naval 
architects and shipbuilders have the problems of holes in hulls well under 
control. IMO, unfortunately, does appear to have a strong inclination towards 
                                                     
552 See Wikman, J. et al. Study investigating cost effective measures for reducing the risk 
from fires on ro-ro passenger ships (FIRESAFE), European Maritime Safety Agency, 
Brussels, 2016. 
553 IUMI Current issues, briefing note pp. 22 & 23, 24 January 2018. 
554 Voss, J. C. Ibid.  
555 Choice of two formulae to be discussed at the 97th session of the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC) of IMO. See IMO to focus on Passenger Ship Safety Level, in 
www.marinelink.com/news/passenger-safety-focus-418535. 
556 See press release from Danish Maritime Authority, Passenger ship safety level to be 
considered by IMO, 18 November 2016, and IMO press release, 14 November 2016. 
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trying to find expensive technical solutions to simple human problems. This 
inclination appears to be fuelled by North European and Scandinavian design  
consultants and naval architecture academics promoting their own, usually 
complex and expensive solutions to perceived problems.557 A corporate sense 
of proportion in IMO would be very welcome. It would be far better if it were to 
focus its limited resources on the real causes of most safety problems. As well 
as modelling itself on ICAO, it would probably be beneficial if it were to closely 
examine the activities of the very impressive European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA). 
 
Perhaps, if IMO were to focus more on its self-declared role whereby: “IMO 
measures cover all aspects of international shipping – including ship design, 
construction, equipment, manning, operation and disposal – to ensure that 
this vital sector for (sic) remains safe, environmentally sound, energy efficient 
and secure”, there would be fewer fatal ferry accidents.558  
 
6.2.1. Conventional, monohull Ro-Pax ferries are statistically a 
very significant problem. 
 
There is one very important exception to the general rule concerning 
structural and mechanical causes of accidents. That concerns the very 
convenient but conceptually unseaworthy conventional monohull Roll-On–
Roll-Off (Ro-Ro) or Roll-On-Roll-Off Passenger Vehicle (Ro-Pax) ferries that 
have been involved in 135 or 18 per cent of fatal ferry accidents and 25 per 
cent of fatalities over the fifty years studied.559 It is estimated that around 
4,000 to 6,000 conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are currently in service. 
That figure includes cross-river ferries and landing craft types of all sizes.560 
 
For the 16 years from 2000 to 2015, the monohull Ro-Pax percentage of fatal 
ferry accidents reduced from 18 to 16 per cent. However the percentage of 
ferry fatalities attributable to monohull Ro-Pax accidents increased 
significantly from 25 to 32 per cent over that same period.561 There were a 
total of 91 accidents causing 10,031 fatalities involving conventional Ro-Pax 
ferries in that latter period. This is quite disproportional to the actual numbers 
of such vessels in the industry.562 It is more nearly proportional to the 
increasing numbers of elderly monohull Ro-Pax ferries being sold to poorer 
countries. 
  
The Ro-Pax concept developed during the Second World War when a 
demand arose for large amphibious landing ships to transfer tanks, trucks and 
other large vehicles directly onto beaches during seaborne invasions. Thus 
                                                     
557 For example, Cichowicz, J. et al. Damage Survivability of Passenger Ships – Re-
Engineering the Safety Factor, Safety, 2 (4), MDPI, Glasgow, 19 February 2016. 
558 From Introduction to IMO, www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/ . 
559 Appendix A, Ibid. 
560 Estimated by the author by extrapolating from Clarksons Research data. Clarksons list 
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561 Appendix A, Ibid. 
562 The author estimates that Ro-Pax ferries represent fewer than ten per cent of the total 
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were Landing Ship Tanks (LST) conceived.563 They evolved into various 
forms and sizes of landing craft for civilian use. Then, during the 1960s, quite 
large and complex monohull Ro-Pax ferries were designed and built, initially 
in Northern Europe, but soon after in North America, Japan, Korea and 
Australia.564 Such expensive ships necessitated considerable investment by 
the ferry industry in both vessels and their attendant infrastructure such as 
berths and loading ramps. 
 
6.2.2. Fatal conceptual flaw of conventional monohull Ro-Pax 
ferries makes them particularly vulnerable in an accident. 
 
Ro-Pax ferry vehicle decks and access doors, except in the case of multi-
hulled Ro-Pax ferries, have proved to be fatal conceptual design flaws. They 
have numerous vulnerabilities.565 They, as can be seen from the BMPVA 
database, are made much worse by age and inadequate maintenance as well 
as by stability-robbing modifications and inadequate crewing.566 They have a 
significant propensity to capsize and sink following incidents such as 
capsizes, groundings and fires that other vessels would normally survive. 
 
Even the staunchest exponents of the conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferry 
concept in Northern Europe have had to admit that the concept has its flaws. 
In its Public Final Report, the Safer EURORO “Thematic Network” based at 
the University of Strathclyde‟s Ship Stability Research Centre presented a 
number of suggested means by which monohull Ro-Pax ferries could be 
made safer.567 In something of an EU funded case of „locking the stable door 
after the horse had bolted‟, the report urged a number of professionally self-
serving design and structural changes but mostly ignored the fundamental 
problem of human error. Many of the recommended „improvements‟ had, in 
any case, already been implemented six years previously with the introduction 
of the Stockholm Rule.568 
 
Interestingly, 60 per cent of the vessels described in the case studies of major 
accidents in Chapter 3, were conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries. One of 
their major flaws is that they are conceptually required to have at least one, 
and frequently two, large holes in their hulls just above the static waterline. 
They are the doors giving access to the vehicle deck or decks. The Chapter 3 
case studies highlight the particular vulnerabilities of such craft. The 
accompanying images illustrate those weak points well. They are generally 
large vessels and, so, experience very high death tolls when they are involved 
in accidents. Because their main role is to carry motor vehicles, they 
sometimes experience fuel spills, particularly of petrol, on the vehicle deck. 
                                                     
563 Lane, F. C. et al. Ships for Victory, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2001, p. 4. 
564 Fildes, R. Ships Worldwide: What Ship is That?, Ships Worldwide, Sydney, 2007, p. 21. 
565 Refer to General Arrangement drawing of the Estonia, Image 6.2. in 6.3.1. below. 
566 As, for example, in the cases of the Sewol and Al Salam Boccaccio 98 as described in 
Chapter 3. 
567 See Vassalos, D. et al. Design for Safety: An Integrated Approach to Safe European Ro-
Ro Ferry Design, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 2003. 
568 Well described in GARD Web News, 1 July 1996. Ferries – Ro-Ro/Passenger vessels, 
GARD P&I Club, Oslo, 1996. 
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Several fatal fires on conventional Ro-Pax ferries have been caused by 
carelessly discarded cigarette butts igniting those fuel spills.569 
 
Because of their usually large and complex structures, egress from capsized 
conventional Ro-Pax ferries is often difficult, if not impossible. As the data in 
the BMPVA database clearly shows, capsizes are the almost inevitable 
outcome of collisions and groundings when conventional Ro-Pax ferries are 
involved because their stability is compromised by the free surface effect of 
water on their vehicle decks.570 This egress difficulty is often made worse by 
the illogical positioning of life jackets. This subject has been well explained by 
respected American naval architect Bruce Hutchison in his October 2017 
paper, Capsize Egress and Survival with Particular Reference to Ro-Ro & 
Passenger Vessels.571 Mr Hutchison further explained that: “A salient feature 
of many (Ro-Pax) capsizes is the rapidity with which it (sic) proceeds”. 
 
A brief and very simple article describing the dangers of Ro-Ro ships from a 
crewman‟s perspective was published in 2016 under the heading: 8 Reasons 
That Make Ro-Ro Ship Unsafe to Work On.572  Its revelations are disturbing. It 
is a pity that IMO‟s “Panel of Experts” and other conventional Ro-Ro apologist 
theoreticians, mentioned below, will be unlikely to read them. 
 
IMO, impressively, published a paper in 1997 that recognised many of the 
weaknesses and risks associated with conventional monohull Ro-Ro (or Ro-
Pax) vessels.573 However, it examined all the known „problem areas‟ but 
ranked crew inadequacies in seventh and last place in their rankings. 
Regrettably, however, its “Panel of Experts” focused on north European 
vessels and continued with its highly technical and theoretical approach to 
very obvious and quite simple problems. In that region, by 1997, the safety 
problems had largely been contained. The by then well-known problems of 
conventional Ro-Pax vessels in developing countries were, as usual, not 
considered nor even mentioned. They have, as noted, continued unabated 
and largely unrecognised by IMO.574 
 
6.2.3.  Southward migration of elderly monohull Ro-Pax ships 
is a serious danger. 
 
Since the 1970s, older, obsolete and surplus examples of conventional Ro-
Pax ships have migrated southward through the Mediterranean to Africa and 
from Japan to China, Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia.575 Al Salam 
Boccaccio 98, Da Shun, Le Joola, Sewol, Tamponas II, Moby Prince, Salem 
Express, Senopati Nusantara, Princess of the Stars and Spice Islander were 
all typical examples of that phenomenon. Even as recently as February 2017, 
                                                     
569 See Appendix A, Ibid  and Chapter 3 for examples. 
570 Appendix A, Ibid. 
571 Presented at the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers (SNAME) Conference 
in Houston, Texas, 24-27 October 2017, www.sname.org. 
572 Karan, C. in Marine Safety, 9 November 2016. www.marineinsight.com/marine-safety/. 
573 Anon. IMO and ro-ro safety, IMO, London, January 1997. www.imo.org. 
574 See Appendix A, Ibid to December 2017. 
575 See case studies on Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines, Senegal and Tanzania in Chapter 5.  
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an elderly Stena Ro-Pax-Rail ferry was sold via Greece to Iran.576 And, even 
worse, in March 2017, Washington State Ferries of the United States sold a 
63 year old monohull Ro-Pax ferry Evergreen State to Grenada for USD 
300,000.577 This, after seeing its passenger only ferry Skagit  sold on, via an 
intermediary, to Tanzania and capsizing and sinking in 2012 with the loss of 
150 to, more likely, 296 lives.578  
 
The Evergreen State, apart from being very old, was designed for the 
sheltered waters of Puget Sound, not for the exposed waters of the aptly 
named Windward Islands. Skagit, incidentally, was built to a Gulf of Mexico 
crew/supply boat design with an extra deck added to give it more passenger 
space and less stability. That further facilitated the overloading that led to its 
capsize. It was sold, via an intermediary, for a similarly derisory USD 
400,000.579 
 
Even more alarmingly, BC Ferries, the British Columbia provincial government 
owned ferry company is understood to have sold a 65 year old protected 
waters Ro-Pax ferry to windy Fiji.580 Reportedly, this August 2017 sale was 
inspired by the inability of BC Ferries to arrange scrapping of the vessel in 
North America because of the amount of asbestos it contained.581 It must be 
emphasised that both Washington State Ferries and BC Ferries are 
government owned organisations.582 
 
While there were several fatal accidents involving conventional Ro-Pax ferries 
in Northern Europe such as those involving European Gateway, Herald of 
Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star, Estonia and others, the problem became 
much worse in the developing world.583 It was made so by the gross 
overloading that was commonly practiced on dangerously modified and poorly 
maintained and operated vessels there. Most of the really large death tolls 
have arisen on elderly, significantly modified and often neglected Ro-Pax 
vessels operating in developing countries.584 Some of those are described in 






                                                     
576 Described in Shippax.com web news site on 25 February 2017. 
577 Refer to the Washington State Ferries press release of 1 March 2017. 
578 Appendix A, Ibid. 
579 Schacht, R. Ethical Engineering Analysis of Passenger Ship Accidents in Zanzibar, Webb 
Institute, New York, 2012. 
580 Affected for the major part of the year by Trade Winds that blow at around 20-25 knots. 
581 Reported to the author by senior executives of BC Ferries at the INTERFERRY 2017 
Conference in Split in October 2017. 
582 Refer to www.wsdot.gov/ferries/ and www.bcferries.com. 
583 Appendix A, Ibid. 
584 See examples in Chapter 3. Such as, notably, Tamponas II, Le Joola, Al Salam Boccaccio 
98, Sewol, Senopati Nusantara, and Princess of the Stars.  
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6.2.4. Thirty-two per cent of ferry fatalities have involved Ro-
Pax ships. Ninety-eight per cent of those occurred in 
developing countries. 
 
Since January 2000 some 32 per cent of ferry fatalities involved conventional, 
mostly elderly, second-hand Ro-Pax ferries. Of those, 98 per cent occurred in 
developing countries.585 This is disgracefully disproportionate.586 
 
While there have only been eight known fatal Ro-Pax accidents, and 11 
fatalities, in Northern Europe since 2000, there have been seventeen 
accidents resulting in 186 fatalities in the Mediterranean Sea.587 So, even the 
so-called developed countries of Spain, Italy, France, Turkey and Greece 
have not yet been able to make their Ro-Pax ferries completely safe. The 
known Ro-Pax death toll in developing countries reached 9,809 in 58 
accidents between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2015. The comparable 
figures for developed countries were 224 fatalities in 33 accidents.588 
 
6.2.5. Conventional Ro-Pax ferry fatality summary 2000-2015. 
 



























Accidents  8   2   17   4   NIL   14   2   42   2   91  
Fatalities  11   19   186   6   NIL   5,989   2  
 




accident  1.4   9   11   1.5   N/A   428   1   89   40  110 
Percentage 
of total 
fatalities 1% 1% 2% 0% 0% 58% 0% 37% 1% 100% 
*All BC Ferries 
                   
Table 6.1. Conventional Monohull Ro-Pax Ferry Fatality Summary 2000-2015 
(BMPVA database). 
 
The numbers of fatalities in developing countries are obviously exacerbated 
by the overcrowding and evacuation, smoking discipline, lifesaving and 
rescue problems that are the norm there. There were seven fatalities per Ro-
Pax accident in developed countries but 169 in developing countries.589 So, 
thanks to the poverty factor, you are more than 24 times as likely to die in a 
Ro-Pax accident in a developing country as elsewhere.590 
 
                                                     
585 Appendix A, Ibid. 
586 Ibid. 
587 See Ibid. 
588 Appendix A, Ibid. 
589 Ibid. 
590 This has also been commented on by Hutchison, B. Ibid. 
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Put bluntly, developing countries simply do not have the cultural, educational, 
regulatory and enforcement wherewithal to ensure the safe operation of such 
complex and inherently vulnerable ships as conventional monohull Ro-Pax 
ferries. 
 
The dangers of elderly, poorly maintained, imported, conventional Ro-Ro and 
Ro-Pax ships was noted by Lu Cheng in the Chinese magazine World Ships 
& Boats in 2000591. Lu described the capsize and sinking of the sixteen year 
old Japanese built Ro-Pax Da Shun in Bo Hai Bay, northern China in 1999. 
That accident starkly highlighted the risks associated with poorer countries 
importing such vessels from richer ones. Without exception, the conventional 
Ro-Pax ferries involved in fatal accidents in developing and Mediterranean 
countries are old.592 Fortunately, albeit slowly, the Chinese government 
seems to have heeded Mr Lu‟s warning. Less fortunately, many other ferry 
dependent developing countries have failed to heed that warning. 
 
During the 1990s numerous conferences were held by naval architecture 
schools, learned institutions, classification societies and, of course, by the 
Maritime Safety Committee of IMO to investigate the problems of conventional 
monohull Ro-Ro/Ro-Pax vessel safety.593 These followed and were largely 
inspired by the European Gateway, Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian 
Star, Jan Hewelius and Estonia disasters among others. Probably the most 
important development arising from those was the implementation of the so-
called Stockholm Rules (Or Stockholm Agreement) in the North European 
countries in 1996.594  
 
The Stockholm Agreement was made among several Scandinavian and 
North-West European Ro-Pax ferry operating states and IMO. Its objective 
was to prevent further accidents involving conventional Ro-Pax ferries. 
Fundamentally, the rules aimed at improving the stability and hence the safety 
of such vessels by addressing their most basic conceptual design weakness. 
That was to significantly reduce the so-called „free surface‟ effects of water on 
their low, long, open and wide vehicle decks. This was achieved through an 
amendment to and development of the SOLAS Code. They also defined 
operating limits as to wave heights and sea conditions. The Rules only apply 
to international voyages among the 18 nations involved. They did not come 
into force for six years (in 2002) and there were a number of exemptions.595 
 
While the Stockholm Rules, unarguably, has been effective in preventing 
further fatal accidents in those countries, it has, arguably, been equally 
effective in moving the problem southward. The ships that were deemed 
unsafe to operate in the Baltic and North seas and English Channel were 
                                                     
591 Lu, C. Chinese present coastal passenger/Ro-Ro ship fleet and ship life analysis, World 
Ships & Boats, Beijing, 2000. 
592 See Appendix A, Ibid for construction dates. 
593 Presented by, among others, The Royal Institution of Naval Architects, DNV, Lloyd‟s 
Register and ABS. 
594 GARD Web News, Ferries- Ro-Ro/Passenger vessels, Ibid. 
595 GARD Web News, Ibid and Anon, Agreement concerning specific stability requirements for 
ro-ro passenger ships…(Stockholm agreement, 1996), www.m.likumi.Iv/doc.php?id=81629. 
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simply sold to operators in the Mediterranean and Africa. There they were 
frequently modified to increase their capacity and inadequately maintained so 
as to make them even less safe.596 They have been involved in numerous 
accidents, some of them fatal. Indeed, too many of them as the BMPVA 
database so clearly shows.597 
 
Ironically, IMO claims its measures cover all aspects of international shipping 
including, among others, disposal of vessels.598 Clearly, it has failed 
completely to prevent the sale (or disposal) of dangerous, elderly, monohull 
Ro-Pax ferries from richer to poorer countries. That gross and tragic failure 
should be more widely exposed, condemned and corrected. 
 
6.2.6.  Dangers of „grandfathering‟. 
 
There was also the problem of „grandfathering‟ whereby older ferries were 
permitted to continue to operate with only very minor modifications made to 
slightly improve their safety.599 The discussions and debates on that matter 
and their resultant compromises were hardly the finest demonstration of the 
ethics and professionalism of the naval architecture profession, most notably 
of the academic and regulatory branches of it. Safety, which should never be 
compromised, often was, particularly where it concerned the safety of non-
northern European people. Nor, however, could the discussions and debates 
withstand the lobbying efforts of, mainly north European, Ro-Pax ferry 
owners, designers and builders and their self-proclaimed „objective‟ academic 
advisers. 
 
As with so many such controversies and debates, the real problem was 
obscured. The safety of passengers was accorded less importance than the 
investments of owners and the reputations of certain naval architects, 
shipbuilders and regulators. Remarkably, the clearly flawed concept of 
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries was permitted to survive with relatively 
few changes. Simultaneously, of course, many of those same actors, tried 
very hard to prevent and delay the introduction of the modern, high-speed, 
aluminium catamaran Ro-Pax ferries600 that have proved to be so much safer 





                                                     
596 For example Al Salam Boccaccio 98 and Le Joola as described in Chapter 3. 
597 See Appendix A, Ibid and, more particularly, Appendix H, List of known fatal Ro-Pax ferry 
accidents. 
598 Refer to Introduction to IMO, Ibid. 
599 „Grandfathering‟ with not very onerous restrictions has been permitted under both SOLAS 
and the Stockholm Rules. 
600 Mostly developed initially in Australia by the Incat and Austal shipbuilding companies. See 
Jeffs, A. Ibid. 
601 The author contends that the motive for the original introduction of the High Speed Craft 
code was a deliberate attempt by the maritime authorities of, particularly, the UK, Denmark 
and Germany to prevent the development of such craft in Australia because those European 
countries possessed no such technology. 
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6.2.7. Fast ferries, particularly multihulls, are very safe ferries.  
 
That negative activity actually resulted in an unintended positive consequence 
in the implementation of the High Speed Code by IMO. That Code has 
contributed to the excellent safety reputation of high speed ferries generally 
operating on both domestic and international routes.602 Ironically, if certain of 
the very stringent safety provisions of the HSC Code, particularly those 
pertaining to fire safety, were to be extended to conventional Ro-Pax ferries, it 
would be likely to make them significantly safer.603 For the purposes of this 
work, fast or high speed ferries are defined as those having a service speed 
exceeding 25 knots. 
 
Without exception, all 36 known fatal high speed ferry accidents have been 
attributed to human error.604 Of those, 27 (75 per cent) were either collisions 
or groundings. Seven (19 per cent) of those 36 accidents involved fast Ro-
Pax ferries and they resulted in a total of nine fatalities, less than two per cent 
of the total of fast ferry fatalities and an infinitesimal proportion of all ferry 
fatalities.605 There have been 554 fast ferry fatalities but, of those, 318 (or 
57%) were the result of just two accidents involving passenger only fast 
ferries in Tanzania.606  
 
One of those involved the Skagit, a modified, four engined, Gulf of Mexico 
crew/supply Offshore Service Vessel (OSV) fitted with an additional deck that 
made it unstable in open sea conditions, particularly when overloaded. That 
vessel was originally built for Washington State Ferries to operate in the 
benign waters of Puget Sound on the west coast of the United States. It was 
sold, via an intermediary, to Tanzania where, soon afterwards, operating in 
the open Indian Ocean, and apparently grossly overloaded, it capsized killing 
an estimated 296 people, 53 per cent of the fifty year fast ferry fatality total. 
 
Frighteningly, similar vessels are currently operating in the Philippines. They 
are former crew/supply OSVs that have been converted to ferry operations by 
the simple but dangerous expedient of adding an extra passenger deck.607 
 
                                                     
602 Refer to Appendix E, List of Known Fatal Fast Ferry Accidents 1966-2015. Drawn from 
Appendix A, the BMPVA database. 
603 International Maritime Organisation, IMO Code of Safety for High Speed Craft, IMO, 
London, 1996. 
604 Refer to Table 6.1. 
605 See Appendix E, Ibid. 
606 Ibid. 
607 The author observed two such craft operating between Cataclan on Panay Island and 





Image 6.1. The demise of the formerly Washington State Ferries owned 
Skagit serves as a stark reminder of the dangers of selling inappropriate 
vessels to developing countries. In this case Tanzania (Wikipedia). 
 
Two years later, in 2014, another fast ferry Kilimanjaro II nosedived at speed 
in rough seas off Zanzibar.608 Twenty-five passengers, who should not have 
been riding there, were washed off the bow and drowned. There was no 
significant damage to the ferry and, remarkably, little effort appears to have 
been made to recover the victims. Kilimanjaro II was a very well designed, 
built and equipped vessel from the Australian shipyard Richardson Devine 
Marine.609 It was, quite clearly, operated negligently to the point of 
recklessness. 
 
Fewer than 20 (less than one per cent) fast ferries of the approximately 2,000 
that have ever been built have operated in Tanzania. It is very disturbing, 
therefore, that 57 per cent of all known fast ferry fatalities have occurred in 
just two accidents in that country.610 Having closely observed and 
experienced ferry operations there, the author is unsurprised at that appalling 
reality. 
 
Notably, seven of the 36 known fatal accidents involving fast ferries occurred 
in the Pearl River delta region of China around Hong Kong, Macao and 
Zhuhai. There are considerably more fast ferries, catamarans and jetfoils, 
operating in that area than anywhere else on earth.611 Those seven accidents 
resulted in 21 fatalities, an average of three per accident with a maximum of 




                                                     
608 Appendix A, Ibid. 
609 Ibid. 
610 According to the Fast Ferry International Database there were 1,732 fast ferries in service 
in June 2017 of a total of about 2,000 ever built. Of them, about 1,200 are multihulls. 
611 Fast Ferry International Database, Ibid. 
612 See Table 6.1, for details and Appendix A for report references. 
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6.2.8. Fast ferry fatality summary. 
 










































































































Mediterranean 1 <1% 6 1% 1 <1% 4 <1% 12 2.20% 
Northern 
Europe - - 8 1.4% 7 1% 18 3.2% 33 6% 
Pearl River 
Delta - - 1 <1% - - 16 2.9% 17 3% 
Tanzania 293 53% - - - - 25 4.5% 
31
8 57.5% 
Other 142 26% 22 4% 1 <1% 6 1% 
17
1 31% 
Total Fleet 436 79% 27 5% 9 1.60% 69 12.5% 
55
4 100% 
           
 
Table 6.2. Summary of fast ferry fatalities by vessel type and region 1966-
2015 (BMPVA database). 
 
Eleven of the total of 36 fatal fast ferry accidents involved hydrofoils or jetfoils, 
a disproportionately high percentage of 30 per cent. The author estimates that 
fewer than 13 per cent of fast ferries are of the hydrofoil or jetfoil type.613 It is 
interesting and telling that five fast ferry owning companies had vessels 
involved in at least two fatal accidents each. Ten fatal accidents, or 28 per 
cent of the total, involved Italian built craft. This, also, is disproportionate.614 
 
In terms of the overall safety record of fast ferries, it is very important to note 
that, while they represent no more than five per cent of the total global ferry 
fleet, they have been involved in fewer than .05 per cent of the fatal accidents 
recorded in the BMPVA database. Even more importantly, they were 
responsible for a mere .01 per cent of fatalities. Fast ferries, especially 
properly designed, constructed and maintained multi-hulled fast ferries, are 
indeed very safe ferries.615 Catamaran fast ferries have not been known to 
capsize or sink, except for one suspicious recent case in the Philippines.616 
Trimaran ferries are not known to have ever been involved in any fatal 
accidents.617 
 
                                                     
613 From Fast Ferry International Database. Ibid. 
614 Refer to Appendix E, List of all known fatal fast ferry accidents. 
615 Appendix A, Ibid. 




Of the 554 fatalities that occurred in fast ferry accidents, 435, or 79 per cent 
involved monohulls, 36 (6.5 per cent) involved hydrofoils and jetfoils and 82, 
or 15 per cent, catamarans.618 As catamarans, at around 1,200 in total, 
represent 60 per cent of the total fast ferry fleet, monohulls 26 per cent and 
hydrofoils and jetfoils 14 per cent, catamaran fast ferries are clearly 
considerably safer than other types.619 
 
There are two main reasons for this. Properly designed constructed and 
maintained catamaran (and trimaran) ferries are both more stable and less 
likely to sink than conventional monohull ferries. They are more stable 
because they are considerably wider compared with their length and usually 
have a significantly lower centre of gravity. Therefore, they are very unlikely to 
capsize. Indeed, none are known to have done so.620 Further, their widely 
separated hulls are also multi-compartmented. Most of those compartments 
are watertight.621 So, in the event of their grounding or colliding with another 
vessel, the majority of those compartments will not be breeched enabling the 




























                                                     
618 Ibid. 
619 Data from Fast Ferry International Database. 
620 Appendix A, Ibid. 
621 Refer to Image 6.3. in 6.3.3. below. 
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Image 6.2. General arrangement drawing of the Estonia, previously Viking 
Sally, a typical but particularly tragic example of a late 1980s conventional Ro-
Pax ferry. Note particularly that the lower of two, wide-open vehicle decks is 
barely above the static waterline. There is even accommodation beneath the 
lower vehicle deck and, therefore, below the static waterline. The bow and 
stern doors inherent in the traditional, monohull Ro-Pax design concept, make 
the vessels particularly vulnerable to flooding of the vehicle deck and beneath 




In addition to the damaged stability, and even undamaged stability, 
vulnerability that their design concept involves, conventional monohull Ro-Pax 
ferries have also proved to be exceptionally vulnerable to fires. Those fires 
have mostly ignited in their vehicular cargoes or on spilt fuel on their vehicle 
decks and spread rapidly, especially where their vehicle decks are partially 
open to the elements. The fire on board the Norman Atlantic in the Ionian Sea 
as recently as December 2014 is a case in point.622 A vehicle deck fire on that 
ship resulted in 32 fatalities.623 
 
Naturally, owners of existing conventional Ro-Pax vessels and those 
financially dependent on them such as Ro-Pax designers, builders and 
equipment suppliers as well as academic naval architect „expert witnesses‟, 
advocated that existing vessels should have been “grandfathered” and 
allowed to operate largely as built.  
 
The author believes the concept of conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries is 
fundamentally dangerous. The idea of a vessel usually able to be opened at 
both ends, with a large open vehicle deck between, protected by complex 
mechanical doors and positioned only slightly above the vessel‟s static 
waterline, simply incorporates too many weak points.624 Even when there is 
only one vehicle door located at one end of the vessel as in the case of 
„landing craft‟ type Ro-Pax ferries, that vulnerability remains because the 
single access door is normally at the bow and the vehicle deck is usually too 
close to the vessel‟s static waterline.  
 
6.3.2. Multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferries have proved to be 
significantly safer. 
 
Correctly designed, constructed and maintained multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferries 
are quite different in that their vehicle decks are located well above their static 
waterline. Any water taken aboard can, by virtue of that height above their 
waterline, be simply drained away by gravity. Their two or three distinctly 
separate hulls are sub-divided into numerous watertight compartments. Even 
their bridging decks are normally buoyant in themselves. In the case of the 
Incat 98 metre vessel illustrated in Image 6.3, there are eight such 
compartments in each hull.  
 
Further, the larger examples are wide enough to not require a forward vehicle 
access door. Vehicles, even large semi-trailers can be easily turned around 
on the vehicle deck. Importantly, under the HSC Code, they are required to 
have far superior fire prevention systems than their conventional monohulled 
counterparts that operate under the SOLAS Code.625 Conclusively and very 
notably, not one multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferry has been involved in any kind of 
serious accident since they were first introduced in 1988.626 
 
                                                     
622 The Australian, News Corp, Sydney, 31 December 2014. 
623 Appendix A, Ibid. 
624 Fildes, R. Ships Worldwide, Ibid, pp. 14 & 21. 
625 The HSC and SOLAS codes are available from IMO, Ibid. 
626 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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Image 6.3. shows a General Arrangement Drawing of a 98 metre high speed 
catamaran Ro-Pax ferry designed and constructed by Incat in Tasmania. It is 
not unique. A number of competing vessels have been built by Austal, 
Damen, Finnyards and other shipyards.627  
 
Notably, apart from their impressive safety records, such vessels operate at 
about double the speed of conventional monohull competitors having the 
same passenger, vehicle and cargo capacities. Obviously, at those higher 
speeds, they can offer double the voyage frequency. Their capital costs are 
considerably lower.628 They could also be operated at similarly lower speeds 
to conventional monohull Ro-Pax vessels with significantly reduced fuel 






























                                                     
627 Finnyards is defunct but each of the others has a website. 
628 In October 2017, Robert Clifford, the Chairman of Incat, advised the author that the 
average price for a new Incat 110 metre vessel was around USD 90million. In the same 
month Austal Ships announced the sale of two new 117 metre trimaran Ro-Pax ferries for 
USD 70 million each. Clarksons Research Services listed a number of new orders for 
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries, of around the same capacity and operating at about 
50% of the speed of the multihull vessels  at in excess of USD 200 million each. See Austal 
press release, October 2017. www.austal.com. And refer to Clarksons at www.crsl.com. 
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6.3.3. Multi-hulled Ro-Pax ferries are far less vulnerable to 
human error. 
 
Image 6.3. General arrangement drawing of a 98 metre high speed 
catamaran Ro-Pax ferry designed and built by Incat in Tasmania. Its vehicle 
deck is well above the waterline. There is no forward vehicle door. All 
vehicles, including large trucks, can be turned around on the vehicle deck so 




Given their now well proven and nearly impeccable safety record, it must be 
asked why so many regulatory obstacles were put in the way of their 
development by IMO and various Northern European national marine safety 
authorities during the early to mid-1990s even as a number of conventional 
Ro-Pax ferries came to grief. Could it have been a conspiracy to protect the 
designers, builders and suppliers of equipment to such conventional vessels? 
Or, perhaps, a move designed to protect the value of the existing fleet? 
 
 6.3.4. Even conceptually unsafe vessels require human errors 
to kill. 
 
Although conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries and the Filipino motor bancas 
are problematic because they are conceptually dangerous, they still require 
human errors to cause them to kill people .629 If properly maintained, equipped 
and operated, they can still safely carry passengers from port to port. They do 
so every day. However, they do undoubtedly have a much worse record for 
both the number of fatal accidents involving them and for the number of 
fatalities arising from those accidents. The simple fact is that, due to their 
designs and structures, they are considerably more vulnerable than other 
vessels to the effects of human errors. 
 
Motor bancas have in theory a much better record than monohull Ro-Pax 
ferries. The author believes that this is largely due to the poor recording of 
fatal ferry accidents in the Philippines and the relative sizes of the vessels. 
There have been 14 known accidents involving motor bancas from 1980 to 
2015. They resulted in 483 fatalities for an average of 35 per accident. Of 
course, monohull Ro-Pax ferries, being much larger, normally carry 
significantly more people and operate further offshore than do motor bancas 
so, numbers of fatalities per accident in Ro-Pax accidents are invariably 
considerably higher. 
 
It should be repeated, though, that despite their conceptual vulnerabilities, 
motor bancas still require some form of human error to initiate a fatal accident. 
However, in the event of such an accident, their design or structural 
deficiencies make them far more dangerous than other vessels. 
 
Conversely, catamaran and trimaran ferries have an almost blemish free 
record over the 40 years that they have been operated commercially. The 
BMPVA database shows only two accidents resulting in more than four 
fatalities.630 Both were passenger only vessels. The first involved the Sleipner 
which was driven at high speed onto granite rocks off the west coast of 
Norway. This was a clear case of human error in the form of poor lookout and 
poor seamanship that killed 16 people.  
 
The next was Kilimanjaro II that was driven into a wave at high speed, off 
Zanzibar, washing a number of passengers overboard from its foredeck, 
                                                     
629 Such as the Kim Nirvana described in detail in Chapter 3, above. 
630 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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where they should not have been permitted to be anyway. Obviously, this was 
also human error, in the form of negligence and bad seamanship. While there 
was no significant damage to the vessel, 25 passengers were left to drown 
after being washed overboard. 
 
Apart from those accidents, which certainly were not due to structural or 
mechanical causes, the BMPVA database records only 17 „known‟ fatal 
accidents involving catamaran fast ferries. Thirteen of those were collisions, 
one a fire, and three „Man Overboards‟ or suicides. Even the fire, on Stena 
Voyager, was attributed to engineering negligence.631 Interestingly, six of the 
collisions occurred in Hong Kong‟s crowded waters where very large numbers 
of fast catamaran ferries operate.632 
 
Most importantly, only the Sleipner accident resulted in the almost complete 
destruction of the vessel. Of the others, vessel damage was superficial or 
minor at worst. The Kilimanjaro II was almost undamaged. In summary, 
catamaran and trimaran fast ferries, both Ro-Pax and passenger only, have 
an excellent safety record. Even if suffering complete engine failure, which is 
very unlikely given their two widely separated engine rooms, they will remain 
afloat until repaired or towed home. The author has experienced the failure of 
all four engines in an Incat Ro-Pax ferry in the English Channel between 
Guernsey and Weymouth. The vessel eventually reached home unassisted 
on the power of one engine but it was not a frightening experience in any way. 
 
6.4.1. The HSC Code – An unforseen benefit. 
 
A significant unforseen and probably unintended benefit has arisen from the 
obstacles put in the way of the development of fast catamaran ferries in the 
early to mid-1990s, mentioned above. They have, since 1996, been subject to 
the IMO HSC Code (High Speed Code).633 While originally intended for 
vessels engaged in international voyages, the code has been widely adopted 
in domestic use. That has undoubtedly been a good thing as it covers all 
aspects of safety including stability, fire, lifesaving, structures and navigation.  
 
If such a strict approach to IMO‟s ISM Code had been applied to conventional 
Ro-Pax ferries, particularly as it applies to stability, fire prevention and life-
saving, there would undoubtedly have been fewer fatalities since. The HSC 
Code is based on and similar to the ICAO code for aircraft. The ferry travelling 
public would benefit from its wider or, preferably, universal adoption.  
 
Fast ferry designers, builders, owners and operators seem to have coped very 
well with the HSC Code, despite its allegedly onerous requirements.634 
Importantly, it does not appear to have detracted from the profitability of fast 
ferry operations. In fact, high speed ferries, generally, have a distinctly 
                                                     
631 Appendix A, bid 
632 Ibid. 
633 IMO HSC Code, Ibid. 
634 Indeed, the author spoke, in December 2016, with Robert Clifford, the Chairman of 
shipbuilder Incat, who complained about the problems he experienced in building a harbour 
ferry that was not subject to the HSC Code. 
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superior safety record to that of slower conventional craft. Indeed, of the 32 
known fatal, non-Man Overboard, accidents involving them, all were clearly 
the result of human error.635 The HSC Code, regrettably, cannot prevent that. 
 
While the original intentions for the implementation of the HSC Code may 
have been somewhat malignant in trying to restrict and impede the 
development of high-speed aluminium catamaran ferries from outside Europe, 
the final, probably unintended, consequences have been generally beneficial. 
Perhaps the main safety features of the HSC Code, particularly those 
concerned with fire prevention and suppression, should be adapted to 
conventional ferries also and, indeed, to all passenger vessels engaged in 
both domestic and international trade. 
 
6.4.2. Little likelihood of technical factors causing accidents. 
 
So, apart from the dangerous exceptions of Filipino motor banca ferries and  
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries, there is little likelihood of structural or 
mechanical failures causing ferry accidents. The fatal accident statistics 
confirm this. Because there have been so few „known‟ fatal ferry accidents 
caused by technical factors, it appears that little can realistically and 
practically be done to further reduce their incidence. 
 
Even the concept of motor bancas is not entirely dangerous. Their safety 
could easily, simply and cost-effectively be considerably improved. In reality, 
thousands of them operate safely enough everyday around the Philippine and 
Indonesian archipelagos. A stronger structure connecting the outrigger floats 
to the central hull and more buoyant outriggers would solve most of their 
problems. Of course, better maintenance and well-enforced rules to prevent 
them operating offshore and/or by incompetent crews or in bad weather would 
also bring about a significant improvement. 
 
The oil tanker sector was required to substantially modify the construction of 
its vessels to incorporate „double skin‟ hulls in the early nineties. It coped very 
well with that. There is no reason why monohull conventional Ro-Pax ferries 
could not be phased out in the same way as were single skin tankers. IMO‟s 
MARPOL 1992 regulations, which managed that phase out, provide an 
excellent model for a similar global phasing out of conventional monohull Ro-
Pax ferries.636 A ten year phase out would seem to be a practical 
arrangement. 
 
                                                     
635 Appendix A, Ibid. 






Image 6.4. This approximately 20 metre Filipino motor banca on which the 
author was a passenger in February 2017 was held together with string. In 
fact, mostly monofilament fishing line. Its „stabilising‟ outrigger float was a 
bamboo pole! The Philippine Coast Guard mandated „lifejackets‟ issued to 
passengers were flimsy, tiny water ski vests (Author). 
 
6.5.1. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are the major 
problem technically. They should be banned. 
 
Monohull Ro-Pax ferries, then, are the major problem. They are conceptually 
dangerous and construction of new examples should be banned. Existing Ro-
Pax ferries should be phased out and either converted to other uses or 
scrapped, as were single-skinned oil tankers in the 1990s. Many of the world‟s 
best naval architecture and equipment manufacturer minds have been long 
devoted to conceiving a solution to the inherent deficiencies of conventional 
monohull Ro-Pax ferries. They have not succeeded. Their talents would be 
better devoted to other, fundamentally safer, craft. 
 
No one has come up with a workable solution to the dangers arising from low 
opening vehicle access doors and a wide-open deck that is located only 
slightly above the vessel‟s static water line. All manner of expensive „band-aid‟ 
solutions have been applied but none of them will really work en extremis. 
They simply have too many conceptual weaknesses that leave them more 




Ironically, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are also notably more 
expensive in terms of capital and crew costs than their high speed aluminium 
competitors.637 Further, if those aluminium vessels were to operate at similar 
speeds to conventional mono-hulled, steel Ro-Pax vessels, they would be 
even cheaper to operate as their fuel consumption would be significantly less 
than that of conventional monohull vessels thanks to the lower resistance of 
their fine hulls.638 
 
There is an ongoing role for Ro-Pax ferries but all future examples should be 
built as multihulls or beamy, low-profile monohulls. If it is imperative to persist 
with monohulled vessels they must be loaded and unloaded from the stern 
only. There should be no bow doors and vehicle decks must be located 
significantly higher above the static waterline than is current practice. Designs 
for and actual examples of such vessels exist.639  
 
An example of a practical design for such a vessel from leading Dutch 
shipbuilder Damen is shown in Image 6.5. Two examples of that design are 
now operating safely and successfully in the open Atlantic Ocean off Canada. 
However, if we persist with building and operating conventional monohull Ro-
Pax ferries, we will continue to experience the same kinds of accidents 
resulting in massive death tolls as we have for the past half-century, 
especially if they are operated in developing countries. 
 
This should not present an economically, professionally or socially disruptive 
problem to the owners, designers, equippers and builders of monohull 
vessels. They will just have to adapt to the safety reality of multi-hulled ships 
or of mono-hull ferries without bow doors and with vehicle decks located 
higher above their static waterline than is common practice. The oil tanker 
sector provides an excellent example of how such an adaption could be 
accommodated. 
 
                                                     
637 They require significantly larger crew numbers. Up to ten times that of a fast ferry of similar 
capacity. 
638 Refer to 6.3.2. 
639 See the drawing in Image 6.5. from Damen Shipyards Group for a pair of Ro-Pax ferries 




Image 6.5. General arrangement drawing of the 2017 launched Damen 5510 
monohull Ro-Pax ferry designed and built for operation in the open North 
Atlantic Ocean off Eastern Canada. The profile of the 55 metre LOA vessel 
shows that the vehicle deck is safely located well above the static waterline 
and there is no bow door. A scaled up version of the same design concept 









Image 6.6. This comparatively small (55 metres LOA) Ro-Pax ferry developed 
by Dutch shipbuilder Damen shows that monohull Ro-Pax ships are feasible if 
sensibly designed without bow doors and with higher than normal vehicle 
decks and stern doors. Two such vessels are successfully operating in the 
open Atlantic Ocean off Canada‟s east coast (Damen). 
 
6.5.2. Simple, standardised smaller ferry designs would help. 
 
With smaller ferries there is substantial potential for the introduction of simple, 
standardised designs that could be built almost anywhere of aluminium, FRP, 
HDPE or even steel. Such vessels could be powered by diesel outboard 
engines that require no „through-hull‟ fittings. If of catamaran hull form, as they 
should be, they can be practically non-capsizable and unsinkable due to their 
beam and use of numerous watertight compartments in each hull.  
 
6.5.3. Human factors almost always the cause. 
 
The data presented and discussed throughout this chapter confirms very 
conclusively that, apart from motor bancas and conventional monohull Ro-Pax 
ships, there is no particular class of passenger vessel that is inherently 
dangerous for structural, mechanical or design, in other words „technical‟, 
reasons. Human factors are almost invariably the cause of fatal accidents 
and, despite their conceptual weaknesses, most of the major fatal accidents 
involving bancas and conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries have ultimately 
been caused by human failings unrelated to their conceptual design 
weaknesses .640 The human failings simply exacerbated those weaknesses. 
 
                                                     





Human factors – The roles of data collection, analysis, 
training, education, psychology and insurance – 
Developing a safety culture 
 
Human error: Wrongful decisions, mistakes, blunders, 
carelessness, miscalculations or negligence made by or 
on the part of human beings. 
 
7.1.1. Human error – the main overriding cause of almost all 
fatal ferry accidents. 
 
The statistics described, interpreted and analysed in the foregoing chapters 
show with considerable clarity that the main overriding cause of almost all 
fatal ferry accidents is human error. In all its various forms, human error has 
been the primary cause of 98 per cent of the almost 60,000 fatalities arising 
from the 750 passenger vessel accidents described and discussed here.641 Of 
those, 681, or 91 per cent, occurred on ferries and tourist boats.  
 
Obviously, therefore, effective modification of inadequate or dangerous 
human behaviour must be the primary objective of any reform efforts. As 
achievements in other transport sectors, particularly road, oil tankers and 
aviation, illustrate very clearly, such safety improvement objectives can 
realistically be attained. 
 
Human behaviour can be modified in order to achieve realistic reform 
objectives. There are specialist professionals, using mostly psychological 
techniques, and behavioural modification who are trained to encourage such 
modification. Of course, traditional maritime and naval training in developed 
countries used to do that on an ongoing basis. 
 
It is notable that all known airlines, most major oil and mining companies, air-
forces, navies and many railway operators employ or retain human factor or 
safety managers and/or consultants who combine the disciplines of 
engineering, psychology and ergonomics with the objective of improving 
safety.642 In stark contrast very few ferry or smaller cruise ship-owning 
companies appear to do so. In reality only the very largest or most safety 
conscious of them, such as Carnival Cruise Lines, Royal Caribbean Cruises, 
Stena, P&O Ferries, Sydney Ferries, Thames Clippers, Washington State 
Ferries, Archipelago Ferries and BC Ferries do.643  
 
                                                     
641 In Appendix A, Ibid. To 31 December 2015. 
642 Refer to the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors, www.ergonomics.org.uk. 
643 From CIEHF, Ibid and individual corporate websites. 
 
 204 
Indeed, in the ten worst countries focused on in this study, no ferry owners or 
ferry owning companies, except Archipelago Ferries in the Philippines, are 
known to employ or even consult such specialists.644 It is obvious that more of 
them should!  
 
Most of those people are trained professionals who may be psychologists, 
master mariners, ergonomics engineers or airline training or check pilots or 
have various combinations of such qualifications. They closely study how and 
why accidents or near misses have occurred. More importantly, they devise 
ways to encourage, train and educate human participants to avoid repeating 
the same kinds of errors in future. 
 
There are numerous human factor consultants who could, indeed should, be 
retained as consultants by ferry owning companies that are too small to afford 
staff experts.645 The key, though, is that someone should be made 
responsible for such matters. The possibilities for human error should be 
investigated, described, analysed and plans made and measures taken to 
prevent them.  
 
The study of human factors in all manner of corporate, military or government 
activity has become a recognised professional discipline646. By focusing on 
the subject in an organised, objective and intellectually analytical way, the 
consciousness of operational employees can be systematically raised to 
ensure that they are sufficiently disciplined as to be constantly aware of the 
safety ramifications of their actions; to be situationally aware; and, most 
importantly, alert. They need to be made almost instinctively responsive to 
any abnormality. 
 
This overwhelming preponderance of human factor causes highlights the 
potential for a significant reduction in ferry fatalities to be achieved by human 
factors professionals and a wider but closer managerial focus on human 
errors. That would, in developing countries, be a pioneering and likely very 
worthwhile activity. As Wayne K. Talley, a prolific pioneering researcher into 
human factors in maritime accidents put it; it is more constructive to regulate 
human actions on ships than the physical condition of ships.647 Given the 
foregoing, particularly Chapter 6, there can be little argument with that. Talley 
also explained, in another paper, his findings that passenger vessel accidents 
caused by human rather than environmental, structural or mechanical factors 
result in significantly worse casualties.648 
 
                                                     
644 From an examination of vessel owner websites and personal interviews of owners by the 
author. 
645 Details are available from the website of the Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human 
Factors. www.ergonomics.org.uk  
646 Ibid. 
647 Talley, W. K. The safety of sea transport: determinants of crew injuries, Applied 
economics, Taylor & Francis Online, Vol 31, 1999, Issue 11, Abstract. 
648 Talley, W. K. et al. Determinants of the severity of passenger vessel accidents, Maritime 
Policy & Management, Taylor & Francis Online, Vol 33, Issue 2, 2006, Abstract. 
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Having extensively studied the safety improvements achieved in the aviation, 
mining, oil and gas, rail, road transport, construction, international shipping 
and manufacturing industries in developed countries, it is obvious that 
attention from human factor experts has contributed substantially to them. The 
most obviously similar problems and the most impressive results have been in 
the aviation industry that has improved so significantly since the 1970s.649 It 
seems very likely that the improvements gained from involving human factor 
experts with ferry operations could be expected to be similar. They can 
interpret and describe procedural safety deficiencies and devise training, 
education and promotional programmes to eliminate them. 
 
7.1.2. Behavioural improvement is achievable. 
 
The preliminary figure for passenger vessel fatalities in 2016 came to an 
estimated 800. That comprises 534 known deaths plus an allowance, based 
on the author‟s long experience and analysis of the data available, of an 
additional 50% for unreported fatalities. For 2017, the figures were 
significantly worse at 742 known deaths giving an estimated total for the full 
year of at least 1,100, a 39 per cent increase on 2016. The 2016 total was the 
lowest death toll in fifty years according to the Baird Maritime Passenger 
Vessel Accident database.650 In reality, it is probably the lowest in history, or 
at least since passenger carrying vessels first developed some four thousand 
years ago. 
 
The 2016 figure of about 800 fatalities compares with the next best year, 
2013, when there were about 900. It compares with an estimated average of 
around 3,000 fatalities per annum over the past fifty-one years. That is a 
remarkable achievement.  
 
It was a very encouraging development and shows what can be achieved 
when ferry owners, operators and regulators take more care than usual. The 
death toll was on course for a significantly lower figure until the end of 
September 2016 but a spate of fatal accidents occurred in October, 
November and December that ruined the excellent result that had been 
achieved until then. Indeed, until the end of September 2016, there had only 
been about 180 reported deaths.651 
 
Of course, and probably inevitably, the first day of 2017 saw a major accident 
occur just off Jakarta in Indonesia when a 30 metre wooden, passenger only 
ferry, the Zahro Express was destroyed by fire and 40 or more people 
perished. The usual human factors seem to have applied: an overloaded, 
poorly maintained vessel with insufficient lifesaving equipment aboard. This 
„accident‟ occurred within the immediate vicinity of the headquarters of the 
                                                     
649 See Figure 4.2. and, by comparison, Table 4.1. 




Indonesian Coast Guard about two nautical miles off the port of Batavia.652 As 
usual, there has been no published report of any subsequent inquiry. The 
facts will have to be gleaned from sparse general media reports. 
 
Five months later, in May 2017 another fire, this time commencing on the 
vehicle deck, consumed an elderly but substantial Ro-Pax ferry Mutiara 
Sentosa 1 on a voyage across Indonesia‟s Java Sea from Surabaya to 
Balikpapan. While not yet precisely known, the death toll looks likely to have 
exceeded 40.653 The global ferry death toll, meanwhile, continued to rise 
throughout 2017. Showing what can be achieved with the correct approach, 
the Philippines had recorded no ferry fatalities in 2017 until 21 December 
when the catamaran fast ferry Mercraft 3 sank in a storm killing about 11 
passengers.654 No details of that accident are yet known. However, given the 
type of vessel concerned and the prevailing conditions, it appears very 
suspicious. 
 
While we can only hope that this is not a sign of things to come, it is ominous 
nevertheless. As usual, most of the fatal accidents in 2016 and 2017 occurred 
in poor or „poorish‟ countries. The Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, Uganda, 
Yemen, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, and Egypt were the more notable 
offenders in 2016. Indonesia, Brazil, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Malaysia 
and Myanmar have continued to be in 2017. In the first five days of 2018 there 
were two fatal ferry accidents in Indonesia. Not a promising start 
 
There were fewer accidents with fewer resulting fatalities in 2016 in a number 
of other countries including developed nations such as New Zealand, Italy and 
France.655 There were, as always, collisions, fires, capsizes due to 
overloading, sinking in storms or typhoons, a capsize and sinking while 
crossing a dangerous bar and the almost inevitable lifeboat drill „accident‟. 
Without exception, all could be attributed, as usual, to human error. As could 
hundreds of non-fatal accidents and „near misses‟. They are rarely reported or 
recorded, unfortunately, so we learn little or nothing from them. 
 
7.1.3. Accidents don‟t just happen. 
 
Fires don‟t just happen, nor do collisions or capsizes of overloaded vessels. 
Storms, particularly typhoons, are well and clearly predicted now, even in the 
Philippines. They, like dangerous sandbars, can be easily avoided thanks, 
largely, to good navigational charts, GPS satellite navigation systems and to 
readily accessible and cost free satellite weather tracking websites.656 All that 
is required is at least adequate seamanship, proper maintenance, care and 
situational awareness. In every case the human factors of greed, negligence, 
                                                     
652 Topsfield, J. and Rosa, A. Indonesian ferry fire: Scores killed and injured in Thousand 
Islands, www.theage.com.au/auction/printAricle?id=1017123581 , Fairfax Media, Melbourne, 
2 January 2017. 
653 Appendix A, Ibid. 
654 Ibid. 
655 Ibid. 
656 For example: www.tropicalstormrisk.com, www.metoffice.gov.uk, and www.nhc.noaa.gov.  
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lack of training, absence of situational awareness and stupidity are the real 
causes of these fatalities.657 
 
It is notable that five of the usual worst ten countries for ferry accidents 
appeared again in 2016 in leading roles with the accidents with the biggest 
death tolls occurring in them. They are consistently bad performers. To recap, 
78 to 80 per cent of the known ferry fatalities over the past 50 years have 
occurred in those ten worst countries. They are: The Philippines, Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Haiti, Egypt, Tanzania, Senegal, China and the DR 
Congo. A further twelve per cent of fatalities occurred in just ten more 
countries so that at least 90 per cent of fatalities arose in a mere 20 countries 
or about ten per cent of the world‟s total countries.658 Of those, 93 per cent 
occurred on domestic voyages.659 
 
While the DR Congo and Haiti are obviously far too poor and corrupt to have 
any serious potential for short-term safety reform, all the others in the worst 
ten have definite potential and should be capable of doing much better. The 
Philippines, Bangladesh and Senegal did notably better in 2016, which is 
gratifying, but they are still home to far too many accidents that continue to 
result from the same human related causes.660 
 
Without wishing in any way to detract from the impressive (about 11%) 
reduction in the number of fatalities in 2016 from the previous lowest total in 
2013, the numbers are clearly still much too high. The „known‟ data for 2017 is 
discouraging with the number of fatalities increasing by about 50 per cent over 
2016.661 Given their causes and their concentration in only ten countries, it 
has to be possible for the death toll to be reduced significantly further. 
 
The global aviation industry has shown the way. Its record over the past 30 
odd years has been very impressive.662 It recognised early and accepted that 
human factors were the predominant causes of accidents and went about 
reducing them logically, scientifically, and very systematically on a global 
basis, even in the countries with poor ferry safety records. It works 
assiduously, globally and constantly to train, educate, promote and discipline 
airline employees at all levels to ensure they are eternally vigilant in matters of 
safety. 
 
The techniques developed to bring about those improvements are well 
known.663 As mentioned above, there is now a distinct profession comprising 
human factors consultants and managers who service the aviation, railway, 
                                                     
657 Well described in the case of the United States Navy by Chief of Naval Operations, 
Admiral John Richardson in a memorandum of 2 November 2017 following a spate of fatal 
collisions. Similarly, in the USA, the National Transportation Safety Board Chairman, Robert 
L. Sumwalt commented on a chain of tragic human errors in the El Faro Inquiry, 12 December 
2017. 
658 Appendix A, Ibid. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Refer to 5.2, Economic, Political and Cultural Comparisons, and Appendix A. 
661 Appendix A, Ibid. 
662 Refer to Figure 4.2. 
663 And are described in Chapter 4. 
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mining, oil and gas, road and parts of the maritime industries, among 
others.664 They are experts at changing mindsets and behaviour. Their 
psychological analyses and disciplined processes are the keys to reform. 
 
As far as is known, very few human factors specialists are employed or 
consulted by the maritime, particularly ferry, sector. They should be. They are 
obviously very effective in other industries even in so-called poor countries. 
IMO is and has been for many years very well aware of the „human element‟. 
It has, “Since the 1980s …increasingly addressed the people involved in 
shipping in its work”.665 The International Maritime Organisation should, at the 
very least, be encouraging the use of human factors specialists in the twenty 
worst countries for ferry fatalities. 
 
The use of the word “encouraging” should be carefully noted. IMO doesn‟t 
need to “interfere” in the internal affairs of its “sovereign member countries” as 
it is so loathe to do. All it needs to do is emulate its civil aviation counterpart 
(ICAO) and encourage the kinds of human error reduction reforms that have 
been so effective in that industry. 
 
7.2.0. The six most dangerous human factors. 
 
The six most common human factors that are the root cause of the errors that 
lead to fatal passenger vessel accidents are defined and described below. 
However, as a reminder, Figure 1.1. is reproduced here as Figure 7.1. to 
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Figure 7.1. The hierarchy of human errors. Author assessed causes of fatal 
passenger vessel accidents 1966-2015. By accidents on the left and by 
fatalities on the right. (BMPVA database). 
 
7.2.1. Unseaworthy vessels. 
 
As shown by an analysis of the data in the Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel 
Accident database this is clearly the major human error cause of passenger 
vessel accidents. It is obviously closely related to negligence and the two 
factors are, in reality, almost inseparable. Negligence, in this sense, is 
deemed to be more deliberate than careless. Between them, they were the 
cause of 51 per cent of fatal accidents. There can be little doubt that a vessel 
is unseaworthy if it capsizes or simply sinks without involvement in a collision 
or grounding, for example. Vessels become unseaworthy because they are 
badly maintained; dangerously modified; poorly designed; or, badly 
constructed. They also become unseaworthy when they are overloaded or 
otherwise negligently operated. They must be adequately or properly manned. 
All those factors are the inevitable result of human errors of omission or 
commission. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary aptly and accurately 
describes seaworthy as: “Of a ship etc: in a fit condition to undergo a voyage 
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7.2.2. Poor lookout. 
 
The next most significant cause of accidents is poor lookout. Lookout has 
been defined as: “A person or party employed or stationed to look out; a  
reconnoitering boat or vessel”. 2. „The action or an act of looking out”.667 This 
failing has caused 21.5 per cent of accidents and a similar percentage of 
fatalities.  
 
It is indisputable that collisions, allisions and groundings can have only one 
real cause and that is inadequate lookout keeping. That arises from any 
number of primary causes that range from fatigue, physical eyesight 
deficiencies, drug or alcohol use, illness such as influenza, inadequate 
training, inadequate discipline or, as can be seen in the YouTube videos of 
the Bangladeshi accidents in Appendix F, to sheer stupidity or lack of 
interest.668 It seems that malnutrition caused apathy or fatalism are the main 
ultimate driver of such causes as explained in Chapter 5. 
 
All commercial and leisure mariners globally, and vehicle drivers and aircraft 
pilots, are expected to know the „Rules of the Road‟ or COLREGS669 but, 
obviously, they are as frequently ignored at sea as they are on land in 
developing countries for mostly the same reasons.670 
 
7.2.3 Overloaded vessels. 
 
Overloaded vessels are quite clearly unseaworthy vessels but, for the 
purposes of this analysis, they have been kept separate because they are 
only one of a number of specific factors that may make a vessel unseaworthy. 
To overload a vessel is to: “load with too great a burden or cargo, put an 
excessive load on”.671  While at 15.9 per cent, they are only the third biggest 
cause of accidents, they are, at 33.7 per cent, the major cause of fatalities. 
Obviously, overloaded vessels have far more people and/or other cargo 
aboard than they should so that, when they are involved in accidents, they 
can be expected to have higher fatality rates than correctly loaded vessels in 
similar situations. The Le Joola and Spice Islander accidents are good 
examples of that phenomenon.672 
 
Overloading has many parents. Greed, obviously, and stupidity, ignorance, 
inadequate regulation and non-existent enforcement are some of the more 
common. Mostly, operators in poor and poorly regulated countries, seem to 
get away with overloading but, when something goes wrong, such as a 
collision or grounding, or, even, too sharp a turn, an overloaded vessel 
becomes a very dangerous vessel. They are less stable and, inevitably, have 
                                                     
667 Ibid. 
668 See Appendix F. 
669 IMO, www.imo.org/COLREGS/  
670 See Figure 1.5.  
671 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Ibid. 
672 Described in Chapter 3, 3.17. and 3. 23. 
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significantly less life saving equipment than necessary. Overloading will 
invariably exacerbate other safety deficiencies. 
 
Overloading, unsurprisingly, usually involves unseaworthy, poorly maintained 




Negligence, obviously, is something of a „catch all‟ word that encompasses a 
number of human errors. More specifically, though, it is used here in the 
sense of its New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition of: “Lack of 
attention to what ought to be done; failure to take proper or necessary care of 
a thing or person; lack of necessary or reasonable care in doing something; 
carelessness”.673  
 
An Indian study of the causes of 25 sinkings in the Arabian Sea in the three 
years to October 2007 concluded that in 23 cases, “…the primary cause was 
Indian seafarers not exercising due care or displaying their professional skills 
in discharging their duties…”.674 Interestingly, while that study was revealed 
by the Deputy Director General of Shipping in India, it failed to appear on the 
Directorate‟s website. However, while unseaworthy vessels, poor lookout and 
overloaded vessels could also, of course, be described generally as 
negligence, they are better described more specifically when the evidence of 
them is obvious. 
 
7.2.5. Poor seamanship. 
 
Another „catch all‟ expression that is closely related to negligence and is used 
here when the evidence points to it as the sole most precise description of the 
cause of an accident. Seamanship in this case can be defined as: “… the art 
or practice of managing a ship or boat at sea; the skill of a good seaman”.675 
In the BMPVA database, as far as numbers of accidents are concerned, poor 
seamanship is classified among “Others” but, among numbers of fatalities, it 




These somewhat nebulous words are used to describe obvious suicides, man 
overboard and slip and fall accidents. In many cases it is difficult to be certain 
as, for example, with a person overboard, whether it is a fall or suicide or, 
even, a murder. That is, was it accidental or deliberate? The vast majority of 
such incidents involve cruise ships rather than ferries and drugs or alcohol 
appear to often be involved. Suicides and accidents comprise 4.1 per cent of 
                                                     
673 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary On Historical Principles, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, UK, 1993. 
674 Analysis revealed by India‟s Nautical Surveyor, Captain Deepak Kapoor, in Lloyd‟s 
Register-Fairplay, 12 November 2007. 
675 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Ibid. 
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fatal passenger vessel accidents but are immaterial as far as the total 
numbers of ferry fatalities are concerned.676 
 
7.2.7. The hierarchy of accident causes. 
 
It must be emphasised that this hierarchy is author assessed and is derived 
from the often very limited reports that are available as to the causes of many 
of the „known‟ accidents incorporated in the BMPVA database. Nevertheless, 
there is no better available source of such information so it must suffice for the 
purposes of this thesis. In any case, where full, descriptive official reports 
have become available, they have generally, with the notable exception of the 
multi-national Estonia, inquiry, agreed closely with the author‟s 
assessment.677  
 
7.3.1. Analysis of human factors or errors and their effects – 
the human element. 
 
Considerable research has been conducted into this subject, particularly since 
1980. Several learned and practical books have been written and numerous 
papers and articles published. Many of those have been cited in earlier 
chapters.678 All that thought and effort has led to considerable improvement in 
the safety consciousness and behaviour of mariners in developed countries. 
Much of this has been achieved by better training methods and a relentless 
focus on the importance of situational awareness to mariners, particularly 
watch keepers. Crews and other employees of ferry companies must be 
constantly reminded to think safety. Safety consciousness has to be drilled 
into them so that it becomes practically instinctive as it is in the aviation 
industry. The development and maintenance of a safety culture is now widely 
considered to be imperative. 
 
Regrettably, however, practically all of that improvement has been seen in the 
developed world. As has been shown often enough in the foregoing, poorer 
developing countries continue to experience an alarming frequency of fatal 
passenger vessel accidents. They, almost without exception, (93%) involve 
domestic ferries. In reality, in the first seventeen years of this third millennium, 
the average annual global death toll has changed very little.679 And, most 
importantly, human error remains the predominant cause of maritime 
accidents even in western developed countries. 
 
                                                     
676 Appendix A, Ibid. 
677 The author strongly disagrees with the major findings of Laur, U. (Chairman) et al. Final 
Report on the Capsizing …of the… MV Estonia, EDITA, Tallinn, 1997. He believes the final 
assessment was a political compromise and that more blame should have been attributed to 
the ship‟s master and owners. He feels that too much blame was directed at the builder and 
designer. In other words, that the cause was overwhelmingly one of human error rather than 
of technical failure. 
678 Such as Ala-Pollanan, A.; Bailey, N. et al.; Baker, C.G, & Seah, A. K.; Barraclough, S.; 
Bhattacharya, Y.; Boisson, P.; Cahill, R.A.; Dobie, G (Ed).; Go, K. et al.; Grech, M. R.; and, 
Tille, N. et al. Refer to Bibliography for details. 
679 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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The seemingly impossible imperative is to transfer some of that research, 
training, thought, education, discipline, regulation and enforcement from the 
developed to the developing worlds. While in the African countries educational 
standards, generally, are low, in Asian maritime nations, with the notable 
exception of Myanmar, the majority of people have received at least a primary 
education.680 That means that effective safety training and education should 
be achievable in at least half of the worst ten countries. Again, sadly, there 
seems to be considerable reluctance, or at least an absence of will, on the 
part of IMO to at least try to emulate the very successful work of its ICAO 
counterpart in such countries.  
 
Norwegian researchers Rumawas and Asbjornslett overstate the obvious with 
respect to the Philippines and other developing countries in their paper A 
proposed model to account (for) human factors in safety critical systems.681 
Quoting Spouge, Lawson and Weisbrod, they introduce their paper with the 
comment that: “The conditions are characterised by low operating standards, 
cheap fares, mixture of cargo and passengers, low safety awareness, 
inadequate regulations, inadequate vessels, second-hand fleet, overcrowding 
and unpleasant services”.682 They have then tried to create a mathematical 
model to predict and prevent fatal human errors affecting ferry operations. 
Their approach seems far too complicated to be likely to be introduced in 
practice. Human behaviour seems rarely to comply with mathematical models. 
It can be analysed and described far more simply and effectively without using 
them. 
 
An American Bureau of Shipping analysis was more realistic.683 It at least 
gathered real data that was as accurate as possible from the US, UK, Canada 
and Australia. There inquiries are open, fair, careful, and their determinations 
publicly available. Their work that, obviously, excludes developing country 
data, concludes that 50 per cent of maritime accidents “are initiated by human 
error” while a further 30 per cent were ”due to failures of humans to avoid an 
accident”. That, presumably, amounts to almost the same thing. Their 
analysis provides an illuminating overview of human error causal factors in 
developed countries. Regrettably, due to the data deficiencies that afflict all 
such studies, including this one, they did not examine their developing country 
counterparts.  
 
Several organisations and individuals have tried to instil a safety culture into 
governments and ferry operators in developing countries. IMO has at least 
paid lip service to the ideal. It has given minimal support and its imprimatur to 
an effort by INTERFERRY, in concert with the Worldwide Ferry Safety 
                                                     
680 Derived from the UNDP Human Development Report of 2016. See Statistical Tables, 
Education Achievements, p. 230. www.hdr.undp.org/en/2016-report/. See Table 5. 3. 
681 Asbjornslett, B. E. & Rumawas, V. in Reliability, Risk and Safety – Ale, Papazoglu & Zio 
(eds), Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2010.  
682 Ibid. 
683 Presented by Baker, C. S. & Seah, A. K. Maritime accidents and Human Performance: the 
Statistical Trail, at Martech 2004, Singapore. 
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Association, to encourage improvement in Bangladesh and Indonesia.684 That 
programme had the laudable but completely unrealistic objective of reducing 
ferry fatalities by 90 per cent over the ten years from the end of 2005.To its 
credit, though, perhaps the dramatic reductions in fatalities in 2013 and 2016 
may have been due in some measure to the programme. Unfortunately, 
however, the other years in the sequence showed no real improvement and 
large numbers of fatalities have continued to occur in both countries since.685  
 
As far back as May 1991, J. R. Spouge published a paper Passenger ferry 
safety in the Philippines in which he compared the risk of ferry travel in the 
Philippines with that in the UK.686 He came to the logical conclusion that, “… 
the most important underlying cause of the accident record is poverty and 
therefore the most effective solution is not naval architectural but lies in 
economic and political development”. While very largely correct, in the sense 
of poverty induced fatalism, ignorance and carelessness, he did overlook the 
obvious conceptual design deficiencies of the flimsy motor bancas and 
neglected elderly and often poorly conventional modified Ro-Pax ferries that 
continue to be widely used in the Philippines despite their appalling safety 
record. 
 
There is little doubt, though, that the widespread attention to human error 
induced accidents in many areas of endeavour in the developed world since 
the 1980s has had many positive results. Indeed, the author contributed to 
one such programme in the mid-1970s. It was inspired and directed by Sir 
Tristan Antico, Chairman and managing director of a then large Australian 
building materials company Pioneer Concrete. Antico had become alarmed at 
the number of human error caused accidents affecting his employees and 
determined to significantly reduce them. Basically, through personal example, 
good communications, humour, leadership and training, a very sound safety 
culture was imbued throughout the company‟s work force. Employees were 
reminded to think safety. A significant reduction in minor and major accidents 
ensued within two years.687 A safety culture was imbued. 
 
One of the world‟s largest ferry owning companies, Canada‟s state owned BC 
Ferries, has shown what a focus on human errors can achieve. In a major 
awakening, following the scandal arising from the grounding and sinking of its 
Ro-Pax ferry Queen of the North in 2006, BC Ferries made significant efforts 
to improve its safety behaviour throughout the very large company. In the 
following decade it has only suffered two known fatalities and no significant 
vessel damage. The company attributes that success to maintaining a 
constant focus on safety on the part of all its employees.688 
                                                     
684 Described in Golden, A. S. & Weisbrod, R. E. Trends, Causal Analysis,and 
Recommendations from 14 Years of Ferry Accidents, Journal of Public Transportation, New 
York, Vol 19, No 1, 2016 
685 Appendix A, Ibid. 
686 Requested from Researchgate but only Abstract received. No details available. 
687 Personal experience of the author. Pioneer Concrete no longer exists nor, unfortunately, 
do any examples of the documents utilised in the programme. 





Regrettably, this dramatic and substantial improvement has been tarnished by 
BC Ferries‟ inexplicable sale of a very elderly sheltered waters Ro-Pax ferry to 
Fiji.689 The company has somewhat redeemed itself since with the very 
conditional sale of its 53 year old ferry Queen of Burnaby.690  
 
The Philippines Government, through its Maritime Industry Authority 
(MARINA), has implemented an extensive regulatory programme since 
2013.691 While progress has been slow it has been discernable and provides 
a good example of what can be achieved by a determined developing country 
government.692  
 
The inculcation of a safety culture is achievable if enthusiastically promoted 
from the top. It would certainly be a good investment in any organisation, 
particularly those involved with public transport.693 
 
7.4.1. Wider analyses of human factor roles in fatalities. 
 
Probably the best, most effective, in terms of inspiring reforms, and most 
widely reported MBOI was that into the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize.694 
Even more focused and therefore interesting was an analysis of the accident 
and the subsequent inquiry by investigative journalist Mick Hamer that was 
published in The New Scientist on 23 July 1987.695 Mr Hamer‟s article 
presents a devastating summary of the main points made in the report of 
Justice Sir Barry Sheen‟s very thorough Formal Investigation into the 
circumstances of the accident. It describes a litany of human errors on the 
part of almost all involved from senior management through the master to the 
lowliest seaman. It also describes the inevitable attempts to „cover-up‟ the 
facts and shift the blame, particularly by the vessel‟s owner and the 
responsible government authorities. Mr Hamer‟s most salient points were:- 
 
 “The capsize took about 90 seconds…” 
 “The speed of the capsize was the direct cause of the high death toll…” 
 “It is the fundamental design of the ferry that, I understand, is the 
problem…”, M. Thatcher, Prime Minister. 
 “I have no evidence to support the view that this was due to any fault in 
the design of the ship”. J. Moore, Secretary of State for Transport. 
 “…naval architect told the inquiry that …roll-on roll-off ferries should 
have a subdivided car deck to prevent water from sloshing across…” 
                                                     
689 See details in 6.2.2. 
690 Described on www.govdeals.ca, December 2017. 
691 Detailed in www.marina.gov.ph/policies/listMC/. 
692 See Appendix A, Ibid for trends. 
693 A useful paper advising how to do so is: Implementing An Effective Safety Culture – Basic 
Advice for Shipping Companies and Seafarers, International Chamber of Shipping, London, 
2013. 
694 Sheen, B. (Sir). Formal Investigation into the Flooding and capsize of ro-ro passenger ferry 
Herald of Free Enterprise with loss of 193 lives, Marine Investigation Branch, London, 1987. 
695 Hamer, M. A ferry designed for disaster, The New Scientist, Reed Business Information, 
London, 1987, pp. 24 and 25. 
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 “The rapid capsize caused the great loss of life. That is the area which 
is so difficult”, Sir Barry Sheen. 
 “The shipping companies (Ferry owners) are now fighting a scarcely 
veiled rearguard action to delay or shelve (deck) subdivision”. 
 “The immediate cause of the accident was not a subject of controversy 
at the inquiry. The bow doors…were open. The assistant bosun, whose 
job it was to close them, was asleep”. 
 “When the speed reached 16 knots, the water began to enter the bow 
doors and the ferry was doomed”. 
 “Much of the evidence at the inquiry concerned the slipshod operating 
methods of the vessel‟s operators”. 
 “The buccaneering spirit of the company…” 
 “The inquiry heard that on another occasion, another ferry had sailed 
with its watertight doors open. Again, this was because the crew 
member…had fallen asleep”. 
 “Communications in the company were so poor that…” 
 “Captain Martin, Townsend Thoresen‟s senior captain sent a 
memorandum saying: „It is so important to the safety of the ship that 
they (the bow and stern doors) are closed, we should have bridge 
indication‟. The company treated this request with derision”. 
 “The company had plenty of warnings. Its captains regularly pointed 
out serious deficiencies”. 
 “Following his review of safety in the wake of the sinking of Townsend 
Thoresen‟s ferry the European Gateway, in 1982 (6 fatalities), Captain 
Martin wrote: „The company could be considered negligent on a 
number of points, particularly when it affects commercial interests‟”. 
 “He warned about the dangers of overloading”. 
 “The company replied that this was an operational matter, implying that 
overloading did not affect the safety of the ship”. 
 “…shore staff counted the number of passengers boarding the 
ships…separate counts by the crew on board had been abandoned to 
remove the possibility of discrepancies…” 
 “Nevertheless, several captains carried out spot checks because the 
captain is legally liable if the ship is overloaded. These spot checks 
revealed large discrepancies between the two counts”. 
 “The possibility of overloading was all the more serious because the 
draughts were virtually never read”. 
 “…Townsend Thoresen…relied on declarations of the weight of their 
lorries by drivers. These declarations were frequently false…by an 
average of 10 per cent”. 
 “The Herald of Free Enterprise was almost certainly overloaded on the 
night of the accident…” 
 “The company‟s strategy at the inquiry was to admit its shortcomings 
and to argue that it had remedied them. P&O took over Townsend 
Thoresen three months before the accident”. 
 “ The shipowners (P&O and rival Sealink), through the General Council 
of British Shipping, and after talks with the Department of Transport, 
have started a research programme on ferry safety. The research will 
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be carried out by Three Quays Marine Services, part of P&O, and Hart 
Fenton, part of Sea Containers, the owners of Sealink”. 
 “…the lawyer representing the Secretary of State for Transport at the 
inquiry, questioned whether this study was a device to forestall, or 
delay, subdividing car decks near the waterline”. 
 “Marshall Meek, vice-president of the Royal Institution of Naval 
Architects, said that the principle of subdividing decks dated back to 
before the Titanic, Britain‟s worst maritime disaster. He said: „Ro-ros 
are more likely to capsize‟”. 
 “Meek said that he strongly suspected that the shipowners often hid 
behind the delays in achieving international agreement to avoid costly 
changes in design”. 
 “…a senior nautical surveyor…said that it was policy for Britain to 
negotiate changes in design through the International Maritime 
Organisation. He gave an example concerning lifeboats…” which took 
18 years to be implemented. 
 “I cannot understand the reluctance… to lead the field in safety”, 
Justice Sir Barry Sheen. 
 “On 1 May, two Sealink train ferries collided off Dover…On 2 June, a 
Townsend Thoresen ferry ran aground just outside Larne Harbour in 
Ireland. In neither case was there injury”.696 
 
Townsend Thoresen, it should be remembered, is the company that 
threatened to sue the author‟s company, Baird Publications, for defamation 
after it published a series of articles exposing the safety deficiencies of many 
English Channel and North Sea ferries, including but without specifically 
mentioning Townsend Thoresen‟s ships, in the months prior to the Herald of 
Free Enterprise tragedy. It was also the owner of the Ro-Pax ferry European 
Gateway which capsized on the opposite side of the North Sea, killing six 
people five years before the Herald of Free Enterprise capsized.697 Townsend 
Thoresen was purchased by P&O Ferries three months before the latter 
accident.  
 
The Sheen Inquiry exposed the multitude of human errors of both omission 
and commission that were the norm among major ferry operators in some of 
the most developed countries at the time. Many of these had been highlighted 
in the articles written by Dag Pike and published in Baird Publications‟ 
magazine Work Boat World that are mentioned above.698 It took nearly a 
decade and three more major Ro-Pax ferry accidents, involving the 
Scandinavian Star, Jan Heweliusz  and Estonia, and a further 1,116 fatalities 
before any significant reforms were implemented in Northern Europe699 with 
the implementation of the Stockholm Rules.700 
 
                                                     
696 Hamer, M,/ Sheen, B. Ibid. 
697 Appendix A, Ibid. 
698 See various issues of Work Boat World published in1986. 
699 Appendix A, Ibid. 
700 Refer to 6.2.2. 
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Inevitably, even the Stockholm Rules involved considerable compromise and 
prevarication on the part of ship owners, their consulting and employed naval 
architects and some national regulators. However, as the data in the BMPVA 
database shows, the rules have been effective in the Northern Europe region 
in which they apply.701 
  
Tragically, they have still not been implemented elsewhere and the same 
kinds of human errors, or worse, continue to cause numerous significant fatal 
accidents every year. The reports of the MBOIs into the Rabaul Queen and 
Sewol  accidents are disappointingly reminiscent of that into the Herald of 
Free Enterprise disaster.702 Worse still, those reports of very thorough 
inquiries are exceedingly rare. Most other fatal ferry accidents are barely 
inquired into or reported on at all.  
 
As with road accidents in developed countries prior to the publication of Ralph 
Nader‟s influential Unsafe at Any Speed,703 when accidents were routinely 
investigated by untrained junior policemen, investigations of ferry accidents in 
developing countries are generally accorded a very low priority. Indeed, apart 
from the three inquiries mentioned above and that into the Marchioness 
collision and capsize as well as most of the Hong Kong Marine Department‟s 
accident inquiries, useful reports emanating from MBOIs are disappointingly 
scarce, particularly in developing countries. They are practically non-existent 
in the countries where most of the major fatal ferry accidents occur. Of 
course, inevitably, the most thorough inquiries and the most enlightening 
reports are produced in the countries where fatal ferry accidents occur least 
frequently. 
 
7.5.1. IMO‟s Human Element Vision. 
 
As have most other maritime organisations that are concerned with safety, 
IMO has devoted considerable time, money and discussion to solving or 
reducing the problem of human error. Most particularly during the mid-1990s, 
IMO reviewed and revised its STCW (Standards of Training Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers with an increased focus on human factors or the 
human element.704 Further, in 2006 and through to 2010, it again reviewed the 
STCW Code and Convention culminating in the, so-called, Manila 
Amendments which entered into force on 1 January 2012.705 It declared: “The 
safety and security of life at sea, protection of the marine environment and 
over 90% of the world‟s trade depends on the professionalism and 
competence of seafarers”. 
 
                                                     
701 See Appendix A. 
702 See case studies of each accident in Chapter 3. 
703 Nader, R. Unsafe at Any Speed, Pocket Books, New York, 1966. Its publication inspired 
global road safety improvements by exposing the far too close relationships between 
American car manufacturers and governments. 
704 In its Vision, Principles and Goals, resolution A.850(20) of November 1997, IMO adopted, 
in part, a vision: To significantly enhance maritime safety and the quality of the marine 
environment by addressing human element issues to improve performance; 
705 IMO Resolution A.1022(26) which entered into force on 1 July 2010. 
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Such resolutions and many like them illustrate an understanding and 
realisation of the importance of human factors to the safety of maritime 
activity. There is little doubt that wider realisation, combined with a focus on 
the dangers of conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries, has led to a significant 
reduction in the numbers of ferry accidents and fatalities in the developed 
world, the OECD countries in other words. That is shown clearly by the data in 
the BMPVA database.706 However, and tragically, that message is obviously 
not getting through to most of the developing countries where, since 2000, the 
accident and fatality rates have remained largely constant. 
 
Indeed, despite the best declared intentions of IMO and its far more 
enthusiastic  and effective collaborators in INTERFERRY and the Worldwide 
Ferry Safety Association, their combined plan to reduce global ferry fatalities 
by 90 per cent over the ten years from 2005 to 2014 has sadly and very 
embarrassingly failed.707 That failure was not due to an absence of effort and 
good intentions on the part of INTERFERRY and its associated WFSA, rather, 
it was due more to a lack of will on the part of IMO.708 
 
So, IMO has paid attention to human factors, elements and errors and even 
allowed for them in revisions to its STCW and SOLAS codes. The problem is 
that human errors are continuing to cause fatalities in passenger vessel 
accidents and IMO seems to be at a loss as to what to do to prevent them in 
developing countries in particular. IMO continues to make grand statements of 
realisation and intent but it also continues to fail to follow up with action on its 
own part. It fails most notably to persuade or support its poorer “sovereign 
member nations” to take any action inspired by its grand statements. 
 
IMO also tends to focus excessively on the, nonetheless important, 
contributing factors of fatigue and poor working conditions rather than on 
proven potential cures such as more and better safety training and more 
rigorous disciplines. It would be preferable if it left the fatigue and working 
condition problems to its related organisation the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and took a more holistic approach to all human factor 
problems. 
 
7.5.2. Classification societies, too, have researched human 
error extensively. 
 
The classification societies, particularly Lloyd‟s Register, DNV GL, Bureau 
Veritas and ABS, have analysed, researched, discussed and published 
extensively on the maritime dangers of human error for more than thirty years. 
They have made numerous recommendations as to how human errors could 
                                                     
706 Appendix A. Ibid. Particularly 1995 to 2015. 
707 The objective was detailed in Lawson, C. T. and Weisbrod, R. E. Ferry Transport: The 
Realm of responsibility for Ferry Disasters in Developing Nations, 2004. The data is verified in 
the BMPVA database. 
708 For Interferry‟s intentions and approach, refer to Roueche, L. Ferry safety: Lending a hand, 
Cruise & Ferry Info, Gothenburg, June 2005, p. 4. 
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be significantly reduced, if not eliminated.709 As with the similar efforts of IMO, 
however, their work has very definitely borne fruit in developed countries. 
There, as the data in the BMPVA database clearly shows, there has been a 
very significant reduction in the numbers of both accidents and fatalities. Their 
influence, however, has been negligible in the developing countries where the 
vast majority of fatal ferry accidents have occurred and continue to occur.710 
They effectively have little or no influence on domestic ferry operations in 
developing countries. In such countries the activities of the classification 
societies is almost entirely focused on international shipping, particularly 
cargo shipping. Few, if any, domestically operating passenger vessels are „in 
class‟ there.711 It is to be hoped that situation will change eventually. 
 
Nevertheless, their work has been approached thoroughly and scientifically 
and its results are of considerable value even allowing for their largely 
ineffectual dissemination to those places where they could be most useful. If 
nothing else, they could provide useful educational, training and propaganda 
material if IMO were to seriously encourage safety improvements in the 
developing countries where they are most needed. The classification societies 
have undoubtedly met with considerable success in many of the developed 
countries where both the number of ferry accidents and their deadliness have 
been significantly reduced over the past two decades.712 At least they have 
shown how the human error problem should be approached. 
 
Their newsletters, corporate magazines, brochures and conference papers 
have consistently promoted the requirement and the means to reduce human 
errors. DNV GL, for example, in an online article, compares the ferry industry 
crew fatality rate in OECD countries with whole of industry „best practice‟ and 
shows it is ten times higher in the maritime industry. 713 The article promotes 
three safety goals: “using human error as a symptom of weakness in the 
system, rather than as an explanation for an accident; to manage major 
accident risks; and, to assess and improve the safety culture”. It states, very 
reasonably, that: “People are making mistakes but it is very seldom that the 
mistakes are deliberate”. Further, it reasons: “…the deliberate violation link is 
almost non-existing and that the wrong action or judgement is the main 
contributor to accidents”. In other words, as Joseph Conrad put it so well more 
than a century ago in his novel Lord Jim, we need to determine “why” 
accidents happen much more than “how” they happen.714 Few Marine Boards 
of Inquiry, as they are currently constituted, manage to determine “why”. 
 
                                                     
709 For example, Anon.The Human Element: A perfect storm? LR, London, 2008; Anon. 
Safety in the ferry industry, DNV GL, Oslo, 2017; Anon. Ferries Ro-Ro/Passenger vessels, 
GARD P&I Club, Oslo, 1996;  Boisson, P. Safety at Sea – Policies, regulations and 
International Law, Bureau Veritas, Paris, 1999; and, Baker, C. C. and Seah, A. K. Marine 
Accidents and Human Performance, ABS, 2004. 
710 Very clearly illustrated in the BMPVA database, Appendix A, Ibid. 
711 Indeed, any examination of records of vessels beyond the OECD and major „flag of 
convenience‟ countries will be virtually devoid of references to classification societies. 
712 Appendix A, Ibid. 
713 Safety in the ferry industry – Taking the next step up the safety ladder, 
www.dnv.gl.com/article/safety-in-the-ferry-industry/  
714 Conrad, J. Lord Jim, Ibid. 
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Moving toward a discussion of safety culture, the article states that: “If the 
ferry industry wants to improve in this area, it needs to establish an 
understanding of the company‟s responsibility to facilitate good human 
performance. If human error occurs it needs to be treated as a symptom of 
weakness in the system, and not as a standalone human error”715. It says, 
“safety culture has been defined in many different ways in literature, however 
the saying „it‟s what you do when no one is watching‟ sums up the definitions 
quite well”.716 
 
Lloyd‟s Register, too, has highlighted the human factor problem in many of its 
publications. An example is its October 2008 publication, Human Focus. 
Under the heading, The human element: A perfect storm, it describes, “The 
list of reported problems involving the people in shipping seems to grow all 
the time”.717 It mentions many of the problems described elsewhere in this 
work, such as: “Navigation accidents… Slips, trips and falls. Near misses. 
Morale… Terms of employment. Accommodation conditions. Human error. 
Poor equipment maintenance… Attitudes and culture. Communication 
difficulties… Fatigue. Complacency. Poor training. Lack of experience. Ship-
shore conflicts”. 
 
The articles mention problems of adapting to new technology; competence 
requirements lagging new regulations and technology; and, outsourcing and 
subcontracting. They say: “It is time to rethink how people are incorporated 
into the maritime system”. Further, it states, very presciently: “The human 
element is widely accepted as the greatest source of operational risk to 
modern ships. For ship operators, being able to manage this risk effectively 
will help to reduce incidents involving damage to life, vessels, cargo and the 
environment, as well as encouraging an effective, motivated and satisfied 
workforce”. 
 
Lloyd‟s Register has gone to considerable lengths, and expense, to establish 
and fund the Lloyd‟s Register Educational Trust Research Unit (LRETRU) that 
operates as a charity to help “protect life and property and support education, 
engineering-related research and public engagement”.718 It has sponsored 
significant research and, most significantly in the present context, a Cardiff 
University study into “safety and perceptions of risk in the maritime sector”.719 
 
The most useful and revealing paper arising from that research reveals very 
significant differences between perceptions of risk and the reality of accidents 
in the minds of mariners. The study also highlights the scarcity of useful data 
describing „ship level‟ events and seafarer injury.720 This ongoing problem is 
described in 2.1.3. 
                                                     
715 DNV GL, Safety in the ferry industry, Ibid. 
716 Ibid. 
717 See HUMAN FOCUS, Lloyd‟s Register, London, October 2008, pp. 2-12. 
718 For details, see www.lr.org/en/research-and-innovation/lr-foundation/. 
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between respondent perceptions and recorded accident data, Seafarers International 
Research Centre, Cardiff, 2010. 




Impressively, the Lloyd‟s Register Foundation in its Insight report on global 
safety challenges for 2017, mentions the “safety challenge” of passenger 
ferries. It recommends as follows: “Seek to influence the IMO to enforce 
regions to take up regulations  that would make ferries safer in design and 
methods of use”.721  
 
French based Bureau Veritas, too, has backed similar studies and in 1999 
published the very useful and impressively honest book Safety at Sea – 
Policies, Regulations & International Law, by Philippe Boisson.722 It is a very 
comprehensive review of all aspects of maritime safety approached from a 
very practical and realistic legal perspective. 
 
The statistics show clearly that all the research by the governments of 
western developed nations and their associated research and educational 
institutions and classification societies is having a positive effect on maritime 
safety in those developed countries.723 That is laudable and gratifying. The 
problem described, analysed and considered in this thesis is that those 
valuable reforms are not, however, being effectively introduced into the much 
more needy developing countries. They, after all, are where the major part 
of the problem has always been and continues to be. 
 
7.5.3. Governments, generally, are well aware of the human 
error problem. 
 
Marine and transport departments of developed country governments are well 
aware of human error as a major cause of accidents. Many of them go to 
considerable trouble and expense to educate, train and inform mariners of the 
dangers of such accidents. They sponsor, facilitate and organise numerous 
accident avoidance programmes. They also assiduously investigate accidents 
and widely disseminate the reports of those investigations and publicise the 
lessons that can be learnt from them. Some of them, such as the Transport 
Department in the Australian state of New South Wales, employ behavioural 
scientists such as psychologists with that in mind.724 Regrettably, those 
practices are generally non-existent in the developing countries where so 
many of the fatal ferry accidents occur.  
 
Countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and all the west European and Scandinavian nations 
have similar and very highly developed systems in place that are focused on 
accident avoidance. Hong Kong and Singapore, with their particularly 
crowded waterways and high general standards of living and education, are 
similarly conscious of the dangers of human error caused marine accidents. 
                                                     
721 Anon. Insight report on global safety challenges, Lloyd‟s Register Foundation. London, 
June 2017. 
722 Refer in earlier chapters, particularly in 2.1.4, to Boisson, P. Ibid. 
723 Appendix A, Ibid. 
724 Personal conversation with Dr. B. Barnes of the New South Wales Department of Roads 





In Australia, for example, the New South Wales state government Office of 
Transport Safety Investigations is responsible for “identifying „why‟ (author‟s 
quotes) an accident or incident occurred and to make recommendations to 
prevent a similar occurrence happening in the future”.725 As of 17 April 2017, 
the OTSI website listed thirty complete or “in-progress” Investigation Reports 
on ferry accidents or incidents on Sydney Harbour dating from February 2004 
to October 2016. Most were minor and only two involved one and four 
fatalities respectively.726 However, all were carefully investigated and the 
lessons learnt publicised. All the other Australian state governments have 
departments that take similar approaches. 
 
Nationally, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau performs a similar function 
for accidents and incidents that occur in Commonwealth waters beyond state 
boundaries. Its reports are detailed, readable, instructive and widely 
disseminated.727 They also: “…seek to identify safety issues and encourage 
safety action to reduce the risk of future accidents and incidents”. They aim to 
determine „why‟ accidents occurred. 
 
The United Kingdom, similarly, has its Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
which conducts investigations into and reports on all significant marine 
incidents and accidents.728 The MAIB‟s objectives are identical to those of its 
Australian counterparts. So, too, are New Zealand‟s Transport Accident 
Investigation Commission729 and Canada‟s Marine Accidents and 
Investigations section of its Transport and Infrastructure Department.730 
 
Because it has dual civil and military roles, the United States Coast Guard 
carries out policing activities in addition to the investigation and analysis 
activities of its counterparts in other countries. Nevertheless, it performs all 
their other accident prevention activities. The US Coast Guard‟s Office of 
Investigations & Casualty Analysis leads the,”…Coast Guard‟s investigation 
program to promote safety, protect the environment, and to prevent future 
accidents”.731 
 
Most other developed nations take similar approaches to the problem of 
maritime transport safety. The data in Appendix A show that their efforts have, 
unsurprisingly, been largely successful. Those governments share their 
knowledge among themselves both through and beyond IMO at various 
conferences, seminars and symposia held around the world. They are 
remarkably co-operative and constructive and mostly work diligently to reduce 
the human error effect on marine safety. As a result, they mostly use similarly 
effective educational, promotional and enforcement techniques. 
 
                                                     
725 From Ferry Safety Investigations, www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/ferry/investigations.php.  
726 Appendix A, Ibid. 
727 For examples, see www.atsb.com.au/marine/. 
728 See www.gov.uk/maib-reports/. 
729 See www.taic.org.nz/ReportsandSafetyRecs/MarineReports/. 
730 See www.canada.cn/en/services/transport/marine/marineaccidentsandinvestigations/. 
731 See www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/. 
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Even the governments of developing countries such as the Philippines, 
Bangladesh and Papua New-Guinea are well aware of the safety deficiencies 
of their domestic ferry industries. The author has discussed the problem at 
length with a number of senior maritime officials in each of those countries.732 
They unanimously agree that human error is the real cause of most fatal 
accidents. Their difficulty lies in persuading their governments to take 
constructive action to remedy the problem. At least, though, despite generally 
inadequate support, they have been employed by their governments to try to 
improve domestic maritime safety. Further, as noted in 7.3.1, the Philippines 
has recently been making considerable regulatory efforts towards that 
objective. 
 
7.5.4. Industry and professional associations are similarly 
active.  
 
The global ferry industry association INTERFERRY733 has a domestic ferry 
safety sub-committee (Of which the author is a member) that investigates 
safety matters and trends and actively promotes greater ferry safety, 
especially through its associated organisation, the Worldwide Ferry Safety 
Association.734 The latter organises specific focused ferry safety conferences 
annually in New York to date. Encouragingly, however, its 2019 conference 
will be held in Bangkok. INTERFERRY also holds annual conferences at 
changing venues around the world. They always have a safety component in 
which IMO involvement is encouraged. Indeed, the WFSA conducts 
International Student Design Competitions in conjunction with government or 
operator representatives from developing nations. It also promotes „e-learning‟ 
and the greater use of weather and navigational technology. 
 
The recently appointed (late 2016) chief executive of INTERFERRY, Michael 
Corrigan, was previously the CEO of BC Ferries where as COO in 2006 he 
dealt with the aftermath of the fatal Queen of the North foundering.735 He has 
actual experience of such accidents, and the importance of their human 
factors. He has done much to prevent their recurrence. The WFSA should, it 
might be argued, become more effective as some of its conferences are held 
in developing countries rather than New York. 
 
Nevertheless, the WFSA, through its active research programme, has 
compiled generally similar causal statistics for ferry accidents to the author‟s. 
Its data are not as extensive but their trends are similar. It states, for example, 
that 95 per cent of ferry accidents occur in developing nations (the same 
figure as the author)736 and that, using “liberal” criteria, “… 86 per cent of lives 
                                                     
732 Refer to Personae for details of Carlos Agustin, Gualterio dela Cruz, Fakhrul Islam and 
Nurur Rahman. Each of them has discussed the ferry safety problem of human error with the 
author with respect to the Philippines, Bangladesh and Papua New Guinea. 
733 For more information, refer to www.interferry.com.  
734 See www.ferrysafety.org. 
735 Refer to interview by Hothof, P. of Shippax, 12 May 2017. 
736 In www.magazines.marinelink.com/Magazines/MarineNews/201501/. 
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lost were linked to human error”.737 This compares with the author‟s estimate 
of 98 per cent. The WFSA has, in conjunction with INTERFERRY, as 
mentioned in 7.5.1 above, been trying to work with IMO in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and the Philippines to promote greater ferry safety. Disappointingly, 
those efforts have met with negligible success so far except, to a still limited 
extent, in the Philippines. 
 
The London based professional association for master mariners, The Nautical 
Institute, has arguably carried out more research, educational and 
promotional work on the marine human error problem than any other 
organisation. It has published widely and constructively on the subject. Apart 
from numerous magazine articles and conference papers, it has published 
substantial books such as: Managing Safety and Quality in Shipping; 
Improving Ship Operational Design; Human Performance and Limitation for 
Mariners; Casualty Management Guidelines; Collisions and Their Causes; 
Managing Collision Avoidance at Sea; and, Maritime Education and 
Training738. A number of those have been cited elsewhere in this work but all 
share the objective of reducing human errors in the maritime domain. 
 
Despite all that valuable effort, in his January 2017 editorial, the Nautical 
Institute‟s President, Captain Keith Stevens, commented to the effect that the 
safety message fails to get through.739 Despite the expenditure of 
considerable effort and money by most shipping companies injuries and 
deaths continue. This, he said, is irrespective of “nationality, culture, gender or 
age of the seafarers”. He recommends more concentration on training 
seafarers to think and act “in the now”. The heading on his article, “Being 
aware, staying safe”, summed up his message well.  In other words, training 
them to think and concentrate.  This is something that is clearly not happening 
sufficiently, even in the developed world where his organisation, of necessity, 
most closely focuses its efforts.  
 
Another very valuable maritime safety encouragement organisation is the also 
British based CHIRP Maritime.740 CHIRP (Confidential Hazardous Incident 
Reporting Programme) encourages incident reporting, even of minor incidents 
and „near misses‟, in an endeavour to encourage learning from such 
experiences. The organisation arose from the aviation industry, where such 
experiential learning is widely valued and used. It is becoming more widely 
known and recognised in the maritime industry although, regrettably, mainly in 
developed countries. It publishes very valuable instructive articles in its own 
newsletter and more widely. They are simple and based closely on actual 
                                                     
737 In Trends, Causal Analysis and recommendations from 14 Years of Ferry Accidents, 
Journal of Public Transportation, Vol 19, No 1, 2016, New York, p.20. 
738 All published by The Nautical Institute, www.nautinst.org. 
739 In Captain‟s Column, Seaways, January 2017, The Nautical Institute, London, 2017. 
740 Refer to www.chirpmaritime.org for background. 
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experiences.741 IMO has been alerted as to its work by the UK 
Government.742 
 
Again, as with so many other human error reduction efforts, they are largely 
effective in developed nation environments but practically invisible in the 
developing countries where they are obviously most needed. So, too, are so 
many of the other human error focused texts that have been cited in previous 
chapters. A similar experience has confronted road safety campaigners in 
developing countries.743 This, obviously, has become a major component of 
the human error conundrum – how do we transfer proven human error 
reduction techniques to the poorer countries where they are most needed? 
How do we encourage the inculcation of a safety culture into such countries? 
 
7.6.1. How, then, is a “safety culture” to be developed? 
 
The Australian state government body Workplace Health & Safety 
Queensland informs us that:- 
 
A safety culture is an organisational culture that places a high level of 
importance on safety beliefs, values and attitudes – and these are shared by 
the majority of people within the company or workplace. It can be 
characterised as „the way we do things around here‟. A positive safety culture 
can result in improved workplace health and safety (WHS) and organisational 
performance. 
 
For a safety culture to be successful it needs to be led from the top – that is, 
safety culture needs to be embraced and practised by the CEO and senior 
managers.744 
 
As with the wider topic of human error, safety culture has been extensively 
studied, written about and promoted. It is related to and bound up in the ever 
more intensive safety consciousness that has become widespread in most 
developed countries since the early 1980s. Led by the aviation, oil tanker and 
road safety developments described in Chapter 4, the promotional techniques 
have been notably effective. They have, as a result spread widely through 
most forms of human activities in those countries and elsewhere. 
 
However, while there are some encouraging developments occurring in 
places such as the Philippines,745 the concept of a safety culture is still little 
known and unappreciated in the poorer parts of the world except in the 
aviation industry. It is to be hoped that as has happened in the developed 
                                                     
741 Such as, Why the Human Element and CHIRP Maritime Causal Analysis, CHIRP, London, 
2017. 
742 In a 19 May 2017 letter to the IMO Secretary-General from Ms Katy Ware, Permanent 
Representative of the UK to the IMO. 
743 See Figure 1.5. 
744 From the introduction to a safety culture pamphlet published by Workplace Health and 
Safety Queensland. 
745 Refer to an example in 5.12. of the Archipelago Ferry Corp in the Philippines. 
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world, aviation safety consciousness will gradually spread through ferries to 
road safety and beyond. 
 
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland asserts that even in industries such 
as construction, where safety used commonly to be disregarded, a safety 
culture can be developed and encouraged by implementing these culture 
actions:- 
 
1. Communicate company values 
2. Demonstrate leadership 
3. Clarify required and expected behaviour 
4. Develop positive safety attitudes 
5. Personalise safety outcomes 
6. Engage and own safety responsibilities and accountabilities 
7. Increase hazard/risk awareness and preventive behaviours 
8. Improve understanding and effective implementation of safety management   
systems 
9. Monitor, review and reflect on personal effectiveness.746 
 
Such may be appropriate in developed countries enjoying high general 
standards of education. Their likely effectiveness in poorer countries is 
doubtful, however. The ongoing problem of poverty caused fatalism as 
discussed in Chapter 5 seems to be a major obstacle to reform. It is, 
unfortunately, a problem that is very difficult to solve. 
 
There are many useful and accurate descriptions of „safety culture‟. One of 
the better and more widely used comes from the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Commission. It states:  
 
The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, 
and style and proficiency of, an organisation‟s health and safety 
management.747 
  
Put more simply, perhaps, a good safety culture can be promoted and 
developed by good training techniques and practices and leadership example. 
 
Again, a more cynical view based on the author‟s personal observations in 
developing countries and the reports of the MBOIs into the Rabaul Queen and 
Sewol disasters, suggests that such visions of a safety culture may be more 
likely to be realised in developed and well-educated countries.748 In 
developing countries, more brutal, militaristic techniques for instilling a safety 
culture among employees appear more likely to be successful. There is little 
evidence of any safety training of ferry crews being conducted in developing 
countries. Perhaps, therefore, an organised campaign of customer avoidance, 
                                                     
746 W H & S Queensland, Ibid. 
747 See HSC (Health And Safety Commission), Third report: Organising for safety, ACNSI 
Study Group on Human Factors, HMSO, London, 1993. 
748 Refer to 3.24. and 3.25. 
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or a boycott, might force recalcitrant ferry owners to act to introduce the kinds 
of readily accessible safety training programmes that are required. 
 
A 2015 study Measuring Safety Culture on Ships Using Safety Climate: A 
Study among Indian Officers was revealing as to how difficult it is to instil a 
safety culture among officers in a developing country environment.749 
Importantly, it found among these comparatively well-educated seafarers, 
that, “The perception of safety level of seafarers was found to be low 
indicating the existence of misalignments between safety culture values and 
the actual safety climate”. It also found national culture, probably 
unsurprisingly, to be an important factor in efforts to promote a safety culture. 
 
The study also found that: “Although the (IMO) ISM Code is considered to 
provide a good basis for safety management, the extent of its implementation 
is a widely held concern with ISM audits and statutory surveys widely 
perceived to be of very limited benefit in helping to drive forward positive 
changes in safety management and leadership”. So, as recently as 2015, it 
found that, “…there appears to be a significant gap between espoused safety 
values and those actually found on board…” This is not encouraging. 
 
By contrast, though, Lu, C. S. and Yang, C. S. found in a 2010 study of 
Taiwanese ferry crews that, a “… greater safety climate will lead to better 
safety behaviour and further reduce accident occurrences”.750 This, perhaps, 
reinforces the view that it is more likely that an effective safety culture can be 
instilled in a developed, educated country, like Taiwan.  
 
Mr Lu has studied ferry safety widely in the context of Taiwanese operations. 
He determined that, “…crew members‟ ability was the most important 
dimension in the passenger ferry context…”.751  
 
Britain‟s Royal Navy, while far from flawless as far as accidents are 
concerned, has maintained a generally good and effective safety culture for 
generations. A reason for this may well be that the Navy, “…fosters 
cheerfulness and nourishes its collective memory”.752 This was proposed in a 
managerial advice essay by Andrew St. George. He states that the captain 
sets the mood of a vessel and that good communications are enhanced by 
“banter” and “informal networks”. The Royal Navy‟s “style of leadership”, he 
suggests, “fosters trust, respect and collective effort”. It is an approach that 
has facilitated an effective safety culture for well over a century. 
 
Often, but usually only in wealthier and military communities, humour can be 
very effective in promoting the safety message. It has certainly helped in the 
                                                     
749 Bhattacharya, Y. International Journal of e-Navigation and Maritime Economy, Elsevier, 
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750 Lu, C. S. and Yang, C. S. Safety climate and safety behavior in the passenger ferry 
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Royal Navy and the author noted and utilised it in his Pioneer Concrete 
experience.753 The Canadian aviation safety promotion company System 
Safety uses humour widely in its promotional literature and videos.754 Humour 
can be very effective psychologically in promoting safety culture.  
 
Swedish based Stena Line is one of the world‟s largest ferry operators. 
Impressively, if disappointingly unusually, it employs a safety manager. In the 
1990s he was Mr Per Nordstrom, who is, among other things, a qualified 
naval architect. Mr Nordstrom spoke at the Cruise & Ferry 95 Conference in 
London on the subject: The human factor in ferry safety.  
 
Importantly, he commented as follows: “I am convinced that there is a human 
error behind close to 100 per cent of all accidents at sea”. Further, he 
emphasised: “There is though, one significant problem with ferries. When 
something goes wrong or out of hand it can effect and involve many hundreds 
of passengers”. He added: “We as shipowners have to take full responsibility 
of how the ship is built, equipped, maintained and last but not least manned 
and organised”.755 Mr Nordstrom also commented on the need for ferry 
owners to deal with education, training, motivation and organisation in order to 
develop a safety culture. Significantly, Stena Line has never suffered a 
serious, multiple fatality ferry accident. 
 
Researching a paper published in the journal Industrial Safety on Cultural 
factors in maritime accidents, Finnish ethnologist Anne Ala-Pollanen 
examined the 121 accidents recorded as occurring in the Baltic Sea during 
2011.756 This was undertaken against a background of maritime culture. Ms 
Ala-Pollanen points out that, while most recent studies largely blame human 
factors for maritime accidents, “…there are no worldwide standardized 
accident reporting systems in the maritime domain to summarize causal 
themes from accident data…”.She states that: “Accidents are not usually 
caused by a single failure or mistake, but by the confluence of a whole series, 
or chain, of errors”. 
 
She also raised another possible maritime cultural problem in its “emphasis 
on masculinity” and maritime traditions that may now be outmoded if not 
obsolete. An interesting idea. 
 
7.6.2. The aviation industry, as usual, shows us the way. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the aviation industry, particularly since about 
1980, has successfully shown all other industries the way with respect to 
safety training, education and culture. The story of the recovery of the Qantas 
Airbus A380, QF32, from a very dangerous and damaging engine explosion is 
                                                     
753 Described in 7.3.1. 
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an example of the aviation safety culture working to perfection.757 It describes 
the recovery from a situation that could easily have degenerated so as to 
cause hundreds of deaths. All the positive factors of aviation safety culture 
were displayed there. 
 
The aviation industry has been imbued with a much more safety conscious 
culture than the maritime industry. Partly, this must be due to the clear 
effectiveness dichotomy that distinguishes ICAO from IMO. Partly it may be 
because ships work in two dimensions rather than the three of aircraft. That 
requires greater situational awareness. Partly it could be because aircraft 
travel so much faster than ships, thus requiring much greater concentration. 
And, partly, it may be possible that the generally much greater asset value of 
aircraft than ships ensures that their operators focus better. 
 
Despite the best efforts of shipowners, governments, classification societies, 
professional associations and the maritime media, the safety message is still 
failing to get through to seafarers as Captain Stevens‟ comments in 7.5.4. 
make clear. Obviously, it must very effectively concentrate the minds of 
aviators to know that if they do make an error, the high speeds at which their 
aircraft operates makes fatalities almost inevitable. Seafarers are equally as 
aware that usually any errors they make will not result in fatalities. Their 
minds, therefore, are less likely to be as focussed as are those of aviators. 
 
These factors make it unlikely that the rigorous operational standards and the 
very strong safety culture of most aviation industry operators will ever be fully 
transferred to the maritime industry. Nevertheless, they provide an excellent 
and well proven model for the maritime industry to copy. The inarguable fact 
is that the aviation industry‟s safety education, training, culture and techniques 
have been impressively successful for nearly four decades. The maritime 
industry, particularly the ferry sector, should follow aviation‟s example much 
more closely than it does. 
 
The author discussed elsewhere the strange safety dichotomy between the 
aviation and maritime industries as follows:- 
 
7.6.3. Aviation vs. Maritime – A strange safety dichotomy 
 
Having studied the problems of maritime safety – particularly with respect to 
passenger vessels – for nearly forty years, I have been struck by the vastly 
different attitudes prevailing in the aviation and maritime industries. 
 
I am well aware that I am far from the first to notice this but I think that what 
really amazes me is that this strange dichotomy endures. It seems irrational to 
me that, generally speaking, the lives of aviation passengers are regarded as 
being far more valuable and important than their ship or boat passenger 
counterparts. 
 
                                                     
757 Hughes, A. J. What Air Crash Investigations Didn‟t Tell You About QF 32 (Airbus 380), 
Airlines & Aviation, 26 December 2014, Reprinted on LinkedIn, 22 January 2017. 
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This also manifests itself in the differing attitudes and consciousness of 
mariners and aviators. Perhaps, having been trained in both spheres, I am 
more conscious than most of the differences. 
 
I well remember a short voyage I took aboard a Royal Australian Navy Attack 
class patrol boat from Melbourne to Westernport in the early eighties. It was 
neither the first nor the last such voyage I have been fortunate enough to take 
on the vessels of a number of navies. What stood out, however, was that this 
particular boat was commanded by a naval aviator. His pre-voyage safety 
briefing was careful, comprehensive and comprehensible, even by the lowliest 
and youngest rating in his crew. I have, notably, never experienced the same 
again. 
 
Now that I am more than ever intently studying the problem of fatal passenger 
vessel accidents, I am often reminded of that fundamental attitudinal 
difference between most mariners and most aviators. I hasten to note that I 
use the word “most” very advisedly as I have seen and experienced “careless 
cowboys” in both worlds. 
 
In its many clear and concise texts on maritime safety, command, 
seamanship and navigation, the always excellent Nautical Institute frequently 
refers to aviation industry procedures by way of illustration of best, or at least 
better, practice. They are very right to do so since the dichotomy between the 
aviation and maritime industries is most starkly defined in their differing 
approaches to safety. 
 
Obviously, approaches to safety also differ within both transport media. For 
example, oil and gas service vessel and gas tanker personnel are generally 
far more safety conscious than their counterparts operating fishing boats or 
passenger vessels except, mostly, cruise ships. That statement is derived 
both from my personal observation and from accident statistics. 
 
A notable and very interesting phenomenon is that both the numbers and 
rates per flying hours and passenger miles of passenger aircraft accidents 
and fatalities have been steadily declining over the past half century. With 
passenger shipping, the opposite has been the case. This is partially due to 
the fact that reports and records of passenger vessel accidents were scarce 
until the advent of the internet. Until about 2000, many shipping accidents 
were simply never reported. Aviation accidents, on the other hand, were 
faithfully and comprehensively reported and recorded assiduously and in 
great detail. Apart from in the richest, most developed countries, maritime 
accidents were widely ignored. 
 
This relative absence of passenger shipping accident statistics offers a very 
sharp contrast between shipping and aviation and probably best sums up the 
dichotomy between the sectors. Aviation is very careful to collate, compile, 
study and learn from its accident statistics. Shipping, generally, tries very hard 




I invite readers to refer to the International Maritime Organisation‟s online 
GISIS database and its accident statistics. This Global Integrated Shipping 
Information System is a well meaning but completely inadequate attempt by 
IMO to match its aviation counterpart, ICAO, in the provision and study of 
accident statistics. Sadly, GISIS, apart from as far as the rich developed 
countries are concerned, is almost completely useless. Refer to some of the 
more notable developing country accidents you know of and see how GISIS 
approaches their recording. Then compare and contrast that with ICAO‟s 
treatment of even the least known aviation accidents. It is a very and tragically 
revealing exercise. 
 
Starting from this paucity of data, the differences between aviation and 
maritime approaches to safety multiply dramatically. Anyone who has 
travelled by either ferry or passenger aircraft would be well aware of the 
differences between the approaches to safety in the two sectors. Safety is 
serious business in aviation. In shipping, regrettably, it is too often a 
grudgingly made afterthought at best. 
 
Safety regulations and reporting requirements are rigorously enforced globally 
in aviation. In shipping, even in developed countries, they are frequently 
regarded lackadaisically. In developing countries they are generally ignored. 
 
Shipping has much to learn from aviation in terms of safety and many other 
matters. It is high time we took the aviation example much more seriously. 758 
 
Safety, it seems, is a state of mind. That state of mind is dominant globally in 
aviation and in developed country shipping but practically and tragically non-
existent in most non-aviation activities in developing countries. 
 
7.6.4. Adapting proven human error solutions to the maritime 
industry. 
 
Israeli American psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
demonstrated that humans are “wired to make mistakes”.759 However, they 
showed that people value and take note of gains and losses, thus making 
their behaviour able to be modified. Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize 
in 2002 for his work on behavioural economics. 
 
This ability to modify human behaviour has been proved almost ad nauseum 
in successful campaigns to improve safety in almost all industries and much 
of public behaviour in most developed countries. It would seem that the 
psychological techniques the pair researched and developed in the 1970s and 
1980s should be readily adaptable to the maritime industry, even in 
developing countries. 
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In their work on improving safety in complex systems, Marais et al described 
the “interactive complexity” of “tightly coupled” systems such as aircraft, 
aircraft carriers, air traffic control towers and nuclear power plants.760 They 
also referred to ferries and described the “complex interactions” in the Herald 
of Free Enterprise accident. 
 
Using a rather convoluted and confusing diagram, they described quite clearly 
how: “The type of bottom-up decentralized decision-making advocated for 
HROs (High Risk Organizations) can lead to major accidents in complex 
socio-technical systems”.761 This analysis was based on the Herald of Free 
Enterprise accident. They described ferries as complex and high-tech and 
claimed that “… learning from accidents is not the only or even the most 
effective way to lower risk in high-tech systems”. 
 
Their analysis compares the objectives of greater reliability and safety in 
systems and suggest that they sometimes conflict. They logically claim that a 
systems approach to safety is more likely to be effective than a component 
approach. 
  
Other marine accident analyses describe issues of language, fatigue and 
working conditions as being contributors to human errors. Language, 
however, seems unlikely to be a factor in domestic ferry accidents where 
almost all fatalities (93%) have occurred. Fatigue and working conditions 
logically appear to be significant contributors. However, obviously, elimination 
or improvement of those in developing countries will require very significant 
government intervention.762 
 
7.7.1. Better training would eliminate many problems. 
 
With some 180 active maritime training and education institutions, it is 
incongruous that the Philippines continues to have such a bad ferry safety 
record. That, the author has been advised by Commodore Dante La Jiminez, 
is due to the fact that almost all graduates of those institutions are employed 
outside the Philippines.763 The fact that their graduates are in considerable 
demand from developed country shipowners confirms that advice. 
 
So, as in most, if not all, of the twenty most dangerous countries for ferry 
accidents, it appears that crew training is dangerously deficient, at least as far 
as domestic ferries are concerned. The 2016 Allianz Safety & Shipping 
Review from leading marine insurance underwriter, Allianz, confirms that. 
Discussing passenger ship safety, it states that: “some Asian routes are many 
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years behind recognised international standards, as evidenced by a number 
of ferry losses in South East Asian waters”.764 
 
One of the major handicaps restricting an insurance led safety improvement is 
due to the very inadequate data available about domestic ferry accidents in 
developing countries. Indeed, at the International Union of Marine Insurers 
2017 Conference in Tokyo, in which the author participated, there was a100 
minute workshop dedicated to the problems of „Facts & Figures‟.765 Indeed, 
the marine and Protection & Indemnity (P&I) insurance sectors appear to be 
increasingly interested in the risks associated with domestic ferry operations. 
The very fact of the author being invited to address the 2017 IUMI Tokyo 
Conference indicates that. The marine insurance sector, generally, could be a 
very powerful reforming influence as far as domestic ferry safety is concerned. 
Fortunately, it appears likely that it will be. 
 
The Allianz Review describes an increase in fatigue related insurance claims, 
low crew numbers and a “future staffing shortage”. It comments that 
“…training remains below par in some areas…”. Complacency, boredom, 
drudgery and “routinisation” have been described as additional human error 
inducing factors in an editorial in trade magazine Ferry Technology.766 All 
these would indicate an urgent need for increased and improved training of, 
particularly domestic, ferry crews. Much greater discipline of crews is equally 
urgently needed. 
 
Leading Australian fishing vessel owner Hagen Stehr AO, wrote in May 2016 
that: “Training is still an unappreciated field of endeavour”.767 Mr. Stehr is the 
founding chairman of the Australian Maritime Academy. He is well aware of 
the safety deficiencies of the fishing industry that are similar to those exhibited 
by the ferry industry.  
 
Describing problems he sees in the fishing industry, he commented: “…I did 
advocate strict laws and controls in the maritime and fishing sectors 
concerning training, skills and knowledge, for our crews to become more 
professional, committed, have a pride in their positions, and to eliminate the 
„she‟ll be right mate‟ attitude so entrenched in our industry”. He concluded his 
comments thus: “The conclusion is that training and tough analysis of skills 
are imperative in a safety conscious industry and you can never get enough 
training. 
 
Another Australian, Captain Kim Cleggett, the founder of International 
Maritime Services, a global vessel delivery and crew training business,768 
commented to the author thus: “Many of the (Asian) crews we work with have 
the paper qualifications but they lack the experience and „hands on‟ training 
                                                     
764 See Allianz Safety and Shipping Review 2016. Ibid, p. 2. 
765 Anon, IUMI 2017 Tokyo, September 17-20, Conference Programme, p. 28, Hamburg, 
2017. 
766 Roberts, E. Ferry routine raises risk of rogue behavior, Ferry Technology, Labdon, 
London, June/July 2008, p.3. 
767 Stehr, H. in Ausmarine, Baird Publications, Melbourne, May 2016, p. 6. 
768 See www.inationalmaritime.com. 
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required to make them competent. We frequently need to retrain them to 
make them safe to go to sea with”.769 
 
As Lu and Yang, in their 2010 paper Safety climate and safety behaviour in 
the passenger ferry context describe it, “…the majority of workplace accidents 
and injuries can be attributed to the unsafe work practices of employees 
rather than unsafe working conditions”.770 Their work was based on a study of 
practices in a Taiwanese ferry industry context but set against research into 
wider, global literature.  
 
They concluded that a management led and inspired safety climate is vital 
and that, “…safety training and emergency preparedness are positively 
associated with safety behaviour, including safety compliance and safety 
participation, whereas safety policy and safety communication have a positive 
but not significant influence on safety compliance”.771 In other words, their 
very extensive research confirms that effective safety training significantly 
improves safety behaviour and consciousness. 
 
7.7.2. Who will pay for such training? 
 
Who will pay for such training in developing countries? Ultimately, it will 
probably be a combination of national government and foreign aid money. An 
extant example is the support provided to Indonesia by the Australian 
Maritime Safety Authority. Meanwhile, however, private companies such as 
the large Dutch shipbuilding company Damen Shipyards Group are practical 
and effective benefactors. In the Philippines, for example, Damen joined with 
the Netherlands Shipping Training Centre in 2016 to offer a training course 
they have developed for Philippines based ferry crew. The launching press 
release explained: “The training package will feature a number of elements, 
including rules and regulations (ISM Code), crew and crisis management and 
– important in public transportation – cross-cultural differences”.772 
 
As with most other aspects of ferry safety in developing countries, the wheel 
does not need to be re-invented. The maritime industry in developed countries 
and many other industries globally have excellent training programs that could 
readily and economically be adapted to local conditions even in the most 
impoverished of nations. Again, what is required to make it happen is a 
willingness on the part of IMO and the national governments concerned to 
ensure that it does happen. Very regrettably, there is little evidence of such 
will forthcoming from IMO headquarters in London or from the capitals of the 
countries concerned. It seems more likely that the private sector, some NGOs 
and benevolent neighbouring developed countries will make things happen, 
perhaps with some encouragement from insurers. 
 
                                                     
769 Conversation with the author at INTERFERRY 2017 Conference in Split, October 2017. 
770 Lu, C. S. & Yang, C. S. in Accident Analysis and Prevention, Vol 43, 2011, Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, 2011, p.329. 
771 Ibid. p. 339. 
772 Described in Damen press release of 13 October 2016. www.damen.com. 
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7.8.0. Insurers to demand reforms. 
 
While most of the smaller vessels that are involved in fatal accidents are 
believed to be un-insured, the larger ones – with the biggest death tolls – 
appear to be at least partially insured, especially in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Press reports of the aftermath of accidents often refer to 
insurance claims and disputes, particularly in the Philippines.773 In developed 
countries ships are invariably insured. Passenger compensation costs, even 
in developing countries, are apparently increasing rapidly. They have already 
done so in developed countries. This, obviously, is of considerable concern to 
insurers who can be expected to act rationally and logically in their own best 
interests in response. 
 
As far back as in 2000 at the London conference of the International Union of 
Marine Insurance (IUMI), a leading underwriter, David Davies of Royal and 
Sun Alliance said that a major cruise ship loss “would blow the guts out of the 
market”.774  The rapid growth in the predominantly American owned cruise 
industry over the last twenty years has highlighted the problems facing the 
marine insurance sector. Obviously, American litigation habits make the 
problem particularly alarming to insurers in that jurisdiction but those habits 
are inevitably spreading globally. IMO has dithered and a division between 
rich and poor countries has opened as the value of a human life has been 
debated. Is, for example, a Filipino worth as much as a Frenchman? 
 
Commencing at an IMO conference in Athens in December 1974, the 
dithering and debate finally resulted in the „Entry into force‟ in April 2014, forty 
years later, of the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers 
and their Luggage by Sea (PAL).775 According to IMO: “The Convention 
establishes a regime of liability for damage suffered by passengers carried on 
a seagoing vessel”. However, unless such was caused recklessly, the 
carrier‟s liability, including for death or injury, can be limited to 250,000 SDR 
(Special Drawing Rights), or about USD 345,000, per person. The Convention 
requires carriers to be insured accordingly. 
 
At the time of publication none of the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities 
were signatories to the PAL Convention. Indeed, by January 2016 only 24 
countries were.776 Again, IMO has shown itself unwilling, even with more than 
forty years to prepare, to persuade, cajole, demand or influence its poorer 
member states to take this elementary step towards ensuring greater ferry 
safety. 
 
While the passenger vessel insurance debate has tended to focus on cruise 
ships because of the staggering amounts of money likely to be involved – one 
incident with passenger deaths, pollution and salvage involved could easily 
                                                     
773 There are numerous examples in Appendix A, particularly with respect to Sulpicio Lines 
and Negros Navigation. 
774 Reported in Seatrade Cruise Review, Stuart, D., Escalating risk, Seatrade Group, London, 
December 2000, p. 37. 
775 For details refer to www.imo.org/en/About/conventions/. 
776 According to Shoreline Passenger Solutions, www.shoreline.bm/sps_faq/. 
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exceed USD 1 billion. Indeed, it already has in the case of the Costa 
Concordia.777 However, in the 1990s, the Norwegian protection and indemnity 
club (P&I Club) Skuld, had to pay out on the Scandinavian Star, Estonia and 
Sleipner ferry disasters, among others, that cost 1,057 lives in total. By the 
beginning of 2000, Skuld was in financial trouble and required re-
structuring.778 
 
The availability and costs of insurance cover for ferries, therefore, is already a 
problem in developed countries and becoming one in developing countries 
where larger ferries operate such as Indonesia and the Philippines. It is 
difficult to imagine that the insurers of ferry owning companies such as 
Sulpicio Lines and Negros Navigation, or their successors, have failed to see 
the implications of the spread of accession to the PAL Convention. It seems 
inevitable that even their governments will eventually accede to it. 
 
Meanwhile, such companies are evidently at least partially insured. Given 
their appalling accident records, the risks involved in insuring them must give 
all marine insurers and P&I clubs considerable food for thought. It must also 
make careful and responsible operators think about how much of their own 
premiums subsidise such irresponsible operators. No doubt they will be 
informing their insurers of their concerns. 
 
The International Union of Marine Insurance, which represents hull insurers 
as distinct from protection and indemnity insurers, and its members are well 
aware of the safety problems facing developing country ferries. They have a 
sound overall general knowledge of the appalling safety record of ferry 
owners in such countries. Their problem, which they openly acknowledge, is 
that they lack accurate, detailed data with which to properly estimate risk.779 
The topic has been extensively discussed at their annual conferences, most 
particularly in Hong Kong in 2014 and Tokyo in 2017. At the former 
conference naval architect Stuart Ballantyne gave a very detailed explanation 
of the ferry safety problem in developing countries and proffered some 
practical potential solutions.780  
 
The author was subsequently invited to deliver a paper on developing country 
domestic ferry accidents at the IUMI 2017 Conference in Tokyo.781 He 
suggested that the insurance industry should do more, in its own best 
interests, to encourage greater safety consciousness among ferry operators 
and regulators in such countries. As described in 7.7.1, the industry, at that 
conference, lamented the paucity of available data on marine accidents 
                                                     
777 The total claims exceeded USD 2 billion according to: www.artemis.bm/blog/2014/07/15/ 
and www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/costa-concordia/. 
778 See Mulrenan, J. Skuld for the scalpel, TradeWinds, NHST Media Group, Oslo, 17 March 
2000. p.18. 
779 See presentation by Seltman, A. Global marine insurance report, at the IUMI Conference, 
Genoa, September 2016 slide headed Data Challenges. 
780 Presentation by Stuart Ballantyne at the IUMI Conference, Hong Kong, September 2014, 
www.iumi.com. 




generally and domestic ferry accidents in particular. The IUMI 2017 
Conference dedicated a session to that problem.782 
 
So, clearly, the marine and protection and indemnity insurance providers are 
well aware of the problem and of the problems they face as ferry operators in 
developing countries increasingly seek to purchase insurance cover from 
them. They are already aware that the Asia-Pacific region is the fastest 
growing for hull cargo and P&I insurance premium income.783 However, so 
far, they have little passenger vessel claims experience in the region.784 It can 
be assumed that, as that happens, insurers will require much greater 
emphasis on safety from those owners. Insurance obviously involves risk but 
it is not gambling. Insurers will ensure that the vessel operators they insure 
behave responsibly. 
 
Insurers, generally, are becoming increasingly proactive in risk reduction. The 
industry‟s interest in obtaining more and better data about ferry safety risk is 
indicative of that. An interesting related move made by major industry 
participants could be readily adapted to the ferry sector. In that example, five 
major marine insurers have united to refuse to insure fishing vessels that have 
been blacklisted for pirate fishing, also known as illegal, unreported and 
unregulated (IUU) fishing.785 
 
7.9.0. Proven human error solutions are well known. 
 
The topic of human error, particularly maritime human error, has been widely 
researched, analysed, discussed and written about. Numerous very effective 
solutions to it have been developed, proposed, promoted and effectively 
implemented. It has been approached rigorously in most commercial and 
government activities, including maritime activities, in most developed 
countries. Those solutions have proved to be very effective in widespread 
practice across many industries and many cultures.786 
 
Even in developing countries, industries such as aviation, oil tanker, mining 
and offshore oil and gas implement safety regimes that are identical to those 
in force in the developed world. They are equally as effective there. 
Employees from developing countries working in developed countries have 
been readily trained to developed country safety standards.  
 
So, standard developed country safety training techniques could readily be 
transferred to developing countries – as they already are in certain industries 
– if only the will to do so were there. The real problem lies in the unwillingness 
of national governments to act and the absence of any apparent will on the 
part of IMO to persuade them to so act or to support them in doing so. 
 
                                                     
782 IUMI 2017 Tokyo, Conference Programme, Ibid. 
783 Sellman, A. Ibid. 
784 Ibid. 
785 Reported in Anon. Insurers unite to cut pirate fishing lifeline, 
www.bairdmaritime.com/fishing-boat-world/regulation/ 17 October 2017. 
786 As has been shown in the foregoing pages. 
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Further, as ferry operating businesses in developing countries mature, they 
will increasingly need to purchase hull, cargo and P&I insurance. Before 
insuring such risks, insurers will obviously do everything they can to reduce 
them. They will certainly not insure against almost inevitable disasters. That 





Evacuation, lifesaving and search and rescue deficiencies 
 
It‟s no use having the best most expensive evacuation and life 
saving equipment available if it is unable to be readily accessed or 
launched or, even worse, if the master of the vessel and his crew 
are incompetent. Equipment and procedures must be practical and 
appropriate to the local cultural, educational and economic 
situation. 
 
8.1.0. Evacuation, lifesaving and SAR deficiencies cause 
many fatalities. 
 
Sadly, the BMPVA database is replete with instances of fatalities being 
directly attributable to inadequate evacuation or escape equipment, 
organisation or procedures.787 The same applies to lifesaving equipment and, 
after the event, to inadequate or botched search and rescue (SAR) efforts. 
While, obviously, such problems arise occasionally in developed countries, 
they continue to occur with disappointing frequency in developing ones. 
Combined, they contribute to significant numbers of unnecessary fatalities. 
 
Normally, the most common accidents, groundings, collisions, allisions and 
disintegrations, happen very rapidly. Too frequently, they result in capsizes. 
Thus an organised evacuation is usually more difficult than from accidents 
involving fires and explosions.788 When a vessel capsizes, as it usually does - 
except in the cases of multihulls - following those common accidents, there is 
rarely sufficient time available to organise a disciplined and orderly 
evacuation. Survivors find themselves in the sea and dependent upon any 
lifejackets, lifeboats or liferafts and Emergency Position Indicating Radio 
Beacons (EPIRB) that happen to float free. Otherwise, they must rely on 
flotsam. Lifesaving equipment should be purchased and installed with that 
reality in mind. 
 
The BMPVA database records 750 fatal passenger vessel accidents from 
1966 to 2015.789 Notably, ferries were involved in 681 (or 91%) of them. Of 
the total PV accidents, 555 or 74 per cent resulted from collisions, allisions, 
groundings, disintegration or straight capsizes. The difficulty of evacuation or 
escape from such accidents is emphasised by the fact that 90 per cent of the 
known fatalities arose from them. Conversely, 97 accidents, or 13 per cent of 
the total, resulted from fires or explosions that resulted in eight per cent of all 
fatalities. 
 
                                                     
787 See the Notes column in Appendix A, Ibid. 
788 Commented on at length and with particular reference to developing country Ro-Pax ferry 
accidents by American naval architect Bruce Hutchison, Ibid. 
789 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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8.2.1. Evacuation difficulties are the primary problem. 
 
An orderly and successful evacuation depends upon a number of factors. The 
first is the speed of the accident. Allisions, collisions, groundings and 
disintegrations usually happen very rapidly and often result in capsizes and/or 
nearly immediate sinkings.790 This problem is exacerbated in the case of 
conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries by their complex internal layouts and 
structures.791 When neither crews nor passengers are trained or even briefed 
as to how to respond to such an accident, the chances of a successful 
outcome are small. They are even less so if exit signs are inadequate; if 
safety exits are locked or blocked; and, if life jackets and rafts are invisible or 
inaccessible as they often are from the author‟s observation. Small, enclosed 
monohull ferries or tourist boats are particularly dangerous in such 
situations.792 
 
8.2.2. Some vessel types are much harder to evacuate. 
 
Successful evacuations also depend on the damaged stability and buoyancy 
of the vessel. If it submerges quickly, there is obviously a major impediment to 
evacuation. If exits are locked or if, as in the case of the Sewol, the 
passengers are ordered by the master to remain in their cabins, chances of 
survival are negligible.793 Conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries are 
particularly susceptible to damaged stability deficiencies and tend to lose 
buoyancy almost instantly if capsized. 
 
Aluminium or FRP multi-hulled ferries, therefore, are incomparably safer in 
such accidents than are monohull ferries constructed of any material.794 
Catamarans tend to remain largely afloat and relatively stable even after 
severe accidents. The only known instance of that not happening was in the 
1999 case of the Sleipner where the vessel grounded on a granite reef at 
such speed that it practically disintegrated.795 More of the 16 fatalities in that 
case were due to impact injuries than to drowning or hypothermia. Even then, 
apparently, the wreckage of the vessel remained upright and largely above 
water. 
 
Even large monohull Ro-Pax ferries such as the Herald of Free Enterprise, 
Jan Heweliusz, Estonia, Al Salam Boccaccio 98, Le Joola and several others 
have tended to capsize and/or sink very rapidly following an accident.796 This 
largely precludes significant evacuation and, in any case, the lifeboats with 
                                                     
790 For example, see the videos of a ferry collision and capsize in Bangladesh in Appendix F 
791 Explained in detail by Hutchison, B. Capsize Egress and Survival with Particular 
Reference to RO-RO & Passenger Vessels, Ibid. 
792 Note the rapidity of the capsize in the second of the two videos in Appendix F. 
793 For details refer to 3.25. 
794 See, for example, the detailed reports of the Lamma IV ferry collision in Hong Kong on 1 
October 2012 in Appendix A. There an aluminium monohull ferry collided with an aluminium 
catamaran ferry. There were 39 fatalities on the monohull and none on the catamaran. 
795 For details see Appendix A and Chapter 3 generally.  
796 See Chapter 3 generally for details. 
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which they have been expensively equipped have proved to be largely 
useless. 
 
8.2.3. Evacuation problems have been studied extensively. 
 
Numerous academic, classification society, maritime media and regulatory 
studies have been made about evacuation from ships and of human reactions 
to and behaviour during such evacuations. One Korean study published in 
2003 examined IMO‟s May 1999 “guidelines for the evacuation analysis of 
Ro-Ro passenger ships to prevent loss of life in maritime accidents”.797 It 
concluded that the IMO proposals were insufficient to increase, “…the degree 
of passenger safety to a satisfactory level”.  
 
It gave as an example the botched evacuation from the non-fatal and not very 
serious grounding of the aluminium catamaran fast ferry St. Malo off Jersey, 
in the Channel Islands, in 1995.798 That accident, which resulted in minor 
injuries and mild hypothermia for 55 elderly passengers, was more due to 
officer incompetence than to the IMO guidelines.799 The captain was widely 
criticised by the subsequent MBOI and in the media for his illogical evacuation 
procedure which followed his appalling seamanship in taking the dangerous 
short cut that originally caused the grounding. 
 
The vessel did not sink and, as is always the case, the vessel itself, if it 
remains afloat, is the best place of refuge for survivors. Indeed, all those 
aboard could have stepped directly off the vessel onto rescue craft, of which 
many were available, without getting wet. Instead, the captain unnecessarily 
deployed his vessel‟s inflatable liferafts and directed his passengers to jump 
into them from heights of more than a metre. They were where the ankle 
fractures, hypothermia and other injuries were sustained among the 
passengers.800 
 
While the authors of that paper drew the correct conclusions from their study, 
their analysis and reasoning was wrong. They stated that: “This shows that 
evacuation analysis is meaningless in practical situations if it does not take 
account of rolling, pitching and listing of the ship and panic of the 
passengers”.801 In reality, this author contends, only the listing of the ship was 
relevant in the St. Malo case. It could not roll or pitch as it was hard aground 
on rocks. The most important factors contributing to the injuries of the 
passengers were the captain‟s original negligence and the incompetent 
manner in which he directed the evacuation. His was clearly human error and 
no amount of mathematical analysis can explain or justify that. 
 
 
                                                     
797 Lee, D. et al. The current status and future issues in human evacuation from ships, in 
Safety Science 41, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2003, pp. 861-876. 
798 For an excellent summary report of the subsequent MAIB investigation, refer to 
www.independent.co.uk/news/ferry-captain-who-hit-rocks-risked-300-lives/.  
799 As described in Work Boat World, Baird Publications, Singapore, May 1995, p. 5. 
800 St. Malo investigation report, Ibid. 
801 Lee, D. et al. Ibid. 
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8.2.4. Meaningless mathematically based evacuation analysis. 
 
Mathematically based evacuation analysis is indeed meaningless. Very few 
accidents are the same. Nor do human beings react uniformly to them. 
Vessels, crews, masters, weather conditions and types of passenger 
reactions differ from case to case. They cannot be modelled in the abstract. 
Equations are of little or no use in predicting weather or human behaviour. 
Evacuation principles and practices can only realistically be studied and 
taught as generalities and by studying cases of actual accidents. The most 
important preventative measure is to employ captains who are quick thinkers, 
innovators and improvisers who have common sense. 
 
The study‟s authors would have done far better to have examined the much 
less successful evacuations of the Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia 
which they mentioned in their introduction but failed to examine.802 Those 
accidents starkly exposed the inadequacies of evacuation procedures and 
equipment in 1987 and 1994 and which have barely improved today except 
where evacuation chute systems with integrated inflatable life rafts, or marine 
evacuation systems (MES) are fitted, mainly to fast ferries.803 
 
All the St. Malo accident really proved was that fast aluminium catamaran 
ferries are exceptionally safe even in the hands of a negligent and 
incompetent captain. Human errors from the Titanic through the Estonia and 
St. Malo to the Kilimanjaro II and many more prove that, even if you have an 
excellent vessel and equipment, a negligent or incompetent captain will 
largely negate that. 
 
A more recent study took a psychosocial approach to examining passenger 
“knowledge and perceptions of safety and risk during voyage at sea”.804 
Essentially, that Norwegian focused study showed that older passengers took 
more notice of safety briefings than their younger counterparts and that in vivo 
safety briefings, as are standard practice in aviation, were more effective than 
video only instructions. It took a somewhat more realistic approach to the St. 
Malo grounding than its Korean counterpart but still missed the point of the 
lessons learnt from it. It did, however, learn enough to present serious doubts 
about the value of IMO‟s 2002 evacuation analysis. 
 
 
8.2.5. The importance of effective safety briefings. 
 
The study emphasised the importance of effective safety briefings for both 
feelings of passenger security and the likelihood of a successful evacuation. It 
should be noted, though, that the subjects of the Norwegian study were 
affluent, generally well-educated and travelling on well constructed and 
                                                     
802 See case studies in Chapter 3. 
803 Refer to websites of Liferaft Systems Australia and Viking Lifesaving Equipment, Ibid. for 
examples of available systems. 
804 Hystad, S. W. et al. Safe travel: Passenger assessment of trust and safety during 
seafaring, Transportation Research, Elsevier, Amsterdam, February 2016, pp.29-36. 
 
 244 
equipped and competently crewed vessels. Rather unlike their counterparts in 
developing countries who would be unlikely to be given a safety briefing at all. 
 
This same theme was examined in a 1999 article How to cope with crisis point 
– Understanding how passengers react in an emergency is crucial to safe 
evacuation in Lloyd‟s Cruise International.805 This described a British study of 
the case of the May 1999 fire and sinking of the cruise ship Sun Vista in 
daylight in glassy calm weather in the Malacca Straits. Although it was a near 
perfect evacuation with all 1,104 people aboard safely evacuated by lifeboat 
to almost immediate rescue, it was a most unusual scenario. However, the 
important point made was that it is “…essential for crew to understand how 
humans tend to react in a crisis or a crowd”.  
 
This experience was reinforced in a contemporary Canadian study reported in 
Lloyd‟s List in 1999.806 That study was made in the context of ferries and 
tourist boats rather than cruise ships. It simulated evacuation behaviour and 
passenger paths. It discovered that it is wrong to think that passengers 
necessarily panic. Rather, they “…defer to figures of authority even when they 
are wrong”. The problem occurs when the figures of authority, usually the 
captain, let them down. Even then, though, panic does not necessarily ensue. 
 
Evacuation remains a topic of considerable debate. Organisations as diverse 
as IMO, INTERFERRY, the Institute of Marine Engineers, the Bahamas 
Maritime Authority, the British MCA, the International Council of Cruise Lines, 
the Royal Institution of Naval Architects, DNV-GL, Lloyd‟s Register, the U.S. 
Coast Guard, Australian Maritime Safety Authority, the British maritime union, 
Nautilus, and many others have looked frequently at the problems of 
passenger ship evacuation and the deficiencies of lifeboats and their 
launching systems.807   
 
While some slight improvements have been made, the recent appalling 
disaster of the Costa Concordia evacuation in 2012 proves that there is still a 
long way to go.808 That applies to the cruise ship sector that takes such 
problems very seriously. The ferry sector in developing countries is another 
matter again. It is much worse and, generally, owners and crews have proved 
to be uninterested in safety matters. Even in developed countries, however, 
safety briefings and availability of and access to life jackets and rafts can still 
be wholly inadequate.809 
 
 
                                                     
805 Cypher, L. J. Lloyd‟s Cruise International, Informa Group, London, September 1999, 
pp.14-15. 
806 O‟Mahoney, H. Safety study may herald passenger craft rethink, Lloyd‟s List, Informa 
Group, London, January 2000, Regulation. 
807 For example, see articles by Parker, S. in various issues of Lloyd‟s Cruise International, 
Informa Group, London during 2000 and www.worldmaritimenews.com/archives/201888/. 
808 See Appendix A for details. 
809 As the author noted during a cruise on two separate Zurichsee owned ferries on Lake 
Zurich, Switzerland, in October 2017. See 8.2.6. below. 
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8.2.6. Exits and life saving equipment must be accessible, 
obvious and easily used. 
 
It is regrettable that the great majority of fatal accidents in developing 
countries are caused by allisions, collisions, groundings capsizes and 
disintegrations.810 They, almost invariably, as mentioned, result in rapid 
capsize or sinking. So, in such countries, especially in smaller vessels, 
lifejackets ought to be worn at all times and lifeboats, Carley Floats, strobe 
lights, EPIRBs and liferafts should be of the simple „float free‟ type. That 
would give survivors of such accidents some hope of remaining afloat until 
rescuers find them. 
 
Outbreaks of fires, from whatever cause, usually provide sufficient time for an 
orderly evacuation to take place if the vessel‟s crew is well trained and 
disciplined and adequate lifesaving equipment is fitted. That, obviously, is not 
always the case as we saw with the Tamponas II, Moby Prince, Norman 
Atlantic and numerous other examples.811 
 
Even in developed countries, to give two recent instances, inadequately 
briefed passengers relied on directions from officers and crew who were more 
interested in saving themselves than attending to passengers. This happened 
in Italy with the Costa Concordia grounding and capsize in 2012 and with the 
capsize of the Sewol in Korea in 2014. In the former case the passengers 
were largely left to their own resources while the master and officers 
evacuated. In the latter the passengers were ordered to remain in their cabins 
as the vessel sank and, again, the officers evacuated.812 This resulted in 32 
deaths in the case of the Costa Concordia and nearly ten times as many, 
mostly teenage children, on the Sewol. In both cases the responsible ship 
masters and some of their officers, following exhaustive MBOIs and criminal 
trials, were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.813 
 
The author, as mentioned previously, published a series of articles written by 
Dag Pike that described the many safety deficiencies of Ro-Pax ferries 
operating in the English Channel and North Sea during the mid-1980s. Apart 
from numerous unsafe operating procedures, the articles described such 
dangerous practices as obscuring exit signs and even chaining exit doors 
closed. The author has also observed many other examples of dangerous 
practices in the United Kingdom as recently as 2013.814 One particularly 
egregious example, in the early 1990s, was aboard a near sister-ship to the 
Thames tourist ferry Marchioness shortly after that vessel capsized following 
a collision in 1989 with 51 fatalities resulting.815 The exit doors were 
insufficient and lifejackets very difficult to access. There was no safety 
briefing, just a blatant request for a tip from the crew. 
 
                                                     
810 See Appendix A generally and Chapter 3 for case studies. 
811 Refer to 3.5. and 3.10. and Chapter 3 more generally. 
812 For details of the Sewol sinking, refer to 3. 25. 
813 Appendix A, Ibid. 
814 Aboard the Scillonian III operating from Penzance to the Scilly Islands. 
815 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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During various travels through South East Asia in recent years, the author has 
sailed on numerous, mostly smaller, domestic ferries and tourist boats. Few, if 
any, beyond Singapore and Hong Kong are equipped with sufficient, 
accessible or effective lifejackets. Even on Hong Kong‟s iconic Star Ferries, 
life jackets are difficult to access.  
 
Life rafts or Carley Floats are rare, EPIRBs and strobe lights even rarer and 
printed evacuation instructions or verbal safety briefings non-existent. Exits 
are often blocked by cargo or passenger luggage. Crews rarely appear 
concerned with either the comfort or safety of their passengers. There are 
exceptions but, as of early 2017, they are rare. 
 
Even in highly developed countries, ferry safety is not always taken 
sufficiently seriously. For example, the author travelled on two ferries on Lake 
Zurich in Switzerland in October 2017. Both were operated by a Swiss 
government owned company, Zurichsee. Neither offered printed or verbal 
safety briefings; there were no life rafts or Carley floats obviously fitted; and, 
life jackets were stowed obscurely. This, despite the very cold water on which 
they operated. Two emails were sent to the managing director of Zurichsee 
enquiring about these deficiencies but no response has been received.816  
 
8.3.1. Little effective safety equipment reaches developing 
countries. 
 
A vast amount of evacuation, lifesaving and SAR equipment and training in 
techniques is available on the world market. However, regrettably, despite the 
best efforts of some generous rich country governments, very little of it finds 
its way to the appropriate places in developing countries. Consequently, in the 
twenty nations in which 89 per cent of passenger vessel fatalities have 
occurred, such equipment and training in its use is scarce to non-existent. 
Except, that is, for training in the Philippines. That country has numerous 
maritime schools and colleges but they seem to be very largely focussed on 
providing graduates for international rather than domestic employers. Filipino 
domestic ferries and tourist boats, except very new ones, are generally poorly 
equipped. As in all the other countries discussed, few, if any, EPIRBs or 
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) are known to be fitted there. 
 
Even where such equipment is fitted to ferries in developing countries, it is 
often of inferior quality and of impractical sizes and inaccessible. For example, 
the author has noted on recent ferry and tourist boat voyages in Thailand and 
the Philippines that lifejackets are sometimes required to be worn. That would 
be a considerable improvement if the lifejackets issued were actually of 
adequate size and quality and capable of supporting an unconscious survivor 
with his or her face out of the water. They were not. They were cheap and of 
very poor quality and poorly maintained. Apparently, they were more intended 
to satisfy regulatory inspections than for any lifesaving effectiveness. 
 
                                                     
816 Refer to Bibliography. 
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8.3.2. Much IMO “approved” safety equipment is heavy, 
difficult, expensive, impractical and even dangerous. 
 
Much of the equipment that is available in both rich and poor countries 
continues to be heavy, expensive, difficult and even dangerous to use. 
Lifeboats and their launching equipment continue to be a major problem. Too 
many lifeboat launching drills result in fatalities.817 Some inflatable life rafts 
are still being sold that require the use of a powered crane to launch them. 
Indeed, as recently as 2013 the author travelled on an elderly (36 years) 
English ferry, the Scillonian III  with such an arrangement.818 If there had been 
engine failure, which often accompanies an accident, an absence of hydraulic 
power would have made life raft launching very difficult, if not impossible. 
 
It is becoming apparent that traditional, standard life boats are becoming an 
expensive and sometimes dangerous anachronism. Most serious accidents 
such as those that befell the Herald of Free Enterprise, Scandinavian Star, 
Estonia, Al Salam Boccaccio 68, Moby Prince, Sewol and Costa Concordia 
found them wanting, if not completely useless.819 On all except the latter, 
evacuation was the fundamental problem. However, those survivors who did 
manage to evacuate were rarely able to access the lifeboats, if any, that were 
launched. 
 
Ferries, certainly, and even most cruise ships, rarely venture far from other 
marine traffic. Any survivors are unlikely to have to wait long for rescue, 
usually considerably less than 48 hours, especially when, or if, their vessel is 
fitted with a now globally mandatory automatically activated EPIRB. EPIRBs 
and AIS transmitters are inexpensive and very effective. Even the Rabaul 
Queen was equipped with one that worked effectively (albeit via stations in 
New Zealand and Australia.) and led to a rapid rescue effort.820 Even that, 
sadly, was too late. The grossly overloaded and under-equipped vessel 
capsized quickly and sank causing the deaths of many passengers. 
 
8.3.3. Conventional lifeboats are an expensive, complex, 
heavy and largely inadequate solution. 
 
Following the sinking of the Titanic in 1912 various types of lifeboat and 
various ratios of them to the numbers of people on board have been 
mandated by various authorities, ultimately by IMO with its SOLAS Code.821 
Lifeboats have undoubtedly saved many lives but mostly under favourable 
conditions. Launching them, particularly larger and heavier examples, in 
anything but benign conditions can be very dangerous. This is confirmed by 
the numerous examples of lifeboat drills gone wrong in the BMPVA 
                                                     
817 An experienced ship master, Captain Phillip Rentell MNI, commented: “…few masters with 
any common sense would consider putting boats in the water during their weekly crew drill”. 
In Seaways, The Nautical Institute, London, July 2000, p.13. 
818 In July 2013 on the Penzance to Scilly Islands ferry. 
819 Refer to case studies in Chapter 3. 
820 Chapter 3, Ibid. 
821 See IMO/SOLAS Code, Chapter III, www.imo.org. 
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database.822 That list, of course, only records passenger vessels. Lifeboat 
drills on non-passenger vessels have killed many more people. 
 
Lifeboats and their launching and retrieval systems have undergone 
considerable development in the century since the Titanic sinking. One 
notable feature of that development is that they have steadily become larger, 
heavier, more complex and, inevitably, more expensive. So have their 
launching systems. That, also inevitably, is largely the result of the ever 
increasing amount and complexity of the regulations covering their 
construction and operation.823 
 
As Captain Phillip Rentell MNI, an experienced cruise ship master described it 
in an essay in the Nautical Institute magazine Seaways, passenger ship 
evacuation is, “A master‟s worst nightmare”.824 There he described the 
dangers of a, “…slow and cumbersome davit launching system”. He 
advocated the then (in 2000) recently introduced evacuation chutes. He 
explained that in anything more than very light winds the possibility of safely 
launching more than half a passenger ship‟s lifeboats was slim. He further 
doubted the effectiveness of “archaic” lifejackets in keeping survivors‟ faces 
out of the water and in reducing hypothermia. His conclusions about then 
current safety and survival systems in use in 2000 were generally negative. 
Little has changed since despite a number of IMO and other conferences that 
were aimed at encouraging improvement. 
 
Captain Rentell‟s essay drew considerable comment in subsequent issues of 
Seaways from his fellow master mariners. Almost all were supportive and 
some described even worse problems.825 Essentially, even after more than a 
century of SOLAS and its predecessors, experienced and thoughtful 
passenger ship masters have serious doubts about the effectiveness of 
SOLAS mandated safety equipment and evacuation procedures. 
 
8.3.4. Evacuation and lifesaving equipment should be simpler, 
lighter, cheaper and easier to use. 
 
Given that reality, it seems logical and practical that even vessels operating 
well offshore should be equipped with inflatable life rafts accessed via 
evacuation chutes as on aircraft. They are far less expensive and lighter than 
traditional rigid hulled lifeboats and considerably simpler and easier to launch 
and access.  
 
A number of companies such as Liferaft Systems Australia, Zodiac of France 
and Viking Lifesaving Equipment of Denmark manufacture proven systems.826 
                                                     
822 Appendix A, Ibid. 
823 For example, see the Guidance notes: Lifeboat release and retrieval systems – new IMO 
regulations, Lloyd‟s Register, London, May 2012. 
824 Rentell. P. Passengership evacuation – A master‟s worst nightmare, Seaways, The 
Nautical Institute, London, July 2000. 
825 Ibid. October 2000. 




Described accurately as “Marine Evacuation Systems”, they can be deployed 
in less than a minute and are able to evacuate 100 people in fewer than four 
minutes per raft.827 They will also more reliably „float free‟ than traditional 
lifeboats have been known to be and even their access chutes are buoyant 




Image 8.1. Liferaft Systems Australia (LSA) evacuation chutes and liferafts 
deployed as Marine Evacuation Systems (MES) from an Austal built fast 
trimaran Ro-Pax ferry in a training exercise (LSA pic). 
 
For vessels operating on inshore or riverine routes (in other words, almost all 
domestic ferries) effective evacuation and survival systems can be simpler 
and less expensive still. Obviously it would be preferable if passengers were 
required to wear lifejackets at all times on board. However, if that is 
unacceptable or impractical, they should at least be properly briefed on their 
location and how to don them. Carley floats, EPIRBs and strobe lights should 
also be of the „float free‟ type to allow for the likely reality of a rapid capsize or 
sinking. They would at least offer accident survivors a reasonable chance of 
recovery. 
 
8.3.5. Currently mandated safety equipment is often 
inappropriate to poor tropical countries. 
 
Regrettably, in both rich and poor countries, much of the equipment mandated 
by IMO and national authorities is inappropriately heavy, expensive, complex 
and expensive to maintain. It requires careful and frequent training to ensure 
that crews are capable of using it effectively. Similarly, if passengers are 
                                                     
827 As claimed on the LSA website www.lsames.com/mes/. 
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briefed at all on the „safety features‟, as the airlines call them, of their vessel, it 
is usually a cursory and frequently ignored briefing given, on a usually 
unintelligible public address system, after the commencement of the voyage. 
Evacuation, lifesaving and survival would be more economical and likely to be 
successful if simpler, lighter and less expensive equipment were to be 
specified. 
 
Indeed, much of the IMO and national authority prescribed equipment is 
designed with rich, North Atlantic countries and economies in mind. It has 
been lobbied for and promoted by manufacturers in such countries. It tends to 
be heavy, complex and expensive to buy and maintain. It is also intended for 
use in very cold water. A very understandable primary objective for it is to 
prevent or reduce hypothermia in cold climates. The safety equipment 
prescribed for poor tropical countries should be more appropriate for warmer 
environments and relative poverty. It should be significantly cheaper, simpler, 
lighter and easier to use. It should require practically no maintenance so 
inflatable equipment is generally inappropriate. 
 
It is notable, albeit arguable, that lifeboats, rescue boats and their associated 
launching and recovery equipment are heavy, complicated, expensive, high-
maintenance and frequently dangerous. While no one, apparently, has 
carefully studied the subject, it is entirely possible that over the last fifty years 
more people have been killed or injured in lifeboat drills or training exercises 
than have been saved by them. The design of simpler, safer and lighter 
lifeboats and their associated launching equipment could make a worthy topic 
for future study. That could possibly be inspired by the organisation of a global 
contest with a significant cash prize as the reward for success. 
 
8.3.6. Alternative, more economical, safety equipment is 
available. 
 
Alternative solutions are readily available and many are of lower cost than 
some of the mandated equipment prescribed for ferries. There are also lighter 
and more effective solutions available that may be more expensive but which 
have been proved to be very effective even in poor conditions. 
 
Much more appropriate to coastal and riverine ferry operations in developing 
countries would be the modern development of what IMO describes as Rigid 
Liferafts or the Carley Float, the Karly Float.828 They are fitted to many 
commercial vessels in Australia and beyond including tourist boats and small 
ferries. They are compact and easy to both stow and launch. They are very 
durable and require practically no maintenance, other than an occasional 
wash. A twenty person version is priced at USD 900 retail in Australia. In 
China, they are even less expensive. That compares with an enclosed 
inflatable liferaft of the same capacity for around USD 5,000 plus biennial 
servicing costs of about USD 1,000. 
 
                                                     
828 Refer to www.karlyfloats.com.au and www.marinelifesaving.com. 
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The author has seen numerous versions of them fitted to ferries and tour 
boats in many parts of the world. For domestic ferries operating close to shore 





Image 8.2. An inexpensive, lightweight Carley Float or “marine rigid lifesaving 
life float and raft” of traditional style but made of HDPE. It is manufactured by 
Chinese company Zhenjiang Matchau Marine Equipment Co (From 
website).829 
 
As they are simple, flat and „Rotomoulded‟ from HDPE, the 20 person Karly 
Floats could undoubtedly be manufactured for considerably lower prices in 
developing countries. While they are one metre by 2.1 metre flat rafts 
weighing 37.5 kilograms, more “boat-shaped” and protective craft could also 
be readily, cheaply and lightly manufactured from HDPE. The author has seen 
locally manufactured examples on tugs in the Philippines. They would provide 
greater protection to survivors but would cost probably 50 per cent more than 
Karly Floats. Like them, though, they would require minimal maintenance. 
 
Much the same applies to lifejackets. On the same website, SOLAS compliant 
commercial coastal lifejackets are advertised at USD 30.830 They are 
presumably manufactured in China. The author has purchased similar 
lifejackets from his local yacht chandler in Australia for USD 12. Strobe lights, 
lifebuoys and EPIRBS are all now available at similarly low prices, especially 
in developing countries.831 So, there is no excuse financially for adequate life 
saving equipment to not be fitted at a price for a complete package of 
considerably less than USD100 per person. 
 
                                                     
829 www.matchaumarine.com. 
830 www.karlyfloats.com.au and www.marinelifesaving.com. 
831 EPIRBs are emergency position indicating radio beacons that pinpoint the position of 





Image 8.3. The 20 person Karly Float is simple, light, effective and 
comparatively inexpensive. (Image from www.karlyfloats.com.au ). 
 
Even less expensive and therefore appropriate to very poor countries such as 
DR Congo and Haiti would be the pool noodles‟ described in Chapter 1.832 
They should not cost more than 50 US cents each. Indeed, that was their 
retail price in Australia in 2016 for models fitted with flashing LED lights. They 
are easily stowed, maintenance free, simple to understand, easy to use and 
readily deployed. They will keep a conscious adult afloat indefinitely. While 
not recommended where superior alternatives are affordable, they are 
significantly better than nothing. 
 
8.4.1. Search and Rescue failures remain a serious problem. 
 
Considerable amounts of government and private donor money have been 
spent on the provision of search and rescue services and their associated 
equipment. This is particularly the case in western developed countries but 
also in China, the Philippines and South Korea, three of the worst performing 
countries as far as ferry fatalities are concerned. All three have substantial 
coast guard organisations. However, all seem to fail too frequently in both 
preventing accidents and in being in the right place at the right time to conduct 
effective SAR operations. Indonesia, too, has a coast guard but it appears to 
                                                     
832 See Image 1.7. 
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be even less effective than those of the other three nations mentioned. In the 
other six countries of the worst ten, SAR services are practically non-existent. 
Any hope of rescue there will, in the absence of fatalistic indifference, be 
based on the possibility of assistance being provided by a vessel 
coincidentally passing by.833 
 
Almost all developed coastal countries possess SAR organisations of a 
generally high standard. They tend to be very effective and reliable with 
strong traditions of service. Combined with the widespread use of EPIRBs, 
AIS and high quality safety equipment, they ensure that the chances of 
survivor recovery are high. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Spain, Greece, Turkey and the United States have had adequate to 
good SAR services in place for well over a century.834 Ironically, but 
unsurprisingly, they are less likely to experience fatal accidents in the first 
place. 
 
Most have well co-ordinated partnership arrangements with defence forces 
and bodies such as customs services. Their floating and flying assets can 
readily be pressed into service to assist with SAR operations when required. 
That effectively multiplies the capabilities of the SAR service itself. The use of 
substantial fleets of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters as well as patrol boats 
and warships significantly enhance the chances of finding and recovering 
survivors of a passenger vessel accident. 
 
Most developed countries now require strict adherence to IMO‟s ISM, SOLAS 
or High Speed Craft codes or a local equivalent for domestic operations. They 
also tend to have well-established and equipped SAR services. These are 
often a mixture of both government and voluntary services. There is even a 
well- organised and funded NGO, the International Maritime Rescue 
Federation (IMRF) that represents such services and organises international 
SAR conferences where developments are discussed. 
 
Developed country SAR services also appear better able to effectively co-
operate with commercial tug and OSV operators and commercial shipping 
more widely to assist with SAR activities. They are generally happy to assist 
because they may require help themselves one day. This kind of effective co-
operation exemplifies the spirit and intent of the IMO SAR Code and makes 
the SAR function in the developed world generally very successful. In a 
coincidental way it happens to some degree in developing countries but it 
would be better if more structured arrangements could be established there. A 
formal recognition by all parties that such co-operation exists would seem 





                                                     
833 The case studies in Chapter 3 describe a number of such scenarios. 
834 Refer to 8.4.2. 
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8.4.2. Excellent models exist for effective SAR organisation. 
 
Numerous histories of the various national rescue services have been 
written.835 They describe their people, processes and equipment in 
considerable detail. All offer excellent proven models for SAR services that 
could be adopted elsewhere if the money were available. Similarly, many 
excellent books have been published on the subjects of rescue and 
salvage.836 Most would provide useful guidance to any national government in 
any attempts it might make to improve its SAR services. So would the 
websites of the various national organisations.837 
 
The development of those services was boosted during the Second World 
War with the establishment of very effective Air Sea Rescue (ASR) services 
by the UK, USA, Australia and Canada in particular. These were developed to 
recover downed pilots who were very expensive to replace. Japan, notably, 
was largely devoid of such services and suffered from crippling losses of 
pilots as the war progressed. Effective radio-location devices and fast 
recovery boats were highly refined through the course of the war.838 Some 
13,000 aircrew and hundreds of sailors were recovered by the British ASR 
service during the course of WW II. The other Allied services were similarly 
successful. They proved to be a very good investment and an excellent model 
for succeeding civilian rescue services. 
 
Civilian rescue services have also proved that rapid SAR response 
organisations can be a very good investment. 
 
The wartime ASR services developed doctrine and techniques for search and 
rescue that were easily and very effectively passed to their civilian 
counterparts for peacetime use.839 Their vessels, equipment, communications 
systems and procedures all had widespread civilian applications. Interestingly, 
T. E. Lawrence, of Lawrence of Arabia fame, was very constructively involved 
with the development of new and improved fast rescue craft in the 1920s and 
1930s.840 He applied considerable intellect to their developmen. 
 
IMO has developed and invoked a Search and Rescue Convention (SAR) that 
guides the wider maritime world generally in SAR matters.841 However, as is 
becoming tediously familiar, the SAR Convention appears to have had little 
effect in developing countries. That is particularly so in the ten countries 
                                                     
835 Two examples are: Beilby. A. Heroes All! The Story of the RNLI, Patrick Stephens, Yeovil, 
UK, 1992, and Noble, D. L. Rescued by the U.S.Coast Guard, Naval Institute Press, 
Annapolis, 2005. 
836 Such as: Sanders, R. E. The Practice of Ocean Rescue, Brown, Son & Ferguson, 
Glasgow, 1998.  
837 For example: www.rcmsar.com, www.rnli.org, www.seenotretter.de and www.snsm.org. 
838 For a detailed description of the British approach and its results, refer to Sutherland, J. and 
Canwell. D. The RAF Air Sea Rescue Service 1918-1986, Pen & Sword Books, Barnsley, UK, 
2005. 
839 Sutherland, J. & Canwell, D. Ibid. 
840 Ibid. pp. 13-20. 
841 International Maritime Organisation, International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue (SAR), 1979, www.imo.org. 
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concentrated on in this study. Very little appears to be happening in them in 
the form of establishing and maintaining either governmental or NGO 
organisations for SAR. Fortunately, most such countries have comparatively 
crowded waterways so that opportunistic rescues by passing vessels are the 
norm. Passing vessels, however, as has been noted, cannot always be relied 
upon to undertake rescues.842 The absence of formally focused SAR 
organisations is an unfortunate fact of life in many developing countries. It 
significantly reduces the chances of successful discovery and recovery of 
maritime accident survivors. 
 
8.4.3. IMO‟s SAR Convention has proved to be effective where 
implemented. EPIRBs and AIS  are very effective when fitted. 
 
The SAR Convention, generally, while certainly of benefit, particularly for 
training purposes, in developed countries, has been less useful elsewhere. 
One more recent (1999) component of it, however, has contributed to rapid 
SAR responses in cases such as the Rabaul Queen.843 That is the 
widespread mandatory introduction of automatically activated Emergency 
Position Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRB) by IMO and co-operating 
nations.844  
 
When registered, maintained and stored correctly in a „float free‟ situation, 
EPIRBs do facilitate rapid responses to distress calls as, in addition to 
transmitting a MAYDAY distress message, they incorporate a GPS which 
broadcasts the precise position of the distressed vessel. Unfortunately, since 
they cost about USD 250, few vessels operating domestically in developing 
countries are equipped with EPIRBs. It would be better if they were made 
mandatory on a global basis as they are in developed countries. It would be 
better still if the fitting of AIS transceivers were also made mandatory. 
 
More recently, the development of effective, efficient and relatively easy to 
use unmanned vehicles or „drones‟ have been promoted as having a SAR 
role. This would seem to be logical, achievable and probably very cost 
effective, particularly for the search part of the activity. At the International 
Maritime Rescue Federation Future Technology Panel meeting in 2016, 
Professor John Dalziel of Dalhousie University, Canada, described the work 
being done at his university on assessing the possibilities for using unmanned 
vehicles in SAR activities.845 Their preliminary conclusions were very positive. 
 
8.4.4. Real efforts being made to promote better SAR services. 
 
Both the International Maritime Rescue Federation and the Worldwide Ferry 
Safety Association have tried hard to promote the establishment of effective 
                                                     
842 Note comment in 8.3.1. Para 1. 
843 Refer to 3.24. for details. 
844 For background refer to Search and Rescue and the GMDSS, Focus on IMO, IMO, 
London, March 1999. 




SAR organisations throughout the world.846 Kiersten Reid-Sander of the 
WFSA presented an illuminating paper on the subject at the 2015 
International Maritime Rescue Conference.847 In that she highlighted the 
paucity of SAR resources in the ten worst and a number of other countries. 
Despite their best and very generous efforts, the two organisations have so 
far met with little success in developing countries. Inevitably, they have been 
least successful in the ten worst countries for fatal ferry accidents. 
 
The WFSA works to define and explain the extent of the ferry safety problem. 
It promotes the quest for effective solutions to it. Its data on the SAR 
deficiencies of, particularly, poorer countries is an important component of 
that role. 
 
For its part, the IMRF, which obviously focuses on SAR aspects, has 
developed two very useful online information services that can be freely and 
very beneficially accessed by both developing country and developed country 
SAR services. Released at the World Maritime Rescue Congress in 
Bemerhaven in 2015, the Rescue Boat Guidelines (RBG) and the Mass 
Rescue Operations (MRO) library collate global case studies and experience 




8.5.0. Evacuation, lifesaving and SAR deficiencies remain  
although practical and economical solutions are available. 
 
Despite the many advances made during the fifty years considered here, most 
of the benefits of them have accrued to developed nations. The poorer parts 
of the world, especially the ten worst performing countries discussed here, 
have made little or no progress. The challenge remains to transfer or adapt 
such proven effective developments to the very real needs of the countries 
where most fatal ferry accidents continue to occur.  
 
Emergency egress from many ferry types, most particularly conventional 
monohull Ro-Pax vessels, remains a significant problem even in developed 
countries. It requires particular attention, however, in developing countries 
where most such vessels seem now to meet their fates. Again, the design 
concept of such ferries makes them particularly vulnerable in the event of an 
accident, many of which result in capsize.849 
 
Evacuation systems, lifesaving equipment and SAR services could all be 
significantly improved at affordable cost everywhere except, probably and 
unfortunately, DR Congo and Haiti. If such improvements were to be made, 
very substantial numbers of lives would undoubtedly be saved. 
                                                     
846 See www.international-maritime-rescue.org and www.ferrysafety.org. 
847 Ferry Accidents – The Challenge of Rescue. WFSA, New York, 2015. 
848 Published as an “eBook” online at www.international-maritime-
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The actual costs of doing so would be achievably low if the will were there to 
try to reduce fatality rates. The capital costs of the lifesaving equipment need 
be no more than USD 100 per passenger on a typical small, 40-50 passenger 
ferry. Sensibly but minimally maintained, largely by just an occasional wash in 
fresh water, that equipment should last considerably more than a decade. So, 
a real outlay of less than USD 10 per annum per passenger seat or space 
could ensure a much greater degree of survivability from ferry accidents. An 
EPIRB, at around USD 350 and an AIS transceiver at USD 500 per vessel 






National and international regulatory and enforcement 
deficiencies 
 
Too many regulations, not enough enforcement.  
 
9.1.0. A global problem. 
 
I think one point we could all agree on is that the solution does not 
necessarily lie in creating more and more legislation. Over the last three 
and a half decades, IMO has adopted several shelves full of rules and 
regulations. They have certainly helped to improve the situation. 
However, regulations are only effective if they are put into practice and 
are enforced and there is no doubt that many IMO conventions and 
other standards are not implemented as rigorously as they should be. 
Before adopting still more regulations, we should, therefore, 
concentrate on assuring that the ones that already exist are, in fact, 
applied to all ships throughout the world. 
                                          W. A. O‟Neil, Secretary-General, IMO, 1990-
2003850 
 
9.1.1. Too much regulation – Too much bureaucracy – Too 
much corruption – Too little competence - Too little 
enforcement – Too little effect – Too little will to reform. 
 
The preceding chapters describe a litany of regulatory and enforcement 
deficiencies that have served to facilitate the making of human errors. While 
most obvious in those countries having the worst records for ferry fatalities, 
which are almost invariably comparatively poor and less developed, they are 
not alone. Richer, developed countries continue to experience, albeit more 
rarely and usually less deadly, fatal accidents for the same ultimate human 
error reasons. They, however, have been better prepared and financially able 
to invest in the training and education of mariners that is so essential to 
reducing human errors as well as in the SAR systems to recover from them. 
 
IMO has focused on the implementation of its SOLAS Code.851 However, 
although it applies on all domestic and international voyages except by 
warships or ships navigating on the North American Great Lakes, it tends to 
be ignored for both domestic and international voyages in or between poorer 
countries. It should, like the IMO MARPOL and COLREGS codes, be more 
rigorously implemented domestically in all IMO member nations. IMO, apart 
from the occasional token conference, has evinced little serious and practical 
                                                     
850 O‟Neil, W. A. Secretary-General of the International Maritime Organisation, from an 
Opening Address to the IMO Assembly, London, 1996. 
851 See especially SOLAS Chapter V. 
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interest in trying to reduce the numbers of ferry accidents by properly 
implementing its codes in developing countries. 
 
It has been particularly remiss in not implementing its casualty and near miss 
reporting and Safety Investigation codes or its IMO Member State Audit 
Scheme (IMSAS) in any of the twenty most dangerous countries for ferry 
travel except China.852 Although only in force since January 2016, IMSAS 
would appear to be an obvious and effective means by which IMO could 
encourage improvements in domestic ferry safety in developing countries. 
 
9.1.2. IMO is well aware of the domestic ferry safety problem. 
 
Clearly, as can be seen from Secretary-General O‟Neil‟s obviously heart-felt  
comments, successive heads of IMO have been well aware of the problems 
that face their organisation. However, all have been reluctant to get involved 
at the member nation level. They all respond to the „why can‟t you do more?‟ 
question with similar answers to the effect that: “We cannot interfere in the 
internal affairs of our sovereign member nations”.853 This, then, is the kernel 
of the problem. The vast majority of ferry fatalities, 93 per cent, occur on 
domestic voyages but this jurisdictional hurdle very effectively prevents IMO 
from making more than token efforts to prevent them.854  
 
Another serious problem for IMO is the very effective lobbying that sometimes 
diverts it from its usually well-intentioned course. The London based NGO 
InfluenceMap claimed in October 2017 that certain corporations and shipping 
industry associations had undue influence over IMO decision making, 
particularly with respect to shipping exhaust gas emissions.855 Its report stated 
that: “…at the most recent IMO environmental committee meeting 31% of 
nations were represented in part by direct business interests”. It said, “The 
IMO appears to be the only UN agency to allow such extensive corporate 
representation in the policy-making process”. The author noted similar 
influences at work in the early days of the introduction of fast aluminium 
catamaran Ro-Pax ferries when owners, designers and builders of 
conventional Ro-Pax vessels worked closely with their government IMO 
delegates to retard that development. Perversely and amusingly, that lobbying 
had an unintended but widely beneficial consequence with the introduction of 
the HSC Code. 
 
Unsurprisingly, IMO and various shipping industry associations such as 
BIMCO, the World Shipping Council and the International Chamber of 
                                                     
852 There is no evidence of the implementation of any of the MSC/MEPC codes or of IMSAS, 
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Shipping attacked the InfluenceMap report.856 InfluenceMap responded 
vigorously and was supported by credible shipping industry leaders such as 
Warwick Norman, CEO of RightShip, and the Chairman of the International 
Bunker Industry Association. Indeed, the chairman of the IBIA, Jens Maul 
Jorgensen was quoted thus: “The IMO has become an impenetrable system 
in which political factors again and again trump well thought-out decisions that 
involve common sense and considerations for shipowners and operators 
around the world”.857 
 
It is notable that the widely quoted IMO press release, in which Secretary-
General Lim Kitack refuted the criticism of its efforts on emissions reduction, 
was not available on the IMO press release archive a month after its 
publication.858  
 
9.1.3. IMO, generally, fails to „follow-up‟. 
 
IMO has promulgated and published numerous „Codes‟ related to the 
promotion of safety. The problem is that it provides them with little or no 
effective follow-up or support especially with respect to domestic operations in 
developing countries. It could well be asked whether this, too, is due to the 
kinds of „corporate capture‟ mentioned above. This is its most obvious failing. 
Its rectification would undoubtedly lead to a very significant reduction in the 
numbers of ferry fatalities. 
 
The inadequacies of IMO mirror those of its parent body the United Nations 
Organisation and many of its other operating subsidiaries except, most 
notably, ICAO. Then President elect, Donald Trump, summed up the views of 
many when, in December 2016, he stated on Twitter that: The United Nations 
has such great potential but right now it is just a club for people to get 
together, talk and have a good time. So sad! 859 
 
That is a very commonly held view globally that is often expressed by donors 
to, beneficiaries of and observers of UN activities. Certainly, the article in 
Bloomberg Businessweek from which that quotation was taken, lists a litany of 
bureaucratic incompetence, corruption, „wastefulness and sclerosis‟ on the 
part of the UN generally.860 The author and members of his family have 
observed and experienced such deficiencies personally in countries such as 
Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Ethiopia, the Philippines and DR Congo. The 
whole UN organisation including subsidiary bodies such as IMO, FAO, 
UNICEF, UNHCR and others would undoubtedly benefit from drastic reform. 
                                                     
856 From Chambers, S. Authors of IMO „corporate capture‟ report respond to criticism, 
Splash247, Singapore, 26 October 2017. 
857 Kristiansen, T. IBIA chairman in strong criticism of IMO, www.shippingwatch.com, 15 
October 2017. 
858 Published in, for example, the web news of Seatrade Cruise News, Splash247 and 
Shippingwatch around 24/25 October 2017. Not available on the list of IMO press releases of 
that period as of 16 November 2017 on www.imo.org. 
859 Twitter broadcast by then United States President elect Donald Trump in December 2016. 
Cited in MacDougall, C. What Trump Got Right About The UN, in Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 




Apart from ICAO, few UN subsidiaries appear, to the interested observer, to 
be working either effectively or economically. 
 
Wastefulness, certainly, is widely evident. There is an obvious need for much 
tighter administrative control and significantly greater accountability 
throughout the organisation. Corruption, too, is facilitated by an absence of 
standard commercial management controls. The author has experience as a 
victim of that in dealings with FAO.861 IMO, like much of the UN, would benefit 
from less funding and more spending and behavioural discipline. The 
solutions to the problems outlined here will not require any significant funds. 
Rather, they must be very carefully costed, planned and administered. Simply 
throwing money at such problems will not help. It is more likely to encourage 
further corruption and incompetence. 
 
Another apparently significant contributor to the deficiencies of IMO is its 
remoteness from the places where most ferry accident problems occur. Its 
headquarters location in central London seems to very largely restrict its focus 
of attention to the North Atlantic region at best and only to Europe at worst. 
While European accidents are generally well described in its GISIS database 
of marine accidents, the same certainly cannot be said for accidents in Asia, 
Latin America or Africa, for example.862 Similarly, IMO evinced far more 
interest in the Costa Concordia sinking than in several far deadlier accidents 
that occurred in Asia and Africa in the same year. They seemed to barely to 
register on the institutional mind of IMO. 
 
Meanwhile, fatal ferry accidents continue to occur in Asian and Latin 
American countries, where there are generally plenty of regulations but 
minimal enforcement, and in African countries where there are practically 
none of either. The difficulty is to determine who should take responsibility for 
that state of affairs and then to ensure that someone does so. Should it be 
IMO? Should it be the local authority? Should it be a combination of both? Or, 
should it be a separate external body such as a specialised ferry safety NGO 
if both IMO and the local authority are beyond redemption? 
 
9.1.4. IMO is the most important weak link in the regulatory 
chain but there are many other national versions of it. 
 
Obviously, such decisions will very much depend on local conditions. In 
reality, it will probably involve a combination of all players with support and 
urging from both local and international media and developed country 
governments. Nothing significant is likely to happen without strong public and 
media demand for safer ferries. Similarly, given IMO‟s aversion to interfering 
in the internal affairs of sovereign member states (indeed its legal duty to not 
interfere), particularly in matters concerned with domestic voyages, its 
involvement will need to be of the persuasive, supportive and advisory kind. 
                                                     
861 The author‟s company, Baird Publications, was significantly disadvantaged financially by a 
„side payment‟ made by a conference venue to a since dismissed FAO accountant. 
862 Refer to the GISIS database at www.imo.org for numerous examples of IMO‟s badly 
disproportionate Euro-centric focus. 
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That, done properly, such as by the judicious use of IMSAS, could be very 
effective.863 Despite its many obvious weaknesses, IMO is generally and 
widely well-regarded within the maritime industry.864 Probably that is on the 
basis that there is no alternative. 
 
The various IMO instruments such as SOLAS, COLREGS, MARPOL, SAR, 
ISM, HSC and Code of Safety for Small Passenger Ships, among others, 
provide an excellent and very useful foundation or framework that would be 
readily adapted by national governments to provide the basis for their own 
regulations.865 In most cases, it seems, that has been done. COLREGS, for 
example, are mandatory, even if not normally closely adhered to, in all 
member nations. MARPOL, while not legally mandatory, is effectively so in 
almost all countries. The practical deficiencies lie in IMO‟s inability to 
effectively promulgate or promote its other generally very sensible and 
practical codes in developing countries. The same applies also to the general 
apparent lack of interest on the part of many developing country governments 
in enforcing such regulations as they have in place. 
 
9.1.5. Oil tanker reforms show what IMO is capable of. 
 
It is disappointing that IMO has been unable or unwilling to apply itself to the 
domestic ferry safety problem. It showed what it is capable of in working with 
the oil tanker industry, through INTERTANKO, and many national 
governments to bring about a very significant reduction in the number of oil 
spills since 1970. Described in Chapter 4, that campaign reduced the number 
of marine oil spills by more than 90 per cent between 1970 and 2015 despite 
oil tanker numbers more than doubling over the same period.866 The oil tanker 
experience shows that IMO would be similarly capable of acting to reduce the 
numbers of ferry fatalities. It simply requires the will to do so. 
 
Chapter 5 described the economic, social, cultural and geographic factors that 
contribute to the disproportionately large numbers of ferry accidents and 
fatalities that occur in the ten worst performing countries. That chapter also 
mentions the politico-legal barriers to reform that are endemic in those same 
countries. The following pages describe the regulatory and enforcement 
realities of the ten most dangerous countries. Those realities are also very 
largely applicable to most of the next ten worst performing countries. The 
safety problems of the twenty most dangerous countries are generally similar. 
 
9.2.1. The Philippines – Major enforcement weaknesses but 
government is well intentioned and has good potential. 
 
The Philippines provides good examples of most of the ferry safety problems. 
It has clear and well-defined maritime regulations in place that trace their 
                                                     
863 Refer to 9.1.1. Para 4. 
864 The author has discussed IMO widely among the global maritime industry generally. 
865  Details of all IMO codes are listed in the Bibliography, or refer to www.imo.org. 
866 Refer to 4.5.2. 
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origins to the nation‟s half century of American colonisation.867 They have 
since been modified and adapted to comply generally with current IMO codes. 
Those regulations are intended to be enforced by a substantial bureaucracy in 
MARINA (The Marine Industry Authority) and a relatively well-equipped, 
managed and manned Coast Guard.868  
 
The reality, though, is that the theoretically effective system is not yet so. 
Through corruption, disinterest, cronyism or any number of other cultural 
reasons, negligent, greedy ferry owners largely ignore MARINA, the PCG and 
the regulations they are charged with enforcing. They actively lobby against 
safety reform. Otherwise, when that fails, presumably, they bribe officials of 
those organisations. This is so particularly in the provinces beyond the capital 
Manila.  
 
As has been noted elsewhere in this work, that situation is changing with 
promising results. That change, though, is coming about very slowly. It is 
obvious, however, that without a very focussed and strong „naming and 
shaming‟ effort conducted from outside the Philippines, it will be a very 
lengthy and difficult process to overcome the inertia of the existing system. 
Assassination of journalists and others who expose corrupt behaviour is not 
unusual there.869 The appalling safety records of ferry owning companies 
such as Sulpicio Lines and their owners should be made known worldwide. 
Potential passengers everywhere should be warned against travelling on their 
ships. 
 
The print and electronic media in the Philippines frequently expose marine 
safety deficiencies in the country. The government promises reform and the 
wider ferry industry reacts against it on the grounds of impossible expense. A 
2017 article in The Manila Times typically highlighted the problem.870 In 1999 
the Philippine Government mandated the implementation of the ISM Code in 
domestic shipping including for passenger vessels. This was supplemented a 
year later with the adoption of the National Safety Management Code (NSM) 
in domestic shipping to cover all vessels. 
 
Inevitably, there was “…continuing opposition from stakeholders who 
expressed concern on the burden and difficulties in complying with the 
international standards imposed by the ISM Code”.871 In 2015 the government 
rescinded the NSM Code and imposed the ISM Code for domestic voyages. 
 
Subsequent fatal accidents involving the Ro-Pax ferry Starlight Atlantic and 
other vessels confirmed that the ISM Code continued to be ignored through 
2016. As the author of that article concluded: “The recent sea mishaps have 
somehow diminished the confidence in the fervent commitment of improving 
                                                     
867 From 1898 to 1948 less three years of Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945. 
868 See websites for details: www.marina.gov.ph and www.coastguard.gov.ph. 
869 For examples, see www.cpj.org/killed/asia/philippines/ and 
www.en.unesco.org/sites/…/unesco_condemns_killing_of_journalists_philippines_en/.   
870 Pimental, B.V. Domestic ferry safety: Adopting a safety management system, The Manila 
Times, Manila, 21 January 2017. 
871 Pimental, B. V. Ibid. 
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the safety record of domestic shipping. It is incumbent on government and the 
shipowners/management and crews to reverse that perception”.872 
 
There are very brave crusading individuals and associations in the Philippines 
that are promoting greater safety and the elimination of corruption in the local 
maritime industry. Led by Commodore Dante La Jiminez, president of the 
Philippine Association of Maritime Institutions, a multi-sectoral task force to 
Save the Seafaring Industry was established in 1994. However, as detailed in 
local maritime magazine Marino World, “Midstream stakeholders blocked 
powerful opportunists tailor-fitting ordinances to serve their vested interests. 
The movement apparently, “…lost wind gradually against the inspired task 
force”.873 
 
Filipino “…ferry captains are required to submit a document called the Master 
Oath of Safety Departure (MOSD – testifying that the vessel meets all 
requirements and disclosing the number of passengers on board – to the 
coast guard before every sailing”.874 The same 2009 article in Time describes 
inadequate coast guard oversight, document falsification and government 
good intentions. It concludes with a comment from the transport industry 
under-secretary and MARINA administrator, Elena Bautista: “The main issue 
here is the safety culture of the Philippines,” she said. “We have very, very 
low regard for safety”.875 Meanwhile, the July 2016 appointed director of 
MARINA, Marcial Amaro, was dismissed on 4 January 2018 by Philippines 
President Rodrigo Duterte for alleged “excessive foreign travel”.876 Perhaps 
he attended too many IMO meetings? 
 
The author, having travelled extensively, both domestically and internationally, 
on the two main Philippine airlines, Cebu-Pacific and Philippine Airlines, 
disputes Ms Bautista‟s allegations about the safety culture of the Philippines. 
From his experience and observation, those airlines maintain world-class 
safety standards. Their unblemished record proves it. If the Philippines 
government, presumably encouraged and supported by ICAO, can ensure 
that its airlines can maintain those standards on both international and 
domestic flights, it should be able to do the same with its ferries. 
 
Encouragingly, as mentioned in Chapter 1, there are a number of local 
domestic ferry operators that are operating safe vessels safely and promoting 
themselves accordingly.877 Even without external support for safety reform, 
the strong competition provided by well-funded newcomers such as 
Archipelago Ferry Corp, owner of the FastCats and its competitor Oceanfast 
Fast Ferries, will eventually inspire wider improvement.878 They, and other 
companies, have established their businesses by promoting their international 
                                                     
872 Ibid. 
873 From www.marinerslegazpi.edu.ph. 
874 From Binlot, A. Asia Continues to Wrestle with Ferry Safety, Time, Time-Warner, New 
York, 15 January 2009. 
875 Binlot, A. Ibid. 
876 See www.vanguardngr.com/2018/01/. 
877 Refer to the FastCat ferries mentioned in 1.14.4. 
878 Mentioned in the Philippines case study in Chapter 5. 
 
 265 
safety standards. It is to be hoped that other ferry owners will learn from their 
example. 
 
Meanwhile, the President of the Philippine Register of Shipping, William 
Hernandez, commented that, despite a strong effort by MARINA in promoting 
greater safety, much remains to be done. He alleged that ship maintenance is 
inadequate and that class certification is handed out corruptly. He said that 
the government needed to do better in “promulgating its rules”.879 
 
There is much more to be done in the Philippines but its brave and largely 
free press and frequently well-intentioned, semi-democratic government 
should enable reform to be gradually achieved. That reform movement would 
be much stronger if it were better supported by IMO. In reality, though, it is 
more likely that foreign media exposure of the dangers of domestic ferry travel 
there will damage the tourist industry and force local ferry owners to behave 
better. The government has the tools, it just needs the will to use them 
effectively. A dedicated global ferry safety NGO could expose the dangers of 
Filipino ferry travel by facilitating the placement of revealing articles in 
newspaper travel sections, travel magazines and travel guides. The resulting 
commercial pressure would help to encourage reform. 
 
9.2.2.  China, too, is well intentioned but slow acting. 
 
China, too, has substantial, well-organised, well-manned and well-equipped 
maritime authorities and an impressive, quasi-naval coast guard.880 It has a 
central government that loudly espouses its intention to eliminate corruption 
and, like the Philippines, it has numerous well-regarded nautical schools that 
should be improving the quality of the captains and crews who man its ferries. 
However, as in the Philippines, old bad habits are very slow to be corrected. 
„The system‟ again. That system, unlike in the Philippines and Indonesia, is 
not democratic and the press is not free. 
 
While corruption is known to be still rife, the central government proclaims its 
anti-corruption credentials and has been very publicly punishing corrupt 
officials recently, even at the highest levels. China has, in addition to the 
Maritime Safety Administration of the Ministry of Communication (CMSA) and 
Coast Guard, some 20 local maritime administrations in each of the major 
maritime provinces.881 The CMSA, alone, has a fleet of more than 500 boats. 
The Chinese Coast Guard and a number of other maritime departments such 
as customs and fisheries also have numerous patrol craft.882 
 
                                                     
879 Quoted in a report published online in www.splash24/7.com/philippine-register-of-shipping-
safety-drive/, 6 June 2017. 
880 Described well in Erickson, A. S. et al (Eds). China, The United States and 21st Century 
SEA POWER, pp. 142-147, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2010.   
881 Refer to Yu, J. X. and Zeng, H. Present status of work boats for China Maritime 
Administration, in World Ships & Boats, CSSC, Beijing, 2000. 
882 From Wertheim, E. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 16th Edition, 
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2013. 
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Following a number of accidents, especially the sinking of the Ro-Pax ferry 
Dashun in the Yellow Sea in 1999 with 290 fatalities, the Chinese 
Government introduced new safety rules. They applied particularly to 
conventional Ro-Pax vessels. A total of 249 Chinese ships sank in 1999 
leading to 769 deaths.883 The State Maritime Bureau ruled in the next year 
that all coastal ferries including river ferries that enter coastal waters were 
required to fit a „Black Box‟ Vessel Data Recorder (VDR) within 12 months.884 
 
Less than two years later, the Ministry of Communications banned individually 
owned companies from operating passenger ferries. Reportedly, the ministry 
claimed that China‟s more than 80,000 individually owned shipping 
businesses were the main cause of shipping accidents.885 Those businesses 
did not only operate ferries. 
 
Needless to say, there have been numerous accidents involving Chinese 
ships since 2002. There have been many fatalities arising from passenger 
ship accidents in domestic operations.886 It is believed that the annual number 
of accidents has reduced but, because of the absence of data for the period 
prior to 2000 and, to a lesser degree since, it is impossible to make accurate 
comparisons. The known annual numbers of ferry fatalities do seem to be 
declining, however. 
 
The Chinese authorities appear to now be conscious of their ferry safety 
problem and are attempting to eliminate it. Judging from the data for the past 
decade, they are making progress, albeit slowly. The Oriental/Eastern Star 
disaster of 2015 was a notable setback.887 However, China‟s Communist 
government does have the power, the personnel and the equipment to 
achieve substantial safety reform if it applies itself fully to achieving that 
objective. A Chinese Government endorsed presentation made at the 
December 2017 ASEAN Ferry Safety Forum in Shanghai revealed some 
interesting data and some encouraging intentions.888 
 
9.2.3. Indonesia – Plentiful regulations, regulators and 
investigators but insufficient enforcement. 
 
Indonesia possesses both a Directorate General of Sea Communications and 
a Coast Guard, now known as the Badan Keamanan Laut Republik Indonesia 
(BAKAMLA).889 They are well established, well manned, possibly to the point 
of over-manning, and relatively well equipped. The country has more than 
adequate regulations that are generally in accord with IMO‟s codes. It has 
                                                     
883 Recorded in www.portguide.com. 
884 From Fairplay Daily News, 15 December 2000, www.lrfairplay.com. 
885 This forced those operators to incorporate to obtain operating licenses. Described in 
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886 For details refer to Appendix A, Ibid. 
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888 Anon. Ferry Safety Supervision in China, China MSA, Guangdong, 2017. 
889 Details from, Rusdi, S. The dilemma of Indonesia‟s coast guard, The Jakarta Post, 
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even banned the importation of ships including ferries but more in an 
endeavour to protect the local shipbuilding industry than to improve safety.890  
 
Indonesia also has a seemingly well intentioned but largely ineffectual 
transport safety organisation, the National Transportation Safety Committee of 
Indonesia, (NTSC), that is responsible for investigating and analysing ferry 
accidents, among others.891 It is meant to publicise its findings. As is so often 
the case with accident inquiries, it has been suggested by local naval architect 
and Marine Safety Investigator, Aliek Nurwahyudy, that there is too much 
focus on the how of the accident and too little on the why. However his 
summary of recommendations for the period 2003-2013 attributes almost all 
accident causes to human factors. Inadequate supervision and training as 
well as crew fatigue are listed as the most important factors.892 
 
Indonesia has an ongoing close and supportive maritime cooperation 
relationship with Australia.893 The current president, Joko Widowi, has 
declared his country to be “a global maritime fulcrum” with a vision of better 
managing all Indonesia‟s plethora of maritime resources. 
 
That vision, however, is proving very difficult to realise. There are “entrenched 
interests” and „turf wars‟.894 “Getting the adequate resources for BAKAMLA 
continues to be challenging” and, finally, the director of BAKAMLA was, in 
April 2017, facing corruption allegations.895 That is in keeping with the general 
reputation for rampant corruption that surrounds both the Indonesian Navy 
and Coast Guard.896 So, despite the best of presidential intentions, maritime 
safety reforms are proving very difficult to realise in Indonesia. 
 
Again, as the country values its important and rapidly growing tourist industry, 
achieving safety reform will be most effectively inspired by international media 
exposure. That would be well enhanced by serious support from IMO. 
 
9.2.4. Bangladesh has similar problems to Indonesia. 
 
Bangladesh, too, has a substantial and very well manned Department of 
Shipping and a well equipped coast guard.897 There are some excellent and 
dedicated senior bureaucrats who have for many years been attempting to 
                                                     
890 Reported in Hellenic Shipping News Worldwide, 23 June 2015. 
891 Mentioned in Nurwahyudy. A, Contemporary Issues in Domestic Ro-Ro Passenger Ferry 
Operation in Developing Countries, Master of Science thesis, World Maritime University, 
Malmo, 2014. 
892 Nurwahyudyy, A. Ibid. 
893 Described in 9.3. 
894 Refer to Rusdi, S. Ibid. 
895 Described by Parameswaran, P. in Confronting Indonesia‟s Maritime Coordination 
Challenge, The Diplomat, www.thediplomat.com/2017/04/confronting-indonesias-maritime-
coordination/challenge/, 2017. 
896 The author has been aware for many years of well-founded allegations of corruption in 
those organisations emanating from a number of ship owners with operations in South-East 
Asia. They regard bribing officers of the Indonesian Coast Guard and Navy as well as judges 
as simply a cost of doing business. Transparency International offers many other examples. 
897 Refer to the Bangladesh Department of Shipping website, www.dos.gov.bd, for details. 
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institute safety reforms. The good intentions are there as is the equipment for 
enabling the enforcement of regulations and, when properly directed, rescuing 
survivors from ferry accidents.898 
 
Despite its possession of those attributes and assets, Bangladesh remains a 
very dangerous place in which to travel on ferries. As noted in Chapter 5, its 
economy is growing rapidly and its overall life expectancy has improved 
dramatically over the last three decades. It has a growing and high quality 
export ship building industry and a relatively reputable international airline, 
Biman, with new private sector competitors entering the business.899 Biman is 
approved to fly into Europe and has not suffered a fatal accident since 1984. 
 
If a country can operate airlines safely and build sound ships locally, it should, 
in theory, be capable of ferry safety reform. In Bangladesh that parallel is 
handicapped, though, by its unstable politics, corruption and overwhelming, 
self-serving bureaucracy. That bureaucracy, generally, seems to largely act 
as a very negative „dead hand‟ in stifling reform. It illustrates clearly that it is 
possible to have too many regulations and too many regulators to the point 
that they just get in the way of reform. Its press is only partly free and the 
country would best be described as a ‟limited‟ democracy. Unfortunately, its 
tourist industry is practically non-existent so it cannot be used as a lever to 
introduce reform.  
 
Bangladesh is in some ways similar to the Philippines in that it has proved 
that it can operate airlines safely. From its own resources assisted by foreign 
companies and NGOs, with apparently little or no government involvement, it 
has very impressively managed to make dramatic improvements to the life 
expectancy of its people.900 It has dramatically reduced its former health 
problems. It has shown that it is very capable of reform. If IMO were to adopt 
ICAO‟s “no country left behind policy” and support local safety reform, 
Bangladesh would seem to have considerable potential to overcome its 
numerous handicaps. 
 
9.2.5. Tanzania. Chaotic but having realistic reform potential. 
 
Tanzania has a most interesting history. Even more interesting is the history 
of Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous offshore island province of the Republic of 
Tanzania. While serious fatal ferry accidents have occurred on Tanzania‟s Rift 
Valley lakes and rivers, the two most deadly recently occurred off Zanzibar. 
They involved the Spice Islander and the Skagit. The former led to about 
2,976 fatalities and the latter, 293.901 They happened in 2011 and 2012 
respectively. 
 
                                                     
898 The Bangladesh Coast Guard website, www.coastguard.gov.bd provides details as does 
The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets, Ibid. 
899 Biman Bangladesh Airlines is described on its web page at 
www.bgtest.zapways.com/corporate/. It claims to have experienced only one accident that 
occurred prior to the airline commencing commercial service. 
900 Described in Chapter 5. 
901 Appendix A, Ibid. 
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The offshore archipelago of Zanzibar has its own maritime regulations that are 
separate from the Merchant Shipping Act that governs mainland Tanzania.902 
This, it seems, leads to considerable confusion. Zanzibar is not a sovereign 
nation and, theoretically, Tanzania is responsible for Zanzibar as far as 
international treaties and conventions are concerned. So, Tanzania is 
responsible for ensuring that Zanzibar adopts legislation that accords with 
IMO conventions and codes. However, as Mr G. Kazi explains, in his 
remarkably prescient 2010 University of Oslo Masters thesis Conformity of 
Zanzibar Maritime Legislation with International Safety Conventions…, “…like 
many developing countries, many of their laws are just ink on the page hence 
it is not surprising that practically nothing is done”.903  
 
While the constitutional arrangements of Tanzania/Zanzibar are unusual and 
complex, its maritime safety regulations, as Mr Kazi commented, are treated 
with the same disdain that is common in all the dangerous countries 
discussed here. The Tanzania Ports Authority is responsible for the regulation 
and administration of all Tanzanian mainland ports including those on the 
rivers and very large lakes that surround the country.904 Probably inevitably, 
though, the President of Tanzania dissolved the board of the Ports Authority 
and sacked the permanent secretary of the transport ministry in December 
2015. The reason for that, allegedly, was corruption.905 
 
This, perhaps, explains the inability of Tanzania/Zanzibar to regulate for ferry 
safety and to enforce those regulations effectively. Yet, Tanzania is a 
comparatively wealthy country with substantial mineral, agricultural and 
forestry resources. It has a large and fast growing tourist industry taking in 
both the mainland and the Zanzibar islands. By many measures it is 
economically, politically and socially more advanced than at least four of the 
worst ten countries for ferry fatalities. 
 
It should be able to effectively reform its ferry safety enforcement but will 
obviously require assistance in that from IMO and some benevolent European 
nations. To better motivate it to initiate reform it would be useful for some 
„naming and shaming‟ of delinquent ferry operators to be carried out by the 
international travel media. 
 
9.2.6. Myanmar is probably worse than it looks. 
 
Myanmar‟s capacity for reform is difficult to effectively analyse. Having 
experienced its own „enlightenment‟ recently and become at least semi-
democratic, it does appear to have some potential. However, it is still 
regarded as the most corrupt of all the nations examined here.906 
 
                                                     
902 Explained by Kazi, G. J. in a Master of Laws thesis, University of Oslo, 2010. 
903 Kazi, G. J. Ibid. 
904 See www.ports.go.tz. 
905 Refer to Magufuli sacks Tanzania port bosses, 
wwwmonitor.co.ug/News/National/Magufuli-sacks-Tanzania-port-bosses/.    
906 Refer to 5.2. Economic and Cultural Comparison. 
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It is also difficult to accurately analyse the real extent of its ferry safety 
problem except to suggest that it is undoubtedly considerably worse than the 
BMPVA database statistics indicate. The reasons for that are due to the 
significant under reporting explained in Chapter 5. 
 
The country‟s overriding handicap, however, is appalling corruption which 
very largely prevents any kind of regulatory or enforcement reform.907 
 
Myanmar is rich in many resources and has a very fast growing tourist 
industry. The economic importance of that may, again, be a lever for 
promoting safety reform through a „naming and shaming‟ campaign. Naming 
and shaming of Myanmar‟s dictatorial political leaders appears to have made 
a positive contribution to the country‟s „enlightenment‟ between about 2007 
and 2010. More positive, ICAO style, support from IMO would undoubtedly be 
valuable as would practical help from developed Asian countries such as 
Singapore, Japan and Taiwan.  
 
9.2.7. Egypt, despite its many problems, has reform potential. 
 
Egypt is placed second of the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities on the UN 
Human Development Index.908 Its situation is the same for GDP per capita 
after China. It enjoys a large and lucrative tourist industry that involves 
significant aquatic tourism. That is supported by a reliable airline, Egypt Air, 
that is sufficiently safe as to be permitted to fly into Europe and the USA.909 
Indeed, its tourism industry comprises one per cent of the world market.910 
That involves significant travel on both ferries and tourist boats on the River 
Nile and in the Red Sea. The country cannot afford to gain a reputation for 
abnormally high levels of ferry fatalities. 
 
There is an Egyptian Authority for Maritime Safety and a General Authority for 
River Transportation.911 Both appear to be at least adequately manned and 
equipped and have promoted themselves with impressive mission statements 
on their equally impressive websites. They are subsidiaries of the Ministry of 
Transport. In addition, the Egyptian Coast Guard possesses a fleet of more 
than 100 patrol and rescue vessels of varying shapes, sizes and sea-
worthiness ranging upwards from around 10 metres LOA.912 Most of them are 
known to have been acquired as foreign aid gifts so how well they are 
operated  or even how many are operational is questionable. 
 
Egypt has a significant maritime training institution and many of its more 
ambitious student seafarers attend foreign institutions.913 
 
                                                     
907 See Transparency International, Myanmar, and 5.2. 
908 See 5.2, Economic and cultural comparison. 
909 For routes and details, refer to www.egyptair.com. 
910 Refer to Egyptian tourism in Farouk, E. Egypt‟s tourism revenues rise 170 percent in first 
seven months of 2017:official, www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-tourism-revenues/. 
911 For details, refer to www.mts.gov.eg/en/content/30/1-107-Authority-for-Maritime-Safety/. 
912 Described in Wertheim, E. The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets…, Ibid. 
913 The Arab Academy for Science, Technology & Maritime Transport in Alexandria.  
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However, while the publicity material disseminated by the Maritime Safety 
Authority emphasises the word “safety”, a careful perusal of its propaganda 
material reveals a greater focus on Suez Canal and port operations and their 
profitability. That, presumably, and thanks to its enormous toll revenues, is 
where the Authority‟s attention really lies. Egypt‟s appalling ferry safety record 
tends to confirm that. Its adherence to IMO codes and conventions appears to 
be mostly „lip service‟. 
 
As for how Egypt could improve its ferry safety record, there are numerous 
obstacles. First, the usual problem of corruption that is endemic in all the ten 
worst countries.914 While Egypt is only mid-range (the same as Indonesia) on 
the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, it is generally 
recognised as having significant problems in that regard. The country 
obviously has more than adequate maritime safety regulations and regulators. 
Its problem is how well those regulations are enforced. Given its disgraceful 
fatality record, it is quite obvious that they are far from adequately enforced.915 
 
Thanks to the vital importance of its tourist industry, Egypt is almost uniquely 
vulnerable to bad publicity concerning that sector. That is certainly where 
publicity pressure for reform could effectively be concentrated. Of course, it 
would be preferable if IMO were able – and willing – to support and persuade 
Egypt to reform its ferry safety practices on its own account. Yet again, it is a 
country with an airline (Egypt Air) that has proved itself capable of operating 
consistently to international standards. That being so, why can its maritime 
sector not do the same? 
 
9.2.8. DR Congo, Haiti and Senegal will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to reform. 
 
Many generally well-intentioned local and foreign individuals, organisations 
and governments, including the United Nations and many of its agencies, 
have noted the need for economic, governance, health and safety reform in 
those three countries and have attempted to achieve it. Sadly, they have so 
far met with little success.  
 
Unfortunately, despite possessing substantial maritime bureaucracies, there is 
little evidence of anyone in those countries taking the implementation and 
enforcement of maritime regulations seriously. They are sadly, as far as this 
work is concerned, completely dysfunctional „failed states‟, both economically 
and in terms of governance. Regrettably, there seems little potential for ferry 
safety reform in any of them in the foreseeable future. Reform efforts would 
be more profitably directed at the other seven countries where real potential 
exists.  
 
While only the most adventurous of tourists visit such places, the international 
tourism media should be more thoroughly and frequently warned as to the 
dangers of ferry travel in those countries. Developed country „travel 
                                                     
914 From Table 5.2, Economic and cultural comparison. 
915 See Appendix A, Ibid. 
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advisories‟ do try to publicise the dangers of ferry travel there but it would be 
helpful if the general travel media were able to do more.916 
 
9.2.9. The twenty worst countries for ferry fatalities and their 
potential for reform. 
 
The author has analysed the existing effectiveness of the national maritime 
authorities of the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities as follows:-917 
 
Philippines   - Slowly improving but still corrupt and inadequate. 
Bangladesh  - Slowly improving but still corrupt and inadequate. 
Indonesia  - Slowly improving but still corrupt and inadequate.  
China  -  Strong systems but corrupt. Reformable domestically.  
Egypt  -  Weak. Corrupt but reformable. 
Tanzania  -  Weak. Corrupt. Reform will be slow and difficult. 
Myanmar  -  Weak. Corrupt. Reform will be slow and difficult. 
Senegal  -  Almost non-existent. Weak and corrupt. 
DR Congo  -  Non-existent. Beyond realistic reform. 
Haiti  -  Non-existent. Beyond realistic reform. 918 
 
The next to worst ten countries for ferry fatalities: India, Nigeria, South Korea, 
Estonia, Brazil, Sierra Leone, Greece, Peru, Yemen and Somalia need to be 
considered differently.919 Estonia is listed on the basis of just one accident, 
the Estonia sinking.920 Greece has suffered many accidents but few recently. 
It is showing definite signs of improvement.921 
 
Estonia and Greece have substantial maritime regulatory regimes and, very 
largely, the means to enforce them. The remaining eight countries continue to 
experience frequent fatal ferry accidents. Of them, Sierra Leone, Somalia and 
Yemen, given their very unstable political situations, seem unlikely to be able 
to be reformed in the short term. The other five nations, India, Nigeria, South 
Korea, Brazil and Peru, appear to have reasonable prospects for reform. So, 
twelve of the twenty most dangerous countries for ferry travel appear to have 
real potential for significant safety improvements. 
 
9.3.0. Enforcement deficiencies are the core problem. 
 
Given the preponderance of human error causes of ferry accidents it is 
obvious that the fundamental problems are behavioural rather than 
mechanical or structural. So, equally obviously, the responses to those 
problems must primarily be aimed at improving human behaviour.  
 
                                                     
916 As described more specifically in Chapter 5. 
917 From Table 5.3, Ibid. 
918 Author assessed. 
919 From Table 5.3, Ibid. 
920 For details, refer to Chapter 3, Estonia case study. 
921 As detailed in Appendix A, Ibid. 
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In most but not all of the nations studied there is considerable regulation 
already in place. Arguably, in some cases there may be too much. Also, 
arguably, there may be too many bureaucrats charged with enforcing that 
regulation. As former IMO Secretary-General O‟Neil pointed out, the problem 
lies in enforcing the regulations that already exist.922 That enforcement should 
involve encouragement and education just as much as penalty and 
punishment. Both „carrots‟ and „sticks‟ are required. 
 
IMO is well equipped to assist with the carrots of persuasion and 
encouragement, if it chose to utilise them, but the sticks of enforcement and 
education must be the responsibility of national governments. Almost all of 
those, particularly the ten worst countries for ferry fatalities, have both marine 
departments and coast guards.923 The problem with those, obviously, is that 
they are largely ineffectual. That is mainly due to poverty and its resultant 
corruption. Those countries require considerable support, encouragement 
and, probably, hectoring to become effective. 
 
Regulatory and, most particularly, enforcement deficiencies are clearly the 
core problem. Addressing them will be the key to reducing the waste of 
passenger lives in domestic ferry accidents. Persuading or forcing ferry 
owners, their crews and the bureaucrats who control them to behave better 
will be the most rewarding factor in ferry safety reform. That, clearly, is the 
role of national governments with support from IMO. Such reform is 
achievable as has been shown by the ICAO and oil tanker examples.924 
 
Notably, in its recently published Insight report on global safety challenges, 
the Lloyd‟s Register Foundation suggested that a potential solution to the 
safety challenge posed by passenger ferries is to, “Seek to influence the IMO 
to enforce regions to take up regulations that would make ferries safer in 
design and methods of use”.925 
 
Judging from their historical performance records, it will not be easy to 
motivate reform in either the IMO or any of the national governments of the 
worst performing countries. There is considerable inertia there. There is a 
disappointing absence of the will to achieve safety reform in many areas of 
human activity, not just in ferry travel. Inevitably, then, some substantial 
„naming and shaming‟ will be necessary to overcome that largely cultural and 
economic inertia so as to initiate the necessary reform.926 That would best be 
supported by something similar to the „No country is left behind‟ system 
promoted so effectively by ICAO.927 
 
                                                     
922 O‟Neil, W. A. Op cit. 
923 Most have websites and the coast guards are well described in Wertheim, E. The Naval 
Institute Guide to COMBAT FLEETS OF THE WORLD, 16TH EDITION, THEIR SHIPS, 
AIRCRAFT, AND SYSTEMS, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2013.  
924 Described at length in Chapter 4, 4.1.5. 
925 Anon. Insight report on global safety challenges, Lloyd‟s Register Foundation, London, 
2017 
926 Ibid. ICAO proved very effective at that activity. 
927 For details, refer to the ICAO website www.icao.int/about-icao/. 
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Indeed, to a still too limited degree, that is already happening through both 
formal and ad hoc arrangements. For example, the Australian Maritime Safety 
Authority has for some years been assisting Indonesia to improve its maritime 
safety.928 The same Australian department also assists other neighbouring 
island nations to Australia‟s north.929 An NGO, the International Maritime 
Rescue Federation, in collaboration with the United Kingdom‟s Royal National 
Lifeboat Institution, has conducted children‟s lifesaving programmes in 
Tanzania.930 
 
There are numerous effective maritime safety improvement programmes 
being used in developed countries. They can or would be excellent models for 
developing country governments to follow. There are also commercial courses 
that focus on the same subject.931 IMO developed a Technical Assistance 
Subprogramme in Maritime Safety for casualties on ships not covered by the 
provisions of international regulations. That was offered to “Member 
Governments wishing to enhance the safety of such ships” in 1999.932 
Obviously few took up the offer.  
 
Naming and shaming would best be undertaken by an international NGO. If 
carried out globally and focused on serial delinquents, it could have a 
significant effect, particularly if it starts to affect a country‟s tourist industry. 
Such a campaign should be coordinated with the marine hull insurers and 
protection and indemnity clubs in their own best interests. If an owner is 
publicly criticised and cannot purchase insurance, he really has no option 
other than to reform. Similarly, if the tourist guides, magazines, websites and 
other media warn tourists against travelling with particular delinquent owners, 
they will eventually suffer. They will be forced to behave better. 
 
9.4.0. Effective regulatory and enforcement reform is possible 
but will require cultural and behavioural modification. 
 
As extensively examined and discussed in Chapter 5, there are numerous, 
mostly poverty caused, cultural handicaps that retard ferry safety reform.933 
Democratic developed countries have very largely instituted effective safety 
regulations and enforce them rigorously although, mostly, with a light touch. 
The data show that such systems significantly minimise the risks of ferry 
accidents.934 Table 5.3. effectively summarises and highlights the economic 
                                                     
928 See press release, Australia-Indonesia maritime cooperation continues, 
www.amsa.gov.au/about-amsa/recent-events/2015. 
929 For example, through its support for the Asia-Pacific Heads of Maritime Safety Agencies, 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands. 
930 Described in a press release on www.international-maritime-
rescue.org/organisationseducation/. 
931 For example, the Lloyd‟s Maritime Academy Diploma in Maritime Safety Policies and 
Regulations, Informa group, London 2017. 
932 Described in MSC 72/14/2 of the IMO Maritime Safety Committee, IMO, London, 8 
November 1999. 
933 Examined on a country-by-country case study basis that produced largely uniform results. 
934 Refer to Appendix A generally. 
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deficiencies that are the root cause of social and cultural problems that lead to 
the appallingly bad safety records of the ten worst countries.  
 
Such problems, however, can be largely and very economically eliminated. 
They are not insoluble. Neither are the so-called geographic problems of 
archipelagic, riverine or lakeland nations that are, in reality, not problems at 
all. Rivers, lakes and sheltered seas provide such nations with very low cost 
and lightly polluting transport media. If utilised safely and sensibly, they can 






  Some possible solutions – What is to be done? 
 
There are numerous ways in which ferry safety, 
particularly developing country domestic ferry safety, 
could be significantly improved. The aviation industry and 
the cruise and oil tanker sectors have shown the way. 
 
10.1.0. Human error is the fundamental problem and IMO is 
currently an inadequate solution. 
 
 Wide-ranging statistical analysis of considerably more comprehensive 
passenger vessel accident data than has been used previously highlights the 
fundamental problem.935 The BMPVA database records 750 „known‟ fatal 
passenger vessel accidents that occurred between 1 January 1966 and 31 
December 2015. There have undoubtedly been many more that are so far 
unrecorded.  
 
Clearly, cruise ship and fast ferry, particularly multihull fast ferry, accidents 
and their resulting fatalities are statistically negligible. Cruise ship, casino ship 
and cargo liner accidents caused only 688 or 1.2 per cent of the 59,600 
fatalities that occurred between 1966 and 2015. They were almost invariably 
engaged on international voyages and carrying developed country 
passengers. A significant proportion of those fatalities are likely to have been 
suicides or drunken falls.  
 
Ferry accidents in developed countries, particularly since the Estonia sinking 
in 1994, have been rare and have produced few fatalities. Fast ferry accidents 
have been extremely rare. They have resulted in 544 (0.9%) fatalities over the 
fifty year period studied here. Accidents involving multihull fast ferries have 
been even rarer. They resulted in 69 deaths (0.1%).936 
 
Clearly, then, by far the major part of the problem lies with ferries, particularly 
mono-hulled or outrigger stabilised ferries of the vulnerable conventional Ro-
Pax and motor banca types. More specifically, they are ferries undertaking 
domestic voyages in developing, largely archipelagic, lakeland and riverine 
countries. Some 76 per cent of ferry fatalities occurred in just ten such 
countries. A further 14 per cent of fatalities have occurred in an additional ten 
similar countries. So, 90 per cent of the world‟s ferry fatalities have occurred 
in just ten per cent of its nations. Thirty-two per cent of the ferry fatalities from 
2000 to 2015 occurred on conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries. Ninety-three 
                                                     
935 The constantly evolving and growing Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database 
(Appendix A) is the compendium of that data. 
936 All statistics referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 are drawn from the BMPVA database, 
Appendix A, Ibid. 
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per cent of them occurred on domestic voyages. Of those fatalities, 98 per 
cent were clearly due to human factors. Especially vulnerable vessels such as 
conventional Ro-Pax and motor banca ferries simply exacerbate those human 
errors.  
 
As the extent, location and reasons for the ferry safety problem have been 
made clear in the foregoing chapters, what then is to be done to ameliorate, if 
not eliminate, it? 
 
Recognising the vital facts described above, there are numerous ways in 
which ferry safety, particularly domestic ferry safety, could be significantly 
improved. Broadly, the aviation industry and the oil tanker sector have shown 
the way. As, to a significant degree, have the cruise shipping sector and 
developed country road safety campaigners. Most of the suggested 
improvement techniques have already been proved in those fields of activity. 
They are described in more detail below but, in brief, they are:- 
 
1. First and foremost, reduce the incidence of human errors through improved 
training, education, encouragement, management and operational disciplines 
and proper enforcement of existing regulations in all maritime nations. 
 
2. To achieve that, reform the remote, North Atlantic centric, disengaged and 
disinterested IMO, rather than replacing it. Unless, that is, it refuses to be 
reformed. Ensure that it focuses on solving the very significant problem of 
developing country domestic ferry fatalities. Relocate its headquarters to a 
South-East Asian city other than Singapore. That should preferably be Manila 
or Bangkok because of their comparatively free press. 
 
3. Encourage IMO to persuade its laggard member states to simplify and 
properly enforce their existing safety regulations as they affect domestic 
ferries. 
 
4. Encourage IMO to develop the „will‟ to practically assist, support and work 
„with‟ developing countries without patronising them. It does not need to 
„interfere‟ in their domestic affairs. Its ISM Code can be extended by member 
states to include vessels engaged on domestic voyages.937 The current „lip 
service‟ from IMO is wholly inadequate. The importance of „face‟ in developing 
countries must be recognised. IMO should expand the useful work it already 
does in educating developing country maritime regulators at its World 
Maritime University. 
 
5. Domestic ferry travel should be equally as safe as international ferry, cruise 
ship, oil tanker and air travel. IMO should be responsible for both domestic 
and international ferry safety globally. ICAO has almost entirely achieved that 
with aviation. Why not IMO with ferries? Aircraft operate in three dimensions, 
ships in only two. It should, therefore, be easier to reform shipping safety. 
ICAO should be adopted as the model for IMO reform.  
                                                     




6. Revise IMO‟s SOLAS Code to be simpler, more practical, economical and 
applicable to developing countries using its own HSC Code as a model. 
Implement the SOLAS/HSC and ISM codes domestically in all member 
nations as has more effectively been done with MARPOL and COLREGS, for 
example. 
 
7. IMO should ban new construction of conventional, monohull Ro-Pax 
ferries. They are exceptionally dangerous in the wrong hands. Conversely, it 
should encourage the building of multi-compartmented, multi-hulled ferries of 
all sizes, construction materials and speeds. Including Ro-Pax ferries. 
 
8. IMO should ban the sale of all second-hand conventional monohull Ro-Pax 
ferries to developing countries. It should rigorously enforce that ban by 
„naming and shaming‟ delinquent companies, officers and countries. 
 
9. IMO should focus its reforms on the twenty worst performing, most 
dangerous countries. It should encourage and support the reform of national 
maritime authorities in the twelve of those countries that have realistic 
potential for improvement. They are the Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh,  
Myanmar, Tanzania, Egypt, South Korea, India, Nigeria, Brazil, Peru and 
Russia. 
 
10. IMO should introduce a simple, standard format accident inquiry and 
reporting model internationally to determine why accidents happen. It should 
promote its Member State Audit Scheme (MSAS) much more effectively than 
it does currently to the most dangerous countries. 
 
11. IMO should establish a detailed, standardised and all-encompassing 
global database of official accident inquiry and media reports of serious 
accidents and incidents to replace its almost useless GISIS database. That 
database should include details of „near misses‟. If its member states refuse 
to contribute to compiling that database, IMO should compile it itself or hire 
someone to do it for it. 
 
12. Utilising that database, IMO should promote a culture of learning from 
major, minor and „near miss‟ ferry accidents as is normal in aviation. 
 
13. IMO should encourage and support the establishment, improvement and 
expansion of search and rescue services in developing countries and improve 
SAR co-ordination and communication between neighbouring countries. 
 
14. IMO should acknowledge and respond, through encouraging appropriate 
regulation and enforcement, to the fact that inadequate vessel maintenance is 
a much bigger problem than design and construction deficiencies. 
 
15. IMO should require the use of human factors specialists by ferry owners 




16. IMO should encourage classification societies to be more pro-active, 
preferably on a pro-bono basis, in developing countries to assist them to 
promote a safety culture. 
 
17. IMO should ban smoking aboard all vessels at all times as on aircraft. 
 
18. The wider ferry industry should be encouraged to improve and semi-
standardise vessel design, construction and equipment as in aviation. 
Preferably using multi-compartmented, multi-hulled vessels. All passenger 
vessels should be compulsorily equipped with EPIRBs and, preferably, AIS. 
 
19. The wider maritime industry should develop simple, lighter, and less 
expensive evacuation systems and lifesaving equipment that is more likely to 
be fitted and used. 
 
20. The wider ferry industry, IMO and national governments should be 
encouraged to introduce improved computerised „fool proof‟ universal ticketing 
systems to ensure that accurate passenger manifests are created. 
 
21. The wider ferry industry, IMO and national governments should 
encourage passenger behavioural reform and national „learn-to-swim‟ 
campaigns. 
 
22. National governments should severely punish convicted delinquent 
owners, officers, crews, classification societies and regulators. They should 
widely publicise such punishment. 
 
23. If IMO will not or cannot be reformed, a global NGO to promote greater 
ferry safety should be established. It should use „naming and shaming‟ 
techniques similar to those used by Amnesty International, Greenpeace, 
WWF, Transparency International and Sea Shepherd, for example, to expose 
the greed and negligence of bad shipowners and corrupt bureaucrats. Market 
forces should then encourage those shipowners to reform. 
 
24. That NGO should be established to raise public consciousness of the 
dangers of bad ferries globally and to campaign for substantial safety 
improvements. 
 
25. That NGO should introduce a global vetting system, similar to Rightship, 
for all passenger vessels, their owners, officers and crews especially those 
operating domestically.938 In co-operation with the International Union of 
Marine Insurers, it should encourage hull and P&I insurers to wield their 
considerable power for reform.939 It should also co-operate with the wider 
travel industry and its publications to ensure the travelling public are made 
aware of the dangers of unsafe ferries. 
                                                     
938 See www.rightship.com. 




In addition to the reforms of IMO and of national governments advocated 
here, there are numerous reforms and improvements that could be 
undertaken by ferry operators themselves. They are described in sections 
10.6.0. to 10.14.0. below. 
 
10.1.1. Reducing human errors must be the primary focus. 
 
Human error, it has been made clear, is by far the most common and 
important causal factor in fatal ferry accidents. 940 The most effective 
solutions, obviously, will be those that successfully address that ultimate and 
overriding cause of 88 per cent of ferry accidents and 98 per cent of ferry 
fatalities. There is much that could and should be done to reduce human 
errors so as to achieve a substantial reduction in the global ferry death toll. 
Those improvements need not be very costly if carried out sensibly. It is far 
more a question of collective will than of money.   
 
Human behaviour can and has been changed for the better in aviation, public 
health, construction, cruise ship and oil tanker operations, mining and road 
safety, for example. It can be done. More and better training, education, more 
rigorous disciplines and punishments and human awareness campaigning are 
the keys. 
 
What will be required to achieve this will be a lengthy and powerful 
international public relations, lobbying and media campaign to bring the 
problem of unnecessary ferry fatalities to the attention of the general public. 
Such a campaign could be inspired and organised by a reformed International 
Maritime Organisation or, if IMO is completely ossified as it appears to be, 
more likely, by the proposed Non Government Organisation described 
below.941 It is notable that IMO is mentioned in 19 of the 24 suggested 
improvements summarised above.  
 
The parent body of IMO, the United Nations Organisation, has launched a 
campaign “Clean Seas” to rid the seas of garbage, particularly plastics.942 If 
that has been possible, why not a FerrySafe campaign led and promoted by 
IMO?943 Similarly, IMO‟s MARPOL and COLREGS codes have been 
implemented universally including domestically in all member nations, at least 
in theory. There seems to be no reason why the SOLAS, ISM and HSC codes 
could not also be so implemented. 
 
In fairness to IMO, although the evidence of continuing fatalities condemns its 
lack of effectiveness, it has publicly demonstrated its consciousness of the 
human factors problem. Its Resolution A.947(23), adopted on 27 November 
2003, titled Human Element Vision, Principles and Goals for the Organisation 
                                                     
940 See Chapter 2, Figure 2.2. 
941 See section 10.17.1.  
942 The Clean Seas global campaign on marine litter. See press release of 23 February 2017, 
UN News Centre, New York, 2017. 
943 The author has suggested that in a note to IMO Public Affairs Manager, Lee Adamson on 
12 March 2017. Baird, N. W. & Adamson, L. UN Clean Seas campaign. 
 
 281 
showed a clear awareness of the problem.944 Similarly, in 1999, the then 
Secretary-General, William O‟Neil, in a presentation to IMO‟s Maritime Safety 
Committee, urged that strong and effective action be taken with respect to 
Casualties on (Passenger) Ships not covered by the provisions of 
international conventions. 945 Since then, a number of conferences have been 
held at which human factors have been considered but other than a significant 
reduction of the annual number of fatalities in 2013 and 2016, little has 
changed.946 In the intervening years and since, in 2017, the annual numbers 
of fatalities have returned to normal. 
 
One such conference was an Asia-Pacific Heads of Maritime Safety Agencies 
Forum held in Busan from 12-15 April 2005. There, a representative of the 
U.S. Coast Guard, Commander Bryan R. Edmond, an engineer, presented a 
very optimistic paper Current State of International Consideration of Human 
Factors.947 Perhaps his research was handicapped by the absence of a 
comprehensive and readily accessible database of fatal ferry accidents at that 
time. Perhaps he was simply ahead of his time. Subsequent events have 
shown that his optimism as to potential reform was sadly premature, 
particularly in the context of an “Asia-Pacific” forum. 
 
Further, IMO has, in its prescient Manila Statement on Enhancement of the 
Safety of Ships Carrying Passengers on Non-International Voyages, which 
was adopted in Manila on 24 April 2015, recommended some of the above 
suggested reforms.948 Sadly, there has been no sign of any subsequent action 
aimed at implementing those recommendations on the part of IMO. 
Intriguingly, the author and a colleague were actively and deceptively 
precluded from attending and participating in the conference at which those 
recommendations were developed.949 The author suspects that the Manila 
Conference was something of a „Show Conference‟ designed as a vehicle to 
present IMO‟s thoughts on domestic ferry safety and to demonstrate its 
concern about the problem.950 
 
10.1.2. Simplify, improve and, above all, enforce existing 
regulations. 
 
As stated by former IMO Secretary General O‟Neil twenty years ago, IMO and 
its member states have enacted enough regulations.951 What they need to do 
now is to properly enforce, or facilitate the enforcement of those already in 
existence.952  
                                                     
944 For details, refer to Resolution A.947(23) of the International Maritime Organisation, 
London, 27 November 2003 
945 See MSC 72/14/2 of 8 November 1999, Technical Assistance Subprogramme in Maritime 
Safety, IMO, London, 1999. 
946 Appendix A, Ibid. 
947 Edmond, B.R. Current State of International Consideration of Human Factors, Asia-Pacific 
Heads of Maritime Safety agencies Forum, Busan, 12-15 April, 2005. 
948 For the complete statement see Appendix G. 
949 Revealed in correspondence among the author, Mr Justin Merrigan and IMO staff. 
950 As in the sense of the Stalinist „Show trials‟ in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. 
951 Quoted in full in 9.1. 




The process should start with remedying, particularly simplifying, the very 
obvious deficiencies in existing international and national regulations and, 
much more importantly, their enforcement.953  This should commence with the 
ten worst affected nations.954 Reforms could then be extended to all other 
nations starting with the next ten worst countries. Encouragement of better 
behaviour on the part of owners, operators and passengers would help and is 
entirely achievable955. Improved vessels,956 evacuation and safety equipment 
and search and rescue services957 would also bring about significant 
improvement as would better passenger education.958 
 
10.2.0. Reform of IMO would be the preferred solution. 
 
10.2.1. IMO appears remote, disengaged and disinterested in 
developing country domestic ferry fatalities. 
 
The International Maritime Organisation suffers from a disappointing 
perception of disengagement and remoteness and an appearance of being 
much too North Atlantic focused. While it has made some small, tokenistic 
efforts in the form of organising expensive but largely unrepresentative 
meetings, conferences and seminars in Tanzania, Kenya, the Philippines, 
Indonesia and Fiji,959 among others.960 IMO‟s consultative process is generally 
restricted to a very carefully selected audience that is unlikely to want to make 
changes or to „rock the IMO boat‟! Such events appear to achieve very little 
apart from projecting an image of concern. 
 
In its current form and with its current self-serving corporate culture, IMO has 
not yet and seems very unlikely to make any worthwhile contribution to the 
raising of safety standards in the domestic ferry sector. This is particularly so 
with respect to domestic ferries operating in developing countries. And they, 
after all, comprise the bulk of the problem. IMO and the ferry voyaging public 
would both benefit from wide-ranging and substantial reform of the 
organisation as outlined below. 
 
IMO gives the impression of having no serious interest in the domestic ferry 
fatality problems of the ten nations in which 80 per cent of the world‟s ferry 
fatalities have occurred. Nor, indeed, does it seem to have made any 
substantial effort in many of the ten next worst nations. It appears „Pontius 
Pilate‟ like in its desire to „wash its hands‟ of such problems and to transfer the 
blame for them to national governments. Most of the printed matter it 
                                                     
953 See Chapter 9 generally. 
954 See Table 5.2. Passenger Vessel Fatalities in Chapter 5. 
955 See Chapter 7, generally. 
956 See Chapter 6, generally. 
957 See Chapter 8, generally. 
958 See Chapter 7 on Human Factors. 
959 Refer to Bibliography for IMO and INTERFERRY press releases. E.g. Manila, 24 April 
2015.   
960 See, for example, IMO press release IMO support to NEPAD Planning and Coordinating 
Authority (NCPA), IMO, London, 2013. 
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produces on the subject of ferry safety would most accurately be described as 
platitudinous.961 The corporate culture of IMO is arrogantly and ignorantly self-
satisfied and self-serving to the point of negativity. It seems to find it difficult, if 
not impossible, to accept questioning, criticism or even suggestions. It mostly 
just ignores them as the author has discovered from personal experience over 
many years. 
 
IMO is invariably very slowly reactive rather than proactive. Normally, a 
disaster, scandals or multiple disasters are required to motivate the 
organisation to act. Even then, it appears much more willing to act or 
comment if such disasters occur in Europe. For example, the capsize of the 
Costa Concordia in 2012, which killed 32 people, inspired far more attention 
and comment from IMO than anything that has ever happened in Asia, the 
Pacific or Africa. In the same year there were 293 fatalities when the Skagit 
capsized off Zanzibar; the Rabaul Queen capsized off New Britain with 170 
fatalities; an unknown ferry on the Brahmaputra River with 251; and, the 
Shariatpur in Bangladesh with 185. A total of 900 fatalities. And, of course, 
there were many other less newsworthy accidents.962 
 
In that year there were ten reported accidents in which many more people 
were killed than in the Costa Concordia disaster but they all happened beyond 
Europe and, so, went largely unreported or commented on as far as IMO was 
concerned. 963 IMO tells us it „consults‟ widely but then, frustratingly, usually 
fails to act in any constructive way. It issues statements following its 
information sharing forums but they are devoid of commitments and timelines 
for action on the part of their participants. 
 
This contrasts distinctly with the publicly expressed desire of the two most 
recent IMO secretaries-general, Koji Sekimizu and Ki Tack Lim, at least, to 
the effect that: “The public expects safety standards on domestic passenger 
ferries to be as strong as those on international vessels”,964 and “I will ensure 
that the utmost focus is placed on improving implementation (of rules) at a 
global level”.965  
 
Ki Tack Lim went on to say: “But perhaps the most valuable tool we have in 
this respect is the Member State Audit Scheme”.966 This is a sadly hollow, if 
not actually delusional, claim as only one IMO member state, China, of the ten 
most dangerous countries, was a member of the MSAS at the time of going to 
press.967 IMO has a long way to go before it fulfils its laudable objectives. The 
                                                     
961 For example, refer to: Anon. Code of Safety for Small Passenger Ships _ Generic safety 
requirements, IMO, London, 2014. 
962 Appendix A, Ibid. 
963 Compare Appendix A, Ibid with GISIS and IMO press releases in 2012, www.imo.org. 
964 IMO Secretary-General Koji Sekimizu speaking at a Conference on the enhancement of 
safety of ships carrying passengers on non-international voyages, Manila, 24 April 2015. 
965 From an Address of the Secretary-General (Ki Tack Lim) at the Opening of the 103rd 
Session of the Legal Committee, IMO, London, 8 June 2016. 
966 Ki Tack Lim, Ibid. 
967 It is difficult to determine how many member states have been audited under the MSAS. 
However, at 6 April 2017, the only non-OECD country known to have been audited was 
Papua New Guinea 
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reality of its actions diverges dramatically from its rhetoric. It does not appear 
to be short of funds, just the will or determination to properly analyse the 
problem and then improve the safety of passenger vessels. 
 
While it would be preferable if IMO were able to be reformed, if it is so ossified 
as to be beyond reform or redemption, it would better be supplemented and 
substantially replaced by a ferry safety focussed NGO, FerrySafe.org or 
SafeFerry.org, perhaps? 
 
10.2.2. IMO must develop the „will‟ to effectively support and 
assist developing countries to improve their domestic 
maritime safety standards by working „with‟ them. 
 
While acknowledging, but not in any way accepting, the restraints placed on 
IMO by its legally-prescribed inability to interfere in the internal affairs of its 
sovereign member states,968 it could, were it to develop the will or 
determination to do so, assist significantly without so interfering. It is a matter 
of approach. 
 
IMO should work „with‟ its sovereign member states to educate, encourage 
and train them to similarly encourage, educate, train and enforce better 
behaviour among their local ferry owners, operators and regulators. It should 
develop a corporate sense of proportion and concentrate on curing the human 
factor problems rather than the very significantly less important technical ones 
that it seems to be obsessed with and on which it has spent so much money.  
 
Its apparently substantial financial and time resources should be directed at 
real problems rather than at speculated or possible ones.969  That should be 
done in a culturally sensitive manner. A greater focus on simple human 
behavioural factors and requiring fundamentally safer vessels is all that is 
required. Finessing the proven inadequate existing rules using complex and 
arcane naval architectural mathematical formulae seems to be an expensive 
waste of time and money. Developing a global maritime safety culture should 
be its primary objective. Safety, in the case of ferries, is a behavioural rather 
than a technical problem. 
 
The biggest problem hindering the reform of IMO is that it is always very 
difficult to change the course of a large and well-entrenched bureaucracy. 
While IMO obviously benefits from the contributions of some dedicated staff 
and committee members, committee chairmen and delegates, its public face, 
as observed by the author, is generally quite different. IMO‟s employees 
appear to be self-satisfied, self-serving people on very good salaries and 
enjoying generous perquisites. As also do its consultants. They are very 
comfortable and, so, unlikely to want to promote change, especially reform. 
They firmly believe that they know best. 
 
                                                     
968 As described in its foundation Charter, see www.imo.org. 
969 See Chapter 8, generally. 
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Employment by IMO appears to be something of a sinecure, right up to 
Secretary-General level. It should not be. Such reluctance to change or 
reform will be endorsed and supported by many, but fortunately not all, of 
IMO‟s generally very self-indulgent national delegates. It will also tend to be 
endorsed by certain ferry owners, designers, builders, naval architecture firms 
and academics and national maritime administrations, particularly from 
Northern Europe and Scandinavia. IMO serves them well. It largely suits them 
exactly as it is. They know how to lobby IMO very effectively. 
 
10.2.3. IMO HQ should move to centre of real maritime world. 
 
IMO‟s headquarters should be moved to somewhere nearer the centre of the 
real maritime world. It is remote from the area where it is most needed. 
London is too attractive a subsidised home to sinecured delegates and staff 
from developing countries to enable any constructive work to be done there. It 
is too far from where most of the problems actually occur. It is no longer the 
„centre of the maritime universe‟. Asia undoubtedly is. It is interesting, by 
contrast, to note that the International Maritime Rescue Federation, a 
charity/NGO based in low-rent, remote Stonehaven, Scotland, has opened a 
regional office in Shanghai.970 
 
10.2.4. Passengers have a right to expect domestic voyages 
to be equally as safe as international ones and airline flights. 
 
Passengers should be entitled to expect that they would be equally as safe on 
domestic as on international voyages. Secretary-General Ki Tack Lim stated 
this personally.971 This is generally the case on both domestic and 
international flights with only a few exceptions in Africa, Latin America and the 
former Soviet Union.972 IMO should follow the example of its sister 
organisation ICAO and oversee domestic voyages just as closely as 
international ones, even if through a carefully supported proxy. ICAO suffers 
from a similarly restrictive charter as IMO but it has not allowed that to prevent 
it from making very significant improvements to the global aviation industry 
including with respect to domestic flights. 973 It is apparent that ICAO is 
notably better led than IMO. Leadership seems to be the key to their disparity 
in effectiveness. 
 
10.2.5. Reform IMO with ICAO as a model. 
 
IMO should be reformed with ICAO as a model. It does not need to be 
replaced unless it refuses to be reformed. The IMO GISIS accident database, 
for example, must be substantially upgraded and maintained. It is wholly 
inadequate. If IMO is unaware of the extent of the ferry fatality problem, it is 
unsurprising that it is so reluctant to do anything constructive about it. If that 
database improvement cannot be done „in-house‟, as seems likely, it should 
                                                     
970 IMRF website, An Overview, P.4. www.international-maritime-rescue.org . 
971 Ki Tack Lim. Ibid. 
972 Refer to ISTARS at www.icao.org.    
973 Refer to www.icao.org and www.imo.org . 
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be contracted out to a free enterprise operator subject to appropriate checking 
and auditing.974 ICAO‟s iSTARS database provides an excellent template or 
benchmark. 975 So, too, does its associated SKYbrary database.976 Another 
excellent example of defining the problem with a database is the international 
road safety equivalent, IRTAD.977 They show what intergovernmental 
organisations are capable of when properly directed. 
 
The Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database shows what can be 
achieved by a private organisation with a very small fraction of the resources 
of IMO. It is incomparably more comprehensive and informative with respect 
to ferry accidents, particularly domestic ferry accidents, than is GISIS. Its 
content has been offered to IMO without charge but that offer was rejected.978 
 
The ferry and tourist boat industry and its regulators should relentlessly 
plagiarise from, copy and follow the aviation industry and the activities of 
ICAO. The oil tanker and cruise ship sectors, too, are showing the way. They 
all provide excellent models. Indeed, they do for the entire maritime industry. 
 
The global ferry industry, through its industry association, INTERFERRY, 
should assiduously and relentlessly lobby for the reform of IMO if only to 
eliminate the rogue operators who give the ferry industry a bad name. This 
would obviously be in the best interests of legitimate operators. Even though a 
fatal ferry accident may occur in Bangladesh, Tanzania or the Philippines, it 
still harms the image of ferry operators everywhere.979  
 
10.2.6. Revise IMO‟s SOLAS Code to be more economical 
using the HSC Code as a model. 
 
IMO‟s SOLAS Code standards are generally far too expensive and, often, 
inappropriate to be realistically complied with widely with respect to domestic 
voyages in developing countries. 980 There must be room for realistic 
compromise. When the SOLAS requirements are unaffordable and 
inappropriate, they will be ignored. It is quite feasible to design and construct 
more affordable and appropriate vessels and evacuation and safety 
equipment suited to poorer and mostly warmer countries. SOLAS should be 
adjusted accordingly using the HSC Code as a model. That would encourage 
the governments of developing countries to introduce more appropriate 
regulations. 
 
The extension of an appropriately modified version of the HSC Code to cover 
all ferries and tourist vessels everywhere, whether or not they are operating 
domestically or internationally, or at high speed, should be undertaken 
                                                     
974 Described in detail in Section 10.17.1.  
975 See ISTARS, Ibid. 
976 Refer to www.icao.org/SKYbrary/  
977 See www.itf-oecd.org/IRTAD/  
978 Refer to correspondence between the author and Adamson, L. of IMO. 
979
 Disclosure: The author is a long time member of INTERFERRY and at the time of writing served on 
its Domestic Ferry Safety Sub-Committee. 
980 Compare the IMO SOLAS and HSC Codes available on www.imo.org . 
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quickly. 981 It is very effective and has been accepted by designers, builders, 
classification societies, operators and regulators alike.982  
 
In both developed and developing countries very few vessels built to or 
operating under the HSC Code have been involved in fatal accidents. The 
number of fatalities thus arising have been miniscule.983 It works very 
effectively and should be an all-encompassing globally implemented rule. 
There is no excuse for permitting lower safety standards on domestic 
voyages. They simply need to be more appropriate and affordable. It is on 
domestic voyages, after all, that 93 per cent of ferry fatalities occur. 
 
10.3.1. Ban new construction of conventional monohull Ro-
Pax ferries.  
 
Conventional Ro-Pax ferries, which have been involved in at least 18 per cent 
of known total accidents, have been responsible for at least 25 per cent of 
known ferry fatalities over fifty years.984 In the final sixteen years of this study, 
however, they have been involved in 16 per cent of accidents but have been 
responsible for 32 per cent of fatalities, almost entirely in developing 
countries. That is grossly disproportionate. Conventional monohull Ro-Pax 
ferries represent considerably fewer than 10 per cent of the total ferry 
population. The statistics speak for themselves. Their bow and stern doors 
and low, wide vehicle decks make them uniquely vulnerable to human errors, 
especially when inadequately manned and maintained.  
 
Future Ro-Pax ferries should be required to have at least two hulls linked by 
an appropriately strong and durable bridge deck. The hulls should each have 
at least six watertight compartments of which none should have a volume 
exceeding 20 per cent of the total volume of that hull. The bridge deck and 
vehicle deck should be a minimum of four per cent of the waterline length of 
the vessel above its laden static waterline. No vehicles or passengers should 
be able to be stored or carried below that level. Bow doors should not be 
permitted. Fire prevention and extinguishment rules should not only be strict 
but they should be strictly enforced.985 
 
The construction of new monohull Ro-Pax ferries with bow doors to their 
vehicle decks should be banned.986 Bow doors destroy the watertight integrity 
of the vessel. Vehicle decks on monohull Ro-Pax ferries should be 
constructed to be a minimum of four percent of the vessel‟s water line length 
above its static loaded waterline. All conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries 
currently in service should be phased out as quickly as possible. The sale of 
second-hand conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries should likewise be 
banned. 
                                                     
981 HSC Code, Op cit. 
982 For example, Bureau Veritas, GL and RINA as shown in their Rules for the Classification 
of High Speed Craft, Bureau Veritas, Paris, 2002. 
983 Note the fast ferry, particularly multihull, statistics incorporated in Appendix A. 
984 Refer to section 6.2.1. on conventional Ro-Pax ferry vulnerabilities.. 
985 Refer to EMSA report on Ro-Ro fires, FIRESAFE. See 6.1.3.  




Unfortunately, many owners, designers and builders of conventional monohull 
Ro-Pax ferries have propagated the myths that their multi-hulled counterparts 
are fragile and expensive to build operate and maintain.  That is largely 
because they are mostly built of aluminium and operate at high speeds. Their 
very effective lobbying appears to have largely convinced IMO personnel of 
those fallacies. 
 
In reality, aluminium multi-hulled fast Ro-Pax ferries are significantly less 
expensive to build, operate and maintain than are their conventional steel 
counterparts of the same economical capacity. Their safety record is almost 
unblemished. Otherwise, obviously, in a conservative industry like shipping, 
few, if any, would have been sold. 
 
Further, multihull Ro-Pax ferries do not have to operate at high speeds, nor do 
they have to be constructed of aluminium. Very importantly, because of their 
greater beam, they can enable semi-trailer trucks to turn around on board, 
thus obviating the need for dangerous bow doors.987 Steel multihull Ro-Pax 
ferries could be designed to operate efficiently at the low speeds common in 
developing countries. They would then be very economical indeed. They 
would also be incomparably safer than their monohull counterparts. The key 
to safety, aside from human factors, is stability and unsinkability. Speeds, 
construction materials or size are irrelevant. 
 
10.3.2. Sales of elderly, conventional monohull Ro-Pax ferries 
to developing countries should be banned immediately. 
 
The IMO facilitated and promoted Stockholm Agreement has been in force for 
over twenty years. 988 It should be replaced as it only serves to protect 
„dinosaur‟ Ro-Pax ferries and their owners, specialist designers and builders. 
It should be re-written so as to promote the design and construction of safer, 
more seaworthy vessels. It has, admittedly, proved to be effective, so far, but 
only in Northern Europe where it has had the unfortunate consequence of 
encouraging the southward export of unsafe ferries.989 The „grandfathering‟ of 
rules only permits and encourages such dangerous practices.990 
 
Given that practically all ferry accidents result from human error, IMO must be 
persuaded that the complex mathematical naval architectural formulae that it 
and its Scandinavian maritime authority contributors promote will not in any 
way solve the problem. Conventional Ro-Pax ferries are especially vulnerable 
to human errors. They may be safer now, than they were, in disciplined, 
developed north European countries but they have continued to be very 
dangerous elsewhere. Indeed, the increase in the percentage of fatalities due 
to Ro-Pax accidents since 2000 seems largely due to this phenomenon of 
                                                     
987 See General Arrangement drawing of Incat 98 metre Ro-Pax catamaran fast ferry in 6.3.3. 
988 For the clearest and simplest explanation of the Stockholm Agreement on Ro-Ro/Ro-Pax 
stability see Ferries Ro-Ro passenger vessels: Improved safety concept for ro-ro passenger 
vessels, Gard, www.gard.no/web/updates/content/51837/ferries-roropassenger/  
989 For example, see Al Salam Boccaccio 98 in Chapter 3, Item 18. 
990 As in the SOLAS Code and the Stockholm Agreement. 
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southward migration. Old, poorly maintained ferries that have been 
dangerously modified are the main culprits.991 
 
The on-sale of elderly North European, North American and Japanese ferries, 
particularly Ro-Pax, to poor countries should be banned. IMO could enforce 
that. Indeed, it already claims that IMO “measures” cover ship disposal so it 
should have already been doing that.992 Clearly, it has failed to do so. 
It has effectively halted the sale of unsafe and inadequate oil tankers so why 
not ferries? 
 
In the interim, it is believed that the Philippines Government has, in late 2017, 
banned the importation of all second hand ferries.993 
 
The international funding agencies (WB, IMF, AID, AIIB and ADB, etc.) and 
commercial banks should be counselled by IMO re funding for the purchase of 
such „clapped out‟ vessels. Indeed, they should be advised to not assist with 
the funding of any kind of unseaworthy or unrealistically expensive vessels. 
 
The World Bank, IMF, ADB, AIIB, AUSAID, JBIC, USAID and similar funding 
agencies should be encouraged to fund simple, seaworthy ferries rather than 
larger, complex ones which really only benefit naval architects and ship 
builders from developed countries. The completely impractical “affordable” 
Ro-Pax ferry concept promoted by Finnish naval architecture firm, Deltamarin, 
at the INTERFERRY 2016 Conference in Manila is just the sort of emotively 
promoted concept that such funding agencies can be regrettably easily misled 
into financing. 994 
 
10.4.1. Focus reform effort on most dangerous countries. 
 
Reform efforts should initially be focused on the six of the ten most dangerous 
countries where they appear likely to be most successful. It should exclude 
China which should be capable of carrying out its own reform if shamed into it. 
China, incidentally and tellingly, is the only one of the ten worst countries to 
have been audited under the IMO‟s Member State Audit Scheme. Those six 
countries, then, are: Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines and 
Tanzania. Four Asian and two African. Regrettably, DR Congo, Senegal and 
Haiti appear too difficult to tackle at first. Once significant reform has been 
achieved in those six countries, efforts could be re-directed to the next six 
countries down the list. 
 
10.4.2. National authority reform. 
 
National authority reform should start with three or four of those countries, for 
example, Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines and Tanzania, and then 
work through the list. Compare the powers and capabilities of national 
                                                     
991 Appendix A, Ibid. 
992 Refer to Introduction to IMO, www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/ . 
993 So the author was advised by Mr Chet Pastrana, CEO of Fast Cat Ferries at the 
INTERFERRY 2017 Conference in Split in October 2017. 
994 See paper on www.interferry.com/Manila- Conference- 2016/papers/. 
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maritime authorities and coast guard services in statistically safe and unsafe 
nations. What could they achieve if assisted and supported by IMO and 
neighbouring developed nations? 
 
IMO should support the improvement of the maritime authorities in terms of 
regulation, enforcement and search and rescue (SAR) services in such 
countries preferably with the assistance of nearby developed nations. For 
example, Australia with Indonesia, the Philippines and Papua-New Guinea, 
Singapore with Myanmar, New Zealand with the Pacific island nations, Japan 
with the Philippines, and the USA, Canada and European nations with various 
central and South American and African countries. This is actually happening 
in a limited way but with little input evident from IMO. For example, the 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority works with its counterparts in Indonesia, 
Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands. Comparing and benchmarking 
with proven effective organisations such as the United States, Canadian and 
Japanese coast guards, Britain‟s Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and the 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority would be a good place to commence.  
 
Coastguards and government SAR services must be increased and up-
graded. NGOs and classification societies could donate services and 
hardware as part of their corporate social responsibility promotions. There are 
excellent models for effective, economical SAR services in many of the 
developed countries. 
 
10.5.1. Introduce a standard format accident inquiry model. 
 
IMO should implement a standard format accident inquiry model from which a 
standard form report should arise. It should also report on „near miss‟ 
incidents. That then should be included in a standardised, global database of 
all PV accidents and incidents. So far its Casualty Investigation Code of 2010 
has failed to do this except in OECD countries. Similarly, GISIS has almost 
completely failed to be utilised except in some OECD countries. Except for 
China, none of the ten worst countries have adopted it at all. It should be 
simplified with a “short form” version for use in developing countries.  
 
All fatal and total hull loss accidents should be properly investigated by a 
legally but simply and inexpensively constituted MBOI. Causes should be 
determined, blame allocated and lessons learnt recorded. IMO should provide 
a universal template for such inquiries based on the Rabaul Queen, 
Marchioness and Herald of Free Enterprise inquiries. To date, IMO‟s Casualty 
Investigation Code, London, 2010, has been largely ignored outside the 
OECD countries. 995 This is not because the Code is inadequate. Rather, it is 
the usual failure of will on the part of IMO. The Code does not require re-
writing, just sensible enforcement. 
 
                                                     
995 See the unfortunately too infrequently implemented IMO Casualty Investigation Code, 
IMO, London, 2010. 
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The British and Australian inquiry and reporting systems are simple and 
effective and, importantly, prompt.996 In particular, the Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau‟s Transport Safety Reports are normally published less than 
two years after the event. They are formulaic, well illustrated and provide an 
excellent single page summary of the accident and the lessons learnt from it. 
 
10.5.2. Improve database of accidents and enquiry reports. 
 
It is impossible to achieve reform without knowing the scope and extent of the 
problem. It is imperative, therefore, that detailed and accurate databases be 
compiled, and maintained in perpetuity, describing all significant passenger 
vessel accidents and “near misses”, both fatal and non-fatal, by every country. 
They should be combined into an international record. 
 
The Rabaul Queen997, Herald of Free Enterprise998 and Marchioness999 
inquiries and reports make for excellent templates. All such reports of fatal 
and total constructive loss accidents should be recorded in perpetuity on a 
database preferably maintained by IMO. As well as documenting the findings 
and penalties recommended or imposed, such reports should highlight the 
lessons learnt from the accident and the inquiry.  
 
They should be profusely illustrated and the names, biographical details and 
photographs of owner company directors and managers published as well as 
those of ship‟s officers deemed to be responsible. These should be recorded 
in perpetuity and extensively cross-referenced on the database advocated 
above to enable passengers, potential crewmembers and insurers, for 
example, to make informed decisions. 1000 So should changes to owner 
company names such as in the case of Sulpicio Lines. 
 
The aviation industry, again, shows the way. It has several independent safety 
ratings agencies that are active, responsive and effective. Two of the more 
notable are Airline Ratings and Skytrax Ratings.1001 They offer good models 
to the ferry industry. 
 
IMO should learn also from the model of the road safety equivalent of ICAO 
and itself. That body is IRTAD, the International Traffic Safety Data and 
Analysis Group, a permanent working group of the Joint Transport Research 
Centre of the OECD and the International Transport Forum. Its successes are 
proven and are based on high quality data and statistics that are the 
imperative foundation of any campaign to change human behaviour. Its efforts 
                                                     
996 See, for example, Fatality on board Skandi Pacific off the Pilbara coast, Western 
Australia /14 July 2015, ATSB Transport Safety Report, 322-MO-2015-005, Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, Canberra, 2016. And, MAIB: Experienced Launch Skipper Relied 
on iPad Navigation App Prior to Collision, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, 
Southampton, 2017. 
997 Refer to Bibliography for details 
998 Ibid. 
999 Ibid. 
1000 Refer to sections 1.12.2. and 10.2.4. 
1001 See, for example, www.airlineratings.com and www.skytraxratings.com. 
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have led to a 42 per cent fall in road fatalities in the 14 years to 2013 in the 32 
countries involved with its programme.1002 
 
10.5.3. A culture of learning from minor accidents and „near 
misses‟ should be widely promoted. 
 
This is widespread in aviation and is encouraged by many national aviation 
authorities as well as by ICAO. There is even a private, non-profit, global 
organisation CHIRP  (Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme) 
that originated in the United Kingdom, and which promotes “Aviation and 
Maritime Confidential Reporting” of minor accidents and near misses. 1003 This 
with the objective of promoting a culture of learning from your own and other 
peoples‟ mistakes. While obviously well-established in the aviation industry, 
CHIRP would appear to have a long way to go before it is well established in 
the poorer countries where most ferry fatalities occur. It is, nevertheless, a 
very worthwhile innovation that could, in theory, contribute substantially to a 
useful reduction in ferry fatalities if adopted more widely. 
 
10.6.0. Improve vessel design, construction and equipment. 
 
10.6.1. Design, construction and equipment of vessels should 
be economically and climatically appropriate.  
 
Passenger vessels and their equipment should be designed and constructed 
appropriately to the countries and economies in which they are to be used. 
Cheaper, simpler, safer and more durable, preferably multi-hulled, vessels 
should be the objective. Catamaran and trimaran ferries have proved to be 
significantly safer on both domestic and international voyages than have their 
monohull counterparts.1004 
 
As explained in Chapter 6, apart from the obvious problems with conventional 
monohull Ro-Pax vessels and Philippine „bancas‟, that make them more than 
normally vulnerable, there is little wrong with vessels generally. Technical 
failures are the cause of negligible numbers of fatalities. That is not to say, 
though, that vessels cannot be improved. They can. Obviously, multi-
compartmented, multihull vessels significantly improve the chances of 
passenger survival in the event of an accident.  
 
Unseaworthy and overloaded vessels are the biggest killers.1005 Eliminating 
them by regulation and enforcement will be impossible except in the very long 
term. Again, aid agencies and NGOs could assist here with the provision of 
simple, inexpensive and seaworthy craft. Inevitably, unseaworthy vessels are 
unlikely to be equipped with even the most basic  safety equipment such as 
life jackets, liferafts, Carley floats, EPIRBs, strobe lights, flares and AIS. Aid 
organisations could also assist with this. 
                                                     
1002 Wegman, F. et al. Ibid. 
1003 For more information, refer to www.chirp.org.uk or www.chirpmaritime.org. 
1004 Refer to detailed data comparison in 6.2.4. Chapter 6. 




The author has discussed ideas for safer vessels with a number of practical 
naval architects and ship builders. For example, Stuart Ballantyne, principal of 
noted naval architecture firm Sea Transport Solutions, has long advocated 
designing vessels that “run out of deck space long before they run out of 
stability or buoyancy”.1006 This in an endeavour to prevent overloading. He 
also advocates steel-hulled craft of catamaran hull form with numerous water-
tight compartments in each hull and a minimum of „through-hull‟ fittings. They, 
even if minimally maintained, should ensure seaworthiness. 
 
Fortunately, an enterprising Filipino ship owning family has invested in at least 
20 Ro-Pax catamaran ferries to Mr Ballantyne‟s designs. They are currently 
operating successfully around the country. Unfortunately, though, even at 
their present rapid rate of introduction, they will take many years to replace all 






Image 10.1. One of the twenty + modern Ro-Pax catamaran ferries designed 
by Sea Transport Solutions that are being operated by Fast Cat Ferries in the 
Philippines. At least ten more such vessels are planned (FastCat Ferries). 
 
Leading Tasmanian based ship builder Toby Richardson of Richardson 
Devine Marine specialises in the construction of aluminium catamaran fast 
ferries which have been exported to many developing countries such as The 
Seychelles and Tanzania.1007 Mr Richardson also advocates catamaran hull 
                                                     
1006 Mr Stuart Ballantyne in numerous discussions with the author. 
1007 Mr Toby Richardson in a discussion with the author. August 2015. 
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forms for the same reasons as Mr Ballantyne. However, Mr Richardson 
believes that smaller catamaran ferries (To about 15 metres long.) could 
efficiently and economically be „rotation‟ moulded from HDPE as with the 
Carley floats mentioned above. Such craft, as can be seen in Chapter 6, could 
well be powered by reliable and easily maintained diesel outboard motors that 
would also eliminate any need for through-hull fittings. Again, the keys are 
simplicity and series production of very simple designs. 
 
10.6.2. Promote standardised safe ferry types and designs. 
 
The ferry industry should encourage a reduction in the variety of ferry types 
and designs. They should be more standardised as are buses and aircraft. 
Even berthing and loading/unloading infrastructure could be beneficially 
standardised. It will save money and enable more seaworthy, economical and 
maintainable vessels to be constructed, maintained and surveyed at more 
reasonable prices. They don‟t all need to be built by one company just as 
buses and aircraft are not. Nor need they be standardised designs. They 
should, however, be built in uniform dimensional classes to facilitate 
economical building, maintenance, berthing and survey. Such standardisation 
need not preclude innovation and improvement.  
 
Competition within certain fixed capacity and dimensional parameters should 
be encouraged. Simplicity, economy and seaworthiness are the keys. Buses 
and aircraft types show how that can be done. For example, Boeing 737 and 
Airbus A320 aircraft share essentially the same dimensions and engines and 
can be boarded via the same „Skybridges‟ at airports world-wide. So do 
Boeing 777 and 787 and Airbus 330 and 350 models. Buses globally are of 
uniform width and mostly constructed to carry 56 seated passengers. 
 
As described above and more extensively in Chapter 6, future Ro-Pax vessels 
should be catamarans or trimarans of the Austal, Damen, Incat and Sea 
Transport Solutions types or simpler, less expensive versions of them.1008 
They do not have to be high speed. They do not necessarily have to be 
constructed of aluminium. They could be constructed of steel or HDPE. Any 
future monohull Ro-Pax vessels should not be permitted to have bow doors. 
Stern vehicle ramps and doors should be significantly higher above their 
waterlines than is current practice. They should be similar in concept to the 
latest (2017) Damen vessels for Canada.1009 Existing monohull Ro-Pax 
vessels should be rapidly retired, very closely watched by authorities, and the 
voyaging public warned of their dangers. Capacity increasing, stability robbing 
modifications should be banned. 
 
Even passenger only ferries would be significantly safer if they were required 
to be properly constructed, multi-compartmented, multi-hulled vessels. The 
statistics shown in Appendix A prove without doubt that such vessels are far 
more likely to protect their passengers and crew in the event of any 
imaginable kind of accident than are any alternative designs. 
                                                     
1008 See 6.3.2. 




10.6.3. Mandate fitting of simple, inexpensive lifesaving 
equipment. 
 
The development of simple, durable, easily used and inexpensive life-saving 
equipment should be encouraged. Pool noodles, lightweight lifeboats, cheap 
HDPE Carley Floats and simple, cheap, lightweight rescue boats would all be 
more appropriate and more likely to be fitted in warm developing countries. 
1010 Inflatable equipment that requires regular and expensive maintenance 
and checking should be avoided. The cost, weight, complexity and 
maintenance of all such equipment should be significantly reduced from those 
required by SOLAS. It is possible. North European equipment is generally too 
heavy, expensive, complex and difficult to store, maintain and use in 
developing countries. 
 
Essentially, the expensive, complex and heavy life saving equipment and life 
boats that are prescribed by IMO and national authorities in those countries 
are often quite inappropriate and unnecessary for poor countries. More 
appropriate and affordable standards need to be developed for developing 
countries. Ironically, in many cases, they may also even be better for rich 
countries. Safety specifications can too often be commercially rather than 
economically driven mainly for the benefit of the safety equipment 
manufacturers. Their products are not durable or rugged enough to survive 
where maintenance is unlikely and climatic conditions destructive. Simpler, 
cheaper, more durable devices would be more likely to be adopted where 
they are needed.  
 
Carley Floats. today, are economically rotation moulded in large numbers 
from high-density polyethylene (HDPE) in much the same way as modern 
canoes, dinghies and kayaks. They are resistant to sunlight and should last 
fifty years with essentially no maintenance. They can be moulded in high 
visibility colours. If enough of an improved global standard design were to be 
manufactured, unit costs could be significantly reduced. 
 
If of double-sided design, it wouldn‟t matter how they are launched or landed, 
they would still provide useful buoyancy on and alongside them for significant 
numbers of survivors. HDPE floats weighing up to 50 kilograms could easily 
be launched by two people and could assist up to twenty people with children 
and the elderly able to be hoisted out of the water on to the float itself. 
Because most passenger vessel accidents occur in tropical waters, 
hypothermia would not be a significant problem with such floats. 
 
Meanwhile, while widely fitted to ferries in developed countries, modern 
versions of Carley Floats are very rare in the developing countries where they 
would be of considerable value. 
 
The use of simple and very inexpensive lifesaving devices should be 
encouraged. It is pointless to insist upon equipping vessels with rich country 
                                                     
1010 As described in 1.14.1.  
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devices in regions that cannot afford them. Even the most basic of lifejackets 
cost USD 10 or more on the world market. That is two weeks‟ income in some 
of the countries discussed here. Much cheaper and easier to use would, for 
example, be „pool noodles‟ which would cost around US fifty cents each if 
purchased in bulk. They provide simple, long-term buoyancy and are very 
easy to store in convenient places aboard vessels. They are also easier to 




Image 10.2. Pool noodles, would provide cheap, easy-to-use and easy-to-
stow buoyancy aids that, while frowned on by rich country regulators, would 
save lives. They cost about USD 0.5 in developed countries. 
 
Much the same applies with lifeboats and liferafts. Rich country mandated 
types are much too expensive to purchase and maintain in developing 
countries. They are complex and beset with rules and „use-by‟ dates that 
appear to be primarily for the benefit of their manufacturers. 
 
EPIRBs, while having „use by‟ dates, because they are battery powered, 
remain a very economical SAR tool. They should be compulsorily fitted as 
should be AIS. 
 
Again, those improvements could be achieved both quickly and economically, 
particularly if IMO could be persuaded to be rational in the application of its 
standards. It must take account of the economic realities applying in poorer 
countries. Comparatively inexpensive safety improvements in terms of 
vessels and their equipment are readily available. 
 
10.6.4. Recognise that inadequate maintenance is a vastly 
bigger problem than bad design or construction deficiencies. 
 
Poor maintenance is a much worse cause of fatalities than inadequate design 
or construction of vessels.1011 This fact should be highlighted at both the 
international and domestic levels. Passengers should be informed that if a 
ferry appears poorly maintained, it probably is. Thus it should be avoided. 
National governments should be encouraged to enforce sensible basic 
                                                     
1011 See Appendix A, Ibid. And refer to Chapter 2 generally. 
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10.7.0. Introduce improved universal ticketing systems. 
 
Overloading is one of the major causes of fatal ferry accidents. It is, for 
obvious economic reasons, a particularly prevalent problem in developing 
countries. IMO and national maritime authorities should introduce simple and 
effective ticketing systems to help prevent overloading and to ensure the 
production of an accurate passenger manifest.  
 
On shorter voyages where a detailed manifest would be impractical, an 
accurate headcount should be taken as a minimum and recorded away from 
the vessel concerned. A simple hand written book at each terminal would 
suffice. 
 
Even the poorest and most primitive of countries are sufficiently computer 
literate to operate such systems. Almost everyone, even the poorest, have 
access to a modern mobile telephone. Systems are being developed to book 
and board public transport vehicles, including ferries, using such devices.1012 
Such systems and their associated operator training could be donated by IMO 
or wealthier neighbouring countries. Obviously, this will first require other 
reforms particularly with respect to enforcement. 
 
In any case, every passenger vessel, world-wide, should be surveyed and a 
safe “Personnel Limit”, including all people, both passengers and crew, 
determined. That limit, rather like a Plimsoll Line, should be printed and 
embossed. in characters at least 25 cm high, on each side and on the 
transom of each vessel. For example: “PL 350”. A global publicity campaign 
should be conducted to inform passengers of the measure. It should advise 
them to make their own count and not to embark on any ferry that appears 
overloaded.  
 
10.8.0. Utilise human factors specialists. 
 
Human factors specialists have contributed significantly to safety 
improvements in aviation, trucking, mining, construction, oil and gas, railways,  
manufacturing, cruise ship and other industry sectors. Their skills would be 
readily adaptable to ferry operations. The International Maritime Organisation 
must overcome its fear of “interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign 
member nations” and encourage the injection of such experts into the worst 
performing countries even if only on a consulting basis.  
 
An extensive Web search reveals that most airlines have „human factors‟ 
managers or similar. EasyJet, Emirates, Lufthansa, Singapore Airlines, Thai 
                                                     
1012 For example, see www.masabi.com. 
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Airways, Virgin and Qantas are examples.1013 The only passenger vessel 
owners that seem to have similar positions are Carnival, RCCL, P&O Ferries, 
Thames Clipper, BC Ferries and Stena. Of smaller ferry companies, that is 
the few that have websites, none list the employment of such specialists. This 
is an important difference between aviation and shipping. Even railways in 
western developed countries have human factors, ergonomics and safety 
managers. This would seem a very effective way of raising safety 
consciousness within ferry companies. 
 
A specifically nominated executive with a clearly defined brief needs to have 
both responsibility for and the means to carry out the safety consciousness 
task in every ferry owning company. Even the smallest airline companies 
seem to have someone carrying that job description. The website of the 
Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors, the profession‟s 
governing body, lists numerous employee and consulting practitioners. 1014 
Even the smallest of ferry companies could afford to consult with such 
specialists if they cannot afford to employ a full time human factors executive. 
 
It is imperative that safety consciousness be raised and appropriate safety 
disciplines and procedures be introduced throughout the ferry industry. Those 
disciplines and procedures need to be assiduously promoted and continually 
enforced. Thus the requirement for human factors specialists to conduct that 
work through training, checking, testing and ensuring simple rules are in force 
and, above all, enforced. The imperative of developing a safety culture among 
all ferry owners and regulators must be relentlessly encouraged and 
promoted.1015 
 
Fatalism, it has been shown, is endemic, as is corruption, in most, if not all, of 
the poorer countries discussed.1016 Human factors specialists would appear to 
be well equipped professionally to modify or eliminate these significant 
behavioural faults. However, poverty, and its close relative, malnutrition, 
obviously, make such necessary reforms difficult. 
 
10.9.0. Encourage classification societies to assist on a pro 
bono basis. 
 
Do we really need classification societies? They originated through a 
requirement to determine whether vessels were insurable. Aviation doesn‟t 
have them despite their best efforts to move into that sector. Insurers should 
be able to estimate risks for themselves. They are well aware of the data that 
is available and of the risks that they highlight.  
 
Classification societies don‟t yet seem to contribute anything obviously 
constructive in the domestic sector in developing countries. Developing 
country governments and vessel owners cannot afford to retain them.  
                                                     
1013 Each of them has an Occupational Health and Safety department or equivalent. Some 
have separate Flight or Aviation Safety departments. 
1014 See the Institute‟s website www.ergonomics.org.uk . 
1015 As described in 7.6.1. 




They could, however, use much of the excellent and valuable research and 
technology they have developed in and for developed countries – which have 
already paid for it – and make it available to developing countries at little or no 
cost. It could lead to the saving of many lives and would have a valuable 
public relations or corporate social responsibility (CSR) benefit for the 
classification societies. 
 
To vessel owners and governments in developing countries, classification 
societies seem like very expensive auditors,1017 rather like the „Big four‟ 
accounting firms that so often overlook frauds and mismanagement.1018 
Indeed, the Sewol Inquiry revealed collusion between ship owner and the 
Korean classification society.1019  
 
It is encouraging, however, to note that the Lloyd‟s Register Foundation in its 
Insight report on global safety challenges for 2017, mentions passenger 
ferries as a safety challenge and urges that IMO be influenced, “to enforce 
regions to take up regulations that would make ferries safer in design and 
methods of use”.1020 
 
10.10.0. Encourage passenger behavioural reform. 
 
10.10.1. Consumer education of ferry passengers should be 
widely promoted. 
 
Consumer education of ferry passengers should be promoted everywhere. If a 
vessel looks overloaded or poorly maintained don‟t go aboard, could be a 
starting theme. As in aviation, ferry passengers should be educated and 
disciplined to listen to and obey the instructions of the crew. They should be 
required to pay attention to safety briefings. This can be achieved.  
 
The author has travelled widely by aircraft in China since the early 1990s. 
Passengers then were unruly, undisciplined and dangerous, with cigarette 
smoking widespread. By the early 2000s this behaviour had been completely 
eradicated. Badly behaved passengers were simply removed from aircraft and 
usually severely fined, if not imprisoned. That proved to be an effective 
method of enforcing good behaviour. 
 
Bad passenger behaviour is not countenanced in developed countries. Why 
should it be in developing ones? The aviation industry has proved that 
                                                     
1017 Noted by the author following numerous discussions with ferry operators in South-East 
Asia. 
1018 See, for example, ad nauseam and including, Scannell, K. Big Four auditors face 
crackdown on global operations, Financial times, London, 15 December 2016. And Newquist, 
C. Here‟s Why a Big 4 Accounting Firm Failure is a Reality, Huffington Post, New York, 15 
June 2010. And, Tadros, E. Poor work risks new Enron, Australian Financial Review, Sydney, 
1 November 2017. 
1019 Refer to the report of the Inquiry into the capsize and sinking of the Sewol in 
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28205785/. 
1020 Anon. Insight report on global safety challenges. Ibid. 
 
 300 
behaviour can be controlled. It must similarly be controlled on ferries and 
tourist boats in those countries. 
 
 
10.10.2. Aviation-like seating rules should apply to smaller 
and fast ferries. 
 
Passengers on certain, smaller and less stable ferry types should have to 
remain seated while berthing and unberthing as in aircraft when landing and 
taking off and in turbulence. They should have to remain seated until mooring 
lines are secure and the vessel safe and stable alongside. This was 
suggested to the author by Torleif Stokke, managing director of Servogear AS 
of Norway following observations from a few days spent in the Philippines. 1021 
They should also be required to wear effective life jackets at all times aboard 
small, open ferries. A stark example of this problem is the list developed by 
Hong Kong‟s venerable and comparatively substantial Star Ferries as 
passengers rush to disembark.1022 Passengers on smaller high speed ferries 
should be required to wear seat belts in the same way and at the same times 
as on aircraft. 
 
10.10.3. NO SMOKING rules should be as rigorously enforced 
at sea as in aviation. 
 
The problem of smoking on board and the complete disdain for NO SMOKING 
signs is common in most developing countries. Smoking has been the cause 
of numerous fatalities.1023 It used to be a problem in the aviation industry, 
particularly smoking in aircraft toilets. Now, thanks to substantial penalties, it 
simply does not happen. Similarly, there should be no smoking on any vessel 
at any time. 
 
The airlines, ICAO and IATA, collectively, have ensured that massive 
penalties apply to those caught breaking the rules and warnings are routinely 
given before and after take-off as part of the safety briefings given on all 
flights. Cabin crews are trained to be vigilant in such matters and electronic 
warning systems direct any smoke detections to the aircraft commander in the 
cockpit. Ferry owners should be required to do the same. 
 
Canada‟s BC Ferries, for example, in December 2017 banned smoking on all 
its ferries and in all its buildings. It is hoped that other owners will soon follow 







                                                     
1021 Suggested personally to the author during the Interferry 2016 Conference in Manila. 
1022 Noted frequently by the author. 




10.11.0. Encourage owner, officer and crew behavioural 
reform. 
 
10.11.1. Basic officer and crew training, education and 
behaviour must be improved. 
 
There are numerous aspects of seamanship, navigation, pilotage, safety 
consciousness, situational awareness and organisational discipline that 
require careful attention in all the unsafe countries. They are common to all 
and are very obvious even to untrained outside observers. Unless they can be 
eradicated, there is little hope of achieving any of the necessary reforms. 
Perhaps acknowledged nautical safety promotional organisations such as The 
Nautical Institute could be supported by and work on behalf of IMO to effect 
better training of officers and crew in developing countries. The NI has proved 
to be very effective in developed countries. There is no reason why its 
methods could not be adopted in developing ones. 
 
For example, all masters and officers should be required to undergo strict and 
substantial training in the proper use of barometers. Many, currently, are not 
so trained. The former Chief of Staff of the Philippine Coastguard, Galtiero 
Dela Cruz, described this to the author as a factor in the propensity of Filipino 
captains to sail into the face of typhoons.1024 They simply do not understand 
the relationship between rapidly falling barometric pressure and the likelihood 
of severe storms. That is if they even check their ship‟s barometer at all. 
 
All masters and watchkeeping officers should be trained and re-trained, 
throughout their careers, to „look out the window‟, to frequently check the 
barometer and not be mesmerised by electronic instruments. The author has 
discussed this problem with many experienced ship masters and senior Coast 
Guard officers such as Carlos Agustin, the first Commandante and founder of 
the Philippine Coast Guard, and the one time master of the cruise ship 
Silverseas Discoverer.1025 All complained of electronic distractions and even 
the use of electronic games on the bridge.  
 
Much more discipline would appear to be required generally in this respect. 
Crews should also be trained in the use, maintenance, proper storage and 
location of the safety equipment carried aboard their vessels. They should be 
made much more aware of the connection between cigarette smoking and 
fires aboard vessels. 
 
Owners, too, should be educated to the effect that: “if you think safety‟s 
expensive, try a disaster”! Again, all ferry owners should be encouraged to 
see the value in developing and promoting a safety culture within their 
organisations. The marine insurance industry could assist with this. 
 
                                                     
1024 Discussed personally with the author in Manila in October 2016. 
1025 Discussed personally with the author in Siberia in July 2014. 
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10.11.2. Delinquent owners, masters and officers should be 
severely punished. 
 
Owners, masters and watch keeping officers, particularly serial offenders, of 
delinquent vessels should be very severely punished when fairly found guilty 
of significant transgressions. Such punishments should be widely publicised. 
Negligence, overloading, inadequate stability and poor lookout equate with 
manslaughter and should be punished appropriately and publicised widely. 
  
Changing social standards and expectations of their leaders by citizens will 
increase demand for higher standards of regulation and enforcement. The 
callous response to the Sewol sinking by South Korean President Park Geun-
hye did not help her attract sympathy when she was impeached for corruption 
in 2016.1026 IMO should respond to such demands. 
 
Callous, unscrupulous owners, particularly repeat or serial offenders such as 
the Go family‟s Sulpicio Lines, Townsend Thoresen, Al Salam Maritime 
Transport, Rabaul Shipping, Aboitiz Shipping, Negros Navigation, Minoan 
Flying Dolphins, and numerous others, should be publicly named, shamed 
and severely punished to discourage them from causing further fatalities.1027 
Serial offenders should be banned by IMO.1028 
 
Modern communication and news dissemination capabilities, especially those 
provided by the Internet, make a global „naming and shaming‟ campaign 
feasible at minimal cost. Defamation laws will largely be impotent in the face 
of such a campaign. A public interest defence will be difficult for perpetrators 
to overcome, particularly for serial offenders. Poorly behaved car 
manufacturers, investment advisors, insurers and airlines, among others, 
have recently been forced to improve their behaviour or have been driven out 
of business by public opinion enhanced and assisted by the Internet. 
 
10.11.3. Problem of fatalism must be rectified. 
 
The cultural problem of fatalism, largely resulting from malnutrition, is a 
significant factor in causing the human errors that lead to fatal ferry accidents 
in the poorest countries. This is graphically illustrated in many of the reports 
on such accidents, particularly in Tanzania, Bangladesh, DR Congo, Haiti and 
Myanmar. The YouTube videos of the Bangladeshi accidents in Appendix F 
show this starkly, particularly in the case of the collision where the larger ferry 
stands on after the collision as though nothing had happened. Its crew and 
passengers do nothing to help. 1029 They do not even throw one of the several 
readily available life rings to survivors in the water.  
 
                                                     
1026 For example, Murdoch, S. Park apology for ferry disaster, The Australian, Sydney, 30 
April 2014, P.10. And, Murray, L. South Korean president impeached, The Australian 
Financial Review, Sydney, 11-12 March 2017, P10. 
1027 Appendix A, Ibid, and Tables 1.6. ,1.7. and 1.12.2. 
1028 Such as those listed in 1.12.2. 
1029 Appendix F. Video footage of ferry collision and capsize in Bangladesh. 
 
 303 
This is a very significant human factor problem which must be eradicated 
through education and encouragement but, probably most realistically, by a 
reduction of poverty. Unfortunately, and obviously, that will be a long time 
coming. 
 
10.11.4. Withhold insurance from proven bad owners. 
 
To a large extent this already happens through the normal workings of the 
global marine insurance market. Obviously, rational marine insurers are not 
going to risk their company‟s funds on proven bad owners or operators. 
Nevertheless, further efforts could be made in this area by encouraging 
insurers to only provide cover to owners and ships that have been objectively 
vetted by a specialised agency such as Rightship ( See 10.13.2.), SafeFerry, 
perhaps. 
 
Insurers, both of hulls and protection and indemnity, have real power, except 
in the poorest countries, to encourage safety improvements. They have done 
so very effectively in developed countries. They need to spread their 
knowledge and influence to developing countries. Commercial and public 
opinion pressures on insurers and classification societies could motivate them 
as suggested by Philippe Boisson.1030 It is in their own best interests to do so. 
 
10.12.0. Improve evacuation, search, rescue and recovery.  
 
When all else goes wrong, we turn to improvements in search and rescue 
services and equipment. As has been seen, these are practically non-existent 
in most of the countries with the highest accident and death tolls. Indeed, they 
are still inadequate in many richer countries as we saw with the Estonia 
sinking, as described in Chapter 3 (3.13). Such services are very expensive 
and, in reality, unlikely to exist except in the rich world.   
 
Radio and satellite communications (Satcom) distress communications and 
AIS should be better organised on a global basis, preferably by IMO. While 
EPIRB distress alerts are generally very effective, VHF radio automatic 
distress signals should be on the same channel worldwide and it should, as 
well as distress calling be the operating channel during SAR operations. At 
the same time, strong radio operational disciplines must be enforced. The 
various Satcom suppliers should be co-ordinated in a similar manner. The 
communications difficulties experienced by the Heraklion and Estonia and 
during their subsequent SAR operations starkly illustrate such problems1031. 
The author is unaware of any subsequent improvements being made in that 
regard. 
 
Beyond the OECD countries, evacuation, lifesaving and SAR knowledge, 
facilities, equipment and services are scarce at best and non-existent at 
worst. Developing nations require considerable assistance in creating and 
expanding these important components of their maritime activity. The IMO, 
                                                     
1030 Boisson, P. Op cit. 
1031 Described in their case studies in Chapter 3. 
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richer nations and their institutions such as SAR organisations, classification 
societies and maritime industry associations could do much more to 
contribute and assist in this regard. 
 
10.13.0. Raise public consciousness of the safety problem.  
 
10.13.1. Global approach required. 
 
A „rogue‟s gallery‟ describing unsafe ferries and their owners could be drawn 
from the database suggested in 10.9.1, above, and economically published to 
„name and shame‟ them on the Internet. Serial or even repeat offenders such 
as those listed in Tables 1.6. and 1.7. in Chapter 1 should be publicly vilified 
with their names distributed to all government and commercial travel  advisory 
media. This, again, would be best undertaken by IMO if it were prepared to or 
capable of maintaining a comprehensive and accurate database of maritime 
accidents. It cannot rely on its sovereign member states for assistance in 
compiling such a database. That database should be global and should 
contain a cross-referenced list of owning companies and their directors, 
owners and managers to warn potential voyagers about the negligent ones. 
Naming and shaming of bad operators would be very effective. 
 
Should IMO be unwilling or unable to maintain such a database, it would 
probably be better undertaken by a specialised and focused, private, non-
profit organisation or NGO. That organisation could, again, be partially funded 
by the classification societies as part of their CSR duty. They could be 
assisted by subscriptions paid by responsible ferry operators wishing to 
promote their safety consciousness. Further funding could come from IMO 
and development banks, for example. Intending or potential passengers 
should be able to go to an easily accessible online database to determine the 
risks of their intended voyage. 
 
The International Maritime Bureau Anti-Piracy Centre offers an excellent 
model for such an organisation.1032 Transparency International also has much 
to offer.1033  So, too, does the International Maritime Rescue Federation.1034 
The dramatic improvement in life expectancy achieved in Bangladesh 
described in Chapter 5 showed what could be done by NGOs and companies 
working together without government involvement.1035 
 
Well-funded philanthropic institutions such as the Gates, Moore, Packard, 
Pew, Nippon, Lloyd‟s, Paul Allen, Commonwealth of Learning and Clinton 
foundations should be encouraged to support a global public 
education/advertising campaign to promote safe ferry awareness. 
 
A global public inquiry led by a passionate and powerful politician such as 
former Australian Transport Minister, the Hon. Peter Morris undertook with his 
                                                     
1032 See www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/  
1033 See www.transparency.org. 
1034 Refer to IMRF in 10.5.  
1035 Described in 5.5.4.  
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“Ships of Shame” Inquiry in 1992 should be instituted.1036 That inquiry 
exposed the appalling behaviour of many bulk ship owners and charterers 
that cost the lives of many of their crew members. It resulted in significant 
improvements to the global operations and safety of bulk ships. It was a very 
effective „naming and shaming‟ operation that could well be emulated with the 
ferry industry. 
 
A global Ferry Safety promotional organisation should be established to 
manage and promote this. Sea Safety? SafeFerry? Safe Seas? Safe at Sea? 
FerrySafe.com? This should be non-profit and could be based on the 
information presented in this thesis and subsequently continuously updated. 
The Worldwide Ferry Safety Association, based in New York, works very 
constructively in this field but suffers from a lack of funding and, consequently, 
personnel. 1037 It could well be incorporated into such an organisation. 
 
As well as advocating reform, it could maintain and further develop the 
BMPVA database, perhaps combined with an improved GISIS as well as an 
App to enable intending ferry passengers to check by mobile phone on the 
safety record of any ferry, or its owner, that they may be considering travelling 
with. Bad owners and bad ships should be named and shamed. Conversely, 
good owners and safe ships should be praised and highlighted. This has been 
very effectively achieved in the aviation industry with its independent safety 
rating organisations such as Airline Ratings and Skytrax ratings.1038  
 
10.13.2. Implement a global „vetting‟ system for passenger 
vessels. 
 
A global vetting system for passenger vessels similar to that operated by 
Rightship in the oil tanker/bulker sectors could be implemented and managed 
by the global ferry safety promotion organisation mentioned above. 1039 
Tanker and bulker operators who are devoid of a positive Rightship vetting 
are increasingly finding themselves „beyond the pale‟. In a number of cases 
such as with Steamship Mutual, the P&I club, insurers are refusing to cover 
them. A SafeFerry version of Rightship would be a logical development. 
Another possibility would be the Vessel Risk Rating system released in July 
2017 by the German vessel tracking website www.fleetmon.com in 
association with the London based International Marine Risk Rating 
Agency.1040 
 
10.14.0. Promote swimming lessons globally. 
 
A large number of ferry fatalities have occurred because many passengers 
and some crews were simply unable to swim. This is an unfortunate fact of life 
                                                     
1036 Morris, P. Ships of Shame Inquiry, House of Representatives, Canberra, 1992. 
1037 See www.ferrysafety.org . 
1038 See www.airlineratings.com and www.skytraxratings.com. 
1039 See www.rightship.com . 
1040 Refer to the Fleetmon press release of 7 July 2017 on www.fleetmon.com. 
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in many developing countries even, perhaps surprisingly, in archipelagic 
countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia.   
 
Swimming lessons and water safety education should be encouraged in all 
countries. Public education campaigns such as have existed in Australasia 
and much of Europe and North America for generations should be established 
globally. Even in Muslim countries, girls should be particularly encouraged to 
learn to swim, if necessary in gender segregated classes. Women and girls 
seem to die in disproportionately large numbers in ferry accidents. 
 
The richer world, through its charities and NGOs, should encourage the 
establishment of simple learn-to-swim programmes in the coastal and riverine 
regions of developing countries. Already, the WFSA and Interferry have 
participated in the WHO‟s Global Report on Drowning. An inability to swim is 
mostly a result of poverty although it can be due to religious beliefs. The death 
tolls arising from many of the accidents studied in this thesis would have been 





The dramatic and continuing success of the aviation industry in improving its 
safety record in the thirty years to 2010 shows what could be achieved by the 
global ferry and tourist boat industry and its regulators.1041 So too do the 
successes of the road safety authorities in most developed countries. Even 
the Philippines which, for decades had one of the worst records for ferry 
safety, now appears to be achieving worthwhile improvements. Thanks to the 
guidance provided by the aviation industry, road safety, cruise and tanker 
sector examples, the ferry and tourist boat industry should be able to reform 
itself in considerably less than three decades. It has the valuable benefit of 
aviation‟s pioneering efforts to work with in the form of proven techniques and 
benchmarks. 
 
Developed country ferry owners and their industry association INTERFERRY 
should, in their own best reputational interests, be assisting with greater 
efforts to make domestic ferry travel safer in developing countries. 
INTERFERRY does have an active domestic ferry safety sub-committee and, 
through his own personal experience, its CEO is exceptionally safety 
conscious.1042 In fairness, it has contributed significantly to the efforts of the 
WFSA. INTERFERRY is, as it should be, generally, promoting the benefits of 
safer ferry travel globally.  
 
Similarly, there are many examples and lessons to be gained or copied from 
the very successful road safety improvement, „Learn-to Swim‟, anti-smoking 
and health improvement campaigns that have been carried out in most of the 
developed countries. Most of those can be readily adapted to the ferry and 
tourist boat industry. 
                                                     
1041 Indeed to zero fatalities in 2017 on commercial jet aircraft. 




The United Nations‟ Clean Seas global campaign on marine litter, announced 
on 23 February 2017, provides IMO with a very impressive „in house‟ example 
of what it could do were it to have the will to do so. 1043 
 
Nevertheless, the outlook is positive if the International Maritime Organisation 
could be inspired, persuaded or forced to reform itself from being a self-
satisfied and self-serving bureaucracy to a well led, proactive agent of change 
and reform such as is its aviation counterpart ICAO. It should very actively 
work “with” its needy member states to achieve comprehensive global ferry 
safety reform. ICAO provides a near perfect model of what the IMO should be.  
 
Even if IMO is really so moribund that it cannot or will not be so moved, it is 
still possible that a global private organisation or NGO, „FerrySafe‟ or 
„SafeFerry‟, perhaps, using effective „naming and shaming‟ publicity 
techniques similar to those utilised by environmental NGOs, could drive 
substantial improvement. 
 
The implementation of any and, preferably, all of the above recommendations 
would undoubtedly lead to significant reductions in the annual global ferry 
accident death toll. 
 
Despite all the obvious problems and roadblocks described, it is very 
encouraging to note the significant reduction in the number of fatalities in 
2016. At 473 recorded and approximately 710 estimated, it was significantly 
better than the previous best year ever, 2013, where the figures were 615 
recorded and, probably, 900 actual.1044 Why was this so, apart from a general 
media led consciousness raising? Or, was it simply good fortune? While 2017 
started badly with 40+ fatalities in Indonesia on January 1, and a total of 742 
„known‟ and probably 1,100 actual for the full year, at least 2016 showed that 
significant improvements are achievable. 
 
During 2016 and 2017 there was considerable speculation globally about the 
prospects for „driverless‟ cars and „autonomous‟ ships. It seems likely that 
such developments will eventually come to pass. However, while autonomous 
bulkers, tankers and container ships, for example, are possibly feasible, the 
prospect of „autonomous ferries‟ seems remote, except over very short 
distances in very calm water. There are simply too many humans involved 
with their operations for the human element to be eliminated. 
 
There is a gross and tragic attitudinal, cultural and operational dichotomy 
between the aviation and ferry industries and their international and domestic 
regulators with respect to their approaches to passenger safety. That illogical 
division can and must be eliminated. It is hoped that this work will go some 
way towards achieving that.                       
 
                                                     
1043 See Clean Seas global campaign on marine litter, Ibid. 
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Afghanistan 15.5 722.4 n/a  4,734 2013 
Africa 26.6 574   246,719   
Albania 15.1 107.2 n/a  478 2013 
Algeria 23.8 127.8 n/a  9,337 2013 
Americas 15.9 33   153,789   
Andorra 7.6 7.9 n/a  6 2013 
Angola 26.9 992 n/a  5,769 2013 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 6.7 20 n/a  6 2013 
Argentina 13.6 24.3 n/a  5,619 2013 
Armenia 18.3 18.2 n/a  546 2013 
Australia 5.4 7.3 5.2 1,252 2013 
Austria 5.4 7.1 5.8 455 2013 
Azerbaijan 10 83 n/a  943 2013 
Bahamas 13.8 36 n/a  52 2013 
Bahrain 8 19.6 n/a  107 2013 
Bangladesh 13.6 1020.6 n/a  21,316 2013 
Barbados 6.7 16.9 n/a  19 2013 
Belarus 13.7 32.9 n/a  1,282 2013 
Belgium 6.7 10.7 7.3 746 2013 
Belize 24.4 26 n/a  81 2013 
Benin 27.7 8177.2 n/a  2,855 2013 
Bhutan 15.1 167.2 n/a  114 2013 
Bolivia 23.2 205.2 n/a  3,476 2013 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 17.7 76.7 n/a  676 2013 
Botswana 23.6 91.6 n/a  477 2013 
Brazil 23.4 50.3 55.9 41,059 2013 
Bulgaria 8.3 17.2 n/a  601 2013 
Burkina Faso 30 328.1 n/a  5,072 2013 
Cambodia 17.4 107.2 n/a  2,635 2013 
Cameroon 27.6 1385.1 n/a  6,136 2013 
Canada 6 9.5 6.2 2,114 2013 
Cape Verde 26.1 229 n/a  130 2013 
Central 
African 
Republic 32.4 4336.5 n/a  1,495 2013 
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Chad 24.1 497 n/a  3,089 2013 
Chile 12.4 51.1 n/a  2,179 2013 
China 18.8 104.5 n/a  261,367 2013 
Colombia 16.8 83.3 n/a  8,107 2013 
Congo 26.4 1063 n/a  1,174 2013 
Cook Islands 24.2 40.2 n/a  5 2013 
Costa Rica 13.9 38.4 n/a  676 2013 
Croatia 9.2 21.1 n/a  395 2013 
Cuba 7.5 133.7 n/a  840 2013 
Cyprus 5.2 9.2 n/a  59 2013 
Czech 
Republic 6.1 8.5 13.9 654 2013 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 33.2 6405.4 n/a  22,419 2013 
Denmark 3.5 6.7 4 196 2013 
Dominica 15.3 44.7 n/a  11 2013 
Dominican 
Republic 29.3 94.9 n/a  3,052 2013 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 19.9 139   122,730   
Ecuador 20.1 183.8 n/a  3,164 2013 
Egypt 12.8 148.7 n/a  10,466 2013 
El Salvador 21.1 163.7 n/a  1,339 2013 
Eritrea 24.1 2171.5 n/a  1,527 2013 
Estonia 7 11.8 n/a  90 2013 
Ethiopia 25.3 4984.3 n/a  23,837 2013 
Europe 9.3 19   84,589   
Federated 
States of 
Micronesia 1.9 24 n/a  2 2013 
Fiji 5.8 58.9 n/a  51 2013 
Finland 4.8 4.4 4.8 258 2013 
France 5.1 7.6 5.8 3,268 2013 
Gabon 22.9 196.4 n/a  383 2013 
Gambia 29.4 998.7 n/a  544 2013 
Georgia 11.8 54 n/a  514 2013 
Germany 4.3 6.8 4.9 3,540 2013 
Ghana 26.2 443.1 n/a  6,789 2013 
Greece 9.1 12.6 n/a  1,013 2013 
Guatemala 19 114.7 n/a  2,939 2013 
Guinea 27.3 9462.5 n/a  3,211 2013 
Guinea-
Bissau 27.5 751.9 n/a  468 2013 
Guyana 17.3 864.4 n/a  138 2013 
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Honduras 17.4 1021.7 n/a  1,408 2013 
Hungary 7.7 20.7 n/a  765 2013 
Iceland 4.6 6.1 4.7 15 2013 
India 16.6 130.1 n/a  238,562 2013 
Indonesia 15.3 36.7 n/a  38,279 2013 
Iran 32.1 92.7 n/a  24,896 2013 
Iraq 20.2 151.2 n/a  6,826 2013 
Ireland 4.1 7.6 3.9 188 2013 
Israel 3.6 9.7 5.3 277 2013 
Italy 6.1 7.3 n/a  3,753 2013 
Ivory Coast 24.2 828.9 n/a  4,924 2013 
Jamaica 11.5 61.7 n/a  320 2013 
Japan 4.7 6.5 8 5,971 2013 
Jordan 26.3 151.4 n/a  1,913 2013 
Kazakhstan 24.2 101.4 n/a  3,983 2013 
Kenya 29.1 640.7 n/a  12,891 2013 
Kiribati 2.9 86.9 n/a  3 2013 
Kuwait 18.7 34.2 n/a  629 2013 
Kyrgyzstan 22 127.3 n/a  1,220 2013 
Laos 14.3 67.5 n/a  971 2013 
Latvia 10 24.8 n/a  205 2013 
Lebanon 22.6 64.8 n/a  1,088 2013 
Lesotho 28.2 474.8 n/a  584 2013 
Liberia 33.7 133.4 n/a  1,448 2013 
Libya 73.4 128.2 n/a  4,554 2013 
Lithuania 10.6 16.1 n/a  320 2013 
Luxembourg 8.7 10.7 n/a  46 2013 
Macedonia 9.4 49.1 n/a  198 2013 
Madagascar 28.4 2963 n/a  6,506 2013 
Malawi 35 1310.4 n/a  5,732 2013 
Malaysia 24 29.9 12.6 7,129 2013 
Maldives 3.5 19.5 n/a  12 2013 
Mali 25.6 1352.5 n/a  3,920 2013 
Malta 5.1 6.8 n/a  22 2013 
Marshall 
Islands 5.7 141.8 n/a  3 2013 
Mauritania 24.5 228.7 n/a  952 2013 
Mauritius 12.2 35.6 n/a  158 2013 
Mexico 12.3 43 n/a  15,062 2013 
Monaco -  -  n/a  0 2013 
Mongolia 21 88.4 n/a  597 2013 
Montenegro 11.9 36.8 n/a  74 2013 
Morocco 18 209 n/a  6,870 2013 
Mozambique 31.6 1507 n/a  8,173 2013 
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Myanmar 20.3 250.8 n/a  10,809 2013 
Namibia 23.9 196.4 n/a  551 2013 
Nepal 17 399.8 n/a  4,713 2013 
Netherlands 3.4 6 4.5 574 2013 
New Zealand 6 8.4 6.7 272 2013 
Nicaragua 15.3 164.3 n/a  931 2013 
Niger 26.4 1491.1 n/a  4,706 2013 
Nigeria 20.5 615.4 n/a  35,621 2013 
Norway 3.8 5.2 4.4 192 2013 
Oman 25.4 85.3 n/a  924 2013 
Pakistan 14.2 283.9 n/a  25,781 2013 
Palau 4.8 14.1 n/a  1 2013 
Panama 10 38.4 n/a  386 2013 
Papua New 
Guinea 16.8 1306.5 n/a  1,232 2013 
Paraguay 20.7 114.7 n/a  1,408 2013 
Peru 13.9 99.3 n/a  4,234 2013 
Philippines 10.5 135 n/a  10,379 2013 
Poland 10.3 15.8 n/a  3,931 2013 
Portugal 7.8 13.7 n/a  828 2013 
Qatar 15.2 50.9 n/a  330 2013 
Republic of 
Moldova 12.5 61.8 n/a  437 2013 
Romania 8.7 31.4 n/a  1,881 2013 
Russia 18.9 53.4 n/a  27,025 2013 
Rwanda 32.1 3521.1 n/a  3,782 2013 
Saint Lucia 18.1 2103.3 n/a  33 2013 
Saint Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 8.2 31.7 n/a  9 2013 
Samoa 15.8 171.9 n/a  30 2013 
San Marino 3.2 1.8 n/a  1 2013 
Saudi Arabia 27.4 119.7 n/a  7,898 2013 
Senegal 27.2 956.4 n/a  3,844 2013 
Serbia 10.4 34.5 n/a  735 2013 
Seychelles 8.6 43 n/a  8 2013 
Sierra Leone 27.3 2414.2 n/a  1,661 2013 
Singapore 3.6 20.2 n/a  197 2013 
Slovakia 6.6 13.7 n/a  360 2013 
Slovenia 6.4 9.5 7.6 132 2013 
Solomon 
Islands 19.2 240 n/a  108 2013 
Somalia 25.4 4480.5 n/a  2,664 2013 
South Africa 25.1 133.9 n/a  13,273 2013 




Asia 17 101   316,080   
Spain 3.7 5.3 7.8 1,730 2013 
Sri Lanka 17.4 70.9 n/a  3,691 2013 
Sudan 24.3 2872.8 n/a  9,221 2013 
Suriname 19.1 49.7 n/a  103 2013 
Swaziland 24.2 1667.4 n/a  303 2013 
Sweden 2.8 4.7 3.5 272 2013 
Switzerland 3.3 4.7 4.3 269 2013 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 31.1 5454.5 n/a  60 2013 
Tajikistan 18.8 374.9 n/a  1,543 2013 
Tanzania 32.9 1073.7 n/a  16,211 2013 
Thailand 36.2 74.6 n/a  24,237 2013 
Timor-Leste 16.6 295.8 n/a  188 2013 
Togo 31.1 3653.4 n/a  2,123 2013 
Tonga 7.6 98.1 n/a  8 2013 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 14.1 58.9 n/a  189 2013 
Tunisia 24.4 154.4 n/a  2,679 2013 
Turkey 8.9 37.3 n/a  6,687 2013 
Turkmenistan 17.4 107.8 n/a  914 2009 
Uganda 27.4 836.8 n/a  10,280 2013 
Ukraine 13.5 35.3 n/a  5,099 2012 
United Arab 
Emirates 10.9 38.2 n/a  1,021 2013 
United 
Kingdom 2.9 5.1 3.6 1,827 2013 
United States 10.6 12.9 7.1 34,064 2013 
Uruguay 16.6 28.5 n/a  567 2013 
Uzbekistan 11.2   n/a  3,240 2013 
Vanuatu 16.6 300 n/a  42 2013 
Vietnam 24.5 55 n/a  22,419 2013 
Western 
Pacific 17.3 69   328,591   
World 17.4     1,250,000   
Yemen 21.5 436.6 n/a  5,248 2013 
Zambia 24.7 670.9 n/a  3,586 2013 






Email to the author from Commodore Gualterio Dela Cruz, PCG (Retd) former 
commanding officer of the Philippine Coast Guard on October 7, 2016 
 
I wish to share with you, some information on the sinking of a RORO-Passenger/Cargo 
vessel, MV Princess of the Orient, which happened sometime in Sept 1998. Some details of 
the vessel and the synopsis of the incident can be found by browsing on the computer, 
pertaining to this incident. 
 
After my retirement from the Navy in 1996 and for the next couple of years, I found myself in 
the golf course, most of eh time. Among my golfing buddies then, were the senior executives 
of Negros Navigation, one of the leading domestic shipping companies. Most of the ships are 
the RORO-Passenger types and operates from Manila to Southern ports of the country. When 
my golfing buddies with Negros Navigation (or NN) gave me ships tickects, when they knew I 
was going to Iloilo City, a southern city in Visayas. In turn, my friends with Negros Navigation 
asked me to take note of the things on board the vessel, which, to me, would need 
refinements or revisions. I took the ship ride. By the way, the names of the NN vessels, then 
were named after " Saiints" , such as "St Peter de Apostle", etc. 
 
While on board the ship and underway enroute from Iloilo City to Manila, somebody has 
informed the Ships Captain of my presence, and invited me for breakfast at the Captain's 
table. During our casual conversation, he mentioned of the sinking of MV Princess of the 
Orient on that fateful day in Sept 1998, They way he recalled the events, seems vivid in his 
mind. 
 
In his statements, on the day of the incident, he was the Master of one of the vessels of NN 
fleet and scheduled to depart from Port of Manila to Iloilo City. As part of his routine activities, 
prior to leaving port, was to check on the loading status of the vessel and prevailing weather 
condition. He took note of the path of the incoming typhoon and strength of the gusty winds, 
but since his ship was a 13,500 GRT vessel, by regulations, his vessel is cleared to sail. 
 
While steaming inside Manila Bay, the sea condition was tolerable, hence continued his 
voyage. The nautical distance from the Port of Manila to the mouth of Manila Bay, facing the 
West Philippine Sea, is about 35 nautical miles or some three hours travel time. Based on his 
statements during our conversation, as soon as his ship passed the mouth of Manila Bay, the 
sea conditions was noted to be getting rough and the distance between wave highest, seems 
to get higher and longer. Perhaps, after evaluating the path of the incoming typhoon and his 
responsibility to the owners of the ship on his control, to include passengers and cargoes, he 
decided to turn around and return back to Port of Manila. 
 
On his return sailing route, northwards to Manila, he meet the MV Princess of Oreint heading 
on his southern route. Upon seeing the MV Princess of the Orient, proceeding on the 
southern route, the passengers on board the NN vessel, demanded an explanation from the 
ships officers on why their NN ship was returning back to Port of Manila. To most of the ships 
passengers, for the vessel to return back to Port of Manila, would mean additional expenses, 
plus some changes in their planned trips. In turn, and as related by the ship captain, he has to 
secure the ship's navigational areas and engine spaces, and ships offices for security 
reasons. The passengers were getting restless and shouting was everywhere. 
 
After a couple hours after the ship has change course back to Manila, the ship radio 
communications systems has intercepted calls for assistance to rescue a commercial ship, 
sinking off between Batangas and Mindoro, sea area. From then on, the maritime 
communications traffic was heavy on exchanging messages for assistance. At the time, the 
said NN ship was inside Manila Bay and relatively far to render assistance. Upon reaching 
Port of Manila, the vessel just drop anchor and waited for the inclement weather to subside. 
 
When the vessel was at anchor already, almost all of the passengers, went to see the ship's 
Captain and expressed their deep gratitude for his hard and wise decision to cancel his trip 
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and returned back to Port. The passengers were all praises to the ship's captain. 
 
When I related the story to my friends at the NN management, they too have a regard for the 
said ship captain. According to my friends with NN, then, the said ship captain is from Iloilo 
and has good grades in school. As noted, the said ship captain was ahead of his 
contemporaries and has been noted to diligent in his assigned tasks. His wife is a school 
teacher in one of the local public schools in Iloilo. He finished his nautical course in the local 
private school, but has noted to assumed responsibility in his junior billets on board different 
ships. At this writing, I don't know his present assignment and lost track of him. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the vessels of NN are mostly named after "Saints". 
 
In my experience in the corporate world, to cancel a trip of a vessel as big as the NN vessel in 
this incident, would entail additional expenses for the shipowners, and delays in the 
schedules of the passengers and cargo on board. The ship captain has placed his profession 
and reputation, on the line. In the words of James Michiner, in one of his books entitled, "The 





Email from Captain Peter Sharp, owner of the Rabaul Queen, to the editor of 




















Vessel name Vessel type Material Tonnage Length (m) Year built Builder Owner Claimed cause Author assessed cause
1983 Hungary 2 Siraly Fast hydrofoil ferry Alum 25 27 1962 Almaz Shipyard, Russia Unknown Collision with barge convoy Human error/Poor lookout
1989 Hong Kong 4 Apollo Jet Fast catamaran ferry Alum 345 42 1981 Marinteknik, Sweden Hong Kong Macau Hydrofoil Control system failure Human error/Negligence
1991 China 2 Unknown Fast catamaran ferry Alum Unknown Unknown Collision with sampan Human error/Poor lookout
1991 Norway 2 Sea Cat Fast catamaran ferry Alum 275 39 1988 Kvaerner Fjellstrand, Norway Fylkesbaatane I Sogn og High speed grounding Human error/Poor lookout
1992 Canada 1 Royal Vancouver Fast catamaran ferry Alum 320 40 1990 Kvaerner Fjellstrand,Norway Royal Sealink Express Collision with BC Ferry Human error/Poor lookout
1994 Hong Kong 3 Unknown Fast catamaran ferry Alum 43 Unknown Unknown Fast ferry ran over sampan Human error/Poor lookout
1994 China 4 Unknown Fast catamaran ferry Alum Unknown Unknown Collision with sampan Human error/Poor lookout
1996 Italy 4 Procida Fast hydrofoil ferry Alum 262 43 1991 Rodriquez Messina, Italy Aliscafi SNAV Grounded then capsized Human error/Poor lookout
1998 Canada 1 The Cat Fast catamaran ferry Alum 5,617 91 1997 Incat, Australia Bay Ferries Trawler ran under ferry in fog Human error/Poor lookout
1998 Hong Kong 1 Flores Fast jetfoil ferry Alum 270 24 Boeing Corp, USA HK/Macau Hydrofoil Co Hit wreck at speed Human error/Poor lookout
1999 Norway 16 Sleipner Fast catamaran ferry Alum 260 42 1999 Austal Ships, Australia Hardanger Sunnhordlanske Grounded at high speed Human error/Poor lookout
1999 UK 1 Stena Discovery Fast catamaran ferry Alum 19,638 125 1997 Aker Finnyards, Finland Stena Line Ferry wash capsized boat Human error/Neglgence
2000 Hong Kong 4 Universal MK 2006 Fast catamaran ferry Alum 850 43 FBM Marine,UK/ Philippines TurboJet Fast Ferries Hit tow cable at speed at night Human error/Poor lookout
2000 Russia 6 Voskhod 42 Fast hydrofoil ferry Alum 220 40 Almaz Shipyard, Russia Rosrechflot Collision with barge Human error/Poor lookout
2001 Greece 1 Aeolos Express II Fast monohull ferry Steel 5,364 103 2001 Alstom Leroux Naval, France NEL Lines Poorly attached mooring bitts Human error/Unseaworthy
2005 South Korea 1 Kobee 5 Fast jetfoil ferry Alum 267 24 1998 Kawasaki Zosen, Japan Miraejet Co Collision with whale? Human error/Poor lookout
2007 Australia 1 Dawn Fraser Fast catamaran ferry Alum 34 41 1998 NQEA, Australia Sydney Ferries Collision with dinghy Human error/Poor lookout
2007 Italy 4 Sagestra Jet Fast catamaran ferry Alum 392 50 1999 Rodriquez Messina, Italy Rete Ferroviaria.Ital Govt Collided with cargo ship Human error/Poor lookout
2007 Australia 4 Pam Burridge Fast catamaran ferry Alum 34 41 1998 NQEA. Australia Sydney Ferries Collision with wooden cruiser Human error/Poor lookout
2007 UK 3 Stena Voyager Fast catamaran ferry Alum 19,638 127 1996 Aker Finnyards, Finland Stena Lines Fire in engine room Human error/Unseaworthy
2007 Vietnam 3 Unknown Fast hydrofoil ferry Alum 67 32 Almaz Shipyard, Russia Unknown Collision with cargo ship Human error/Poor lookout
2007 Italy 1 Giorgione Fast hydrofoil ferry Alum 32 28 1989 Rodriquez, Messina. Italy Siremar Lines High speed grounding Human error/Poor lookout
2007 South Korea 1 Kobee Fast jetfoil ferry Alum 306 28 1994 Kawasaki Zosen, Japan Miraejet Co Collision with whale? Human error/Poor lookout
2008 China 1 The Venetian Fast catamaran ferry Alum 300 43 2005 Austal, Australia CCKC Cotai Jet High speed collision Human error/Poor lookout
2008 Ireland 1 Stena Lynx III Fast catamaran ferry Alum 4,113 81 1996 Incat, Australia Stena Lines Man overboard Suicide/Accident
2008 Vietnam 1 Vina Express Fast hydrofoil ferry Alum 180 35 Almaz Shipyard, Russia Vina Express Lines Collision with small boat Human error/Negligence
2008 Italy 1 Ettore Morace Fast hydrofoil ferry Alum 350 38 Rodriquez Messina, Italy Siremar Lines Crashed into breakwater Human error/Poor lookout
2009 China 2 Unknown Fast catamaran ferry Alum 300 40 Austal Ships, Australia Unknown Collision with dredger Human error/poor lookout
2010 Malaysia 22 Unknown Express Boat Fast monohull ferry Steel 120 34 Local yard, Malaysia Unknown Collided with timber barge Human error/Poor lookout
2011 France 1 Condor Vitesse Fast catamaran ferry Alum 5,007 87 1997 Incat, Australia Condor Ferries Ferry ran down trawler Human error/Poor lookout
2011 Vietnam 15 Unknown Fast hydrofoil ferry Alum 220 40 Almaz Shipyard, Russia Unknown Junk breakdown, collision. Human error/Poor lookout
2012 UK 1 Condor Rapide Fast catamaran ferry Alum 5,000 87 1997 Incat, Australia Condor Ferries Person overboard Suicide/Accident
2012 Tanzania 293 Skagit Fast monohull ferry Alum 95 34 1989 Halter Marine, USA Seagul Transport Company Bad weather Human error/Overloaded
2014 Tanzania 25 Kilimanjaro II Fast catamaran ferry Alum 320 37 2010 Richardson Devine Marine.Au Azam Marine Company Nosedived into wave Human error/Poor seamanship
2014 Turkey 1 Serkici-Harem Ferry Fast catamaran ferry Alum 5,200 88 2007 Austal, Australia Istanbul Fast Ferries (IDO) Car overran loading ramp Human error/Negligence











International Maritime Organization Manila Statement on Enhancement of the 
Safety of Ships Carrying Passengers on Non-International Voyages (April 
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Vessel name Tonnage Length (m) Year built Builder Owner Claimed cause Author assessed cause
1966 Greece 231 Heraklion 8,922 150 1949 Fairfields (Glasgow), UK Aegean Steam Navig Typaldos Enormous waves Human error/Poor seamanship
1970 St Kitts 233 Christena 48 1968 Unknown St Kitts and Nevis Government Leaked/Capsizes/sank Human error/Overloaded
1971 Italy 41 Heleanna 11,674 169 1954 A/B Goterverken,Sweden Const.S. Efthymiadis Galley fire spread Human error/Panic
1976 USA 78 George Prince 259 37 1937 Unknown yard, USA Local government Collided with cargo ship Human error/Poor lookout
1980 Cyprus 1 Zenobia 10,000 178 1979 Kockums Varv, Sweden Rederi AB Nordo Capsized, sank during salvage Human error/Unseaworthy
1981 Indonesia 580 Tamponas II 6,139 129 1971 Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Jap Pelayaran Nasional Indon Fuel ignited by cigarette butts Human error/Panic
1981 Israel 1 Arion 7,851 137 1965 Fairfield Govan, UK Maritime Co of Lesvos Terrorist bomb Terrorism
1982 UK 6 European Gateway 4,263 133 1975 Schichau Unterweser,Germ Townsend Thoreson (Monarch SS) Collision with Ro-Pax Human error/Poor lookout
1983 Greece 28 Chryssi Avgi 736 61 Unknown Minoan Flying Dolphins Explosion, fire,panic,chaos Human error/Unseaworthy
1986 Philippines 194 Doña Josefina 991 72 1968 Mitsubishi Heavy Inds. Jap Carlos A Gothong Lines Capsized and sank Human error/Unseaworthy
1987 Belgium 193 Herald of Free Enterprise 7,951 132 1980 Schichau Unterweser,Germ Townsend Thoresen Bow doors not closed Human error/Negligence
1988 Philippines 5 Doña Conchita 1,442 96 1969 Ishikawajima Ship, Japan Carlos A Gothong Lines Firecrackers started fire Human error/Negligence
1990 Denmark 159 Scandinavian Star 10,513 142 1971 Dubigeon- Normandie. Fr Scandinavian World Cruises Sabotage Sabotage
1990 UK 1 Norrona 12,519 132 1973 Nobiskrug, Germany Smyril Lines Faraeo Islands Fire in accomodation Human error/Negligence
1990 UK 2 Reine Mathilde 5,464 120 1970 Schiffbau Gesellschaft, Ger Brittany Ferries Engine room fire Human error/Negligence
1990 Italy 14 Espresso Trapani 2,719 113 1983 Hijos de J Barreras,Spain CONATIR Capsize in calm sea Human error/Unseaworthy
1991 Italy 143 Moby Prince 6,187 131 1968 Cammell Laird, UK NavigazioneArcipeligo Madd Too fast, collision with tanker Human error/Poor lookout
1991 Egypt 470 Salem Express 4,771 110 1966 Const. Nav.et Industr.deMed Samatour Shipping Co Hit reef in storm Human error/Poor lookout
1992 UK 1 Norsea 31,785 179 1987 Govan Shipbuiders, UK P&O European Ferries Lifeboat capsize in drill Human error/Negligence
1992 France 1 Quiberon 11,813 129 1975 Werft Nobiskrug, Germany B.A.I. S.A.Brittany Ferries Engine room fire Human error/Negligence
1994 Kenya 272 Mtongwe One Unknown yard, Kenya Kenya Ferry Services Capsized in sharp turn Human error/Overloaded
1994 Egypt 21 Al Salam El Saudi El Misr 7,697 125 1970 Ca Na del Terrino e Reuniti Khalid Ali Fouda Boiler explosion/Fire/Sink Human error/Unseaworthy
1994 Denmark 1 Falster Link 5,493 Unknown F-L Shipping Unknown Unknown
1994 Estonia 912 Estonia 21,794 157 1980 Jos L Meyer, Papenburg.Ge Estline Marine Co Too fast for conditions Human error/Unseaworthy
1995 Philippines 122 Viva Antipolo VII 108 33 1985 Local yard, Philippines Viva Antipolo Shipping Engine room fire Human error/Unseaworthy
1995 Philippines 54 Kimelody Cristy 492 63 1972 Kaanawa Dockyard, Japan Moreta Shipping Lines Galley fire/Overloaded Human error/Overloaded
1996 Indonesia 338 Gurita 196 Unknown yard, Indonesia Government of Indonesia Repairs incomplete Human error/Overloaded
1996 Greece 1 Pegasus 12,576 151 1975 Dubigeon- Normandie SA, F Epirotiki Lines Grounded at speed Human error/Poor lookout
1997 Greece 1 Ionian Bridge 12,000 142 1976 State Dockyard, Australia Strinzis Lines Propane gas leak explosio Human error/Negligence
1997 China 1 Guoron Unknown yard, China Dalian Marine Corp Hit anchored cargo ship Human error/Poor lookout
1998 Philippines 150 Princess of the Orient 13,614 196 1974 Kurushima Dock, Onishi,Jp Sulpicio Lines "Fortuitous event" Human error/Poor seamanship
1999 Sweden 1 Prinsesse Ragnhild 35,855 170 1981 Howaldtswerke Deusche We Color Line Engine room fire Human error/Negligence
1999 Philippines 4 Rosalia II 2,452 Unknown yard, Philippines Lapu-Lapu Shipping Lines Fire/panic Human error/Negligence
1999 China 8 Sea Star 4 1,026 Unknown Unknown Sunk in bad weather Human error/Unseaworthy
1999 China 3 Sheng Lu 8,264 1978 Unknown yard, China Yantai Ferry Co Ship caught fire and sank Human error/Negligence
1999 Greece 14 Superfast 3 28,800 194 1998 Kvaerner Masa Yards, Finla Attica Lines Fire on vehicle deck Human error/Negligence
1999 China 292 Dashun 9,843 126 1983 Naikai Shipbuilding, Japan Yanda Ferry Co Vehicle cargo unlashed Human error/Negligence
1999 Philippines 237 Asia South Korea 2,840  1972 Unknown yard, Japan Trans-Asia Shipping Lines Ran on rocks in storm Human error/Poor lookout
2000 Italy 13 Espresso Catania 14,398 150 1993 Fincantieri Palermo, Italy Adriatica di Navigazione Collision sank cargo ship Human error/Poor lookout
2000 Philippines 52 Our Lady of Mediatrix 202 Unknown yard, Japan. Daima Shipping Lines Bombs in luggage exploded Terrorism
2000 Kenya 1 Nyayo 568 1990 Unknown yard, Germany Kenya Government Collision dislodged anchor Human error/Poor lookout
2000 Indonesia 550 Cahaya Bahari 27 Unknown yard, Japan Unknown Stormy weather Human error/Overloaded
2000 UK 1 Fivla 230 30 1985 Ferguson Ailsa, UK Shetland Islands Council Bow visor fell on engineer Human error/Negligence
2000 Spain 6 Ciudad de Ceuta 5,460 101 1975 Astilleros Armon Gijon, Spain Transmediterranea Collision in "misty" weather Human error/Poor lookout
2000 Turkey 1 Gurgen 2 4,178 1966 Nuovi Cantieri Apuania, Italy Unknown Electrical short circuit Human error/Unseaworthy






2000 Canada 2 Spirit of Vancouver Island 18,747 1994 Allied Shipbuilders/Yarrows, C BC Ferries Launch turned in front of ferry Human error/Poor lookout
2000 Russia 13 Unknown Unknown yard, Russia Unknown Bus rolled off ferry Human error/Negligence
2000 Greece 82 Express Samina 4,555 115 1966 Ch. De l'Atlantique, France Minoan Flying Dolphins Officers not on bridge Human error/Negligence
2000 Ireland 1 Koningen Beatrix 31,910 162 1986 Van der Giessen de Noord, N Stena Line Man overboard Human error/Negligence
2000 Italy 1 Knossos Palace 37,000 2001 Fincantieri, Italy Minoan Flying Dolphins Crewman overboard Suicide/Accident
2000 Greece 1 Express Aphrodite 11,690 129 1977 Aalborg Vaerft,Denmark Minoan Flying Dolphins Mooring line in propeller Human error/Negligence
2001 China 36 Tonghui Unknown yard, China Unknown LNG truck cargo exploded Human error/Negligence
2002 Indonesia 3 Duta Banten Unknown yard, Indonesia PT ASDP Govt Co Crew ignored car roll back Human error/Negligence
2002 Philippines 45 Maria Carmela 680 55 Unknown yard, Japan? Montenegro Shipping Lines Fire on vehicle deck Human error/Unseaworthy
2002 Saudi Arabia 2 Al Salam 90 6,909 131 1971 Cant. Nav.del Tirreno, Italy Al Salam Maritime Transport Short circuit in baggage Human error/Negligence
2002 Russia 6 Sedelnikov Unknown yard, Russia Unknown Collision with barge Human error/Poor lookout
2002 Philippines 2 Tacloban Princess 3,079 1970 Fukuoka Shipbuiding, Japan Sulpicio Lines Air tank explosion/Fire Human error/Negligence
2002 Turkey 11 Unknown Unknown yard, Turkey Unknown Sank Human error/Unseaworthy
2002 Senegal 1,863 Le Joola 2,087 80 1990 Germersheim Schiffswerft Senegal Government Gross overloading Human error/Overloaded
2002 Azerbaijan 58 Mercury II 3,950 Unknown yard, USSR Caspian Shipping Co Cargo shift/Badly loaded Human error/Negligence
2003 Philippines 1 Filipina Princess 13,700 170 1973 Kanda Shipbuilding, Japan Sulpicio Lines Passenger murdered crew Murder
2003 China 4 Liaoludu 7 1,324 Unknown Unknown Pax died of hypothermia Human error/Unseaworthy
2003 Greece 1 Blue Star Paros 10,438 124 2002 Daewoo Shipbuilding, S.Korea Blue Star Lines Man overboard in rough sea Suicide/Accident
2003 Philippines 13 Superferry 12 11,914 173 1984 Kanda Shipbuilding, Japan WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz Collision with San Nicolas Human error/Poor lookout
2003 France 1 Danielle Casanova 41,447 176 2002 Fincantieri, Italy SNCM Berthing ship rammed Human error/Poor lookout
2003 Indonesia 50 Wimala Dharma Unknown yard, Indonesia Unknown Sank rapidly in calm seas Human error/Overloaded
2003 Zambia 18 Unknown Unknown yard, Zambia Unknown Boarding truck capsized ferry Human error/Unseaworthy
2003 Indonesia 3 Mandiri Nusantara 8,257 Unknown yard, Indonesia Prima Vista Collision with cargo ship Human error/Poor lookout
2004 Philippines 180 Superferry 14 10,181 156 1981 Hayashikane,Shimonoseki WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz Terrorism/ Abu Sayeff Human error/Negligence
2005 China 10 Unknown Unknown yard, China Unknown Sank soon after leaving berth Human error/Overloaded
2005 New Zealand 1 Santa Regina 14,588 137 1985 Ateliers et Chantiers du Havre Straits Shipping(Bluebridge) Collision with small boat Human error/Poor lookout
2005 Egypt 4 Pride of Al Salam 95 15,503 139 1972 IHC 'Gusto' Schiedam,Neth Al Salam Maritime Transport Rammed by cargo ship Human error/Poor lookout
2006 Egypt 1,026 Al Salam Boccaccio 98 11,779 131 1970 Italcantieri Monfalcone, Italy Al Salam Maritime Transport Fire broke out below deck Human error/Negligence
2006 Bangladesh 10 Unknown Unknown yard, Bangladesh Roads & Highways Department Vehicular river ferry sank Human error/Overloaded
2006 Canada 2 Queen of the North 8,889 125 1969 Weser Seebeck,Bremerhav BC Ferries Inadequate bridge management Human error/Negligence
2006 Philippines 29 Filipina Princess 13,705 170 1973 Kanda Shipbuilding, Japan Sulpicio Lines Lost control in storm Human error/Unseaworthy
2006 France 1 Paglia Orba 29,718 166 1994 ACH Construction Navale, Fr SNCM Car bumped overboard Human error/Negligence
2006 UK 3 Pride of Bilbao 37,500 177 1986 Wartsila Perno, Finland Irish Continental Group Collision with yacht ignored Human error/Poor lookout
2006 Vietnam 4 An Binh 100 Vinashin, Vietnam An Binh Ferry Co Loading error Human error/Negligence
2006 Japan 1 Unknown Unknown yard, Japan Unknown Towed ferry capsized in typhoon Human error/Unseaworthy
2006 Indonesia 39 Tristra 1 Unknown yard, Indonesia Unknown "Slammed by giant wave" Human error/Unseaworthy
2006 Indonesia 560 Senopati Nusantara 2,718 95 1969 Taguma Shipbuilding,Japan Prima Vista Bad weather/Storm Human error/Poor seamanship
2007 Canada 1 Quinsam 1,459 87 1982 Vancouver Shipyards, Canada BC Ferries Ferry departed/no warning Human error/Negligence
2007 Indonesia 52 Levina 1 1,800 1981 Unknown yard, Indonesia Praga Jaya Sentosa Truck fire below deck Human error/Negligence
2007 Philippines 3 Butuan Bay 3,864 115 1989 Iwagi Zosen, Japan Carlos A Gothong Lines Possible terrorism Human error/Negligence
2007 Philippines 100 Blue Water Princess 492 60 1969 Unknown yard, Philippines Sulpicio Lines Cargo shift in face of typhoon Human error/Overloaded
2007 Ireland 1 Dublin Viking 1997 Unknown Norfolk Line Mooring line snapped Human error/Negligence
2007 Turkey 1 Ankara 10,870 1983 Unknown yard, Turkey Denizciler Turizm Denizcilik Mooring line snapped Human error/Negligence
2007 Israel 2 Salamis Glory 10,392 151 1982 Uljanik Shipyard, Croatia Salamis Tours Holdings Collided with anchored ship Human error/Poor lookout
2007 Thailand 3 Jern Jern 20 Unknown yard, Thailand Jern Jern Co Cargo shift/Overloaded Human error/Overloaded
2008 Tanzania 37 Unknown Unknown yard Unknown Overloaded barge sank Human error/Overloaded
2008 Philippines 862 Princess of the Stars 23,842 193 1984 Ishikawajima-Harima,Aioi,Jp Sulpicio Lines Went to sea in typhoon Human error/Poor seamanship
2008 Turkey 21 Hayat-N Unknown yard, Turkey Marmara N Denizcilik Ferry Cargo shift Human error/Negligence





2008 Netherlands 1 Pride of Rotterdam 59,925 215 2000 Fincantieri, Italy P&O North Sea Ferries Suicide/Accident?? Suicide/Accident
2009 Malaysia 20 Ibn Battuta Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown
2009 Indonesia 5 Mandiri Nusantara 8,257 Unknown yard, Indonesia Prima Vista Engine room fire Human error/Negligence
2009 Tonga 78 Princess Ashika 690 51 1972 Shikoku Dockyard, Japan Shipping Corp of Polynesia Capsized/Sank swiftly Human error/Negligence
2009 Philippines 72 SuperFerry 9 7,269 142 1986 Usuki Tekkosho,Saiki, Japan WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz Vehicle shift on car deck Human error/Negligence
2009 Philippines 53 Baleno 9 199 1984 Unknown yard, Philippines Besta Shipping Lines Water through bow ramp Human error/Negligence
2010 UK 1 Scottish Viking 26,904 186 2009 Visentini di Visentini, Italy Scandlines Collision with fishing boat Human error/Poor lookout
2010 Italy 2 Moby Line Fincantieri, Italy Moby Lines Ship lurched from ramp Human error/Negligence
2011 Indonesia 33 Laut Teduh 2 75 Germany ROS Indopratama Cigarette on car deck Human error/Negligence
2011 Sweden 1 Silja Festival 33,818 168 1985 Wartsila Helsinki, Finland Tallink Group Drunk/Suicide? Suicide/Accident
2011 Philippines 1 Trisha Kerstin 380 45 Unknown yard, Philippines Aeson Shipping Lines Person overboard Suicide/Accident
2011 Egypt 22 Unknown Unknown yard, Egypt Unknown Bus rolled off deck Human error/Negligence
2011 Tanzania 2,976 Spice Islander 1 836 60 1967 Unknown yard, Greece Makame Hasnuu Engine failed/Overcrowded Human error/Overloaded
2011 Norway 2 Nordlys 11,204 122 1994 Volkswerft, Germany Troms Fylkes/Hurtgruten Engine room fire Human error/Panic
2011 Indonesia 8 Kirana IX Unknown yard, Indonesia Unknown Truck fire/Panic Human error/Negligence
2011 Albania 8 Ankara/Reina 1 10,870 127 1983 Stocznia Szczecinska, Pol Denizciler Turizm Denizcilik Ferry, cargo ship collided Human error/Poor lookout
2011 Jordan 1 Pella 10,675 148 1983 Unknown yard, Europe Arab Bridge Maritime Co Fire in luggage store Human error/Negligence
2011 Philippines 1 Superferry 3 9,857 1971 Hayashikane Dockyard,Japan WG&A, Superferry, Aboitiz Ferry rammed trawler Human error/Poor lookout
2012 China 12 Unknown Unknown yard, China Unknown Ferry sank Human error/Unseaworthy
2012 Indonesia 16 Bahuga Jaya Unknown yard, Indonesia Unknown Collision with gas tanker Human error/Poor lookout
2013 Canada 1 Quinsam 1,459 87 1982 Vancouver Shipyards BC Ferries Car drove off ramp Suicide/Accident
2013 Philippines 9 Lady of Mount Carmel 98 30 1980 Unknown yard, Japan Medallion Transport Engine failure.Weather Human error/Negligence
2013 Iran 12 Unknown Unknown yard, Iran Unknown Vehicle ferry capsized Human error/Overloaded
2013 Philippines 241 St Thomas of Aquinas 11,408 139 1973 Onomichi Dockyard,Japan 2GO, formerly Negros Navig Collision with cargo ship Human error/Poor lookout
2014 Indonesia 3 Munuwar Unknown yard, Indonesia Unknown Leaking,sank Human error/Overloaded
2014 Gambia 5 Banjul-Barra ferry Unknown yard, Europe Gambia Ports Authority Ship moved before loading Human error/Negligence
2014 South Korea 304 Sewol 6,825 105 1994 Hayashikane Dockyard,Japan Chonghaejin Marine Capsized in sharp turn Human error/Overloaded
2014 Philippines 8 Maharlika II Unknown yard, Philippines Unknown Engine failed in storm Human error/Unseaworthy
2014 Italy 32 Norman Atlantic 26,904 186 2009 Cantiere Navale Visentini, It ANEK Visenti Group Car deck fire Human error/Negligence
2015 Cape Verde 22 Vicente 3,100 57 1965 Brodosplit, Croatia. Tuninha Maritimo Sank in heavy weather Human error/Unseaworthy
2015 Myanmar 263 Aung Tagun 3 30 Unknown yard, Myanmar Unknown Overloaded unstable boat sank Human error/Overloaded
2015 Greece 1 Highspeed 5 4,900 85 2005 Austal, Australia Hellenic Seaways/MinoanFD Electrical fire Human error/Negligence
2015 Japan 1 Sunflower Daisetsu 11,401 190 2001 Ishikawajima Harima Ind, Jap MOL Ferry Co Truck fire on cargo deck Human error/Negligence
2015 Indonesia 20 Wihan Sejahtera 9,786 120 1985 Fukuoka Shipbuilding, Japan Trimitri Samudra, Surabaja Grounded, capsized, sank Human error/Unseaworthy
2016 Indonesia 35 Rafelia 2 999 65 1994 Sanuki Shipbuilding, Japan Darma Bahari Utawa Leaked, capsized in calm sea Human error/Unseaworthy
2016 Italy 3 Sansovino 10,977 123 1989 Fincantieri, Italy Siremar Crew gassed while tank cleaning Human error/Negligence
2016 Philippines 19 Starlite Atlantic 1,497 72 1975 Wakamatsu Shipbuilding,Jap Starlite Ferries Capsized and sank in typhoon Human error/Poor seamanship
2017 Indonesia 33 Mutiara Sentosa I 12,365 135 1988 Mitsubishi Jukogoyo, Japan Unknown Fire broke out on car deck Human error/Negligence
2017 Indonesia 4 Wiraglory 1658 94 2013 Unknown yard. Unknown Passenger went berserk Accident/Suicide
1966 Denmark 1 Skagerak 2,726 88 1965 Aalborg Vaerft,Denmark Kristiansands Dampskips Capsized, sank in heavy sea Human error/Poor seamanship
1968 New Zealand 51 Wahine 8,948 150 1966 Fairfields (Glasgow),UK Union S.S.Co. NZ Navigation error in bad storm Human error/Poor seamanship
1991 Denmark 1 Dronning Margrethe II 10,850 140 1973 Nakskov Skibsvaerft, Denmark DSB Rederi Collision Human error/Poor lookout
1993 Germany 55 Jan Heweliusz 3,015 126 1977 Trosvik Versted, Brevik. No Polish Ocean Lines Bad weather/Force 12 Human error/Unseaworthy
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All references cited are described in detail in the Bibliography. 
 
Since the mid-nineteenth century numerous enquiries and studies have 
looked into the reasons why maritime accidents continue to occur with such 
frequency and deadliness. In Britain, Samuel Plimsoll was the most noted and 
most successful of the early campaigners for improvements in maritime 
safety. 
 
Plimsoll‟s campaigns are well described in The Plimsoll Sensation, Jones, N. 
2006. Plimsoll, a product of the Enlightenment, in an effort to improve safety 
at sea, lobbied for controls on loading of ships. Thus the Load Line or Plimsoll 
Line was compulsorily introduced in Britain. It soon became universal and is 
still in use today. 
 
Thirty years later, the „Titanic‟ disaster was quickly followed by what was, until 
then, the most intensive legal inquiry into an accident, (Eaton, J. & Harris, C. 
1987). That led, ultimately, to the international Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
convention that specified minimum standards for life saving equipment that 
had to be carried by ships. SOLAS has been continually updated since and is 
effectively the foundation of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). 
 
These, obviously, were British initiatives, which is unsurprising as Britain was 
then the world‟s leading maritime nation. The British moves were soon 
followed in other developed countries in Europe, North America and 
Australasia. 
 
Compiling the data – the problem of excessive North Atlantic 
focus 
 
This is undoubtedly why so much of the literature, until very recently, has 
been British-centric or, at least, north Atlantic in focus. The result of that focus 
is that very little useful material has been produced to record and describe the 
many accidents and deaths that have occurred in the poor and hot tropical 
regions that are the major focus of this thesis. Very notably, SOLAS barely, if 
at all, applies in poorer countries. The excuse for this lack of application is that 
SOLAS only applies to international voyages. It does not apply to domestic 
voyages and IMO is loathe to: “interfere in the internal affairs of its sovereign 
member states” and, indeed, is legally precluded from doing so. 
 
Some useful directories of passenger vessel accidents have been compiled, 
mainly in the United Kingdom. They have been very much focused on the 
north Atlantic region although some of the major disasters in Asia are listed. 
Books such as Sea Disasters – The Truth Behind the Tragedies, by Keith 
Eastlake; A Dictionary of Passenger Ship Disasters, by David L Williams; 
Modern Shipping Disasters 1963-1987; and Maritime Casualties 1963-1996, 
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both by Norman Hooke, have provided useful information about most of the 
major disasters that have occurred until 1996. There have been no similar 
compendia published since and the lists presented on the Web, such as by 
Wikipedia, are far from comprehensive. However, Google has generally 
proved to be by far the best source of information about maritime and other 
transport disasters including road, rail and aviation. Google derived 
information has very effectively supplemented the directories mentioned 
above and the, often brief, news reports used by the author in compiling the 
Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database (Appendix A).  
 
The major commercial databases including the Lloyd‟s Casualty Reports, 
IUMI, and IHS Fairplay proved to be useful but are also far from 
comprehensive. They are restricted as to vessel size and, to a degree, 
geographically. The International Maritime Organization‟s GISIS database 
provided no information that was unattainable elsewhere. Indeed, it was 
disappointingly deficient overall. Similarly, a thorough search of all the many 
databases available through the University of Wollongong Library failed to 
uncover any additional data. The two most comprehensive and useful 
databases of passenger vessel accidents by far have proved to be the 
BMPVA database and that of the Worldwide Ferry Safety Association. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is very little general interest in developing 
country transport accidents evinced by the media and academia in developed 
countries. 
 
Interestingly, and very significantly, the prestigious Oxford Encyclopedia of 
Maritime History, (2007) comprising vignettes contributed by many of the 
world‟s leading academic maritime historians, fails to mention any fatal 
passenger vessel accidents beyond the Titanic and three Ro-Pax accidents 
that occurred in the North and Baltic seas in the nineteen-eighties and 
nineties. From reading it, you would think that the countries where 96 per cent 
of ferry fatalities occur never experience such accidents. It is a very 
disappointing publication in many respects. 
 
Cruise sector over-represented in literature 
 
Numerous „popular‟ books have been published that describe the dangers of 
cruise ship travel, for example, Mark Gaouette‟s Cruising for Trouble, and 
Brian Bruns‟ Cruise Confidential. However, as the author‟s BMPVA database 
makes clear, the reality is that cruise lines are very safe. The author, after 
completing and thoroughly analysing his database, significantly changed his 
mind about the dangers of cruising. Ferries are, and always have been, where 
the real dangers lie. At least 91% of passenger vessel accidents have 
involved ferries as have 95% of the resulting fatalities. Domestic voyages 
accounted for 93% of those ferry accidents. 
 
The cruise sector has been the subject of incomparably more literary efforts 
than has the ferry sector. Cruise ships tend to be larger and more glamorous 




There are, considering the number of fatalities involved, very few books 
available on the specific subject of fatal ferry accidents. The author has had to 
rely much more on press reports, press releases, inquiry reports and 
conference papers from which to compile both data and comment. They, too, 
have been disappointingly scarce, particularly until use of the Internet became 
widespread around the year 2000. Fortunately, the aviation, tanker and bulk 
shipping, railway and road traffic sectors have compiled considerable amounts 
of safety data and published widely on that basis. This has provided many 
useful comparisons and ideas that are applicable to the passenger vessel 
safety problem. The aviation industry and its IMO counterpart, ICAO have 
proved to be particularly useful sources of ideas and comparable data. 
 
It has become obvious, too, that some Marine Boards of Inquiry and similar 
tribunals are structured to search more for a scapegoat than for a cure that 
might prevent future similar accidents. As Joseph Conrad stated in his novel 
Lord Jim (1902), MBOIs are far more interested in “the how than the why” of 
accidents. In poorer countries they are unlikely to report at all and, when they 
do, rarely have an objective of prevention of future occurrences. In a rather 
„half-hearted‟ way, IMO claims to encourage member nations to enquire into 
and report on serious maritime accidents but most continue to fail to do so as 
a search of IMO‟s GISIS database reveals. 
 
Scarce and scapegoat seeking MBOI reports 
 
Even in developed countries evidence and “expert” witnesses seem to be 
more focused on technical than behavioural analysis. A blatant example of 
that was the inquiry into the Estonia sinking in 1994, Bjorkman (1998) and 
Eastlake (1998). Interestingly, Bjorkman‟s analytical abilities and objectivity 
have been found wanting following the capsize and sinking of the Al Salam 
Boccaccio 98 with which he was involved professionally. 
 
Transnational inquiries are inevitably subject to conflicts of interest in that it is 
easier to lay blame on foreigners than locals. Despite their many and obvious 
inadequacies, it is probably still preferable to have some form of inquiry 
whereby evidence is recorded and publicised than to not have them at all. 
Unfortunately, in the poorer, hotter regions where most of accidents described 
in this thesis occur, few inquiries are actually made. When they are, they tend 
to be perfunctory and rarely publicised or even adequately documented. 
 
There have, however, been examples of truly thorough inquiries that have 
been recorded in developed countries where all factors in an accident have 
been purely local. The outstanding example of that is the United Kingdom 
inquiry Marchioness/Bowbelle: Formal Investigation under the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995, Clarke (2001). It provides an excellent model for Marine 
Boards of Inquiry everywhere but, unfortunately, would be far too expensive to 
be feasible except in the richest countries. 
 
An exception to that general experience was the exceptionally thorough and 
very revealing Commission of Inquiry into the sinking of the Rabaul Queen. 
The report of that inquiry, which was commissioned by the Government of 
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Papua New Guinea, was concise, simply and clearly put and devastating to 
the culprits. At the time of writing, they were being tried for various crimes 
including manslaughter, corruption and negligence. 
 
The British inquiry into the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize and the South 
Korean inquiry into that of the Sewol were also impressively thorough, 
comprehensive, fair, informative and educational. 
 
Until the use of the Internet became widespread during the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, very few fatal marine accidents that occurred in less 
developed regions were even recorded in the outside world. Despite this, the 
Baird Maritime Passenger Vessel Accident database (Appendix A) shows that 
80% of the fatalities arising from those accidents occurred in just 10 countries 
and 90% in twenty countries. Sixty per cent of them occurred in just five 
countries! However, Marine Boards of Inquiry and their transcripts or reports 
describing such accidents have been extremely scarce. 
 
Hence, the BMPVA database (Appendix A) that provides the data and 
statistics upon which this thesis is based, contains details of far fewer 
accidents and their resulting fatalities (179) in the 35 years prior to 2000 than 
in the 15 years since (573). Indeed, by searching all the known databases 
available in books such as Great Ship Disasters, Bonner, C & K. 2003 and 
Maritime Casualties 1963 – 1996, Hooke, N. 1997; the Lloyd‟s List Casualty 
Reports;  and on the Internet such as www.maritimedata.com , 
www.ferrysafety.org , and www.eurotestmobility.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Chronology-FINAL.pdf, there still is a paucity of 
information about accidents in the less-developed regions of the world. The 
author estimates that ferry accidents and fatalities are under-reported by at 
least 33 per cent. 
 
This scarcity of accident data was remarked upon by Ralph Nader in his 
important and influential book Unsafe At Any Speed in the context of road 
accidents. That book was first published in 1965. As a result, in developed 
countries at least, there is now, if anything, a surfeit of road accident data. 
Boisson (1999) made similar comments about maritime accidents but they 
have, so far, failed to lead to the same improvements experienced with 
developed country road accident data. 
 
Disappointingly, the International Maritime Organisation‟s GISIS database of 
shipping accidents is compiled by the individual sovereign state members of 
IMO. Most of those, particularly those with the worst maritime safety records, 
have been particularly dilatory in their approach to that task. Indeed, for the 
purposes of this thesis, the GISIS database is practically useless. 
 
Careful statistical analysis of the data that does exist, however, has been very 
revealing. For example the disproportionate 32% of fatalities that have arisen 
from accidents involving Ro-Pax ferries revealed in the BMPVA data. That is a 
devastating reality that needs to be immediately addressed by IMO. 
Encouragingly and importantly, that same data highlights the significantly 
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better safety record of modern catamaran and trimaran ferries, except for 
bancas. 
 
Scarce pre-2000 data 
 
This, obviously, makes the compilation and analysis of statistics covering the 
period prior to 31 December 1999 comparatively difficult. International news 
agencies such as Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Reuters, the 
BBC, CNN, Bloomberg and similar possess good archives but often fail to 
record accidents in out-of-the-way places. They, too, presumably thanks to 
the Internet, have widened and improved their coverage more recently. Also, 
the fact that 90 per cent of fatalities have occurred in twenty countries enables 
the attempts at a cure to be more economically and practically confined to just 
those countries. For the purpose of effective reform, the more comprehensive 
and accurate data that has been compiled since 2000 is quite sufficient. 
 
As can be seen from Appendix A, the author‟s BMPVA database, many of the 
reports have been gleaned from many local newspapers in the places where 
accidents occurred as well as from the home-town media of tourist victims and 
a variety of web news sites. Something of a “jig-saw” process then ensues in 
an endeavour to verify the content of those reports. 
 
It is difficult to believe, therefore, that the frequency and deadliness of 
passenger vessel accidents has increased so dramatically since the year 
2000. It can only be concluded that their approximate seven-fold increase is 
due to better reporting facilitated by the widespread use of the Internet. This 
has also been enhanced by the development of “open access” databases 
although those, of course, need to be separately verified where possible. They 
are, in any case, far from comprehensive. This phenomenon has been 
commented on by Girija Shetter in an article in IHS-Fairplay on 1 December 
2015 under the heading “EU maritime casualty rise „due to improved 
reporting‟. 
 
Newspaper and magazine reports are equally in need of independent 
verification but that is often impossible. A reasonable judgement of the 
veracity of such reports can usually be made based on the reputation of the 
publication concerned and by comparing them with reports in competing 
outlets. Sometimes, though, there are no other options. The BMPVA database 
has been made available in its entirety to many people in the ferry industry 
who have expressed an interest in its content. None have suggested any 
corrections. 
 
The case studies presented in Chapter 3 have required in-depth research 
through reference to existing files of newspaper and Internet clippings; a 
number of printed databases; MBOI reports, where available; and, extensive 
Google searching. It was a most interesting and illuminating process that 
revealed some impressive surprises such as the report of the Commission of 




Given recent improvements in safety consciousness, enforcement, search 
and rescue services and survivability, it seems probable that rather than the 
frequency and deadliness of accidents increasing over the last 15 years, that 
they may have declined slightly. On the data available, that is probably so but 
it appears that because of inadequate reporting the frequency of fatal 
accidents prior to 31 December 1999 may have been considerably worse. 
 
Numerous pamphlets, monographs, essays and journal and magazine articles 
have been published on all aspects of the subject. Some, such as 
Hetherington (2006), Weng (2015) and Low (2006) are cited in the thesis. 
Those on behavioural and cultural causes have been constructive and, 
generally, more relevant than those on structural or mechanical causes. Some 
very constructive recent books by Boisson (1999), Grech (2015), Trafford 
(2009), Talley (2008), Chauvel (1997), Kletz (2007) and Whittingham (2004) 
have been very helpful on human factors in accidents. 
 
One of the most comprehensive, positive and useful government reports on 
the subject of human element factors in shipping accidents was published by 
the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency in 2010. It is The Human Element – 
A Guide to Human Behaviour in the Shipping Industry. 
 
The scarcity of doctoral and masters theses on the general subject was both 
notable and disappointing. A wide search of databases such as Google, 
SCOPUS, Research Gate, Science Direct, World Maritime University, Royal 
Institution of Naval Architects, Society of Naval Architects and Marine 
Engineers, Elsevier and the University of Wollongong Library generally failed 
to find anything of consequence under the various .key words. applicable to 
this thesis that has not been cited in it. 
 
Those works that were uncovered are appropriately cited. An exception was a 
series of papers produced by students and academics associated with the 
School of Naval Architecture at the University of Strathclyde in the early to 
mid-1990s. They mostly seemed prejudiced towards maintaining the status 
quo with respect to North European Ro-Pax ferries following the Estonia and 
similar preceding disasters. In this writer‟s opinion, many of those took an 
unprofessional approach that verged on the unethical. There was little to be 
found concerning accidents in developing countries. 
 
What has been discovered from this work, though, is that this project is very 
multidisciplinary. It incorporates aspects of psychology, sociology, economics, 
ergonomics, education, political science, law, naval architecture, meteorology, 
demographics, geography, and history. 
 
Badly behaved ship owners 
 
The behaviour of shipowners, some of whom have been responsible for 
numerous fatal accidents, has come under close scrutiny in newspaper 
articles such as Ferry disaster is 5th tragedy for Philippine firm 
www.inquirer.net, (2013). Indeed, the Go family, the subject of that article, has 
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seen more than 6,000 of its customers die in accidents that befell its ships 
over a twenty year period. 
 
Other owners such as the Carnival Corporation and Royal Caribbean Cruise 
Lines which, between them, control more than 60% of the world‟s cruise ship 
tonnage, have been the subject of numerous books that describe their many 
failings. Bruns (2008) and Butcher (2006) are typical examples of the genre. 
However, to be fair, those companies carry hundreds of thousands, if not 
millions, of passengers annually and, while some may be inconvenienced by 
accidents, very few have died. Of those, most deaths could be construed as 
self-inflicted due to drunkenness or suicide. More deaths have occurred 
among their crews than their passengers. Again, the main cause appears to 
be suicide. That is a separate subject. 
 
Useful literature on human factors 
 
Some very useful texts have been published recently on human factors in 
maritime accidents. Grech et al (2008) is a fine example as is Talley (2008). 
Reference to the aviation industry as a good model for improvement and 
benchmarking is made extensively in The Nautical Institute‟s Human 
Performance and Limitation for Mariners (2015).  
 
More recently, the Nautical Institute published Navigation Accidents and Their 
Causes which strongly supports the thesis that most maritime accidents are 
caused by human error. With its brief case studies or vignettes, it illustrates 
clearly how such accidents occur. More positively, the book makes numerous 
suggestions as to how such human errors might be avoided. 
 
While little has been published on fatal ferry accidents in developing countries 
generally, even less has been published on their human error causes. IMO 
has published some brief, un-researched statements of concern, or even 
alarm, and researchers such as Bhattacharya, Y. (2015) have looked at the 
difficulty in trying to instil a safety culture in Indian ships officers. Two studies 
of similar problems in Taiwan by Lu, C. S. et al are interesting but Taiwan 
could now hardly be described as „developing‟. 
 
Anne Ala-Pollanen, in 2014 in Helsinki, studied Cultural factors in maritime 
accidents, but her findings were more to do with gender acculturation than 
culture in the sense discussed here. Norwegian researchers Rumawax, V. 
and Ashjornslett, B. E., did refer to the specific problems of human error in 
ferry accidents in developing countries in their paper on Survivability of ships 
at sea. Their paper is, unfortunately, too dependent on mathematical 
modelling to be related to reality. Spouge, J. R. in his 1991 paper Passenger 
ferry safety in the Philippines came closest to the author‟s thesis. His 
comment: “However, the most important underlying cause of the (Philippine 
ferry) accident record is poverty and therefore the most effective solution is 
not naval architectural but lies in economic and political development”, was 
prescient, particularly almost thirty years ago. The problems of poverty 
induced malnutrition and its resulting fatalism and carelessness are, 
regrettably, still with us. So too are the fundamentally unsafe bancas and 
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elderly monohull Ro-Pax ferries that are still widely used in the Philippines, 
Indonesia and parts of Africa. 
 
The problems of poverty and the “failed state” have been widely canvassed. 
One positive report and commentary was written by Pryke (2017). It described 
the remarkable success of the Regional assistance Mission to the Solomon 
Islands. 
 
Apart from a handful of conference papers and monographs such as those by 
Golden (2014) and Ballantyne (2013), and various editorials and articles 
published by the author and Michael Grey MBE over the years, little has been 
presented describing the extent of the problem in developing countries. This 





The related problem of lack of local, national and international government 
action in poorer countries has been confirmed and well described by Boisson 
in his important and very useful Safety at Sea; Policies, Regulations & 
International Law  which explains well the inadequacies of the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO). He even makes some worthwhile suggestions 
as to how those inadequacies might be remedied . 
 
Poorer country governments generally have “bigger fish to fry” than to be able 
to worry about ferry safety. Without widespread pressure from outside, they 
are unlikely to respond to the problem unless their tourism industry is 
threatened. 
  
The excellent aviation model 
 
Comparisons with other passenger carrying sectors, particularly aviation and 
road transport (as described in Chapter 4) have made very interesting 
reading. The lack of positive action on the part of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) contrasts strikingly with the very effective and ongoing 
industry reform efforts of its United Nations sister body, the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and its European counterpart, the European 
Maritime Safety Authority (EMSA). While IMO states that it, “Cannot interfere 
in the internal affairs of sovereign member states”, ICAO does so actively and 
positively on the basis that “no country is left behind” in the matter of air 
safety. So too does EMSA. The web sites of the three bodies, www.imo.org, 
www.emsa.europa.eu  and www.icao.int, make for fascinating and very 
revealing reading. ICAO provides an excellent model as to how IMO could be 
reformed and so made significantly more effective. The IMO‟s GISIS accident 
database is disgracefully deficient. The reasons for that deficiency are even 
more disgraceful as the author‟s correspondence with IMO makes clear. 
 
The ICAO website offers a very extensive and comprehensive overview of 
how that organisation implements and encourages the adoption of 
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developments aimed at improving aviation safety. It also „names and shames‟, 
in a positive way, the countries where aviation safety is inadequate. 
 
Successful behavioural improvement campaign models 
 
Most developed countries have made very strenuous efforts to reduce the 
number of road accidents and the resulting fatalities that occur in their 
jurisdictions. Lengthy and costly public awareness campaigns have been 
combined with rigorous enforcement and stiff penalties in an endeavour to 
improve driver behaviour. These very successful campaigns are well 
described on most countries‟ road safety authority websites. Most contain 
numerous examples of activities that could well be adapted to passenger 
vessels. For example, the Australian state of Victoria has met with 
considerable success, see www.vicroads.vic.gov.au and 
www.towardszero.vic.gov.au. 
 
There have been similarly effective campaigns directed towards improving 
occupational health and safety in most developed countries. The literature 
generally disseminated as part of such campaigns is an excellent source of 
ideas. Some of the anti-smoking campaigns, too, have ideas that could well 
be transferred to passenger vessel safety campaigns. So also could the 
various „Learn to Swim‟ campaigns that have been conducted in Australia and 
elsewhere. Even IMO contributed very effectively to a global campaign to 
improve oil tanker safety. That, however, had environmental rather than 
human safety origins. 
 
The psychology profession has done extensive work on this aspect of public 
safety. It is very well described in Vera, E. M. et al. The Oxford Handbook of 
Prevention in Counseling Psychology. 
 
Starting with the ten worst performing countries 
 
Chapter five examines the ten worst performing countries in terms of ferry 
fatalities. While there are some signs of hope, little improvement has yet been 
achieved. Research into other causes of premature death in those countries 
offers some cause for optimism. 
 
A public health improvement campaign that was very effective in Bangladesh 
is well described in The Lancet  and in an Irin News report. It described the 
forty per cent improvement in Bagladeshi life expectancy that was achieved in 
the thirty years from 1980. It offers some hope in the form of techniques that 
could be adopted in the quest for improvements in ferry safety. Similarly, the 
success of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, 
described by Pryke (2017), offers hope for reform of so-called „failed states‟. 
 
Much the same applies to suggestions for reducing the frequency and 
deadliness of accidents in poorer countries. Other than the quite rational 
suggestion of „teach „em to swim‟ very few practical and affordable 
suggestions have been noticed. Perhaps the now widespread use of the 
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Internet will better highlight the deficiencies of some owners and operators 
and their national governments and, so, encourage better behaviour. 
 
Travel guides are media where more could be done to warn tourists of the 
dangers of ferry travel in certain countries. It has been interesting to compare 
and contrast the 2015 Lonely Planet Guide to the Philippines with the website 
www.tripadvisor.com and its advice to travellers in Tanzania. The Lonely 
Planet guide includes two warnings about the dangers of Philippine ferry 
travel while Trip Advisor totally ignores the very real dangers of Tanzanian 
ferries. It prefers to discuss the schedule reliability of various ferry services in 
that country. 
 
However, most developed country governments maintain websites offering 
travel warnings to those of their citizens who may be travelling overseas. 
Those of Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and the United States have 
been reviewed. The information proffered is all fairly similar and the warnings 
starker than those contained in most commercial travel guides. They uniformly 
contain warnings about marine travel in the countries where the majority of the 
passenger vessel fatalities have occurred. 
 
Similarly, local media could be persuaded to expose the dangers of ferry 
travel to their readers. Such public education could, if maintained 
permanently, have a significant effect in warning domestic travellers of the 
dangers of ferry travel. Media pressure has been effective in achieving 
reforms in developed countries. 
 
In Chapter 5, statistics drawn from the World Bank, OECD, UNODP, 
Transparency International, Infoplease, and other sources have been widely 
drawn on to provide the economic, geographic, cultural and behavioural 
backgrounds to the study of the five worst nations for passenger vessel 
fatalities. Maps provided by the University of Texas proved to be very useful in 
that regard. A number of papers published in academic journals have been 
useful in compiling Chapter 5. They cover ferry accidents in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia and Tanzania. They offer some locally compiled statistics as well as 
some well thought out ideas for improvements in marine safety. 
 
The all-important human factors 
 
Chapters 5, 7 and 8 inspired the perusal of the LinkedIn website to determine 
the availability of human factors or human error consultants or managers. It 
seems there are thousands of them. Every known airline and most railways, 
major mining and oil and gas companies as well as manufacturers and 
governments employ or, at least, consult them. As do the largest developed 
country cruise and ferry owning companies.  
 
The author has contacted many of them and has made contact with the 
Chartered Institute of Ergonomics & Human Factors (www.ergonomics.org.uk) 
, the CEO of which has been particularly helpful. Indeed, the author has 
produced a paper that was published in the Institute‟s monthly magazine. It 
has become obvious that much more extensive use of such experts should be 
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made by ferry operators and regulators. They have undeniably contributed 
much to improvements in aviation, road, rail and industrial safety. 
 
There are, of course, many books on human factors or human error of which 
some are mentioned above or listed in the bibliography and cited through the 
thesis. However, the existence of so many experts who are focused on the 
subject in their daily work proves that such expertise has been very beneficial 
to travel safety. Increasingly, there are manufacturers and suppliers of marine 
safety equipment who distribute brochures and press releases that offer ideas 
and solutions. The same applies to „Human Factors‟ consultants. Many 
government bodies also distribute press releases, brochures and pamphlets 
to encourage various aspects of safety consciousness. 
 
IMO, too, publishes considerably in an effort to encourage maritime safety but, 
alas, it rarely seems to be read or noticed by those who could most benefit 
from it. Its database of passenger vessel accidents (GISIS) is wholly 
inadequate, particularly with respect to those accidents occurring in 
developing countries. It also fails to take any obviously serious interest in the 
problem of domestic ferry safety in poorer countries. It falls back on the 
excuse that it is “unable to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign member 
nations”. Strictly legally, that claim is correct but given its published mandate, 
it is exceedingly disappointing that IMO has been unable to imagine ways in 
which it could work with its poorer member nations to assist them to improve 
the safety of their domestic ferries. 
 
No doubt more information will be uncovered as a result of further and more 
intensive reading but this is a broad overview of the literature examined over 
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